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This project seeks to show International Political Theorists that Cicero’s 
theoretical writings on politics are of continuing relevance to their research. I 
argue that this field of study would benefit a great deal in holding a conception 
of politics which is more personal than current frameworks presuppose and that 
his theoretical writings on politics provide an excellent basis upon which to 
investigate real-world problems in politics, whether domestic, international, or 
global. In building a conception of politics which is (partly) personal, the project 
begins with a review of some literature in International Political Theory and a 
few neighbouring fields related to exercising judgments in the world, before 
moving on in the second chapter to address the literature reviewed through 
Hannah Arendt’s theoretical writings on politics. Arendt’s writings allow for the 
development of several terms used in the first chapter which are touchstones of 
the civic republican tradition, such as tradition, authority, and persona, at the 
same time as preparing the way for a consideration of Cicero’s writings. The 
third chapter, as well as developing numerous arguments from the first two, 
provides an account of Cicero’s framework of civic virtues as he articulates them 
in the De Officiis, and the final chapter carries out the same task in relation to 
his theoretical framework of res publica as articulated in the De Re Publica.  
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A Note on Texts and Translations 
For the Latin texts of Cicero, I have used the Perseus Digital Library, available 
online at www.perseus.tufts.edu. For the English translations, I have used the 
editions of the texts listed in the bibliography, and where no editions are listed 
(for some of Cicero’s letters and speeches), the Perseus Digital Library. Any 
passages where I have departed from the translations to any extent are marked 
with an asterisk (*). Changes that have been made have been minimal and 
always with reference either to the Perseus Digital Library, my supervisor, or as 
was most often the case, both, and I take full responsibility for all these 
changes. I have frequently included the relevant Latin words either alongside 
the translations or replacing them, typically quoting them as they appear in the 
texts, e.g., nouns are often cited in oblique cases. The noun praeceptum (and 
its plural praecepta) I have chosen to translate as ‘watchword(s)’, rather than 
‘precept(s)’ or ‘maxim(s)’, because the meanings of the latter two carry some 
connotations from modern philosophy which I think are best bracketed in this 
project. By ‘watchword(s)’, I do not mean to connote any degree of sarcasm, 
frivolity, or irony, as might be picked up from terms such as ‘slogan(s)’, 
‘buzzword(s)’, or ‘mantra(s)’; I mean something along the lines of ‘guiding 
principle(s)’ or ‘word(s) worth watching’.  
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Whoever undertakes to set himself up as judge in the field of truth and 




…Thanne is it wysdom, as it thynketh me, 
To maken vertu of necessitee… 
Geoffrey Chaucer2
 
1 “Wer es unternimmt, auf dem Gebiete der Wahrheit und der Erkenntnis als Autorität aufzutreten, 
scheitert an dem Gelächter der Götter.” Albert Einstein, 1954. ‘Neun Aphorismen’. Essays 
presented to Leo Baeck on the occasion of his eightieth birthday. London: East and West. 
2 Jill Mann (ed.), 2005. Geoffrey Chaucer: The Canterbury Tales. London: Penguin. Cf. T. 




International Political Theory 
From the inception of International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline in 
the early twentieth century, its scholars have been studying and benefiting from 
texts in the history of political thought and in political theory or philosophy, but 
after the onset of the mid-century ‘behaviourist revolution’ in the social 
sciences, ethical or political analysis of international affairs came to be largely 
forsaken by IR scholars in favour of more rigoristic, scientific or systematic 
inquiry, whether of a positivist (or rationalist), constructivist or post-positivist 
(or reflectivist) persuasion.1 In the 1970s and 1980s, a sub-field appeared in the 
discipline which was usually referred to as normative IR theory or international 
ethics, comprising IR scholars who re-discovered or continued to study and 
benefit from the history of political thought and political theory or philosophy, 
and from the 1980s onwards, it came to be referred to more frequently as 
International Political Theory (IPT).2 
This briefest of stories about academic beginnings, developments, fruitions, 
abscissions, and new beginnings could be told in countless ways—as Chris Brown 
says, the relationship between the fields of study mentioned here remains 
“complex and troubled”—and my reason for telling the one I have told is to 
prefigure for the reader some of the blurring of disciplinary boundaries and 
mingling of different scholarly idioms in this project.3 
The editors of the recently published Oxford Handbook describe IPT as focusing: 
 
1 ‘Constructivism’ is a term imported to IR from social theory, itself influenced by the ‘behaviourist 
revolution’ in the social sciences. Broadly speaking, it refers to a meta-theoretical position that 
reality is socially constructed, and although sometimes taking positivist (or rationalist) and 
sometimes post-positivist (or reflectivist) forms, is often construed within IR as offering a ‘middle 
way’ between the two ‘sides’. See for example: John R. Searle, 1995. The Construction of 
Social Reality. London: Penguin; Emanuel Adler, 1997. ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: 
Constructivism in World Politics’. European Journal of International Relations 3(3). pp.319–363. 
On the nimiety of -isms at the meta-theoretical level in IR, see for example: Colin Wight, 2013. 
‘Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations’. Carlsnaes et al. (eds.), Handbook of 
International Relations. Ch.2. 
2 Chris Brown, 2017. ‘Political Thought, International Relations theory and International Political 
Theory: An Interpretation’. International Relations 31(3). pp.227–240. 
3 Brown, Political Thought, IR theory and IPT. p.227. 
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“…on the point where two fields of study meet—International 
Relations and Political Theory. It takes from the former a central 
concern with the ‘international’ broadly defined; from the latter it 
takes a broadly normative identity … A central proposition of IPT is 
that the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ cannot be treated as self-
contained spheres, although this does not preclude states and the 
state system from being regarded by some practitioners of IPT as 
central points of reference.”4 
It seems to me that this nicely puts the purview of IPT, although I would wish to 
add to it that it could involve for its scholars “the interpretation of [not only] 
historical, canonical, and contemporary texts on international politics and 
international law”, but also historical, canonical and contemporary texts in the 
humanities more generally.5 Although the Handbook’s blurb calls IPT a discourse, 
the editors in the Introduction move from calling it a field of study to calling it a 
discipline, one which has emerged after “the collapse of the notion of a self-
contained discipline of International Relations as a result of the challenges of 
constructivism, critical theory, feminist and gender theory, green political 
theory and post-structuralism in all its forms.”6 While the organisation of the 
Academy into disciplines seems to be not only necessary but positively 
beneficial—disciplines are established bodies of specialised knowledge peopled 
by recognised experts in that knowledge who can judge the quality and 
reliability of new research, as well as important sites for integrating individual 
pieces of research into larger frameworks which transcend the achievements of 
the individual researcher—there is always the risk of a given discipline becoming 
too narrow, too discrete, too restrictive, turning in on itself and rendering the 
specialised knowledge it produces insufficient for addressing the complex issues 
and problems we face in the real world.7 The real world, in fact, is a central 
concern of the editors of the Handbook and it frames one of the questions they 
ask of all its contributors: 
 
4 Chris Brown and Robyn Eckerlsey (eds.), 2018. The Oxford Handbook of International Political 
Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.3. 
5 Brown and Eckersley, Oxford Handbook of IPT. p.5 
6 Brown and Eckersley. Oxford Handbook of IPT. pp.3–4. Cf. Clifford Geertz, 1980. ‘Blurred 
Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought.’ The American Scholar 49(2). pp.165–179. 
7 On the benefits of disciplinarity, see for example Jerry A. Jacobs, 2014. In Defense of Disciplines: 
Interdisciplinarity and Specialization in the Research University. University of Chicago Press; 
John Aldrich, 2014. Interdisciplinarity: its Role in a Discipline-based Academy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
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“…how does IPT connect with real-world politics? In particular, how 
does it engage with real-world problems, and position itself in relation 
to the practices of real-world politics?”8 
A real-world problem identified by field philosopher Robert Frodeman is that the 
assumptions upon which the Academy’s disciplinary structure were built in the 
nineteenth century are breaking down under current social and technological 
conditions, which in part has led to knowledge-production itself developing in 
spheres outside of, and thereby presenting a challenge to, the Academy.9 “Faced 
with a super abundance of knowledge in every subfield [“epistemorrhea”]” 
within the Academy, he argues, “we divide and divide again, while the problems 
we face are increasingly integrative in nature”.10 Frodeman turns to notions of 
inter-, trans- and de-disciplinarity in approaching this problem, and frames his 
overall argument in terms of an ecology of knowledge, but behind all of these 
terms of art is his recognition and understanding that the Academy did once 
have an integrative approach, one that came to be called from around the 
nineteenth century onwards ‘the humanities’.11 In our deeply technological age, 
he argues, “philosophy and the humanities have never been so necessary to our 
personal and public lives. But at this very moment the humanities have never 
been so marginalized.”12 I regard this project as a contribution towards 
promoting the humanities within IPT and bringing them in from the margins to 
our personal and public lives, holding a deep conviction that IP theorists would 
benefit a great deal in terms of handling real-world politics and real-world 
problems were they to be reading more widely—and still relevantly—in the 
humanities.   
The general problem it seems to me was understood and raised by Michael 
Walzer in his postscript to the fifth edition of his Just and Unjust Wars, in which 
 
8 Brown and Eckersley, Oxford Handbook of IPT. p.4. 
9 Robert Frodeman, 2014. Sustainable Knowledge: A Theory of Interdisciplinarity. New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
10 Frodeman, Sustainable Knowledge. pp.2 and 5. 
11 Julie Thompson Klein and Robert Frodeman, 2017. ‘Interdisciplining Humanities: A Historical 
Overview.’ Robert Frodeman (ed.), 2017. The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity. Second 
Edition. Oxford University Press. See also Frodeman’s excellent introduction to this Handbook, 
as well as: Harvey J. Graff, 2015. Undisciplining Knowledge: Interdisciplinarity in the Twentieth 
Century. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press; Joe Moran, 2010. Interdisciplinarity: The 
New Critical Idiom. New York: Routledge. 
12 Frodeman, Sustainable Knowledge. p.6. Emphasis added. 
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he appraises the “minor academic industry” that is just war theory for which he 
bears “some small responsibility”: 
“What was the [just war] theorist reading before she began writing? … 
Before I wrote Just and Unjust Wars, I read some key texts in Catholic 
moral theology and early international law—Augustine, Aquinas, and 
Vitoria; Grotius and Pufendorf, and a few others. I read a handful of 
nineteenth and twentieth century legal textbooks and a couple of 
contemporary theorists, like Paul Ramsey … But the greater part by 
far of my reading was … in military history, both academic and 
popular, and then in the memoir literature produced by soldiers of 
different ranks … and then in wartime journalism and commentary … 
Finally, I read many of the novels and poems that deal with the 
experience of fighting and the company of soldiers … I sense that 
many [just war theorists] are not reading the way I did. They are 
preoccupied with the academic literature about moral philosophy and 
about just war theory … they are reading each other … [and] after 
reading each other, these theorists argue with each other …”13 
Walzer recognises that reading each other and arguing with each other is a 
common academic practice, but he says that it has always seemed to him to be 
problematic, especially when the subject is politics and war.14 It involves a 
turning away from the real world. His own reading in a sense involved such a 
turning away as well, but in another sense, it did not: Walzer was reading not 
only what scholars had thought about and wrote upon his subject in the past 
(and only occasionally in the present); he was also reading of real-world human 
experiences in it, whether articulated in poetry or prose. As such, I think it is 
fair to say that Walzer’s studies were humanistic to an extent prior to writing his 
Just and Unjust Wars which has not been reached by many in the ‘minor 
academic industry’ it touched off. There is no doubt many reasons as to why this 
has been the case, but I suspect one of the big ones has been the research norms 
of disciplines. As mentioned above, there seem to be good reasons as to why 
these norms are in place, but I nevertheless think that there is a strong case for 
IPT to make sure that it does not become too disciplinary, to continue to allow 
classics like Just and Unjust Wars to be written, and to the great credit of the 
editors of the Handbook, they refer to IPT far more often in their Introduction 
 
13 Michael Walzer, 2015. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Fifth 
Edition. New York: Basic. p.336. 
14 Cf. Michael Walzer, 2007. ‘A Critique of Philosophical Conversation’. David Miller (ed.), 2007. 
Thinking Politically: Michael Walzer, Essays in Political Theory. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. Ch.2 
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simply as a field of study. And as evidenced in its publication, IPT has now 
established itself as a recognised field of study, associated with various outlets 
in the Academy where its conversations are taking place, such as in Ethics and 
International Affairs, Review of International Studies, and the Journal of 
International Political Theory. The editors of the latter I think provide us with 
an informative account of the field in general when they describe their journal’s 
raison d’être as: 
“ … an interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed forum to explore international 
and global politics from a range of theoretical and philosophical 
perspectives. The journal welcomes approaches that are historical, 
analytical, comparative and normative, and it provides a common 
venue for scholars across the social sciences and humanities seeking 
to advance a new generation of thinking on the breadth of interests 
concerning international political theory.”15 
With these summaries as articulated by the editors of both the Oxford Handbook 
and the journal dedicated to the field, I feel comfortable that my project falls 
within the purview of IPT and that the reader will understand it as doing so. One 
of my aims in it is to broaden researchers’ interests in the field by bringing into 
it some themes from the humanities which are already being addressed in 
neighbouring fields such as the history of political thought, political theory, 
comparative political theory, political philosophy, and (slightly further afield) 
the classics—themes relevant to exercising judgments in the world such as 
rhetoric and ‘virtue ethics’—but which I think have yet to be given due 
consideration by IP theorists.  
Civic Republicanism in IPT and Exercising Judgments in the World 
With the publication of his The Republican Legacy in International Thought in 
1998, constructivist IR theorist Nicholas Onuf brought the civic republican 
tradition to the attention of the field of international studies in general and to 
the discipline of IR in particular.16 There appeared, however, to be insufficient 
engagement with Onuf’s text by scholars in the discipline such that Emanuel 
 
15 Journal of International Political Theory, 2020. Available online: https://journals-sagepub-
com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/home/ipt Accessed 29th October 2020. 
16 Nicholas Onuf, 1998. The Republican Legacy in International Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
17 
Adler, in his chapter on constructivism in the second edition of the Sage 
Handbook of International Relations in 2013, felt it necessary to remind them 
that it was still there as a rich resource for developing their research.17 Onuf 
argues in his text that many IR scholars concern themselves with several of the 
tradition’s pieces but “rarely see a connection [in their research] to a republican 
past because they do not look for it, and they rarely see how the pieces might 
once have fit together.”18 Writers in the civic republican tradition such as 
Machiavelli, Grotius, Hobbes and Kant are read “in a context that defines 
international thought as a contest between realism and liberalism”, skewed 
accordingly, and important continuities and discontinuities between this 
ostensibly disparate bunch missed.19 Onuf carries out an impressive and wide-
ranging job in connecting the civic republican tradition to IR theory. Near the 
beginning of the text, he writes on the undeniably humanistic theme that we (in 
this case, scholars of International Law and IR) tell “stories about ourselves”, 
before going on to distinguish between ‘Atlantic’ and ‘Continental’ versions of 
republicanism in the modern age and connecting them to themes in IR such as 
meta-theory, levels of analysis, construction projects, and “realism and the 
quest for rigor”.20 Although I am unsure as to why Hannah Arendt’s writings did 
not find their way into Onuf’s project, his focus is still very much upon the civic 
republican tradition in the modern age (he touches only very briefly on the 
tradition’s ancient forebears) and connecting it with the research that was going 
on in the late 1990s in IR. As such, although there are a great many points of 
 
17 Emanuel Adler, 2013. ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions and 
Debates’. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), 2013. The Handbook 
of International Relations. Second Edition. London: Sage. p.134. 
18 Onuf, The Republican Legacy. p.3. 
19 There is already a chorus making the call for greater attention to be paid to the history of political 
thought in IR and IPT, to which I gladly add my voice; there is no need here for me to write the 
score. See, for example: William Bain and Terry Nardin, 2017. ‘International relations and 
intellectual history’. International Relations 31(3). pp. 213–226; Duncan A. Bell, 2001. 
‘International relations: the dawn of a historiographical turn?’ British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 3(1). pp.115–126; David Boucher, 2018. ‘History of International 
Thought: Text and Context’. Brown and Eckersley (eds.), Oxford Handbook of IPT. pp.21–34; 
Ian Hall, 2017. ‘The history of international thought and International Relations theory: from 
context to interpretation.’ International Relations 31(3). pp.241–260; Edward Keene, 2017. 
‘International intellectual history and International Relations: contexts, canons and mediocrities’. 
International Relations 31(3). pp.341–356. 
20 Onuf, The Republican Legacy. 
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agreement between my project and The Republican Legacy in International 
Thought, I do not engage with or develop any of Onuf’s arguments therein.      
In the Oxford Handbook of IPT, Steven Slaughter’s chapter, ‘Republicanism and 
International Political Theory’, comes under Part VIII of the text, entitled New 
Directions in International Political Theory.21 Slaughter provides an overview of 
contemporary republican political theory, using Philip Pettit’s ‘neo-Roman’ 
version and its conception of non-domination as a framework for considering 
republicanism as it has been applied in IR and IPT to date. He identifies from 
Pettit’s account four elements of republican practice: the development of a 
constitutional state which exercises power and establishes non-domination 
through the rule of law; practices of (non-direct) democracy as a crucial process 
which develops a sense of political responsibility; an active conception of 
citizenship manifest in an enduring culture of patriotism and civic virtue; and a 
context of international law which protects republican states from being 
dominated by other states. 
Slaughter’s account of republican theory in IR/IPT begins with Daniel Deudney 
who, echoing Onuf’s claim about realism and liberalism by calling them 
‘incomplete fragments’, as well as Quentin Skinner’s claim that important 
elements of the civic republican tradition ‘slipped from sight’ in the nineteenth 
century, argues that the twin concerns of liberty and security in the 
international context are handled by states delegating power to international 
institutions. Slaughter moves on to consider more cosmopolitan strains of 
republican theory in IR, beginning with the work of Jose Luis Marti, who draws 
upon the notion of a civitas maxima (first propounded in 1749 by Christian Wolff 
who was writing upon the ius gentium using the scientific method) as that which 
should be developed in our age of globalisation, and he follows this up with a 
consideration of the work of James Bohman, who argues for a more fluid and 
global conception of citizenship. From these ‘communitarian’ and 
‘cosmopolitan’ versions of republican theory, Slaughter goes on to consider the 
‘Frankfurt-style’ or critical republicanism of Cécile Laborde, which seeks to 
 
21 As I hope will become clearer to the reader as my project proceeds, all chapters of the Handbook 
under the heading of New Directions in IPT (in summary, their topics are (i) judgment, (ii) 
virtues, (iii) emotions, (iv) recognition (a.k.a. honour) and (v) republicanism) are certainly new 
directions in the field, but not new in the sense of being unprecedented. 
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identify the dominating or oppressive features of existing institutions and 
relationships, and having identified them, advocate their transformation.   
Although Slaughter acknowledges that “republicanism requires … significant 
changes in the way people perceive democracy, authority and political 
responsibility”, in using the contemporary republican theory of Pettit and his 
conception of non-domination as a base upon which to consider civic republican 
IPT scholarship, he also argues that “republicanism’s focus on power and liberty 
makes a distinctive and important contribution to IPT” which, although I think 
certainly true as far as it goes, omits the civic republican tradition’s equally 
strong focus upon authority as that quality which mediates between power and 
liberty.22 It is one of my aims in this project to enrich IPT’s understanding of this 
through the writings of Arendt and Cicero. As with Onuf’s text, Arendt is absent 
from Slaughter’s overview of republicanism and IPT and he touches only very 
briefly upon the civic republican tradition’s ancient forebears. 
Slaughter rightly contends in his chapter, however, that the institutional and 
constitutional aspects of civic republican theories need to be complemented 
with a greater focus upon citizens, but he also construes this as “a civic account 
that sees citizens as being active political actors who work through and beyond 
the state as activists who seek to realize non-domination”, bringing to bear in 
the world “types of political activity [which] have a capacity to transcend the 
republican state”.23 He draws at this point on James Tully’s conception of 
‘diverse citizenship’ and Stuart White’s conception of ‘transnational republican 
solidarity’ in moving closer to arguments about civil society (whether domestic 
or global) which many scholars would still probably take to be more ‘liberal’ 
than ‘republican’, and he also brings Onuf’s republican arguments to bear in 
support of this move, who argues that republicans call for both “local civic 
activism and a cosmopolitan view of the human condition”.24 
 
22 Slaughter, Republicanism and International Political Theory. pp.626 and 636. I do not mean to 
say here (quite the contrary) that either Slaughter or Pettit are dismissive of the importance of 
authority in the civic republican tradition. 
23 Slaughter, Republicanism and International Political Theory. p.632–633. 
24 Slaughter, Republicanism and International Political Theory. pp.632–633. 
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 In this project, I develop all the themes I have highlighted here from Slaughter’s 
Handbook chapter, but I have chosen not to do so through an engagement and 
development of the arguments made by contemporary republican political 
theorists or IP theorists—not because I think these arguments are wrong (as with 
Onuf’s text, the reader will find a great many points of agreement between 
what I write in this project and what has been written by republican political 
and IP theorists), but in the spirit of Walzer’s approach as set out above and also 
for the following two reasons. First, I find that many of the themes highlighted 
by Slaughter are being addressed by a wider group of scholars, both in IPT and in 
neighbouring fields, than just those who are concentrating on the development, 
and speaking the language, of the neo-Roman republican accounts provided by 
Pettit, Skinner, et al., or indeed any of the other versions of contemporary 
republican political theory. Many in this wider group of scholars are looking not 
only to political theory but to political philosophy and the history of political 
thought as well, and although some of them would no doubt baulk at labelling 
their own research as ‘civic republican’, they are nevertheless drawing upon the 
writings of thinkers who either stand (however strangely) in the civic republican 
tradition (such as Kant), or who fix their focus only upon what Onuf called one of 
the tradition’s pieces. In the first chapter of my project, I engage with some of 
the writings of this wider group of scholars in the hope of showing IPT, including 
its republican political theorists, that what we call ‘civic republicanism’ is much 
more than a mere theory battling against theories of ‘liberalism’. As Onuf 
recognised, it is better described as a tradition, and it seems to me that it 
overlaps with ‘liberalism’ understood as a tradition in interesting ways. 
The second reason I have chosen not to engage with fellow republican political 
theorists in IPT has to do with the main theme of my project, exercising 
judgments in the world, which I shall try to explain first. By ‘main theme’, I 
mean to say that it is an understanding which recurs throughout and pervades 
my project. Exercising judgments in the world I am almost tempted to say is a 
civic republican principle, even as I have never seen it articulated as such; it 
seems to me to be what citizens are doing in republics, as it is what human 
beings are simply doing. The issue of judgment has long been handled in IPT, 
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mainly through the works of Chris Brown.25 In the Oxford Handbook, it is given a 
conceptual treatment by Friedrich Kratochwil.26 And it is also being considered 
extensively by political theorists (literature which I think will also be of great 
benefit to IP theorists who take up this new direction).27 Arendt, of course, 
famously argued that she could not see a faculty of judgment operating in Adolf 
Eichmann, nor even a faculty of thought, and this led her to think deeply about 
our faculties of thinking, willing and judging, or what she called ‘the life of the 
mind’.28 There has been some very interesting work carried out on her theory of 
judging, even as she never got to write that planned third volume of The Life of 
the Mind: Judging.29 But my concern in this project is not with theorising or 
conceptualising judgment or judging, so I do not engage here in any kind of 
depth with this aspect of Arendt’s writings, nor with any other scholarship on 
judgment or judging understood as concepts. Arendt did recognise, however, 
that closely related to our faculties of thinking, willing, and judging, howsoever 
they might be understood or theorised, is our status as persons. She was terribly 
concerned that we maintain personal responsibility in the world for our actions, 
howsoever our thinking, willing and judging feed into those actions. That we are 
persons is a fundament of my argument and I regard our status as persons as 
being very closely connected both to the civic republican tradition and to 
exercising judgments in the world. That we are persons is of course recognised, 
appreciated, and understood by contemporary republican political theorists such 
as Skinner and Pettit, but here I have exercised my own judgment that, although 
the scholarship of Skinner, Pettit, and other republican theorists is excellent, it 
would nevertheless be a good use of my time not to take off from or develop 
their own arguments, but instead to ‘drill down’ on those of Arendt’s and 
Cicero’s regarding this matter. Whether my judgment in this has been correct, 
 
25 See for example: Chris Brown, 2010. Practical Judgment in International Political Theory: 
Selected Essays. London: Routledge. 
26 Kratochwil has theorised not only judgment but also praxis: Friedrich Kratochwil, 2018a. 
‘Judgment: A Conceptual Sketch’. Oxford Handbook of IPT. pp.575–586; Friedrich Kratochwil, 
2018b. Praxis: on Acting and Knowing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
27 See for example the works of Linda M.G. Zerilli and Alessandro Ferrara. A good account of the 
limitations of theorising judgment can be found in this book review: Leslie Paul Thiele, 2000. 
‘Common Sense, Judgment, and the Limits of Political Theory’. Political Theory 28(4). pp.565–
588. 
28 BPF; EJ; RJ; LKPP; LM1. 
29 See for instance: Ronald Beiner and Jennifer Nedelsky (eds.), 2001. Judgment, Imagination and 
Politics: Themes from Kant and Arendt. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. 
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or right, or appropriate, or not, is for others to decide. Cicero has no theory of 
thinking, willing, or judging to offer us, but he does have much to say about 
personae and politics, and my focus in this project is upon his theoretical 
writings on politics and their continuing relevance to IPT. I understand exercising 
judgments in the world to be something that we all simply do, whether we do it 
as scholars, as citizens, or simply as human beings. And the research question to 
which I am responding in this project is: What can Cicero’s theoretical writings 
on politics contribute to arguments in IPT related to exercising judgments in the 
world?  
Hannah Arendt30 
As both its title and my research question indicate, the focus of my project is on 
Cicero’s theoretical writings on politics. Why, then, bring Arendt’s writings into 
it? Briefly stated, Arendt’s writings perform a double function in my argument: 
they help in clearing the ground after the first chapter and in preparing the 
reader for the next two. In terms of ground-clearing, she helps us side-line many 
of the arguments in the first chapter that rely in one way or another upon the 
modern phenomenon that is philosophy of history, and she also helps in 
clarifying the meanings of some key terms in my project which are used in that 
chapter but are insufficiently developed therein, such as tradition, authority, 
and persona.31 In terms of preparing the reader for a consideration of Cicero’s 
theoretical writings on politics, Arendt—one of quite a few political theorists in 
the twentieth century who sought in one way or another to inject ancient 
political thought into modern—provides us with an extensive account of civic 
republican principles, one which helps fill out what was discussed of them in the 
first chapter at the same time as it feeds into what is discussed of them in the 
subsequent two chapters. 
It is certainly futile trying to extract any doctrines from Arendt’s writings, who 
said “I have no political philosophy that could sum up with an ism … After all, 
 
30 Trusting that the reader knows both figures well enough, I have forgone providing biographies of 
both Arendt and Cicero in this project. For an excellent one of Arendt’s, see Elisabeth Young-
Bruehl, 1982. Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
31 Such terms are, of course, considered and developed elsewhere in political theory and IPT, but I 
have judged it best for our purposes to address them through Arendt’s writings. 
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moi je me sers où je peux. I take whatever I can and whatever suits me.”32 She 
takes from the German philosophy in which she was trained whatever she can 
and whatever suits her, and as we shall see, this is something like Cicero’s 
general approach to philosophy as well; an approach which is often disparagingly 
labelled ‘eclectic’ in a certain tradition of German idealism.33 Like Cicero, 
Arendt’s fundamental intentions in writing political theory, I believe, were to 
provide her readers not with doctrines or anything of the sort, but with ‘food for 
thought’; thoughts that would guide one, first, into a study of the past, a 
remembrance, and consequently, to a deep concern for the world—the only 
place where human beings may have opportunities not only for acting but for 
thinking, willing, and judging as well—in the present and future. She is well 
known for using the image of Penelope’s web in relation to thinking—“it undoes 
every morning what it has finished the night before”—and she makes a point of 
relegating Plato to a footnote on this point.34 In the Phaedo, he also had 
mentioned Penelope’s web in relation to thinking, but in the opposite sense: 
once free of the body’s pleasures and pains, the soul (the ‘mind’) of the 
philosopher will not act like Penelope undoing her own weaving; he or she will 
have ‘seen the light’, will have finished weaving the burial shroud. Perhaps less 
well known and not mentioned by Arendt is that Cicero—in philosophy, an 
Academic sceptic—also used the image of Penelope’s web in his Academica 
against the dogmatic arguments of the Stoics.35 “Every thought is an after-
thought”, Arendt says, I think not unlike how every statement of the Academic 
Sceptics comes after the truth-claims (doctrines) of dogmatists like the Stoics or 
the Epicureans.36 As we shall see shortly, the sceptics are the ‘Penelopes’ of 
Hellenistic philosophical discourse, offering no ‘positive’ arguments, no 
doctrines, themselves. It is beyond the scope of my project to investigate the 
similarities between Arendt’s arguments about ‘thinking’ and the projects of the 
Academic sceptics; I point out the connection here merely to underscore for the 
 
32 TWB. p.498. 
33 J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long (eds.), 1988. The Question of ‘Eclecticism’: Studies in Later Greek 
Philosophy. London: University of California Press. This is an excellent collection of essays, and 
I would draw the reader’s attention especially to the first chapter, which provides a conceptual 
history of ‘eclecticism’, and the last two chapters, which investigate the eclectic range of 
sources that have went into our conceptions of the will and the imagination. 
34 LM1. pp.88 and 225. 
35 Acad. 2.95. 
36 LM1. p.87. 
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reader the kind of intellectual approach in which neither she nor Cicero ‘have a 
political philosophy that could sum up with an -ism’, and to prefigure numerous 
other similarities we shall see between them in what follows.37 
Marcus Tullius Cicero38 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BCE–43 BCE), statesman, orator, writer, thinker, and 
advocate of the Roman republic in its final stages, is perhaps best known in the 
broad field of international studies for saying ‘silent enim leges inter arma’. 
Often translated as ‘in time of war, the law is silent’, and then misinterpreted 
by some realists in the field as licence for an ‘anything goes’ approach to 
warfare, Cicero in fact articulated these words not as a thesis, and not in 
relation to war (bellum), but as part of a speech in a court of law, in defence of 
a Roman citizen, and in relation to the conduct of persons in a domestic 
context, upholding the moral right of self-defence during a time when mob 
violence was becoming increasingly common at Rome. Here is some more of the 
relevant passage: 
“…There exists a law [lex], judges, not written but born with us—
which we have not learnt or received or read, but which we have 
taken and sucked in and imbibed from nature herself; a law which we 
were not taught but to which we were made, which we were not 
trained in, but which is ingrained in us—namely, that if our life be in 
danger from plots, or from open violence, or from the weapons of 
robbers or enemies, every means of securing our safety is morally 
right [honesta]. For laws are silent when arms are raised [silent enim 
 
37 The ancient Greek term whose meaning is closest to the English phrase ‘school of thought’—a 
central idea or founding figure of which we often suffix today with an ‘-ism’ to mark it out, such 
as realism, liberalism, or Marxism—is not scholē but hairesis, a noun which took on a range of 
meanings across a thousand years or so of being used in the Greek language, and which was 
formed originally from the verb hairéō: to take, grasp or seize. The Latin equivalents of hairesis 
are usually secta or disciplina. Cf. David T. Runia, 1999. ‘Philo of Alexandria and the Greek 
Hairesis-Model’. Vigilae Christianae 53(2). pp.117–147. As regards the sceptics, Jacques 
Brunschwig puts the point well: “… could you speak of a sceptical school at all? The very idea 
of sceptical doctrines, on a par with the other philosophical schools, seemed a contradiction in 
terms: if a philosophical school is defined by its ‘dogmas’—by the characteristic theses which it 
maintains and in favour of which it argues—then how could there be a school without dogmas, 
an antidogmatic (or rather a-dogmatic) school?” Despite Charles Brittain’s excellent editorial 
work on Cicero’s Academica, I think this is worth noting, even as he translates the title, 
Academica Quaestiones, as ‘On Academic Scepticism’. The Pyrrhonian sceptic Sextus 
Empiricus has a subtle response to the question as to whether sceptics belong to a hairesis or 
not, drawing upon earlier senses of the term than ‘school of thought’. Cf. Jacques Brunschwig, 
1999. ‘Introduction: The Beginnings of Hellenistic Epistemology’. Algra et al. (eds.), Cambridge 
History of Hellenistic Philosophy. pp.227–259. 
38 For Cicero’s biography, see for example Elizabeth Rawson, 1975. Cicero: A Portrait. London: 
Penguin. 
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leges inter arma], and do not expect themselves to be waited for, 
when he who waits will have to suffer an undeserved penalty before 
he can exact a rightful punishment [iniusta poena luenda sit quam 
iusta repetenda].” 39* 
In defence of his client, Cicero is drawing here upon Stoic philosophical 
arguments about natural law to enlarge upon the facts of a particular situation, 
in which a person who waited for the civil law to deservedly punish another for 
attacking he or she would themselves suffer an undeserved penalty—injury or 
death—by waiting for the civil law to ‘speak’, to operate, to mete out justice to 
the assailant.40 The philosophical argument in the background is that justice is 
something that exists by nature—which we shall consider in chapter four of this 
project—but Cicero here is making neither a philosophical nor a political 
argument; he is making a legal argument focused upon the particulars of a case, 
his entire purpose being to have his client acquitted of the charge which has 
been brought against him. 
Several things might be said, of course, about the Pro Milone and the facts of 
the case, but my purpose in providing the context I have has been threefold.41 
The first has been to underscore for the reader that, although all writings are 
steeped in their historical contexts, some are steeped more deeply than others. 
The second has been to draw down (for now) the reader’s thoughts from lofty 
philosophical questions as to whether justice exists by nature or not to consider 
and appreciate the moral, political, and legal significance of the conduct of 
persons in particular situations, quite apart from any possible answers to these 
philosophical questions. And the third has been to signal some of Cicero’s 
remarkable knowledge, understanding, and versatility in areas of human 
endeavour such as philosophy, law, and rhetoric. 
In Reading Cicero, Catherine Steel begins by noting the enduring relevance of 
the tribute Seneca (4 BCE—65 CE) paid to Cicero’s versatility when he said of 
him that “when a commentator, a literary scholar, and a student of philosophy 
 
39 Mil. 10–11. 
40 Cf. Inv. 2.67 and section 4.3 of this project. 
41 See for example: Lynn S. Fotheringham, 2013. ‘Persuasive language in Cicero’s Pro Milone: a 
close reading and commentary.’ Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement. Vol. 
121.  
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pick up [his De Re Publica], they each pay attention to different things”.42 In an 
important sense, Cicero’s writings are non-disciplinary; multifaceted in a way 
not fully captured by any discipline. Steel goes on to distinguish between four 
genres in which he writes—speeches, letters, poetry, and treatises—but also 
discusses the limits of generic distinctions in his case, given his innovations in all 
four of these.43 Although our projects are different, it is relevant for our 
purposes here to set out what Steel’s is in Reading Cicero: 
“This book puts Cicero the writer and Cicero the politician together 
through an exploration of how he uses written texts to exist and 
operate within the public sphere. In turn the public dimension is 
always present when reading Cicero. The point is not simply that 
Cicero’s writings must be sited in their historical contexts in order 
fully to be understood; it is only by dealing with all of his works as a 
single oeuvre that we can understand the extent of Cicero’s 
achievement in turning writing into a tool which the politician at 
Rome could use to advance his career. I argue that he uses a 
multiplicity of genres in order to multiply the opportunities to tell his 
story; and innovates within the generic possibilities initially available 
precisely in order to tailor what he could write to who he was. A 
fundamental error is to assume that his philosophy and poetry are not 
‘political’; Cicero’s writings could not escape from the public figure, 
and the issue is rather to consider the nature of the interaction 
between his various personas [consul, senator, intellectual, advocate, 
husband, friend etc.] and writings.”44 
Several things are worthy of note here. First, greater understanding of Cicero’s 
writings is achieved by siting them in their historical contexts, but there the 
matter cannot rest, at least insofar as our interests are more than antiquarian. 
Some historical contexts are given in this project, but I move on from these to 
consider the content of Cicero’s writings and their continuing relevance to IPT, 
although it is beyond my project’s scope (and my own competence) to deal with 
all his works as a single oeuvre. Second, whether in Cicero’s time, our own, or 
any other, it seems to me important to keep in mind that politicians may not be 
seeking to advance their career—through writing or any other means—purely for 
their own advantage, but precisely because it is only through career 
advancement that they can serve the public’s (which of course is not to say that 
ends always justify means). Third, like the scholars of International Law and IR 
 
42 Catherine Steel, 2005. Reading Cicero. London: Duckworth. p.7. 
43 Steel, Reading Cicero. pp.47–48. 
44 Steel, Reading Cicero. p.7. 
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of whom Onuf wrote, like Arendt, and like the rest of us, Cicero is in the 
business of ‘telling stories’ to others, including his own. And fourth, there is an 
irreducibly public dimension to all his writings, in whatever genre. I refer in this 
project to his speeches, letters, and treatises, and focus especially on his 
treatises—his theoretical writings—on politics, but it is appropriate here to say 
something about his intellectual approach. 
As already mentioned, in the field of truth and knowledge Cicero is an Academic 
sceptic. Philosophy might be said to have taken an ‘epistemological turn’ in the 
Hellenistic period; before this time, Greek thinkers “took the possibility and the 
actuality of knowledge for granted and concerned themselves primarily with the 
nature of knowledge, its origins, and its structure”, until new technical terms 
introduced by Epicurus (341 BCE–270 BCE) and Zeno of Citium (c.334–262, 
founder of the Stoic school) signalled a shift in interest from questions like ‘what 
is knowledge?’ to questions like ‘is there any knowledge?’.45 Epistemologically 
speaking, it is in Zeno we should perhaps see the beginnings of a systematized 
dogmatism in philosophy, with the head of the Academy at the time, Arcesilaus 
(c.316–241), inspired by the Socrates of Plato’s early dialogues, initiating a 
‘sceptical turn’ in the Academy and roundly criticising Zeno’s dogmatic 
arguments.46 In passing over various perplexities in these epistemological 
debates, we can manage sufficiently well in this project with a brief statement 
of Cicero’s position, given in his own voice in the Academica: 
“The only difference between us and philosophers who think that they 
have knowledge is that they have no doubt that the views they defend 
are true, whereas we hold many views to be persuasive, i.e., ones 
that we can readily follow but scarcely affirm. But we are freer and 
less constrained because our power of judgment is intact and we 
aren’t compelled by any obligation to defend a set of views prescribed 
and practically imposed on us by someone else.”47   
 
45 Brunschwig, ‘Introduction: the beginnings of Hellenistic epistemology.’ Algra et al. (eds.), 
Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. p.230. 
46 Charles Brittain provides a good summary of these epistemological developments: Acad. pp.viii–
xxxix. 
47 Acad. 2.8. Even the scholars of ancient philosophy who specialise in this material find it “baffling” 
at times. Jonathan Barnes, 1997. ‘Logic in Academica I and Lucullus’. Brad Inwood and Jaap 
Mansfeld (eds.), 1997. Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero’s Academic Books. Leiden: Brill. 
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What this leads to in Cicero’s treatises is a “balancing, on any given topic, [of] 
the arguments in favor of a view held by one of the chief philosophical schools 
with [sceptical] arguments against; to the same end [i.e., truth-seeking], he also 
sets against each other the competing teachings of the dogmatists”.48 The 
Academic sceptics in philosophical discourse do not “have any purpose other 
than to draw out or ‘formulate’ the truth or its closest approximation [i.e., 
verisimilitude] by means of arguing on either side”.49 This arguing pro et con on 
any given topic is also a key feature in certain traditions of training in rhetoric, 
such as Aristotle’s, and therefore dovetails nicely with Cicero’s own avid 
interests in both philosophy and rhetoric. Whether contemporary scholars 
construe him as a ‘radical’ sceptic along the lines of Arcesilaus or Carneades 
(c.214–129, also Head of the Academy), or a ‘mitigated’ or ‘moderate’ sceptic 
along the lines of his teacher Philo of Larissa (c.159–84, also head of the 
Academy), that Cicero is not dogmatic matters a great deal.50 Philosophically, it 
allows him freely to explore the Hellenistic schools’ doctrines, as well as the 
arguments of the schools of an earlier time, suspending his judgment as to the 
truth of them all whilst, practically, ‘taking whatever he can and whatever suits 
him’ in his own life and work, i.e., exercising his own judgments in the world. 
From various philosophical perspectives (‘school’ perspectives) across the 
centuries such an approach has been thought unsatisfactory, a ‘pale 
eclecticism’, or even amateurish, but it seems to me not only to be a highly 
sophisticated approach in philosophy, but also one that has an eminently 
practical purpose. In Pierluigi Donini’s words, it shows an attitude, an 
intellectual persuasion, “which chooses among doctrines with [a] deliberate 
program but whose spirit is strongly anti-dogmatic and anti-sectarian”, conscious 
and wary of what dogmas and sects risk creating in the world.51 
 
48 Robert Gorman, 2005. The Socratic Method in the Dialogues of Cicero. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 
Verlag. 
49 Acad. 2.7. 
50 Cf. Harald Thorsrud, 1995. ‘Radical and Mitigated Scepticism in Cicero’s Academica.’ Nicgorski 
(ed.), Cicero’s Practical Philosophy. Ch.6. 
51 Pierluigi Donini, 1988. ‘The history of the concept of eclecticism.’ Dillon and Long (eds.). The 
Question of ‘Eclecticism’. Ch.1. The quote comes from one of the senses of ‘eclecticism’ that 
Donini identifies, and he says that the usual example of an eclectic in this sense comes from the 
field of medicine (Galen). 
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Yet they seem always to emerge, providing ‘eclectics’ with a variety of doctrines 
to consider carefully.52 Cicero was very well-versed in Plato’s writings.53 
Aristotle’s library, including his ethical writings, had disappeared during the 
time that ardent physical theorist Strato of Lampsacus (c.335 BCE—269 BCE) was 
head of the Lyceum, and had only just begun circulating again towards the end 
of Cicero’s life, but Cicero was certainly well-versed in the works of Aristotle’s 
students, Theophrastus (c.371–287) and Dicaearchus (c.350–285), as well as in 
the works of the Hellenistic schools (mainly the Stoics, Epicureans and 
Sceptics).54 I have already mentioned Arcesilaus, who spearheaded a ‘sceptical 
turn’ in the Academy with the onset of epistemology in the new technical terms 
of the Epicureans and Stoics, as well as Carneades, who gave two famous 
speeches to the Romans in 155, for and against justice, which sit behind one of 
the sub-sections in the final chapter of this project. And as already mentioned, 
in Cicero’s own time, he was taught by the head of the Academy, Philo of 
Larissa. He was also taught by another Academic, Antiochus of Ascalon (c.125–
68), who broke away from the Academy’s sceptical outlook, endorsed Stoic 
epistemology, and formed his own school which he called ‘the Old Academy’, 
meaning the sceptics belonged to ‘the New Academy’ (labels which stuck). 
Antiochus’s philosophical system was syncretic: he believed virtually all of the 
differences between the Academics, Peripatetics and the Stoics were merely 
terminological, disagreements over words rather than substance, and he saw 
himself as bringing philosophy back to its proper roots in Plato (duly ‘corrected’ 
by the Stoics in the field of knowledge).55 Cicero was deeply impressed by 
Antiochus’s work, and we shall be considering some of this impression in chapter 
 
52 Cf. LKPP. p.23: “… withdrawal into a sect is the second-best cure for being alive at all and 
having to live among men.”  
53 He gives in his own voice his opinion about Plato’s ‘epistemology’ at Acad. 1.46: “In his books 
nothing is affirmed, there are many arguments on either side, everything is under investigation, 
and nothing is claimed to be certain.” Cf. Julia Annas, 1992. ‘Plato the Sceptic’. James C. 
Klagge and Nicholas D. Smith (eds.), 1992. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 
Supplementary Volume: Methods of Interpreting Plato and his Dialogues. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. pp.43–72. 
54 Peripatetic philosophy properly kicked in again at the very end of the 1st Century BCE, when 
Andronicus of Rhodes published an edition of Aristotle’s works in Latin. For the curious story of 
Aristotle’s library after his death and for Cicero’s knowledge of Peripatetic philosophy more 
generally, see Jonathan Barnes, 1997. ‘Roman Aristotle’. Barnes and Griffin (eds.), Philosophia 
Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome. Ch.1; William W. Fortenbaugh and Peter Steinmetz 
(eds.), 1989. Cicero’s Knowledge of the Peripatos. London: Routledge. 
55 Antiochus’s system inaugurated the period in the history of philosophy we call Middle Platonism, 
between c.90 BCE and Plotinus’s writings in the third century CE (Neoplatonism). 
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three, but here, it suffices to reiterate Cicero’s intellectual approach: he is a 
sceptic in the Academic tradition, suspending his judgment as to the truth of X 
(or using the Stoics’ terms, withholding his assent to the truth of X), and he acts 
upon that which seems to him the most persuasive—the most probable, or 
nearest approximation to the truth—after careful consideration. A.A. Long 
provides us with a good example of the kind of sophisticated flexibility this gives 
Cicero in philosophical discourse: 
“This dual allegiance to Philo [a moderate sceptic] and, with 
qualification, to Antiochus [a dogmatist], is a highly intelligent 
interpretation of the Academic tradition. It allows Cicero to draw 
heavily on Plato and Stoicism, in advocating positions he strongly 
supports, while preserving an exploratory rather than dogmatic style, 
and reserving the right to criticise Stoics and even Plato on 
occasion.”56 
It bears repeating, however, that philosophy was not Cicero’s only interest. He 
was also interested and educated in rhetoric by some of the greatest orators in 
Rome at the time, and he studied it (along with philosophy) in Greece and Asia 
Minor between 79 and 77, before coming back to Rome to embark upon his 
political career. But right along with his studies and his politics, Cicero was a 
Roman; he had a deep connection to the past, the mos maiorum (the ‘ways of 
the ancestors’), which can be seen very clearly in his writings, theoretical and 
otherwise. One of the distinctive features of his writings is precisely this inter-
weaving of philosophy and history without collapsing them into each other. We 
consider this briefly in chapter four as one of the many features of his writings 
which are of continuing relevance to IPT, but for now, let us move on to a 
consideration of his reception. 
On the Rekindled Tradition of Cicero Studies 
Like any major figure in the history of political thought, Cicero has always had 
his supporters and detractors, but the sense across both sides that his 
theoretical writings evince a towering intellect began fading in the nineteenth 
century, when his voice became increasingly smothered by several movements in 
the Academy and beyond, such as Romanticism (with its “cult of originality and 
 
56 A.A. Long, 2003. ‘Roman Philosophy’. David Sedley (ed.), 2003. The Cambridge Companion to 
Greek and Roman Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.184–210. 
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reduced emphasis on style”), the historicism coming out of German idealist 
philosophy (of particular note here is the character assassination upon Cicero 
carried out by Theodore Mommsen in his seminal History of Rome), and the 
source-criticism (Quellenforschung) developed by German philologists, who 
regarded Cicero as a mere rhetor and compiler, a dilettante in philosophy 
political and otherwise who did not really know what he was talking about and 
who posed a frustrating obstacle to the understanding of the Hellenistic 
‘professional thinkers’, virtually all of whose works otherwise survive only in 
fragments.57 Whilst source-criticism (e.g., ‘who is Cicero’s source in this 
passage? Is it Panaetius? Carneades? Philo?’ etc.) in an effort to increase our 
understanding of Hellenistic philosophy is of course a legitimate pursuit in 
reading Cicero, by far our most bountiful source for the period, the effect of 
what now seems to have been a passing fad was that scholars generally ceased 
listening to what he actually had to say for himself and forgot questions about 
his own intentions and approaches in writing philosophy (questions and hearings 
which had been more or less constant and widespread, it is worth repeating, 
from the moment his works had been published until the nineteenth century). 
This general attitude towards Cicero as a political thinker (and more generally as 
an intellectual, a statesman and a person) continued into the twentieth century, 
but over the last few decades there has been a propitious revival of scholarly 
interest in his treatises.58 As the reader will see referenced in this project, an 
excellent body of secondary literature has been produced from roughly the 
1980s onwards which goes a long way towards restoring Cicero’s reputation as an 
intellectual of the highest calibre. It is the classicists who have spearheaded this 
revival, but numerous scholars from other fields have made important 
 
57 Andrew Dyck, quoted in Elisabeth Begemann, 2015. ‘Damaged Go(o)ds’. William H.F. Altman 
(ed.), 2015. Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Cicero. London: Brill. Ch.10. For a more 
general account of Cicero’s reception in the nineteenth century, see for example: Nicholas P. 
Cole, 2013. ‘Nineteenth-century Ciceros’. Catherine Steel (ed.), 2013. The Cambridge 
Companion to Cicero. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.18. 
58 For some of the twentieth century fallout of the nineteenth century reception of Cicero, see for 
example: Walter Nicgorski, 1995. ‘Cicero and the Rebirth of Political Philosophy’. Walter 
Nicgorski (ed.), 1995. Cicero’s Practical Philosophy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press. pp.242–282; William H.F. Altman, 2015. ‘Cicero and the Fourth Triumvirate’. Altman 
(ed.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Cicero. Ch.9.  
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contributions as well, including in the history of political thought and political 
theory.59 
With the volume and richness of Cicero’s theoretical output as well as the 
fragmentary condition of some of the treatises, it is much to be expected that 
some points of contention or differences of interpretation have appeared 
amongst scholars of his work. For example, classicists James E.G. Zetzel and 
Jonathan G.F. Powell have both published an edition of the De Re Publica—
Zetzel for the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought and Powell for 
the Oxford Classical Texts—each arranging the fragments differently to reflect 
their own understanding of the text’s overall argument.60 Jed W. Atkins, who 
emphasises the influence of Plato’s Republic and Laws on Cicero’s De Re Publica 
and De Legibus, disagrees with Elizabeth Asmis that the laws discussed in Book II 
of the latter are a guide which enjoins ordinary people (non-sages) towards 
virtuous actions, regarding them instead as the ‘right reason’ of the sage.61 And 
in the history of political and legal thought, Benjamin Straumann provides what 
might loosely be termed a ‘modernist’ or ‘rationalist’ reading of Cicero’s 
treatises on politics, adhering closely to Stoic philosophy and grounding 
constitutional law in natural law, and this at times places him at some odds with 
scholars more inclined to pay heed to Cicero’s academic scepticism and strong 
emphasis upon the development of morals in political society.62 
 
59 Notable works here include Daniel J. Kapust, 2011. Republicanism, Rhetoric, and Roman 
Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Daniel J. Kapust and Gary Remer 
(eds.), 2021. The Ciceronian Tradition in Political Theory. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin 
Press; Jed W. Atkins, 2013. Cicero on Politics and the Limits of Reason. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Benjamin Straumann, 2016. Crisis and Constitutionalism. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; Dean Hammer, 2014. Roman Political Thought: From Cicero to 
Augustine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Gary Remer, 2017. Ethics and the Orator: 
The Ciceronian Tradition of Political Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Walter 
Nicgorski, 2016. Cicero’s Skepticism and his Recovery of Political Philosophy. Notre Dame: 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
60 For some of the consequences of the arrangements of the fragments for each of their 
arguments, see Jonathan G.F. Powell, 1995. ‘Cicero’s De Re Publica and the Virtues of the 
Statesman’. Nicgorski (ed.), Cicero’s Practical Philosophy. Ch.1; James E.G. Zetzel. 2017. 
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61 Atkins, Cicero on Politics. p.198n31; Elizabeth Asmis, 2008. ‘Cicero on Natural Law and the 
Laws of the State’. Classical Antiquity 27(1). pp.1–33. See also section 4.3 of this project. 
62 Straumann, Crisis and Constitutionalism; James E.G. Zetzel, 2016. ‘Crisis and Constitutionalism: 
Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Roman Republic to the Age of Revolution by 
Benjamin Straumann (review)’. Classical World 110(1). pp.147–148; Malcolm Schofield, 2017. 
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There are many other (often fine and theoretical) points of contention and 
differences of interpretation in the secondary literature, some of which the 
reader will encounter in this project, but all these scholars are joined in firm 
consensus that Cicero’s treatises on politics are well worth reading. Atkins 
speaks of the De Re Publica and De Legibus as “critical for understanding the 
history of the concept of rights, the mixed constitution, and natural law”; 
Straumann construes them as breathing the spirit of constitutionalism; and Asmis 
argues, as I do also, that Cicero does indeed develop an original point of view in 
these works, based upon the Roman conception of societas.63 As Kapust and 
Remer note, there has been somewhat less reliance on the Greeks and an 
accompanying ‘Roman turn’ in political theory from around the end of the last 
century onwards, as well as a renewed interest in rhetoric amongst historians of 
political thought, and Cicero’s works hold a central place in this movement.64 An 
indication of his increasing influence in the Academy more generally may be 
seen in the fact that Cambridge University Press published its Companion to 
Cicero in 2013 and they will soon be accompanying it with the Cambridge 
Companion to Cicero’s Philosophy (including political philosophy).65 The 
centuries-long tradition of Cicero Studies has been rekindled and it is one of my 
aims in this project to bring these studies to the attention of IPT for the benefit 
of researchers in the field who may otherwise miss it. In the words of Ryan K. 
Balot, there is great worth in bringing “ancient political texts into contact with 
broader currents of political theory”, not the least of which is “an enlarged 
understanding of political life” in the present.66  
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Structure of the Argument 
In responding to my research question—What can Cicero’s theoretical writings 
on politics contribute to arguments in IPT related to exercising judgments in the 
world?—I begin in the first chapter with a review of some relevant literature 
from the wider group of scholars mentioned above (p.20), asking: of some 
arguments in IPT related to exercising judgments in the world, where is there 
room for improvement? Having brought in some relevant literature to review 
from some neighbouring fields to support my case, I conclude the chapter by 
distinguishing broadly between conceptions of politics which are ‘personal’ and 
conceptions of politics which are ‘impersonal’, listing several qualities under 
each of these headings, and I argue that the room for improvement in the 
literature reviewed involves moving from the latter conception to the former, 
without excluding the latter or specifying for the reader how far that movement 
should go.  
The theme of the first section of the chapter is Critical Theory and IPT, tackling 
the ‘complex and troubled relations’ between philosophy and history as they 
have appeared in this area of research. It begins with a review of some of the 
work of cosmopolitan theorists Richard Beardsworth and Seyla Benhabib and 
their engagements with critical philosophy, before going on to consider Richard 
Devetak’s recently published Critical International Theory: An Intellectual 
History, which provides a contextualist account of (some of) the critical 
philosophers upon which Beardsworth and Benhabib (and other critical 
international theorists) draw, as well as a different, more historical mode of 
critique which Devetak traces back to the Renaissance humanists.  
The second section’s theme is Persons, beginning with a review of relevant 
literature on ‘virtue ethics’, the ‘person-centred’ approach to ethics as 
contrasted with ‘rules-based’ approaches (deontology and consequentialism). 
Even after Brown’s introduction to the field of Martha Nussbaum’s work on 
virtues and capabilities back in 2000, there is still a dearth of research in this 
area in IPT, so I supplement a review of Harry Gould and Steven Torrente’s 
chapter on virtues and capabilities from the Oxford Handbook with a review of 
the approach as found in some neighbouring fields, such as political theory 
(Aletta Norval), political philosophy (Martha Nussbaum) and comparative 
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political theory (Fred Dallmayr).67 The section concludes with a review of some 
scholarly literature on statespersons, with a particular focus upon the virtue of 
phronesis (or in Latin, prudentia), ‘practical wisdom’, beginning with a 
consideration of the work of Dallmayr and Devetak, in which I place the virtue in 
a broader context within the humanities, and moving on to consider some of 
Brown’s writings on this virtue and how he sees it handled in the work of 
‘classical realist’ figures in IR, Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan.  
The final section’s theme is that to and for which persons, but especially 
statespersons, are responsible: political societies. The first sub-section considers 
domestic political society, beginning with Brown’s contrasting of civil society 
and the state, along with liberalism and republicanism, and moving on to 
Norval’s projects in overcoming these contrasts with an account of civic virtues 
in civil society. From here, the writings of political theorist Bryan Garsten are 
reviewed, who identifies a key problem in liberal accounts of civil society in the 
notion of ‘public reason’ invented by philosophers such as Hobbes and Kant—
what he calls the rhetoric of public reason—which obscures the alienation of 
citizens’ practical judgments about public affairs and prevents a ‘politics of 
persuasion’ in political society, something properly understood as going on in the 
civic republican tradition. This leads into an account of the civic republican 
tradition as provided by Dallmayr, as well as the conception within this tradition 
of political society (res publica) as mixed government, a mixing of the three 
basic types of government (by the one, the few, or the many)—a conception 
which is also considered through some of Walzer’s writings. 
The final section concludes with a consideration of international political 
society, building on the tensions already set out between philosophy (or 
universalism) and history (or contextualism), and beginning with Dallmayr’s 
review of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples in which he provides a history of the 
term ius gentium (‘law of peoples’). This leads into a review of some just war 
scholarship from ‘universalist’ and ‘contextualist’ perspectives, in which my 
distinction between ‘impersonal’ and ‘personal’ is further developed, concluding 
 
67 Chris Brown, 2010. ‘Towards a neo-Aristotelian resolution of the cosmopolitan–communitarian 
debate’. Chris Brown, 2010. Practical Judgment in International Political Theory. London: 
Routledge. Ch.6. 
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with a consideration of just war thinking and international political society 
through the lens of the (personal) virtue of prudentia. 
In the second chapter, I ask: What can some of Hannah Arendt’s theoretical 
writings on politics contribute to the arguments addressed in the previous 
chapter, and how are these writings of Arendt’s related to Cicero’s theoretical 
writings on politics? The themes of the chapter’s three sections are broadly the 
same as the first. One of the issues identified through a consideration of critical 
theory and IPT in the first chapter is a seeming contradiction in terms between 
the notions of tradition and philosophy, even as a broad tradition of philosophy 
and several narrower traditions of philosophy within it can clearly be seen in the 
academic literature. The first section of this chapter is entitled Traditions, 
Politics and Philosophies, with its first sub-section investigating the notion of 
tradition as such in Arendt’s writings. Here, whilst calling into question Arendt’s 
assertion that tradition as such has been undeniably lost in the modern world, I 
draw out her very rich understanding of it which, I argue, contributes to the 
arguments addressed in the previous chapter a greater understanding of what 
philosophers mean when they speak about standing in this or that philosophical 
tradition, and I also argue that we need the help of tradition as such in 
exercising judgments in the world. The second sub-section builds upon this 
argument and questions Arendt’s claim that a particular tradition, ‘the great 
tradition of political and/or philosophic thought’, has come to an end in the 
modern world, through an investigation as to how Cicero appears (or not) in 
Arendt’s stories about this ‘end’. I argue here that ‘the tradition’ has not, in 
fact, ended, and that Arendt’s writings stand comfortably within it, whilst 
drawing out some convergences and perplexities as regards the precise relation 
between Arendt’s writings and Cicero’s. 
The second section considers Arendt’s writings on persons. In the first chapter, 
we see Devetak using the Latin term persona several times in his own argument, 
and in the first sub-section here, I draw out through Arendt’s writings some of 
what she calls “the profound meaningfulness” of this term, firstly through how 
she explains it to her audience in her acceptance speech for Denmark’s Sonning 
Prize in 1975. From here, we move on to a consideration of the matter of 
personal responsibility as it appears in Arendt’s writings after the Eichmann 
trial, and to an investigation of the virtues as they appear in the two sets of 
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lectures on moral philosophy which she gave following the Eichmann 
controversy. This leads into a consideration of Arendt’s writings in which she 
draws upon Cicero’s to discuss the Latin term humanitas, as well as her use of 
this term in her essays on Karl Jaspers. We move on from here to a review of 
Arendt’s story about the terror of the French revolution as it ‘relates’ to virtues, 
mores, and personae, before concluding the sub-section with how we had begun 
it: back with Arendt’s acceptance speech for the Sonning Prize. The section 
concludes with some of Arendt’s writings on statespersons, considering what she 
has to say about the virtues she saw in Winston Churchill and John F. Kennedy, 
and a consideration of her understanding of the virtue of phronesis. 
The final section of the chapter considers Arendt’s writings on political societies, 
with the first sub-section questioning the extent to which we can say that Arendt 
offers us what Margaret Canovan calls a ‘new’ republicanism. In this sub-section, 
Arendt’s writings are linked back to Cicero’s and the Romans more generally, at 
the same time as they help develop the account of civic republican principles as 
set out in the first chapter. The second sub-section considers numerous problems 
with Arendt’s distinction between ‘the social’ and ‘the political’ through a 
consideration of her understanding of the term ‘society’, concluding that it 
remains a problematic distinction and that, as evidenced in some of her 
posthumously published work, she did in fact write of political societies. The 
final sub-section considers Arendt’s writings on international political society as 
well as her argument that we are now aware of ‘a right to have rights’. I argue 
here that the latter was a political rather than a philosophical argument, and 
that, despite some ‘realist’ strains in her writings, we can in fact see (and in 
large part due to her engagement with Cicero and the Romans more generally) a 
notion of international political society in her work. 
Having considered some arguments in IPT related to exercising judgments in the 
world in the first chapter, and having carried out some groundwork and 
preparation for the reader through Arendt’s writings in the second, the stage at 
this point has been set for the third chapter, in which I ask: what can Cicero’s 
theoretical writings concerning the conduct of persons contribute to arguments 
in IPT related to exercising judgments in the world? Briefly stated, I argue that 
his writings on the conduct of persons contribute towards a deeper 
understanding of the arguments considered in both the first and second 
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chapters. Although I build in this chapter upon numerous specific arguments 
addressed in the first two, my purpose in it is also to provide, in broad outline, 
Cicero’s framework of civic virtues as an excellent one within which scholars in 
IPT can think and work insofar as they are holding a conception of politics as 
(partly) personal. 
The theme of the first section is ‘Springs of Initiative’, a term borrowed from 
Michael Oakeshott, mentioned in the second chapter, which he uses in giving his 
own account of what authority is, and which also ties together three starting 
points useful for the reader in considering Cicero’s writings on the conduct of 
persons. The first sub-section considers some of his writings in the De Finibus 
regarding our natural sociability, upon which both Arendt and Kant (in part) rely 
in their own work. We move on in the second sub-section to consider what 
Cicero means by officium, ‘duty’ or ‘appropriate action’, with the aim of 
distinguishing between modern conceptions of ‘duty’ and his own, as well as 
between what he is doing in the De Officiis (practical ethics, written in the form 
of a letter to his son rather than a philosophical dialogue) and what he is doing 
in the De Finibus (a philosophical dialogue with different ethical theories being 
set out). The first section concludes with a consideration of one of Cicero’s 
speeches, the Pro Archia, which shows the great esteem in which he held 
education, and more specifically education in the literary arts, the studia 
humanitatis (including both philosophy and history), providing the reader with 
some context in which to understand his (and Arendt’s) use of the term 
humanitas. 
The De Officiis is structured around the four ‘cardinal’ or primary virtues—or 
what he also calls the four ‘parts’ of the morally right/good/honourable 
(honestas)—and the second section of this chapter, ‘Civic Virtues’, is sub-divided 
according to each ‘part’. We begin here with a consideration of the virtue of 
justice, the supreme social virtue for Cicero which plays a limiting or controlling 
role as regards the other virtues in the De Officiis, and which itself he divides 
into ‘justice simply’ (iustitia) and beneficence (beneficentia). After this, we 
consider some of what he has to say, in the De Officiis and elsewhere, regarding 
the virtues of wisdom (sapientia) and prudence (prudentia), before going on to 
consider his writings on courage (fortitudo) and greatness of spirit (magnitudo 
animi). The section concludes with a consideration of the fourth part of the 
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honestas, called temperance and moderation in the first two chapters, which 
Cicero articulates in the De Officiis as the virtue of decorum, and which includes 
what is called in the literature ‘the four-personae theory’. 
Having set out in broad outline Cicero’s framework of civic virtues, we move on 
in the final section of the chapter to consider his writings on how they are 
manifest in political societies. The first sub-section considers virtuous conduct in 
the political society that is res publica, beginning with an account of the 
juridical background of the term societas, which denotes a partnership, and 
going on to consider each of the virtues in turn as manifest in the conduct of 
persons. The second sub-section considers the virtuous conduct of persons in 
international political society, beginning with an account of the different 
degrees of societas that Cicero sets out in the De Officiis, and concluding with 
his account of the ius of warfare, the virtuous conduct of (states)persons in the 
initiation and prosecution of war. 
In the final chapter of this project, we turn from Cicero’s focus upon the 
conduct of persons to his focus upon res publica, and I ask: what can Cicero’s 
theoretical writings on res publica contribute to arguments in IPT related to 
exercising judgments in the world? As with the third chapter, my purpose here is 
twofold, developing numerous arguments from previous chapters as well as 
providing in broad outline Cicero’s theoretical writings on res publica as an 
excellent framework within which scholars in IPT holding a conception of politics 
as (partly) personal can think and work. We begin in the first section with what I 
regard as four important themes for IP theorists to consider in relation to the 
central treatise for our purposes, Cicero’s De Re Publica. The first sub-section 
considers Cicero’s arguments in favour of living the practical life of the citizen 
vis-à-vis the theoretical life of the philosopher, building upon some arguments 
from previous chapters, as well as highlighting some very intriguing arguments 
given in his own voice in this text regarding the virtue of sapientia which shows 
that his understanding of this dichotomous split between ways of life which 
developed in the tradition of philosophy is not as simple as it might seem. The 
second sub-section provides in broad outline some of the ways in which Cicero 
inter-weaves philosophy and history together in the De Re Publica without 
collapsing them into each other à la Hegel. The third and fourth sub-sections 
turn to the political theory of the text, with the former providing an analysis of 
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the character Scipio’s definition of res publica, and the latter providing an 
analysis of the different types of organisation (or ‘constitution’) a people might 
take on for maintaining res publica; it is here we consider the basic types of 
government (by the one, the few, or the many) together with a non-basic, mixed 
type, as discussed in previous chapters. 
The theme of the second section is Laws and Institutions, beginning with a 
consideration of the Carneadean debate between the characters Laelius and 
Philus in Book III of the De Re Publica about whether a res publica can possibly 
function without justice. Laelius here puts forward a case deriving from Stoic 
philosophy that a res publica cannot possibly function without justice and that 
justice exists by nature, whereas Philus argues (as devil’s advocate) the 
‘conventionalist’ case that a res publica cannot possibly function without 
injustice and justice does not exist by nature, it exists by convention. We move 
on from this discussion, and the De Re Publica itself, in the second sub-section 
to consider Cicero’s writings on the ius gentium, where I argue that it is not 
equivalent to the Stoic account of natural law, even as they sometimes appear 
to overlap. In the third sub-section, we turn to Cicero’s De Legibus, a dialogue in 
which Cicero writes himself in as a character (Marcus), where I provide an 
analysis of the law-code that Marcus writes for Rome, which he derives from 
Stoic (or Stoicising) arguments about natural law, and which later scholars have 
regarded as the beginnings of a tradition of constitutional law. In the final sub-
section, we consider Cicero’s writings on institutions. Instituta are customary 
standards of social behaviour, the topic of Book IV of the De Re Publica (which 
regrettably has come down to us only in fragments), and although frequently 
spoken of together with laws by Cicero in several places in his oeuvre, are 
importantly distinct from each other, and we consider this here in some detail, 
along with the importance of maintaining instituta and mores (customary 
practices of social behaviour) to ensure the ongoingness of res publica. 
The final section of the final chapter considers Cicero’s writings on the ‘best 
citizen’ (optimis civis), which he also calls the ‘ideal statesperson’ (rector rei 
publicae). This section is sub-divided in three, beginning with his explicit 
writings on this figure as are to be found in the De Oratore and the De Re 
Publica, in which it becomes clear, I argue, that what he is providing his readers 
with is an ‘ideal-type’, and some of the qualities and virtues he associates with 
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it are set out. The second sub-section moves on to consider some relevant 
passages from two of Cicero’s speeches, a letter he wrote to Pompey, and the 
De Officiis. I argue here that we may be justified in adding some more qualities 
and virtues to this ‘ideal-type’ which we do not find named explicitly in the 
treatises in connection with the rector rei publicae, and that we can gain from 
these other sources a deeper understanding of the sapientia which Cicero does 
name explicitly in connection with this figure. The final sub-section returns to 
the De Re Publica for a consideration of Scipio’s dream, which concludes the 
dialogue in Book VI. 
Briefly put, I argue that Cicero’s theoretical writings on politics contribute to 
arguments in IPT related to exercising judgments in the world an outstanding 
framework within which theorists can connect, engage, and position themselves 
in relation to real-world politics and real-world problems.  
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Chapter 1 Exercising Judgments in the World 
and International Political Theory: A Literature 
Review 
1.1 Introduction 
As Brown says, the relations between the different fields of study under the 
broad umbrella of international studies is “complex and troubled”, and this to 
the extent that one is probably overstepping boundaries even by speaking of the 
matter in terms of ‘disciplinary boundaries’.1 In practice, however, it might be 
safe enough to say that IR scholars read literature in IPT and IPT scholars read 
literature in IR, and we shall be encountering some of this ‘crossover’ in the 
present chapter. The complex and troubled relations are, to a significant extent, 
I think informed by very similar complexities and troubles as exist between ‘the 
arts’ and ‘the sciences’, as well as between ‘philosophy’ and ‘history’, and I 
should warn the reader here at the outset that there will be significant 
‘crossover’ in these fields as well in this project. 
The first section of this chapter considers some of the complex and troubled 
relations between philosophy and history as they relate to IPT. The section is 
sub-divided in two, with the first sub-section forming a review of two 
cosmopolitan IP theorists’ engagements with critical philosophy. This sub-section 
begins with a consideration of Richard Beardsworth’s programmatic article, The 
Future of Critical Philosophy and World Politics, in which he sets out a broad 
conception of critical philosophy as a field of study with an ethical or normative 
orientation, and in which he provides an ideational framework for critical 
philosophers to engage with “social science within the horizon of world politics”, 
before going on to consider his defence of Habermasian cosmopolitanism against 
the Arendtian arguments of Patricia Owens. The sub-section continues with a 
review of Seyla Benhabib’s work in Another Cosmopolitanism and The Rights of 
Others, considering her interpretation of Kant’s philosophy and the ‘republican’ 
elements of his ‘liberalism’—as we have seen, this is a common distinction in 
politics and political theory, and we shall be bumping up against some of its 
limitations quite a few times in this project—together with a critique of her 
 
1 Brown, Political Thought, IR theory and IPT. p.227. 
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reading of Kant from legal and political philosopher Jeremy Waldron, and a 
review of her theory of democratic iterations. The second sub-section provides a 
review of Richard Devetak’s Critical International Theory: An Intellectual 
History, which criticises universalist standpoints derived from philosophy such as 
those taken by Beardsworth and Benhabib through a contextualist reading of the 
philosophical sources upon which critical international theorists normally draw. 
Also reviewed here is Devetak’s recovery in his project of a different, more 
historical mode of critique which he traces back to the Renaissance humanists. 
Despite some differences between the works of Beardsworth, Benhabib and 
Devetak, these critical international theorists might be said, in contradistinction 
to many poststructuralists or postmodernists, to share an ethical concern to 
promote better human relations either domestically, internationally, globally, or 
some combination of any or all of these, and the theme of the second section of 
the chapter concerns those whose better relations they share a concern to 
promote: persons. Again, the section is sub-divided in two. The first sub-section 
is a consideration of a person-centred ethical approach, virtue ethics, which is 
currently marginalised in IPT in favour of rules-based approaches such as 
deontology or consequentialism. Following an account of virtue ethics as set out 
by Steven Torrente and Harry Gould in the Oxford Handbook, it goes on to 
consider some of the writings of comparative political theorist Fred Dallmayr on 
this approach, which he also calls the Aristotelian tradition of virtuous praxis, 
through his reviews of it as manifest in the works of Alasdair MacIntyre, Paul 
Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer, and the sub-section concludes with a review 
of political theorist Aletta Norval’s appraisal of Habermas’s liberal account of 
civil society in his The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, where 
although broadly supportive of the text, she identifies a lack of engagement in 
Habermas with the virtues and recommends the development of democratic 
subjectivities much in the way recommended by ‘virtue ethicists’: participation 
in public affairs, embodied practices of habituation and the operation of 
exemplars. The second sub-section considers some scholarship in IPT related to 
statespersons, with a specific focus on the virtue of phronesis (or in Latin, 
prudentia), how it differs fundamentally from episteme, and how it has been 
handled in some of the classical realist literature in IR.  
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The theme of the final section of the chapter is that to and for which persons, 
but especially statespersons, are responsible: political societies. Although it can 
be very useful indeed to distinguish between ‘civic republican’ and ‘liberal’ 
conceptions of political societies, there are nevertheless some limits to the 
utility of this distinction, as already noted, and we encounter some of these 
limits in this section. The first sub-section considers domestic political societies, 
picking up Norval’s argument again about the formation of democratic 
subjectivities and reviewing her support for Habermas’s modern liberal 
conception of ‘aversion’ to society, before going on to review an appraisal from 
political theorist Bryan Garsten of some of the Kantian arguments underlying 
Habermas’s theory. Garsten argues that Kant presents to us a rhetoric of public 
reason that aims to silence the controversies which are the very stuff of politics 
and obscure the alienation of citizens’ practical judgments about public affairs 
to a sovereign source of authority (for Kant, this source is the critique of pure 
reason). The sub-section continues with a review of Dallmayr’s turn to the civic 
republican tradition as evidenced in his In Search of the Good Life: A Pedagogy 
for Troubled Times, together with reviews of it from political liberal David M. 
Rasmussen and civic republican Bernard Flynn. The second sub-section concerns 
international political society, beginning with a review of a history of the ius 
gentium (‘law of peoples’) that Dallmayr provides in his own review of Rawls’s 
The Law of Peoples, before going on to consider some of the work of just war 
scholars James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay, who share with Dallmayr a 
similar sensitivity to the historical features of international political society. It 
concludes with a consideration of the virtue of prudence in international 
political society as it is set out or understood from what is often referred to in 
IPT as ‘communitarian’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ perspectives. 
The question to which I am responding in this chapter is: of some arguments in 
IPT related to exercising judgments in the world, where is there room for 
improvement? My response, in a nutshell, is that behind much of the literature 
reviewed in this chapter, I believe there are some presuppositions about or 
conceptions of politics which are excessively impersonal, and what is thereby 
obscured in this literature is a more balanced or rounded appreciation of human 
beings exercising judgments in the world, of politics being (partly) personal. 
While this is much less a critique of ‘philosophy’ and endorsement of ‘history’ 
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than it is a call for a greater awareness and more judicious handling of both in 
IPT—both, after all, form part of the humanities, and I am arguing for a more 
humanistic conception of politics—the room for improvement I find in the 
literature reviewed lies not in the direction of theorising or conceptualising 
‘judgment’ (a legitimate exercise in itself, on the more impersonal end of the 
spectrum) but in the direction of supposing or conceiving of politics to be more 
personal. I do review some literature in this chapter from scholars whom I 
believe to hold a conception of politics which is more personal, and such a 
conception perfuses the theoretical writings of both Arendt and Cicero as well, 
to whom we turn in subsequent chapters to develop the arguments related to 
exercising judgments in the world which are addressed in this one.    
1.2 Critical Theory and IPT 
1.2.1 Critical Philosophy and International Theory 
In 2005, Richard Beardsworth published an article in which he called for “a 
specific engagement between critical philosophy and social science within the 
horizon of world politics”.2 He distinguished in his argument, despite many 
similarities between them, two basic gestures in contemporary critical 
philosophy: French thought over the preceding four decades had been engaged 
in a radicalising of the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Heidegger, 
coming up with a “general metaphysics of temporalisation” as exemplified in 
Derrida’s work, whereas German thought had pursued a Kantian (or post-
Kantian) tradition of critique, as exemplified in the work of Habermas.3 Noting 
Habermas’s critique of Derrida for abandoning the normative orientation of 
philosophy, Beardsworth goes on to identify one of the traits of French thought 
in general as being a stress on “the ethics of radical passivity” and insists that 
more is needed from critical philosophy today, that “it is a question of 
apprehending our actuality”, “assum[ing] again the Enlightenment problematic 
and continu[ing] its project of universalisation”.4 Beardsworth’s overall concern 
in the article is to develop an ideational framework for future critical 
 
2 Richard Beardsworth, 2005. ‘The Future of Critical Philosophy and World Politics’. Millennium 
34(1). pp.201–235. 
3 Beardsworth, Future of Critical Philosophy. p.204. 
4 Beardsworth. Future of Critical Philosophy. pp.205, 212 and 234. 
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philosophers who engage with social science within the horizon of world politics, 
and in doing so he puts forward a neo-Marxist account of society in which history 
is understood as a process of the capitalisation of economic and social relations. 
He also draws upon Habermas to argue that “the philosophical problematic of 
modernity with regard to this history can be understood as a reflective response, 
at the level of ethics, politics and institutionality in general, to this historical 
process”, arguing that the account he provides is preferable to strains of 
postmodern thought which have “short-circuited history … and withdrawn the 
force of constructive thought from the public domain”.5 That said, he gives a 
particular reading of Derrida’s deconstruction which is excepted from this 
charge for being “formative regarding the challenge of the [limited] political 
appropriation of world capitalisation”, even as it risks closing down the alterity 
it promotes by failing to engage with certain determinations of history.6 But 
whether or not with his provision of a neo-Marxist account of society there are 
any tendencies towards a kind of historical determinism in Beardsworth’s 
framework, I wish to emphasise from his article the broad conception of critical 
philosophy he provides: 
“Critical philosophy … is ethical (it is disposed to society as a whole) 
and, in some way or other, it is related to politics. Critical 
philosophising means reflecting upon actuality in such a way that 
furthers, directly and/or indirectly, the betterment of society. It is 
the force of thought pitched against other more determined forces 
(economic, political, military, etc.) to promote, in one way or 
another, better human relations.”7 
Such a worldly understanding of critical philosophy would certainly be 
controversial amongst many of its professionals (and non-professionals), but 
Beardsworth nevertheless insists upon it at this historical juncture and we find 
him defending a normative orientation in philosophy in the idiom of IR theory 
through his engagement with Patricia Owens’ Between War and Politics: 
International Relations and the Thought of Hannah Arendt. Beardsworth writes 
that Owens in her argument “uses Arendtian categories to forge a political 
realism that, while critical of idealism, is reducible to neither classical nor 
 
5 Beardsworth, Future of Critical Philosophy. p.211 and 214. Emphasis in original. 
6 Beardsworth, Future of Critical Philosophy. p.216. 
7 Beardsworth, Future of Critical Philosophy. p.202. 
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modern realism given her concerns with the agency of people and 
empowerment” and argues that, through her use of Arendtian categories, she 
conflates neoconservative foreign policy with progressive liberalism.8 He goes on 
to defend progressive liberalism, or more specifically, projects underpinned by 
Habermas’s cosmopolitanism, in terms of their mediations between norm, 
legality and power. Beardsworth acknowledges that Owens is correct in her 
critique that Habermas’s transcendental approach “denies history” and states 
that it is therefore important to place Habermas’s normativism within history. 
He also states that once a norm emerges within history, it can act as a norm 
beyond history, which is the case with “liberal individualism and progressive 
universalism”.9 Beardsworth argues that Habermas is certainly not unaware of 
the realities that Owens accuses him of neglecting in the formation of the 
bourgeois public sphere in the eighteenth century, but chooses instead to 
“target … the efficacy of a norm”, that is to say, he is concerned “with the 
norms within this formation [of the bourgeois public sphere] that foster and 
propel progressive thought and practice”, and in terms of global civil society, he 
focuses on “the normative dimension of the dignity of the person and on the 
latter’s freeing and empowering potential for individuals contra states if 
institutionalized and codified at the global level”.10 He goes on to say that in 
Owens’ argument “there is no systematic engagement with the limits of the 
‘rights’ conception of the political at national and post-national levels” and 
suggests that this lack of engagement with rights discourse is an inheritance of 
the same in Arendt: 
“…without greater engagement with the liberal discourse of rights, 
with the codification of international law, and with the necessary 
relations between the institution of human rights and state action, 
[Owens’] critique limits the contemporary terms of liberal politics. I 
am … not persuaded that such engagement is possible through Arendt 
given her own normative distinctions.”11 
A critical international theorist who believes an engagement with the liberal 
discourse of rights is possible through Arendt’s writings is Seyla Benhabib, who 
 
8 Richard Beardsworth, 2008. ‘Arendt and the Critique of Moralism’. International Politics 45. 
pp.506–513. 
9 Beardsworth, Arendt and the Critique of Moralism. p.510. 
10 Beardsworth, Arendt and the Critique of Moralism. p.510. 
11 Beardsworth, Arendt and the Critique of Moralism. p. 513. Emphasis in original. 
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reads her as standing in a tradition of Kantian cosmopolitanism, or what might 
be called a rigorist interpretation of his metaphysics of morals, arguing that 
“Arendt must consider the human being … as having a legal status that ought to 
be protected by international law.”12 We shall consider Benhabib’s reading of 
Arendt in the next chapter, but here, it is appropriate to consider her reading of 
Kant. Benhabib describes her own work as standing in a “Kantian morally 
constructivist tradition”, in which: 
“…rights claims are not about what ‘exists;’ rather, we [in the Kantian 
morally constructivist tradition] ask whether our [human beings’] lives 
together within, outside and betwixt polities ought not to be guided 
by mutually and reciprocally guaranteed immunities, constraints upon 
actions, and by legitimate access to certain goods and resources. 
Rights are not about what there is but about the kind of world we 
reasonably ought to want to live in.”13 
Separately from actual rights claims and rights, Benhabib goes on in the next 
paragraph to discuss Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, where the “one basic right” 
he proposes is described also as “the principle of right” which “establishes how a 
juridico-civil order can come into existence that would be in compliance with 
the moral law”.14 She then explains how a discourse-theoretic justification of 
Kant’s principle of right works: 
“The emphasis now shifts from what each can will to be valid for all 
via a thought experiment, to those justificatory processes through 
which you and I in dialogue, must convince each other of the validity 
of certain norms—by which I mean ‘general rules of action.’”15 
Benhabib is standing here in a Habermasian tradition in which Kant’s principle of 
right arrived at via a thought-experiment is assented to, retained, and fed into 
dialogue with another in which the other must be convinced of the validity of 
certain norms, ‘general rules of action’, through rational argument. We shall 
consider Habermas in some more detail below; for now, let us keep in mind 
Benhabib’s assent to and retention of what she reads Kant as saying in his 
 
12 Seyla Benhabib and Robert Post, 2006. Another Cosmopolitanism. Oxford University Press. 
p.14. 
13 Seyla Benhabib, 2013. ‘Reason-Giving and Rights-Bearing: Constructing the Subject of Rights’. 
Constellations 20(1). pp.38–50. 
14 Benhabib, Reason-Giving and Rights-Bearing. p.39. 
15 Benhabib, Reason-Giving and Rights-Bearing. p.39. 
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Metaphysics of Morals and consider how this relates to politics. In The Rights of 
Others and Another Cosmopolitanism, Benhabib addresses what she sees as a 
fundamental contradiction between democratic self-determination and 
cosmopolitan norms of justice through a consideration of Kant’s ‘three definitive 
articles’ in his Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch—‘The Civil Constitution 
of Every State Should be Republican’; ‘The Law of Nations Shall be Founded on a 
Federation of Free States’; and ‘The Law of World Citizenship Shall be Limited 
to Conditions of Universal Hospitality’—with a particular focus upon universal 
hospitality. From her reading of the Metaphysics of Morals, Benhabib argues that 
hospitality is not to be understood here as a virtue of sociability but as a right 
inhering in human beings as such, insofar as citizens in republics are all potential 
participants in a “republican cosmopolitical order”.16 She sees an ambivalence in 
what Kant is saying as to whether hospitality is a moral right of human beings in 
the deontological sense of a duty that we owe to one another, or a juridical 
right in the sense of being an enforceable norm of behaviour. Understanding it 
today to be a voluntarily incurred obligation on the part of states, Benhabib 
argues that the challenge is “how to create quasi-legally binding obligations 
through voluntary commitments and in the absence of an overwhelming 
sovereign power with the ultimate right of enforcement.”17 Distinguishing 
between two conceptions of sovereignty, ‘Westphalian’ and ‘liberal 
international’ (more or less corresponding to what, in terms of international 
society, the English School call pluralism and solidarism), and interpreting Kant’s 
Perpetual Peace as both paving the way for a transition from the former to the 
latter and as laying the foundations for a “post-Westphalian legal order”, 
Benhabib is still careful to acknowledge Kant’s “extremely important move” in 
arguing that any such international or global order would necessarily consist of 
republics with their own discrete legal orders in which persons could be citizens 
in the first place.18 A world government, for Kant, as distinct from a federative 
union of republics, would be a “soulless despotism”, thus he limits his 
conception of world citizenship to conditions of universal hospitality.19 But 
 
16 Benhabib and Post, Another Cosmopolitanism. p.23. 
17 Benhabib and Post, Another Cosmopolitanism. p.23; Cf. Seyla Benhabib, 2004. The Rights of 
Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens. Cambridge University Press. p.28. 
18 Benhabib and Post, Another Cosmopolitanism. pp.23–24. 
19 Benhabib and Post, Another Cosmopolitanism. p.24. 
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despite acknowledging the extreme importance for Kant of a world consisting of 
discrete republics in terms of securing perpetual peace, Benhabib indicates at 
various places her own ambivalence about his position on this. One example may 
be seen when she seems to imply a lack of civic republican vision in Kant and 
emphasises Arendt’s vision with seeming disapproval instead: “Arendt, though a 
Kantian in moral theory, remains committed to a civic republican vision of 
political self-determination.”20 Not unaware of the philosophical perplexities 
involved here, Benhabib insists “on the necessary disjunction as well as the 
necessary mediation between the moral and the ethical, the moral and the 
political”, and asks “How can one mediate moral universalism with ethical 
particularism? How can one mediate legal and political norms with moral ones? 
Such a strategy of mediation is crucial to reclaiming dialogical universalism.”21 
We shall consider Benhabib’s political theory of mediations and dialogical 
universalism below, but here it is appropriate to mention that she also gives a 
Kantian morally constructivist argument in Another Cosmopolitanism as to the 
provenance of cosmopolitan norms: 
“Briefly, such norms and principles are morally constructive: they 
create a universe of meaning, values, and social relations that had not 
existed before by changing the normative constituents and evaluative 
principles of the world of ‘objective spirit’, to use Hegelian language 
… Cosmopolitan norms, of which ‘crimes against humanity’ is the most 
significant, create such new moral facts by opening novel spaces for 
signification, meaning, and rearticulation in human relations.”22 
Engaged with the world as it is, this would certainly come under Beardsworth’s 
conception of critical philosophy, but given that Benhabib admits that 
cosmopolitan norms and principles are independent of actual political societies, 
a question remains as to how citizens could ever understand them as quasi-
legally binding obligations to others. As Jeremy Waldron argues, citizens of 
political societies “are able to identify law as a concrete artifact of their 
politics”, and although cosmopolitan norms and principles apply to the people of 
the world, they “[do] not seem to be ‘ownable’ by them in the same sort of 
 
20 Benhabib and Post, Another Cosmopolitanism. p.15. Arendt’s position vis-à-vis Kant’s moral 
theory we shall consider in the next chapter. 
21 Benhabib and Post, Another Cosmopolitanism. p.19. 
22 Benhabib and Post, Another Cosmopolitanism. pp.72–73. 
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way.”23 Unlike Benhabib, who reads Kant’s writings on hospitality as being about 
relations between individuals and states, Waldron understands them to be about 
relations between people and peoples. Although he does not say so explicitly 
here, it seems to me (and Benhabib) that Waldron is reading hospitality in Kant’s 
third article as a virtue of sociability in human beings.24 Noting the historical 
context in which Perpetual Peace was written—a time of European colonial 
exploitation in which Kant criticised Europeans in America, Africa and the Indies 
for “drinking wrongfulness like water”—Waldron argues that Kant’s general point 
in the third article is that “in spite of the manifest potential for injustice and in 
spite of the actual experience of injustice, there is nothing inherently unjust or 
inappropriate about individually initiated contacts among peoples.”25 Waldron 
would seek to expand on Kant’s understanding of hospitality so that it covered 
contemporary modes of travel, contact and commerce, “the myriad [and 
mundane] processes by which humans, at all levels of social organisation, all 
over the world, come into direct or indirect contact with one another.”26 Law, 
argues Waldron, involves not only commands or sanctions but also customs and 
practices, and this includes more recently evolving customs “growing out of but 
also constituting a social order and a shared and mutually expressible sense that 
our interactions with others are governed by norms, even when there is no one 
to enforce them”, and he is wary of attempts by philosophers at “the 
thunderous imposition of positive law from on high”.27 
Benhabib notes that much of the disagreement between she and Waldron 
centres upon interpreting Kant’s doctrine of ius cosmopoliticum, “which can be 
rendered into English as ‘cosmopolitan right’ or ‘cosmopolitan law’.”28 On 
Benhabib’s reading, Kant articulates in the first article a set of universal 
standards by which all civil constitutions are to be deemed legitimate, “thereby 
piercing the shield of state sovereignty”, and in the second article, she regards 
 
23 Jeremy Waldron, 2016. ‘Cosmopolitan Norms’. Benhabib and Post, Another Cosmopolitanism. 
pp.86–87. 
24 Martha Nussbaum recounts a moving story about this virtue of sociability in Kant himself, who 
called it his ‘sense of humanity’. Martha C. Nussbaum, 1997. ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’. 
The Journal of Political Philosophy 5(1). p.13n39. 
25 Waldron, Cosmopolitan Norms. p.90. 
26 Waldron, Cosmopolitan Norms. p.90. Emphasis in original. 
27 Waldron, Cosmopolitan Norms. pp.93 and 96. 
28 Benhabib and Post. Another Cosmopolitanism. p.148. 
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him as pushing the law of nations toward a model of constitutionalization, “that 
is, toward the subjection of all sovereigns to a common source of law”.29 Against 
this background, she argues, the third article “ascribes to the individual the 
status of being a right-bearing person in a world civil society or a 
weltbuergerliche Gesellschaft”, that “the discourse of hospitality moves from 
the language of morals to that of juridical right” and that Waldron is surely 
wrong to be reading hospitality in Kant’s Perpetual Peace in a non-state centred 
way as a virtue of sociability in human beings qua people and peoples.30  
Whereas Waldron would have us understand hospitality in terms of our everyday 
social activities in the world, Benhabib seeks to extend its meaning beyond 
Kant’s so that it refers to all human rights claims which are cross-border in 
scope, and using the republican theories of both Rousseau and Kant as a 
heuristic devices, she points to some tensions within contemporary liberal 
democracies which could affect such claims: whereas ‘strong liberals’ would 
argue for political society to have pre-commitments to a list of human rights, 
‘strong democrats’ would argue that such a pre-political understanding of rights 
must be open to debate between democratic citizens, although “admittedly 
within certain limits”.31 Whilst accepting that these tensions between ‘strong 
liberals’ and ‘strong democrats’ cannot be fully resolved, Benhabib offers 
“normative and institutional solutions to the paradoxes of democratic 
legitimacy”, arguing that the impact of tensions between ‘strong liberals’ and 
‘strong democrats’ may nevertheless be mitigated through negotiations, 
renegotiations, iterations, and reiterations of these dual commitments and, in a 
move away from the more formalistic accounts of democratic legitimacy in 
discourse theory, uses Derrida’s work in the philosophy of language to develop 
her theory of democratic iterations: 
“In the process of repeating a term or concept, we never simply 
produce a replica of the original usage and its intended meaning: 
rather, every repetition is a form of variation. Every iteration 
transforms meaning, adds to it, enriches it in ever-so-subtle ways … 
every act of iteration might be assumed to refer to an antecedent 
that is taken to be authoritative. The iteration and interpretation of 
 
29 Benhabib and Post. Another Cosmopolitanism. p.149. 
30 Benhabib and Post. Another Cosmopolitanism. pp.148–149. 
31 Benhabib and Post. Another Cosmopolitanism. p.33. 
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norms, and of every aspect of the universe of value, however, is never 
merely an act of repetition. Every iteration involves making sense of 
an authoritative original in a new and different context. The 
antecedent thereby is reposited and resignified via subsequent usages 
and references. Meaning is enhanced and transformed; conversely, 
when the creative appropriation of that authoritative original ceases 
or stops making sense, then the original loses its authority on us as 
well. Iteration is the reappropriation of the “origin”; it is at the same 
time its dissolution as the original and its preservation through its 
continuous deployment … Democratic iterations are linguistic, legal, 
cultural, and political repetitions-in-transformation, invocations that 
also are revocations. They not only change established understandings 
but also transform what passes as valid or established view of an 
authoritative precedent.”32 
In terms of political/legal ‘repetitions-in-transformation’, Benhabib introduces 
her conception of “jurisgenerative processes”, drawing upon the following 
argument from legal scholar Robert Cover: 
“The uncontrolled character of meaning [in a liberal society] 
exercises a destabilising influence upon power. Precepts must ‘have 
meaning’, but they necessarily borrow it from materials created by 
social activity that is not subject to the strictures of provenance that 
characterize what we call formal law-making.”33 
 This “disjunction between law as power and law as meaning can be rendered 
fruitful and creative in politics through jurisgenerative processes”, which occur 
when “a democratic people … engages in iterative acts” by reappropriating and 
reinterpreting its guiding norms and principles, “thereby showing itself to be not 
only the subject but also the author of the laws”.34 This works using Rousseau’s 
and Kant’s republican theories as heuristic devices because, unlike republican 
theories which derive from natural law or right, they are not impervious to 
“transformative acts of popular collective will”.35 “Jurisgenerative politics” thus 
“permits us to think of creative interventions that mediate between universal 
norms and the will of democratic majorities” and, if these iterations of a 
democratic people, or democratic majorities, or democratic citizens, or ‘ours’, 
are productive or creative, result in “the augmentation of the meaning of rights 
claims” and “the growth of the political authorship by ordinary individuals, who 
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thereby make these rights their own by democratically deploying them”.36 As 
noted earlier, the validity of universal, cosmopolitan norms depend upon 
conclusions reached by philosophers. This means that for Benhabib—
notwithstanding the fact that they fall within “every aspect of the universe of 
value”—they are entirely independent of, and so not subjected to, the 
contingent processes of citizens’ democratic iterations, which she acknowledges 
may themselves give rise to “sterile, legalistic or populistic jurisgenerative 
processes” where no normative learning takes place, and she suggests that we 
may refer to such processes as “jurispathic”.37 Nevertheless, Benhabib argues 
that her theory still allows for successful mediations between universal norms 
and self-determination within liberal democracies. 
The theory of democratic iterations is further explained by way of two 
examples, one of which is l’affaire du foulard: the ongoing controversies around 
the wearing of Muslim headscarves in France. On 27th November 1989, the 
Conseil D’Etat sought to protect both the citizens’ freedom of religion and 
conscience as well as the French constitutional principle of laïcité (a strong 
commitment to state neutrality towards all kinds of religious practices, 
institutionalised through the removal of sectarian religious symbols from the 
public sphere) by ruling that the judgment as to whether or not specific 
instances of the wearing of religious symbols in schools was confrontational or 
remonstrative lay with the school authorities rather than the students 
themselves. Benhabib regards some of the actions of the three girls who touched 
off the controversy as democratic iterations, resignifications of the meaning of 
wearing the headscarf. Through a sociological study of the affair, she notes that 
the girls’ voices themselves were hardly listened to in the ensuing debates and 
argues that to assume that their actions were instances of religious defiance or 
provocation constrains their capacities to write the meaning of their own actions 
in public. Moreover, in exercising these capacities, the girls would be involved in 
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learning processes where they would “have to learn to give a justification for 
their actions with ‘good reasons in the public sphere’.”38 At stake here for 
Benhabib is not the legitimacy of the law, but the democratic legitimacy of the 
judge’s decision: 
“I am not suggesting that legal norms should originate through 
collective discursive processes and outside the framework of legal 
institutions: the legitimacy of the law is not at stake in this example; 
rather, it is the democratic legitimacy of a lawful, but in my view, 
unwise and unfair decision that is at stake. It would have been both 
more democratic and fairer if the meaning of their actions were not 
simply dictated to these girls by their school authorities, and if they 
were given more of a public say in the interpretation of their own 
actions.”39 
We have already seen Benhabib acknowledge that democratic debates go on 
within certain limits, which, from this passage, I interpret her as meaning to 
include a “framework of legal institutions”, but it is unclear to me why this 
momentous point—had she not raised it, unwary readers might indeed have 
interpreted her theory as suggesting that legal norms should originate through 
collective discursive processes outside the framework of legal institutions—is 
dealt with so briefly, and nested in one of her examples rather than discussed in 
the first section, where she sets out her theory of democratic iterations.40 
However it may be, in the case of l’affaire du foulard, Benhabib is arguing that 
it is the democratic legitimacy of the ruling which is at stake, i.e. the ruling that 
the school authorities rather than the students should be judging whether any 
particular instance of religious-symbol wearing by students was provocative and 
disturbing of others’ education. This of course is a highly contentious example, 
and while the jurisgenerative politics and democratic iterations which Benhabib 
construes as being involved in l’affaire du foulard may not have produced 
outcomes that all French citizens would want to endorse, she argues that it still 
attests to a “dialectic between constitutional essentials and the actual politics 
of political liberalism”, or between rights and identities, in which both the 
meaning of rights claims and identities themselves are transformed in a 
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discursive process that mediates between cosmopolitan norms and principles on 
the one hand and the self-understanding of democratic republics on the other.41 
1.2.2 An Intellectual History of Critical International Theory 
Richard Devetak is another critical international theorist who is very much 
interested in promoting better human relations, but he is sceptical about 
universalist impositions made by philosophers. In his Critical International 
Theory: An Intellectual History, Devetak provides a contextualist account of the 
emergence of critical theory in the study of international relations and recovers 
a different mode of critique which is more attuned to history and less to 
philosophical abstraction, but before we discuss this historical mode of critique, 
let us consider his account of the philosophical sources upon which critical 
international theorists often draw. 
Kant is an important founding figure for critical theory as it is practised today, 
who intended to overcome the empiricist and metaphysical philosophies of his 
day in such a way as to elevate (his account of) morality vis-à-vis politics, and 
key to this task for him was the establishment of secure epistemological 
foundations for the reasoning or inquiring subject. Rejecting empiricist 
arguments that all knowledge derives from experience, as well as metaphysical 
arguments that knowledge can be attained of things which are outside of 
experience, Kant developed his transcendental philosophy, arguing that the 
conditions of possibility for all knowledge reside in the conceptual structures or 
categories of the mind. His transcendental philosophy, as Devetak says, can be 
understood as “a form of critique concerned with the epistemic conditions under 
which the reasoning human subject attains a pure intelligence, detached from 
experience”, and it is on the basis of his transcendental philosophy that he 
developed his moral theory: 
“…for Kant, only a philosophy grounded a priori in pure reason could 
develop pure moral concepts and unconditional moral rules that would 
‘hold for all rational beings’ … His task was to produce subjects 
capable of intellectually comporting themselves in such a way that 
they could achieve access to knowledge through pure reason, 
unhindered by historical or empirical circumstances. Once achieved, 
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the comportment would enable the subject to pay ‘tribute to 
morality’ as a requirement of ‘a true system of politics’.”42    
For Kant, civil philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf 
remained ‘pre-critical’ since their theories were tied to the real world rather 
than rational wills or universal reason, whereas his own metaphysic of morals 
was meant to be understood as an a priori condition of all politics. 
Enlightenment, on Kant’s telling, was ‘man’s’ emergence from his unwillingness 
to use this reason. In his essay responding to the question ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’, he adopted a phrase from the Roman poet Horace, sapere 
aude, to use as a slogan for Enlightenment, which as Devetak (and indeed Kant) 
points out, reads in translation ‘dare to be wise’, although it is sometimes 
rendered as ‘dare to know’ or ‘have the courage to use your own 
understanding’, and Kant also saw the philosopher as having an important social 
role to play in the Enlightenment in terms of making universal reason, as he 
understood it, public.43 In his own words, he recognised “the right of every 
people to give itself a civil constitution of the kind that it sees fit, without 
interference from other powers”, but regarded it as part of the philosopher’s 
role to have citizens grasp, on the basis of the demands set out in his 
metaphysics of morals, that it is in the very nature of civil constitutions to be 
peaceable and that “there is the aim, which is also a duty, of submitting to 
those conditions by which war, the source of all evils and moral corruption, can 
be prevented.”44 Preventing war is, of course, a highly commendable aim and 
duty, but not only does ‘duty’ take on a special, metaphysical meaning in Kant’s 
philosophy which it seems not all citizens can grasp; it is also the case that this 
meaning is not in touch with history or experience such that this ‘duty’ can be 
straightforwardly or indeed peacefully met. Kant of course recognised this, and 
it is why we see his name appear sometimes in the just war tradition.45 His 
Perpetual Peace is understood by Devetak in this metaphysical context: 
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“[the third article] is a call for a radical rethinking of the normative 
principles upon which all politics are organized … what is clear is that 
Kant employed university metaphysics to cultivate an enlightened 
persona capable of governing themselves according to the principles 
of reason and cosmopolitan morality arrived at through transcendental 
philosophy … By reshaping the subject’s ethical comportment so as to 
produce an intellectual persona induced to obey the demands of the 
metaphysics of morals, Kant could posit an imagined future, 
unconstrained by empirical or historical realities, in which politics and 
international relations would be an extension of his metaphysics of 
morals.”46  
G.W.F. Hegel is another important source for critical theory as it is practiced 
today and who also had a philosophical focus upon the reasoning subject, but he 
rejected Kant’s transcendental conception because it emptied reason and ethics 
of substantive content and treated them in abstraction from actual political 
societies. For Hegel, both the subject and object of knowledge are products of 
history and “he saw his task as bringing Kant’s critical philosophy to completion 
by reconfiguring reason and human subjectivity as necessarily conditioned by 
historical actuality.”47 For Hegel, reason itself has a history and he thought he 
could see it unfolding in the course of events through a series of oppositions 
resolving themselves into higher syntheses in a dialectical movement; he 
believed, as he put it, that “what is rational is actual and what is actual is 
rational” and regarded events in his own time, including the French Revolution 
and the Napoleonic wars, as representing the transition to a new era in which 
reason and history could be reconciled.48 Unlike Kant, he argued that the object 
of knowledge, the ‘thing-in-itself’, could be known, and it was the philosopher’s 
task to get beyond appearances and attain this knowledge of reality. But like 
Kant, he also believed the philosopher had an important social role to play in the 
world. Devetak argues that, in Hegel’s work: 
“… the philosopher’s task is conceived as the dialectical mediation of 
a range of oppositions reflecting the basic opposition between the 
rational and philosophical on the one hand, and the actual and 
sociological on the other … the historical consciousness Hegel wished 
to cultivate is not focused on grasping the past by the marshalling of 
empirical evidence, but on the adoption of a particular intellectual 
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comportment laying claim to powerful normative and hermeneutic 
forms of reasoning that, according to critical philosophy, can discern 
the meaning and direction of history.”49 
The philosopher on Hegel’s account is indispensable to the modern state, being 
the one who can decipher the dialectical process through which the reason 
embedded in history is actualised and freedom stimulated. He provided a 
philosophical account of the state as “a quasi-divine expression of reason and 
freedom” which endeared him to the Prussian authorities, and following his 
death in 1831, his legacy was carried forward on both the left and the right by a 
group known as the Young Hegelians.50 
Karl Marx was a Young Hegelian and although later in life he would often 
criticise the ‘idealism’ of Hegelian philosophy, he seems never to have entirely 
abandoned it in his own writings. His famous architectural metaphor may suggest 
a purely ‘materialist’ history and an economic determinism, but Marx also 
referred often to the totality of our social existence, which included a 
dialectical relation between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’.51 With his dialectical 
philosophy of the social totality, Devetak argues, “history becomes a story of 
reified abstractions in which classes, relations of production, or social structures 
replace real people as the bearers of freedom or necessity.”52 Although he saw 
his task as one of recovering a conception of ‘man’ undistorted by philosophical 
abstractions, Marx never relinquished some of Hegel’s ideas concerning the 
development of human consciousness or the attainment of knowledge of the 
‘thing-in-itself’, but unlike Hegel, he emphasised in his language of materialism 
the importance of the economic ‘base’. His efforts at removing ‘distorted’ 
conceptions of ‘man’ relied, as Michael Freeden says, on his theory of ideology, 
which itself relied: 
“…on the crucial distinction between true consciousness and distorted 
or false beliefs. In order to claim that our understanding of the 
(political) world is based on an illusion, we must be confident that 
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non-illusory knowledge [of it] is attainable. Marx believed that truth 
would emerge once distortion was removed … That truth could be 
conclusively excavated … was a non-negotiable assumption.”53 
Freeden finds value in Marx’s (Hegelian) dialectical method of excavation and he 
also notes that it has become of importance even to non-Marxists: “the 
enterprise of decoding … structures, contexts and motives”; ideologies “that … 
contain levels of meaning that are hidden from their consumers and, frequently, 
from their producers as well.”54 This enterprise appears to fall to the philosopher 
or critical theorist who has discerned the meaning or direction of history over 
and above the mere thoughts, words and deeds of actual human beings, and 
moreover, it is the material or economic aspect of this (philosophy of) history 
which Marx thought was the only one worth studying. As Devetak says: 
“… to the extent that history was used by Marx, it was largely 
instrumental and always subservient to the theoretical needs of a 
[thoroughly dialectical] narrative in which man discovers, with the 
guidance of [dialectical] philosophy, the path from alienation and 
human suffering to communism.”55  
Events of the twentieth century, including the enormities of communism as it 
was practised, led to a collapse of confidence in Enlightenment projects in some 
circles, including amongst a group of scholars known collectively as The 
Frankfurt School. These scholars widened the scope of critique beyond Marx’s 
materialist concerns, analysing various elements of the ‘superstructure’ with the 
intention of transforming the social conditions of advanced industrial societies in 
an emancipatory direction. Enlightenment thought was still regarded as a crucial 
source by many of these scholars in terms of redeeming critical philosophy and 
its analysis of society, seen for example in Horkheimer’s claim that “the battle 
cries of the Enlightenment … are valid now more than ever”, but it is perhaps in 
the work of Habermas that we find the best example of its deployment in the 
Frankfurt School.56 Habermas has remained close to a Young Hegelian 
historicized perspective on philosophy throughout most of his career and, as 
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Devetak notes, his “reconstructed historical materialism” also involved the 
addition of a normative, Kantian element which amongst other things shaped his 
critique of positivism in the social sciences in his Knowledge and Human 
Interests.57 Quoting from this text, Devetak gives an account of Habermas’ 
critique of positivism: 
“What started out in Kant as a philosophy of critical reflection had 
been progressively ‘abandoned’, said Habermas, as the theory of 
knowledge gave way to ‘a methodology emptied of philosophical 
thought’ … As epistemology is ‘flattened out to methodology’, the 
normative and practical concerns evident in the classical conception 
of politics, in which politics is viewed as the continuation of ethics, 
are rendered ‘unscientific’. Since Aristotle, as Habermas points out, 
the classical conception of politics has developed on the basis that its 
knowledge claims ‘cannot be compared … with rigorous science or 
apodictic episteme’. But with the rise of positivism, according to 
Habermas’ philosophical history, the scientific episteme colonised the 
social sciences as well. Here Habermas’s history of philosophy accords 
key features of the stories told by Kant and the Frankfurt School.”58 
Regardless of whether his history of philosophy or philosophical history is right or 
wrong, in opposing positivism in the social sciences, Habermas set out what he 
called a “transcendental pragmatism”, in which pragmatic conditions of 
possibility are seen as structures of experience and action rather than structures 
of the mind (as in Kant), with arguments in social and political life being carried 
on within these structures.59 Crucial to the validity-claims of a speaker on this 
account is the process of argumentation itself within shared structures of 
meaning, which Habermas was to develop further in his Theory of 
Communicative Action, where he sets out a dialogical approach to normative 
issues, commonly known as discourse ethics (which I think Benhabib referred to 
above as dialogical universalism). As Devetak describes it, discourse ethics is 
“essentially a deliberative, consent-oriented approach to resolving political 
issues within a moral framework”, built upon the need for justifying one’s 
actions to another in terms that they can accept or contest on a rational basis.60 
It is committed to Kant’s cognitivism as well as to his arguments about the 
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public use of reason in terms of securing the legitimacy of one’s claims, with any 
new norms, principles or institutional arrangements only securing validity if they 
meet with the approval of all who would be affected by them. As Devetak notes, 
discourse ethics is built upon a model of liberal civil society Habermas had 
originally set out in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 
rejecting notions of morality that rested upon conceptions of ‘the good life’ and 
being guided instead by a notion of ‘procedural fairness’: “it is thus more 
concerned with the method of justifying moral principles than with the 
substantive content of those principles.”61 Although Habermas has described his 
work from The Theory of Communicative Action onwards as being part of what 
he calls “post-metaphysical thinking”, Devetak argues that his theory of 
discourse ethics remains a dialectical philosophy, with Kant’s rational beings 
having been replaced with purportedly concrete actors in dialogue with one 
another achieving higher agreement over universal norms, and with little 
reference to concrete actors in the real world, whether private citizens or those 
holding public office.62 Regarding the latter, Devetak notes that: 
“The presumption inherent to discourse ethics is that the specific 
offices of the statesman, the legislator, or the diplomat reflect one-
sided ethical or problem-solving perspectives in need of sublation by 
critical or universal moral reason.”63 
Through his contextual account of some of its most eminent philosophical 
sources, Devetak sees a mode of critique in critical international theory as it is 
practised today which privileges metaphysics (or post-metaphysics) in one form 
or another over civic responsibilities, presupposing what the purpose and 
method of theory should be and recasting the intellectual persona of the critical 
international theorist. Political structures, whether domestic, international, or 
global, are taken in this mode of critique to be either reflections or realisations 
of universal principles rather than the contingent historical products of those 
actually holding public office, and “to the extent that the words and deeds of 
such actors are taken into account, they are considered empirical domains of 
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knowledge in need of philosophical treatment through acts of theoretical 
abstraction.”64  
Devetak is concerned about an impression in IPT that theory is the provenance of 
philosophy and that philosophy alone is to decide what counts as ‘theory’ and 
what qualifies as ‘critical’, drawing upon Nietzsche to criticise philosophers’ 
lack of historical sense and calling upon critical international theory to “pluralise 
its theoretical strategies by taking history and historiography more seriously”.65 
In taking them seriously, he looks at receptions of the Enlightenment, 
distinguishing between conventionalist and revisionist historiographies, and 
through the latter, traces a line of intellectual descent feeding into it from the 
Renaissance humanists who had developed new historical methods of study so as 
to enhance conditions of political society, with his overall aim being to recover 
this neglected historical mode of critique for critical international theorists. The 
recovery itself is carried out in the final chapter, through a consideration of 
Robert Cox’s article, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’.66 Cox holds a 
somewhat anomalous position within critical international theory for disavowing 
the work of the Frankfurt School in his writings, even as his ‘critical vs. problem-
solving’ distinction bore an accidental resemblance to Horkheimer’s ‘critical vs. 
traditional’ one.67 Devetak observes that Cox drew upon a variety of intellectual 
sources and in some of these we can see a mode of critique distinct from the 
philosophical strains informing critical international theory today. 
The recovery of this mode begins with a consideration of some conventionalist 
historiographies of the Enlightenment—those of Habermas, Jonathan Israel and 
Reinhart Koselleck—which in their different ways according to Devetak construe 
the movement as a unitary phenomenon, “a normative-philosophical project to 
develop critical, moral, and democratic forms of reason oriented to the 
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subjugation of state reason and the liberation of humankind.”68 Devetak argues 
that the historiographies he considers here, despite their obvious differences, 
are underpinned by a dialectical philosophy of history in one form or another, 
with Kant often featuring as the exemplary representative of enlightenment, 
and he emphasises that there are alternative historical accounts of this period 
for critical international theorists to consider. Of these alternative 
historiographies, Devetak turns first of all to Ian Hunter’s, who argues that the 
Kantian account of enlightenment was “the outgrowth of Protestant university 
metaphysics” and was fundamentally opposed to the civil and jurisprudential 
enlightenment as expressed in thinkers such as Pufendorf and Christian 
Thomasius, which was an enlightenment “predicated on the need … to disavow 
the rationalist ambition (from Leibniz to Wolff) of unifying morality and politics 
in a single philosophy capable of restoring the world and its thought to unity.”69 
He then considers the work of J.G.A Pocock, who argued that a civil 
enlightenment may be traced back to Hobbes, which was “predicated on 
encouraging ‘certain self-limitations of the human mind’, a moderating effect 
intended to combat claims to higher moral truths”.70 Finally, drawing on the 
work of Jonathan Green, Devetak also gives account of the work of Friedrich 
Gentz, a student of Kant’s.71 Having spent some time in the civil service and 
reading the literature of the Scottish Enlightenment, Gentz advocated an 
Enlightenment project grounded in a deeper understanding of the maintenance 
and development of political societies.72 But Kantian philosophers were so 
successful in “writing the history of philosophy in their own critical image” that 
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the civil and jurisprudential enlightenment “was conveniently marginalized, 
discarded, or dialectically sublated”, and through giving account of these 
revisionist historiographies, Devetak recovers this understanding of the 
enlightenment—or as Pocock argues, multiple enlightenments—in which its key 
figures are far less interested in metaphysical abstractions than in “mundane 
practices and institutions of government that can clarify civil rights and duties, 
protect freedoms, and secure social peace.”73 
Having recovered this neglected enlightenment for critical international 
theorists, Devetak reaches further back in history to consider some of their 
intellectual sources in the Renaissance. Noting first of all the revival at this time 
of the Ciceronian curriculum of the studia humanitatis which “were intended to 
cultivate the civilizing practices through which peace, liberty and free 
government were to be achieved”, he goes on to give account of the work of 
several Renaissance humanists in terms of the development of new reading 
techniques and contextualist methods which served a variety of public ends and 
were in sharp contrast to the excessive logicising and theologising of the 
scholastics.74 He then traces the work of the humanists he considers, and the 
more historical and secular understanding of the world to which it gave rise, into 
the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where it found further 
development in natural law thinkers such as Pufendorf and political theorists 
such as Jean Bodin, before going on to provide a more detailed example of this 
historical mode of critique in the work of Giambattista Vico, a major intellectual 
influence on Cox.  
What Devetak recovers in his text is a theory programme “in which being critical 
is not predicated on the mastery of dialectical-philosophical methods capable of 
problematizing the self, but on the mastery of the studia humanitatis, including 
the liberal arts curriculum and the ars historica, as a practical engagement with 
public affairs guided by the ethical imperative of civility.”75 He points out in his 
text that he is not dismissing philosophy tout court, but is engaged in recovering 
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and defending this historical mode of critique which is all too easily overlooked 
by theorists who assume that philosophy, especially of the dialectical sort 
coming out of the Enlightenment, is the final arbiter when it comes to what 
counts as theory and what qualifies as critical. The theory programme that 
Devetak recovers implies “a pedagogical role to help practitioners as much as 
university students understand the complex historical and normative conditions 
of political action” and it proceeds by way of careful investigation of texts in 
history, not to discern or excavate the truth or otherwise of what was written, 
but to understand the uses to which texts have been put in particular contexts 
and with particular purposes.76 Such a programme, as Devetak says, uncovers 
neglected riches in our intellectual heritage: 
“By bringing ‘buried intellectual treasure’ back to the surface … the 
alternative critical international theory proposed here allows a more 
historically accurate sense of the present and what makes it 
distinctive or strange. Critical theory in historical mode is critical here 
not because it rejects philosophically or normatively grounded theory 
in toto, which it does not, but because it problematizes the 
assumption that dialectical, normative or social philosophies should 
govern our conception of theory.”77 
1.3 Persons 
1.3.1 Virtue Ethics in (and around) IPT 
In the previous section, we saw in Beardsworth’s work a concern around some 
postmodernists’ ‘ethics of radical passivity’ and their withdrawal of ‘the force of 
constructive thought from the public domain’, as well as his normative-
philosophical engagement within the horizon of world politics through a neo-
Marxist account of history and a defence of Habermasian cosmopolitanism. We 
also saw, in Benhabib’s work, a cosmopolitan project informed by her 
interpretations of Kant, Habermas and Derrida which seeks to mediate between 
cosmopolitan norms and the self-determination of republics through a discourse 
theory of democratic iterations, in which citizens of liberal democracies use 
their capacities to write the meaning of their own actions through learning 
processes in public settings with a view to augmenting the meaning of rights 
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claims, even as the possibility remains that these democratic iterations may 
involve what she calls jurispathic processes in which no normative learning takes 
place. Finally, we saw in Devetak’s work a contextualist account of the 
philosophers who have inspired the work of Beardsworth, Benhabib and many 
other critical international theorists, in which he argued that these philosophers 
understood the enlightened subject to have grasped pure moral concepts and/or 
the direction and meaning of history, and that philosophers had an important 
role to play in transforming society in an emancipatory direction. Sceptical of 
these philosophers’ claims about ‘the enlightened subject’, and the universalist 
impositions of philosophers more generally, Devetak recovered a historical mode 
of critique deriving from the studia humanitatis in which ‘the words and deeds 
of actors are taken into account’ without the need for ‘philosophical treatment 
through acts of theoretical abstraction’ and with the cultivation of a civic 
persona much more attentive to the real world and real human relations than it 
is to metaphysics (or post-metaphysics). 
Despite differences between the work of these critical international theorists, at 
least one of the things holding them together seems to me to be a shared 
concern, in Beardsworth’s words, to promote, in one way or another, better 
human relations, and such a concern I think is commonly understood to be an 
ethical one. But do these critical international theorists share an ethical 
approach? What is behind the ‘force of constructive thought’ which 
Beardsworth’s ideational framework is set up to enable in critical philosophers? 
What, in Benhabib’s theory, are the capacities being used by citizens to write 
the meaning of their own actions through learning processes in public settings 
that, on the one hand, may augment the meaning of rights claims, but on the 
other, founder in processes which are jurispathic? What is involved, for Devetak, 
in the cultivation of a civic persona? 
In their chapter on virtue ethics in the Oxford Handbook, Steven Torrente and 
Harry Gould rightly note that IPT is currently dominated by two general 
approaches to ethics: a Kantian or deontological approach and a utilitarian or 
consequentialist one.78 Citing an article of Martha Nussbaum’s which argues that 
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virtue ethics is a misleading (or confused and confusing) category since the 
Kantians and utilitarians also had a lot to say about the virtues and we would be 
much better off characterising the substantive views of each thinker and then 
deciding what we want to say for ourselves instead, Torrente and Gould go on to 
give an account of deontology and consequentialism broadly conceived, i.e. as 
rules-based forms of ethical reasoning, and also virtue ethics as it is commonly 
understood, i.e. an approach which is not rules-based but person-centred and 
promotes the ethical development of persons and so better human relations.79 
Virtues are dispositions or qualities of character, such as wisdom, justice, 
courage and moderation (sometimes known as the ‘cardinal’ or ‘primary’ 
virtues: those from which it is said all other virtues derive), and proponents of 
virtue ethics, as Torrente and Gould say: 
“[insist] that the focus of moral evaluation and guidance should not be 
primarily discrete acts taken in isolation, nor moral quandaries (hard 
cases), but should be instead the character of agents … Rather than 
act evaluations, Virtue Ethics encourages us to engage in ‘aretaic 
person-appraisals’.”80 
The extent to which Kant’s concern for finding secure epistemological 
foundations for the reasoning subject remains a preoccupation of academics 
when it comes to ethics is suggested by Torrente and Gould in their discussion of 
an alleged antinomianism amongst early proponents of virtue ethics, as well as 
in their observation that this issue remains a question upon which many 
academics in the field focus their attention.81 The allegation from some ethical 
theorists was that virtue ethics suffered from a certain vagueness or an 
‘applicability problem’: “it could neither evaluate acts taken by agents nor 
guide agents in making morally appropriate decisions”.82 Deontology and 
utilitarianism, as Torrente and Gould say, also fail by their own terms in this 
regard, and as Julia Annas argues in relation to rules-based ethical approaches in 
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general, we neither have nor should want an ethical theory that “tells us what 
to do”, as though responsibility for our actions lay outside of ourselves in some 
theory, with no moral effort required on our part.83 
Deontology, as we know, is usually depicted as being primarily concerned with 
what is right and with right actions. In the first section of this chapter, we 
considered a dispute between Benhabib and Waldron over the interpretation of 
Kant’s ius cosmopoliticum, with the former reading it as a right inhering in 
human beings as such and the latter (seemingly) reading it as a virtue of 
sociability in human beings qua people or peoples. It seems to me that the 
dispute between Benhabib and Waldron is informed by Kant’s Metaphysics of 
Morals, which is divided into two sections: the ‘Doctrine of Right’ and the 
‘Doctrine of Virtue’, and as Nussbaum has argued: 
“The Doctrine of Virtue … is now widely discussed and widely 
regarded as central. Nobody can any longer think of Kant’s view as 
obsessed with duty and principle to the exclusion of character-
formation and the training of the passions … his account of virtue 
covers most of the same topics as do classical Greek accounts …  the 
rediscovery of Kant’s theory of virtue has … led to … scholars 
depict[ing] a Kant who is less rigorist and more flexible, less 
concerned with abstract principle and more concerned with the 
exercise of moral judgment…”84 
This is part of Nussbaum’s argument that we would be much better off 
characterising the substantive views of each thinker and deciding what we want 
to say for ourselves, rather than referring to generic approaches like deontology, 
consequentialism or ‘virtue ethics.’ But since we still often talk about them as 
generic approaches, let us return to the latter. In what Torrente and Gould have 
rightly called “an ineluctably and admirably aspirational aspect”, a very 
important feature of virtue ethics is that “it is built upon moral striving.”85 As 
Annas puts it: 
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“… [virtue ethics] has a built-in recognition of the point that the 
moral life is not static; it is always developing. When it comes to 
working out the right thing to do, we cannot shift the work to a 
theory, however excellent, because we, unlike the theories, are 
always learning, and so we are always aspiring to do better.”86 
Brown picks up on this developmental aspect of virtue ethics through a 
consideration of Aristotle’s work, and in doing so, he contrasts Greek ethical 
thought with what he (not unjustifiably) calls ‘Christian/Kantian thought’: 
“The Aristotelian virtues … certainly involve dispositions to act in 
certain ways, but these dispositions are consciously learned through 
the exercise of the human capacity to reason. In a given situation, it 
might seem that the virtuous man or woman will know instinctively 
what is the right thing to do, but this ‘instinct’ … is the product of an 
education in the virtues, something that only the trained mind can 
achieve. This, incidentally, is one of the big differences between 
Christian/Kantian and Greek ethical thought; in the former, simplicity 
is at the root of virtue, for the latter, virtue must be self-aware. To 
illustrate the point from modern cinema, the good-natured simpleton 
Forrest Gump always does the right thing and is a good person in the 
Christian/Kantian sense of the term even though unable to articulate 
clearly why he does what he does; for the Aristotelian, on the other 
hand, this inability would disqualify Forrest from being able to claim 
to be a virtuous person.”87 
As we have already seen from Nussbaum’s work, Brown’s claim here about 
‘Christian/Kantian thought’ is not as straightforward as it might seem, since 
Kant was (and many Christians are) indeed concerned with building character 
through education. We shall have occasion to consider Brown’s argument here in 
chapter three in some more detail, but for now, in returning to a discussion of 
virtue ethics in (and around) IPT, the developmental aspect of this approach is 
also brought out in the work of Fred Dallmayr. In his Post-Liberalism: Recovering 
a Shared World, we find an account of virtue ethics, or—in line with Nussbaum’s 
argument—what he also calls the Aristotelian tradition of virtuous praxis, as 
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manifest in the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre, Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. As Dallmayr says: 
“What is particularly important in Aristotle’s teaching is that virtuous 
life cannot be the life of a hermit or recluse, but requires a certain 
level of participation in public or political affairs. A further aspect 
(not always sufficiently appreciated) is the role of education or 
pedagogy, the fact that virtuous conduct has to be nurtured and 
cultivated in order to become steady and reliable … Human life, in 
this account, is seen as a movement or journey of ethical learning … 
that is stabilized by the ongoing practice of virtues.”88 
Elsewhere, Dallmayr extends his discussion of the virtues in a more cosmopolitan 
direction, but still emphasises the role that education or pedagogy must have in 
their development: 
“…what is urgently needed in our time is a strengthening of the 
dispositions conducive to cosmopolitan coexistence and collaboration, 
chiefly the dispositions of generosity, hospitality, mutuality, and 
striving for justice. This strengthening involves a large-scale 
pedagogical effort aiming at the steady transformation of narrow 
(national, ethnic, or religious) self-interest into a willingness to care 
for the common interest or ‘common good’ of humankind.”89 
Howsoever we might understand a transformation that is steady, let us return 
here to Dallmayr’s Post-Liberalism. In his review of MacIntyre’s After Virtue, he 
seems to agree with MacIntyre that there are numerous ways in which human 
beings may flourish, that even flourishing itself may be expressed in very 
different ways, and points out that humans also have the capacity for speech 
and deliberation, which can facilitate mutual understanding.90 He has some 
reservations, however, about the “metaphysical realism” informing the 
argument, seen in MacIntyre’s acceptance of Aristotle’s account of the human 
being as rational, “thereby completely sidelining the Heideggerian view of the 
‘ek-static’ quality of Dasein”.91 One of the corollaries of this acceptance that 
Dallmayr sees “is a certain centered (or anthropocentric) quality of 
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‘directedness’: human life is basically a self-directed, intentional pursuit—
irrespective of the interventions, irruptions or adventures happening along the 
way”.92 While it might be unclear precisely what Dallmayr’s critique of 
McIntyre’s argument is here, in a footnote to his observation, he mentions that 
MacIntyre makes passing reference to Paul Ricoeur, though without drawing any 
significant conclusions from what Ricoeur says, and then goes on himself to 
review Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another which, although also standing within the 
Aristotelian tradition of virtuous praxis, i.e. with an understanding of human life 
as being ‘self-directed’, pays close attention to self–other relations as well. 
Dallmayr construes Ricoeur’s argument as “a balancing act” which is “quasi-
dialectical” and “basically a reconciliation of modern Kantian-style deontology 
[i.e. focusing on the subject] with the trans-subjective and trans-modern polis-
perspective associated with Aristotle”.93 For Ricoeur, ethics in the 
comprehensive sense means “aiming at the ‘good life’ with and for others, in 
just institutions”, but his (more or less) Aristotelian account must also “pass 
through the sieve of the norm”, i.e. deontology, and due to the dilemmas or 
quandaries Ricoeur finds in deontology, he argues that it must finally cede place 
to “moral judgment in situation” or “practical wisdom”.94 After paying tribute to 
Ricoeur’s work for standing at the forefront of contemporary philosophical 
debates about ethics, Dallmayr questions why he resorted to deontology in his 
argument, regarding his combination of Kant and Aristotle—or what he also calls 
universalism and contextualism—as suggesting perhaps a misreading of the latter 
as a kind of shallow pragmatist or empiricist “neglectful of his ‘ontological’ 
depth dimension”.95 This leads into a discussion of Gadamer, who Dallmayr says 
“finds the meaning of Kantian moral formalism in the effort to preserve the 
purity of the moral will against all the empirical messiness deriving from 
contingent interests and inclinations”, and pays closer attention than Kant (or 
rigorist interpretations of his work) to our empirical messiness, or what Dallmayr 
also calls here “the motivating force of human inclination”.96 Gadamer 
recognises the worth of Aristotle’s ethics in this respect as involving “a steady 
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learning process where praxis is always oriented towards the telos of some 
good”, and Dallmayr describes this, “in more recent philosophical language”, as 
hermeneutical in the sense that the telos one pursues is intrinsic rather than 
extrinsic to action itself, “thus transforming and uplifting the learner or agent in 
turn.”97 In Gadamer’s account, ethical learning is always socially and historically 
conditioned; it always begins from within a given tradition or set of customs and 
practices where conduct is continually shaped through renewed hermeneutical 
reflections. Dallmayr further articulates Gadamer’s account by connecting it 
again with Aristotle’s language of virtue: 
“It is the ‘reflective’ agent, relying on practical wisdom (phronesis), 
who ponders the consequences of actions soberly and reforms them in 
light of the horizon of ‘goodness’ and wellness (eudaemonia). Here 
again, Aristotle emerges as the proper guide because he does not talk 
of moral doctrines but of ‘virtues’ and ‘goods’ which are the 
attributes of praxis. Instead of relying on abstract principles or 
maxims, Aristotelian ethics concentrates on the virtuous character 
and moral ‘being’ of agents…”.98 
Accounts of ethics such as Aristotle’s seem to avoid what Dallmayr calls 
elsewhere the “troubling remoteness of theoretical construction from lived 
practice”, yet later in his Post-Liberalism he “venture[s] into philosophical (and 
theological) terrain in an effort to discern the meaning of human situatedness in 
a place, a space or a ‘world’”, and uses Heidegger’s “metaphysical register” in 
speaking about ‘place’ and ‘no-place’.99 Still, he returns wisely, skilfully and 
safely from his venture back to lived practice in the final section of the 
concluding comments to Post-Liberalism, entitled ‘Learning to be Human’, a 
theme chosen by the 2018 World Congress of Philosophy, where he tells us that 
the theme: 
“ … invites us to think philosophically, but it also invites us to a 
practice or ‘doing’, namely, learning to be human … it asks for 
philosophers as human beings to inquire and learn what it means to be 
human … searching for the human involves a paradoxical balance of 
knowing and not-knowing, of tentative fore-knowledge and the need 
for further inquiry. The balance can easily be disrupted in two ways. 
Some searchers, frustrated by the difficulty, may decide to abandon 
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further inquiry as a hopeless and purely mystical exercise. On the 
other hand, over-confident thinkers—well versed in logic and 
epistemology—may settle for a robust definition or handy formula.”100 
Not unlike what we see in Beardsworth’s conception, this seems to me to be a 
worldly understanding of philosophy, i.e. one with an ethical orientation; but 
perhaps unlike Beardsworth’s conception, it is one that (often) focuses on the 
character of human beings. And such a focus is what Dallmayr suggests is the 
shift that is required if one wants to understand or develop Benhabib’s theory of 
democratic iterations, observing that, as it stands, it does not quite fit into the 
parameters set by a Kantian formalism or the sort of discourse theory inspired by 
Habermas.101 Political theorist Aletta Norval has such a focus in her engagement 
with Habermas’ The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, agreeing 
with much of his assessment of the decline of the bourgeois public sphere in late 
modernity but arguing for the development of civic virtues in contemporary 
liberal democracies. Norval recalls Kant’s and Habermas’s account of this public 
sphere and points out the latter’s aversion to what has come to be called virtue 
ethics: 
“We may do well to remind ourselves of the critical work that the 
public sphere is supposed to fulfil. The critical use of public reason 
creates ‘a forum in which private people, come together to form a 
public’ and ready themselves ‘to compel public authority to 
legitimate itself before public opinion.’ What are the virtues 
associated with these functions? As many commentators have noted, 
Habermas does not seek to provide an account of such virtues, nor 
does he find it necessary. Indeed, he could be argued to be positively 
hostile to the need to provide such an account. Nevertheless, there 
are clues as to what is presumed in Habermas’s historical 
reconstruction of the very idea of a public and the emergence of the 
bourgeois public sphere. A public critically reflecting on its culture 
depends upon the presence of citizens educated in the art of critical-
rational public debate.”102 
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 Emphasising here what Dallmayr says is not always sufficiently appreciated, 
Norval goes on to question Habermas’ distinction between public and mass (the 
former organised so that it can ‘answer back’, the latter cannot ‘answer back’ 
and is manipulated), arguing that publics are both capable of being critical and 
of being manipulated, and that “it is not the case that the virtue of the critical 
use of reason belongs to a particular sociological group or form of society.”103 
Stating that “the fundamentally dichotomous thinking that inspires both 
Habermas’s text and deliberative accounts of democracy more generally, must 
be abandoned, for it is part of the problem”, Norval argues for the formation of 
democratic subjectivities through “participation in practices of ‘talking back’” 
which, if including the education in critical reason to which Habermas refers, 
“also depends upon embodied practices of habituation, upon political 
imagination and upon the operation of exemplars, and upon actions that 
manifest for us other possibilities of being and acting.”104 As with all the other 
accounts of virtue ethics addressed in this sub-section, there is an understanding 
in Norval’s that the fostering of virtues, the fostering of “fundamental abilities 
and capacities of [each and] all”, requires education as well as “continuous work 
on the self”.105 
1.3.2 Statespersons 
We saw in the previous sub-section that Dallmayr described phronesis in terms of 
one who “ponders the consequences of actions soberly and reforms them in light 
of the horizon of ‘goodness’ and wellness (eudaemonia).”  In his Being in the 
World: Dialogue and Cosmopolis, he also describes phronesis as prudential 
judgment, which involves “the search for the right middle path (mesotes) and 
the cultivation of the ethical ability to weigh carefully the pros and cons of a 
given situation”, noting that it is fundamentally different to Kant’s account of 
judgment in The Critique of Judgment, where judging is always subordinated to 
the categorical imperative which is based upon his transcendental philosophy 
and metaphysics of morals.106 Dallmayr emphasises here—in what originally was a 
 
103 Norval, Don’t Talk Back! p.805. 
104 Norval, Don’t Talk Back! p.807. 
105 Norval, Don’t Talk Back! p.808. Emphases in original. 
106 Dallmayr, Dialogue and Cosmopolis. p.66. 
76 
speech he gave at the World Humanities Forum, organized by UNESCO—that this 
subordination is incompatible with humanism and the humanities “because it 
involves the surrender of praxis and practical engagement in favor of abstract 
knowledge”, and making sure to highlight the important connection between 
prudential judgment and the notion of common sense (sensus communis), which 
“in many ways [is] the pivot of humanism”, he goes on to quote Gadamer’s 
support of Vico: 
“‘For Vico, the wisdom of the ancients, their cultivation of prudence 
and eloquence, remains indispensable precisely in the face of modern 
science and its quantitative methodology. For, even now, the most 
important aspect of education is something else: namely, the 
cultivation of the ‘sensus communis’ which is nurtured not by 
apodictic truth but by weighing the likely or probable.’ Seen from this 
angle, the sensus communis is not merely individual aptitude, but ‘a 
sense that founds community or communality (Gemeinsamkeit) … 
According to Vico, what gives to human striving its direction is … the 
concrete universality represented by the community of a group, a 
people, a nation, and ultimately of humanity at large. Hence, 
developing this communal sense is of decisive importance for human 
life’”.107 
Dallmayr himself refers to sensus communis as “an ethical quest for public virtue 
(in both the Aristotelian and Stoic sense)”, and elsewhere, he provides an 
understanding of the relation between ethics and politics which it seems to me 
accords with Aristotle’s in particular, touched upon by Devetak above (p.61): 
“For me, ethics and politics are neither simply identical, nor are they 
opposed. If confined to the personal level, ethics functions in a more 
private context, while politics operates on a broader public level; 
ethics nurtures the personal good life, politics the good life of the 
larger community.”108 
Although he does not say so explicitly here, it seems to me that Dallmayr 
understands it to be a key responsibility of statespersons to nurture the good life 
of the larger community (to and for which they are responsible), an important 
part of which involves “an ethical quest for public virtue”, and to weigh 
carefully the (possible) consequences of their actions before acting. But to 
return to his speech at the World Humanities Forum, Dallmayr also connects his 
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understanding of sensus communis to the writings of Scottish moralists such as 
Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid and Adam Ferguson, who, along with Vico and a 
“host of [other] voices”, were steadfast, in the face of the abstractions of 
certain philosophers during the enlightenment, in maintaining “practical, 
ethically nurtured experience[s] in a social context”.109 He ends this section of 
his speech by referring to the host of voices as “the good-sense tradition”, 
which, in Gadamer’s words, “not only offers a cure for the ‘moonsickness’ of 
metaphysics, but provides the basis for a moral philosophy that really does 
justice to social life.”110 
Whereas Dallmayr describes Vico as being part of a “counter-current” that had 
existed all along against the domination of theory over praxis which sprouted in 
early modernity, we saw Devetak, through his consideration of some alternative 
historiographies of the period, understand him as being part of an enlightenment 
that is civil and jurisprudential, an enlightenment that insists “on non-
transcendental civil history as the most appropriate context for understanding 
human society”.111 Devetak construes Vico’s writings as a continuation and 
adaptation of the historical arts as these were developed through the 
Renaissance; arts which provide a variety of public services: 
“Humanist histories from Bruni and Valla to Machiavelli and 
Giucciardini were decidedly political, insofar as they were ‘not 
written for the delectation of other scholars and humanists but as a 
guide for literate statesmen’. Occupying the office of ‘advisor to the 
prince’, humanist historians made politics, government, statecraft, 
and the res publica the ‘font of value’ and the point of enquiry … they 
cultivated a civic persona concerned with the objectives of statecraft 
and good government, as opposed to the moral persona of the 
scholastic intellectual whose objectives were more closely tied to 
ecclesiastical or theological purposes”.112 
Devetak notes that such humanists regarded it as “dangerous, futile and 
inappropriate in politics to generalise from good intentions or moral principles 
originating in theology”, and that they understood politics to be “an enterprise 
concerned more with securing good political outcomes for the res publica than 
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adhering unswervingly to moral foundations.”113 The humanists he considers saw 
a deeper understanding of history as being necessary in terms of securing good 
outcomes in the present, since it provides a fount of practical wisdom and 
exemplary figures in a world where politics is never not subject to the 
contingencies of time and place. In bringing this historical mode of critique into 
the present, Devetak draws upon Richard Bourke’s conception of historical 
prudence: 
“Political judgment is not an exercise of applying rules or doctrines 
proffered by theory … Judgment must … be considered historical and 
contextual since good or prudent political decision in one context may 
not be prudent or good in another … It should be emphasized that this 
is not to advocate an amoral approach to politics, but to maintain the 
legitimacy of political morality and judgment understood as ‘a form of 
historical prudence’. Distinct from forms of phronesis that remain 
subject to moral reasoning, Bourke’s conception of historical 
prudence is a form of practical reasoning concerned with legitimizing 
political action in particular contexts.”114 
There appears to be some consensus between Devetak and Dallmayr when it 
comes to ethics and politics in favour of praxis, practical reasoning and 
prudential judgment over theory, theoretical reasoning, and apodictic episteme, 
and for cultivating these through education in the humanities (although there is 
perhaps more emphasis placed on history by the former and on philosophy by the 
latter), and we find some very similar concerns in Brown’s work: 
“It seems to me that Stephen Toulmin got it right when, in 
Cosmopolis, he identified the early seventeenth century as the point 
at which things went off the rails, when formal logic came to displace 
rhetoric, general principles and abstract axioms were privileged over 
particular cases and concrete diversity, and the establishment of 
‘rules’ (or ‘laws’) that were deemed of permanent as opposed to 
transitory applicability came to be seen as the task of the theorist.”115 
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Brown has also fixed his focus upon Aristotle and the virtue of phronesis in 
challenging this domination of theory over praxis. We have already seen him 
contrast Aristotelian virtues with Kantian thought, and in the same article, he 
provides account of the three chief intellectual virtues, or ‘virtues of thought’, 
as set out in the former’s Nicomachean Ethics: 
“Episteme … concerns ‘knowledge about things that cannot be 
otherwise’ (1140a35) … the objects of this kind of knowledge are not 
self-aware and cannot react to what is known of them. Aristotle does 
not see this as a virtue of thought that is relevant to human action … 
Techne … is essentially about manipulating material things, the work 
of an artisan, a technician or a craftsman … Phronesis is the virtue of 
thought that is most important in considering human action and on 
which Aristotle focuses. Phronesis is about deliberation on ‘the truth, 
involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or 
bad for a human being’ (1140b5); it is about ‘knowledge of 
particulars, since it is concerned with action and action is about 
particulars’ (1141b15).”116 
Brown rightly points out that it is difficult to map Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
on to social science as it is understood today, since the philosopher’s concern in 
this text is with “the living of a good life rather than with a desire to understand 
social practices”, although it might map well on to the lives of any social 
scientists for whom, like Aristotle, “contemplation … [is] perhaps the most 
important of all ‘activities’.”117 That said, Brown notes that phronesis “is always 
about the exercise of the faculty of reason”, although “practical wisdom is 
based on a reason which in turn is shaped by experience”, and this presents a 
problem for IP theorists who may well have much experience of the world in 
general but no experience of the practices of international politics in particular; 
practices, that is to say, which involve high-level decision-making, the practices 
of statespersons.118 In considering this problem, Brown turns to some work in IR 
that normally comes under the heading of ‘classical realism’, contending that: 
“… at its best, [classical realism] is based precisely on the classical 
Greek virtue of phronesis or, when drawing on the republican 
tradition of Machiavelli, its Latin near-equivalent, prudentia. It is its 
claim to be able to provide the kind of guidance that practical wisdom 
offers that is distinctive about realism … [which is] pre-eminently an 
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approach to international relations that bases its legitimacy on the 
study of what people actually do and why they do it.”119 
We might see some similarities in Brown’s description here of classical realism in 
IR and Devetak’s account of some of the humanist historians of the Renaissance 
who made the res publica ‘the point of inquiry’. The two classical realists Brown 
selects as exemplary figures in IR are George Kennan, an American diplomat and 
historian who had extensive practical experience in international politics; and 
Hans Morgenthau, IR theorist and German émigré to the US who had no practical 
experience in international politics but had studied jurisprudence and history in 
international affairs in some depth. Although acknowledging current scholarly 
interest in the philosophical or theoretical roots of Morgenthau’s work (and also 
touching upon Kennan’s education, who graduated from St John’s Military 
Academy and went on to read history with an emphasis on European diplomacy 
at Princeton before embarking on his diplomatic career), Brown fixes his focus 
upon the lived experiences of both in the immediate post-war years: a time 
when the US was clearly—and clearly seen to be—one of the world’s 
superpowers, and both Kennan and Morgenthau shared a concern about the 
inadequacy of US foreign policy responses to the challenges posed by the USSR: 
“Both Morgenthau and Kennan, coming at the matter from different 
angles, are clear that the problem is not simply that the leaders of 
the US do not know what to do in this difficult situation – more 
fundamental is the fact that they do not know how to do whatever 
they decide they ought to do. It is knowledge of the common-sense 
realities of diplomacy, the kind of unarticulated knowledge that 
experienced practitioners develop, that is missing as much as, if not 
more than, detailed empirical knowledge of the issues or a theoretical 
understanding of international relations … The balance of power is 
given great emphasis in [Kennan’s American Diplomacy], but … as a 
practice rather than as a theory. American failures are not the result 
of an inability to grasp the theory of international politics, but stem 
from a more basic lack of understanding of how the game is played—
Wilsonians lack the common-sense understanding of the unspoken 
elements of diplomatic practice that Kennan had spent a lifetime 
developing.”120 
Although Kennan had developed the requisite practical experience throughout 
his career in terms of understanding how the game is played as distinct from 
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grasping any theory about the game (Brown’s use of the language of games at 
this point I believe is a line of influence that he is seeking to draw in the article 
leading from ‘the practice turn’ in IR inspired by Bourdieu [through 
Wittgenstein] back to Aristotle), it was Morgenthau more than anyone else, he 
argues, who brought to the Americans an understanding of the unspoken 
elements of diplomatic practice. Doubtless with the subtitle of his famous 
textbook, Politics Among Nations, in mind—The Struggle for Power and Peace— 
Brown points out that Morgenthau’s work shows that peace can only be brought 
about “from an understanding of the architecture of power and not from an act 
of will on the part of well-intentioned idealists”, and it does so through the 
humanistic techniques highlighted above by Devetak: careful attention to history 
and the provision of exemplary figures and precedents that exercise readers’ 
judgments in the world. As is well-known amongst IR theorists, the states of 
affairs which bring about peace according to classical realism are balances of 
power, and as Brown points out: 
“…in [Morgenthau’s] discussion of the balance of power he describes 
balances emerging ‘of necessity’, and yet the main thrust of the 
discussion, here as elsewhere in the text, is prescriptive; he is 
concerned to show how states ought to behave in order to create 
balances of power, a concern that would be meaningless if balances of 
power actually created themselves through some ‘necessary’ 
process.”121 
 This speaks both to Morgenthau’s recognition, as well as the humanists’ as set 
out in Devetak’s work, that the judgments and decisions of actual human 
beings—statespersons in this context—matter, and the similarities between his 
work and Aristotle’s in terms of unsettling the modern distinction between what 
Brown calls, in the language of modern social science, ‘normative’ and ‘positive’ 
theory. In a further unsettling of this distinction (and this language), Brown goes 
on in his article to consider Morgenthau’s essay, ‘The Intellectual and Political 
Functions of Theory’, in which an understanding of IR theory’s “perhaps … most 
noble” task that it “can and must perform” in the modern age was set out: “to 
prepare the ground for a new international order radically different from that 
which preceded it”, one that is more appropriate to the existence of nuclear 
power as an instrument of foreign policy, which in itself “is the only real 
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revolution that has occurred in the structure of international relations since the 
beginning of history”.122 For Morgenthau, the international order which has 
developed from the French Revolution to the present is highly inadequate to our 
current circumstances and analysis by theorists can show this. The task of the IR 
theorist on this account is to support efforts at overcoming the quandary in 
which we find ourselves by carrying out some groundwork for statespersons, i.e. 
those persons making high-level decisions which affect us all. Brown describes 
Morgenthau’s claim about the task of IR theorists as “breath-taking”, and noting 
that “nearly 50 years on, there is little sign of the emergence of the new 
principle of political organisation that he describes as a necessary consequence 
of the development of nuclear power”, sees his thinking on this matter as an 
exercise in practical reasoning: 
“In his willingness to think outside the box, Morgenthau displayed the 
virtue of phronesis, but here the common translation of the latter as 
‘prudence’ is a little misleading; in modern English, prudence has 
connotations of circumspection, cautiousness and a degree of 
passivity—indeed some contemporary realists seem to think of 
prudence exclusively in these terms, as providing reasons why one 
should not act. Actually, practical reasoning is better understood as 
the ability to weigh the consequences of one’s actions [before one 
acts] rather than as providing reasons for inaction.”123 
This seems right to me, both about Morgenthau and about some contemporary 
realists’ understanding of prudence, but I think we could take it a step further 
by first of all noting Ronald Beiner’s understanding of Aristotle’s account of 
phronesis: 
“… judgment alone is not enough in order to qualify as a phronimos [a 
man of phronesis] … In short, phronesis minus praxis equals judgment. 
Phronesis is the union of good judgment and the action which is the 
fitting embodiment of that judgment.”124 
If Brown is right that Morgenthau displayed the virtue of phronesis, then his 
action was the writing of his paper, including his articulation of this important 
task of IR theorists (he lists others in the paper as well). Compared with 
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statespersons, the consequences of his actions were always going to be far less 
weighty, whereas compared with most other IR theorists, they were going to be 
more so. But why would—or should—the consequences of Morgenthau’s actions 
(i.e. his publications) carry more weight than most other IR theorists? The 
intuitive response to this question seems to me to be that Morgenthau has more 
authority in speaking about these matters than most other IR theorists. But 
Brown in his article regards as an instance of ‘pulling rank’ Morgenthau’s request 
in the second edition of his Politics Among Nations that its argument be judged 
not only in its entirety instead of merely upon this or that part of it, but also as 
the product of twenty years of relevant study. Such instances of “pulling rank” 
Brown argues are “not happy or conducive to genuine intellectual progress” 
(even if Morgenthau’s text may well be so to genuine political progress), that 
“wisdom is not something that can be claimed for oneself—it has to be 
recognised by others”, that the old charge of the ‘scientists’ that classical 
realism is “‘wisdom literature’, reliant on authority rather than argument, has 
some substance”, and he concludes by warning—rightly—against “the ever-
present danger of hubris”.125 
Yet it seems to me that this ever-present danger should not and anyway cannot 
prevent praxis altogether, and it may well be the case that Morgenthau’s own 
praxis (the writing and publication of his article) involved (like Devetak’s 
humanist historians) ‘advising the prince’ whilst simultaneously contributing 
towards genuine intellectual progress inside the academy. But in returning to a 
consideration of statespersons, let us consider another of Brown’s articles, On 
morality, self-interest and the ethical dimension of foreign policy. In this 
paper, Brown dispels numerous caricatures of realism in IR as amoral and probes 
the reader’s understanding of ethical theories such that we come to recognise 
virtually none of these theories as offering “a totally other-regarding approach 
to moral issues”, and he ponders why some continue to think, speak and act as if 
they do: 
“…why is it that people … find themselves drawn to moral absolutism, 
a black-and-white account of the world, when it comes to 
international affairs? This is genuinely puzzling, but the best 
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explanation may be simply that international relations are sufficiently 
far away from most people’s personal experiences that they do not 
make the kind of connections with their own lives that would reveal 
how silly it is [in international relations] to ask for purity of motives 
and an absolute disregard for self-interest.”126 
Although it is only an analogy Brown is drawing here between the self-interest of 
individuals and the self-interest of states, it still helps in trying to imagine what 
is going on in a statesperson’s head in coming up with a foreign policy; they 
cannot but be responsible for the ‘self-interest’ of the state, even as they are 
also responsible for upholding peace and security in the international sphere, 
just like a citizen is responsible, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, for 
looking out for their own interests as well as the interests of others. In thinking 
through these responsibilities of statespersons which not infrequently come into 
conflict, Brown argues that: 
“…foreign policy cannot be self-abnegatory, nor is there any sound 
ethical reason why states should be required to neglect their own 
interests in the interests of the [international] common good—rather 
the task must be to find ways in which states can be good 
international citizens, pursuing their national interests, while trying at 
the same time to act in the [international] common interest.”127 
It seems to me that achieving such simultaneity in one’s actions is no easy task, 
and the ways found in this chapter by the likes of Devetak and Dallmayr for both 
citizens and statespersons in working towards it have included an education in 
the humanities, such as what Morgenthau had. As Dallmayr says, the humanist 
tradition and the humanities have always had a strong accent upon prudential 
judgment, and he regards as decisive in this respect “the Aristotelian legacy of 
phronesis”, which itself Brown has been promoting in IPT for some time now.128 
He is correct that the Latin prudentia is not an exact equivalent of the Greek 
phronesis, and one might note here that the former is a term that extends far 
further back in time than Machiavelli, but I think it is important to underscore 
that neither phronesis nor prudentia exhaust what the ancient Greeks and 
Romans had to say about the virtues. While Morgenthau says that “Realism 
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considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political 
actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics”, it is certainly not the only one, 
and while I think Brown is right that at its best this school of thought is based on 
this virtue, ‘Realism’ in IR has no monopoly in its understanding of it 
(Morgenthau was in fact pushed by his publisher to write this and other 
‘principles of Realism’ in Politics Among Nations so that it could be read as a 
textbook in the discipline). We shall be considering prudence in its broader 
context of the other primary virtues in the next section and in subsequent 
chapters. 
1.4 Political Societies 
1.4.1 Political Society 
In previous sub-sections, we have touched upon the notion of civil society in 
connection with Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, a text in which he gave an account of its formation in the Enlightenment 
and its decay in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through processes of 
capitalism and the development of mass politics and media. Civil society has 
been a key concept for several modern social and political philosophers as a 
public space in which reasoned discussion and deliberation takes place amongst 
private citizens. In IPT, Brown has provided us with a good account of it in 
relation to the civic republican tradition: 
“The most minimal and negative definition of civil society involves the 
idea of society organising itself separately from and against the state 
… [but this] misses the complexity of the relationship between civil 
society and the state … although civil society sets bounds upon, and 
limits the activities of, the state, it nonetheless requires that there be 
an effective state for it to limit and set bounds upon. In the absence 
of peace, and without some mechanism outside of itself for 
arbitration between major interests, civil society cannot exist. Civil 
society … stands against ancient republican societies which were 
‘free’ … but which possessed, as it were, the wrong kind of freedom … 
[I]n principle, the two ideals [i.e. republican civic virtue and civil 
society] are opposed to one another. The notion of civic virtue implies 
a degree of moral unity, a positive role for law and, in extremis, can 
lead to Rousseau’s notion of forcing people to be ‘free’ … For the 
proponents of civil society, on the other hand, freedom involves a 
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minimalist approach to law, and the abandonment of the idea of 
managed consensus … by the standard-bearers of republican virtue.”129  
As we have seen, Norval has sought to overcome the opposition Brown sees here 
in seeking the development of civic virtues in relation to civil society as it was 
set out by Habermas in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, in 
which he said that the work of such a society is ‘to compel public authority to 
legitimate itself before public opinion.’130 Norval asked in this regard what the 
virtues associated with these functions (or this compulsion) were and noted 
Habermas’s aversion to providing account of them, but drawing upon the work of 
Simone Chambers, she makes a suggestion as to how they could be promoted: 
“As in Habermas, Chambers touches upon the importance of the 
question of how ‘citizens form their opinions’, arguing that it is ‘an 
integral part of a theory of deliberative democracy.’ To think about 
the how is … a matter of … fostering the promotion and proliferation 
of a multiplicity of citizen–citizen encounters. Such ‘face-to-face 
encounters of everyday talk’ could promote ‘the skills needed to be a 
critical yet receptive audience.’”131 
Whilst not addressing in her article what the virtues associated with civil society 
are or might be (since it was written as part of a symposium on Habermas’s text, 
this was not her aim), Norval I think is certainly on the right lines in arguing for 
citizen–citizen encounters in developing them. We have already begun 
considering what some of these virtues might be and we shall continue doing so 
in the rest of my argument, but to return to Norval’s, would the citizen–citizen 
encounters promoted count as civil society? Drawing upon the work of both 
Habermas and Ralph Waldo Emerson, Norval holds a conception of society in 
which its members are required to conform to the extent that they become a 
‘herd’ or ‘mass’. In line with Habermas in particular, she also has a corollary 
conception of self-reliance understood as aversion to society (which, again, is 
conceived as ‘massifying’), with aversion holding the key to the development of 
the required civic virtues: 
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“Aversion opens the way to activities through which we can foster the 
virtues associated with a critical engagement and development of a 
better self and society. The perfectionism invoked here is non-elitist 
and non-teleological: it is a possibility open to each and all. It does 
not predetermine and prefigure what is possible, and along which 
road we must all travel … We should not mourn the loss of the 
bourgeois public sphere, but work on the possibilities opened up by 
the world coming into being.”132 
Norval’s argument is for civil society in a radical democracy, but it seems to me 
that the language of aversion she takes on from Habermas is tied to a certain 
modern liberal ambivalence towards society as such, and that this is an 
ambivalence which radical democrats do not normally have. The language of 
perfectionism seems to come from modern liberal discourse as well, constraining 
Norval to speak it; she must defend her argument about civic virtues from 
charges of ‘elitism’ and ‘teleology’, which it seems exclude ‘perfectionism’—
what Torrente and Gould called moral striving or what Annas called learning—
somehow from being a possibility open to each and all. It seems to me that there 
are unnecessary difficulties in using some of the language of modern liberalism 
when discussing civic virtues and the civic republican tradition (and not only 
because of all the -ism talk), but whatever the case may be, Norval’s 
prescription here for us to work on the possibilities opened up by the world 
coming into being I think is a commendable one, and in this sub-section, we are 
considering some of the work that has been done by political philosophers and 
theorists in this regard, with a view to the further development of the notion of 
political society in subsequent chapters. 
As Devetak says, Habermas’s work incorporates certain Kantian elements, 
including arguments about the public use of reason in terms of securing the 
legitimacy of one’s claims. Political theorist Bryan Garsten has identified such 
arguments as ‘the rhetoric of public reason’, a ‘rhetoric against rhetoric’, the 
aim of which is to silence the controversies that are the very stuff of politics and 
“obscure the alienation of judgment involved in this silencing … produc[ing] 
resentment and frustration among citizens who are subject to them.”133 
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Following a very long tradition that understands rhetoric as speech that aims to 
persuade, and understanding persuasion as “a way of influencing that is neither 
manipulation or pandering”, Garsten argues that it is persuasion rather than 
force that is “the presumption of democratic politics” and that: 
“Speech that aims to persuade can engage our capacity for practical 
judgment … Citizens who can use speech to draw one another into 
exercising this capacity for judgment will find themselves more 
attentive to one another’s points of view, more engaged in the 
process of deliberation, and more attached to its outcome … efforts 
to leave the politics of persuasion behind often ask citizens to 
alienate their judgment in a way that leaves them stranded from both 
the activity of public discourse and its outcomes. Efforts to avoid 
rhetorical controversy tend to produce new and potentially more 
dogmatic forms of rhetoric.”134 
Citizens engaging one another’s practical judgments through speech that aims to 
persuade, it seems to me, well describes the encounters Norval suggests may 
promote the skills required of democratic citizens, but unlike Norval, Garsten 
seems sceptical of Habermas’s account of the rise and decline of the bourgeois 
public sphere, and like Devetak, he provides an alternative history of the 
Enlightenment. Garsten construes it as one which shows public reason not as a 
‘bottom-up’ development from eighteenth-century coffee-houses that broadens 
into a bourgeois public sphere or civil society of private citizens, but a ‘top-
down’ one in which ‘public reason’ is invented by philosophers in efforts to 
alienate to a sovereign source of authority citizens’ practical judgments about 
public affairs. This sovereign source, for Kant, was the critique of reason: “…to 
criticism everything must submit”.135 Quoting an extended passage from The 
Critique of Pure Reason in which its sovereignty is explained by analogy with 
some of Hobbes’s arguments in Leviathan, Garsten goes on to point out in Kant: 
“…the need for a sovereign judge whose authority ‘no one can 
question’ and whose judgments offer ‘relief’ from ‘endless disputes’ 
… Once in possession of that standard of critical reason, one ‘begins 
to feel his own capacity to secure himself against … injurious 
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deceptions, which must finally lose for him all their illusory 
power.’”136 
One might wonder, then, about the extent to which citizens could be receptive 
to others insofar as they are in possession of Kant’s standard of critical reason. 
But the verdict of critical reason according to Kant is not dictatorial; he says 
that it is “simply the agreement of free citizens” (freedom understood as self-
legislation and citizens understood, it seems to me, as in possession of Kant’s 
standard of critical reason), a claim supported and developed by Onora O’Neill 
who, it seems standing in the same Kantian constructivist tradition as Benhabib, 
argues that the authority of critical reason is one that we construct ourselves, 
thereby securing its legitimacy.137 Garsten notes here that O’Neill is drawing 
upon “the legitimising power of consent, the device by which authority and 
freedom can be made to coexist”, and he points out that the analogy drawn by 
Kant, to which O’Neill also refers, is not necessarily an argument for accepting 
critical reason’s legitimate sovereign authority, whether in philosophy or 
politics: “after all, we do not accept Hobbes’s claim that virtually absolute 
monarchical rule would be legitimate if it were constructed.”138 Still, in Kant’s 
philosophy the agreement of free citizens that legitimises the sovereignty of 
critique is not identical to that which brings about Hobbes’s sovereign; it is a 
hypothetical agreement to which we are already party, whether we realise it or 
not. O’Neill argues that if we reflect on what we are doing in debating and 
arguing, we will understand that we are implicitly invoking a standard of 
reasonability which is meant to be understood by all reasonable speakers; the 
standard of critique “cannot be questioned because intelligible questioning 
presumes the very authority it seeks to question”, i.e. it requires no persuasion 
because we are all already committed to it, consciously or unconsciously.139 No 
doubt still mindful of Ronald Dworkin’s claim about John Rawls’ Kant-inspired 
original position that “a hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of an 
actual contract; it is no contract at all”, O’Neill links this idea of a hypothetical 
agreement to Kant’s notion of ‘universal communicability’ as set out in his 
Critique of Judgment, expanding the scope of his arguments there about 
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aesthetic judgments to all reasonable appeals and the notion of a possible, 
rather than actual, community.140 
Key to Kant’s notion of universal communicability is his conception of common 
sense, or sensus communis, a ubiquitous term already mentioned and also used 
by a group in his time known as the popular philosophers, including Christian 
Garve, Johann Georg Heinreich Feder and Moses Mendelssohn; a group whose 
writings—along with those of Petrarch, Erasmus and Montaigne—Hegel was later 
to characterise as ‘Ciceronian philosophy’ because such figures joined 
contemporary philosophical debates from a more humanistic perspective. 
Garsten gives an account of the disputes between Kant and the popular 
philosophers who, in line with some of the figures considered by Devetak in the 
first section of this chapter, endorsed a program of enlightenment that 
incorporated modern advances in knowledge but sought to reverse the 
backsliding into scholastic ways of thinking and writing as evidenced in Kant’s 
critical philosophy. As Garsten puts it: 
“[The popular philosophers] adopted Cicero’s eclectic approach to 
philosophical controversies, taking plausible elements from competing 
schools; they were more concerned with piecing together a pragmatic 
and prudent form of enlightenment than with establishing the 
absolute authority of any one system.”141 
Kant referred to the popular philosophers as ‘indifferentists’, arguing that they 
were feigning indifference to the object of philosophers’ inquiries “which can 
never be indifferent to our human nature” and accused them of dispensing with 
the knowledge—if attainable—of the flourishing sciences that he regarded as 
requiring the institution of a sovereign tribunal of critical reason.142 Peopling this 
tribunal for Kant were philosophers schooled in his critical philosophy; a tribunal 
which he said “…can never become popular, and indeed there is no need that it 
should.”143 Like thinkers of the Scottish enlightenment such as Thomas Reid, who 
argued that the principles used in ordinary life by ordinary people in society “are 
older, and of more authority, than Philosophy”, the popular philosophers 
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rejected Kant’s efforts to subject such principles to the sovereignty of critique 
(or as Garsten also puts it, the sovereignty of scholars).144 Garve, in his review of 
The Critique of Pure Reason, admitted to shedding tears over those passages 
where Kant talked about moral goodness, where “the stronger interest of virtue 
calls him back to the cleared road of common sense”, but such passages jarred 
with the rest of Kant’s theory, and Garve along with the rest of the popular 
philosophers continued their project of “restrain[ing] overzealous theoreticians 
from undermining natural ways of thinking that people [theoreticians and non-
theoreticians] simply could not live without”.145 Indeed, as Garsten argues, it is 
an undermining which can imprudently engender frustration and resentment 
amongst actual citizens who have not been persuaded of the legitimate 
authority of critical reason. Such persuasion would require an appeal to the 
practical judgments of actual citizens which it seems Kant and his followers 
were unwilling to provide, and as mentioned above, through what Devetak has 
described as an ‘act of theoretical abstraction’, Kant would provide a 
philosophical treatment of sensus communis, what Gadamer called ‘a sense that 
founds community or communality’, in his Critique of Judgment. As Garsten 
argues: 
“[Kant] offered to save the notion from the ‘vulgar’ connotations of 
the word ‘common’ and the experiential connotations of the word 
‘sense’. He aimed to portray criticism as an investigation into the 
grounds of common sense rather than a rejection of it. From this 
perspective, common sense was closely related to the activity of 
reasoning, and so was in need of the same discipline and authority 
that gave reason its autonomy [i.e. critique]. Kant proposed that we 
understand the sensus communis as a faculty of judgment that 
operated independently of experience and sensation.”146 
Kant’s insistence that sensus communis floated free not only of experience and 
sensation but also of any actual political society was in sharp opposition to how 
the term was used by both the popular philosophers and to common sense as 
understood by people in society more generally. Whereas Kant’s notion required 
the enlightened subject to abstract from the characteristics that he or she 
shares with fellow citizens, the humanistic tradition throughout the 
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enlightenment taught citizens to occupy themselves precisely with (but not only 
with) these characteristics, both in themselves and in others. 
We have seen Dallmayr refer to this occupation or participation in actual 
political society as deriving from an Aristotelian tradition of virtuous praxis. In 
drawing out some more of the differences between Kantian and Aristotelian 
understandings of citizen and society, it is useful for us to consider Dallmayr’s In 
Search of the Good Life: A Pedagogy for Troubled Times, together with two 
reviews of it, one from a political liberal and the other from a civic republican. 
Dallmayr asks in this text “to whom should we look for moral guidance during 
times of global violence, scarcity and corruption?” and he goes about answering 
this question by revitalising the notion of ‘the good life’ found in various western 
and non-western traditions around the world as the mainspring of personal 
conduct, civic virtue and political engagement, and as exemplified in a number 
of different figures from different cultures in history.147 Dallmayr attributes 
much of the troubles of our times in his argument to certain laissez-faire 
understandings of liberalism. In his introduction, he acknowledges the wish of 
early liberals rebelling against absolutism and mercantilism “to open a space for 
free initiatives (a space variously called ‘civil society’ or ‘the market’), but 
surely not a space outside civil and legal bonds”.148 In a move away from the 
liberal notion of civil society such as was set out by Habermas, he quotes the 
following passage from Michael Sandel’s Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in 
Politics: 
“To deliberate well about the common good requires more than the 
capacity to choose one’s ends and to respect others’ rights to do the 
same. It requires a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of 
belonging, a concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community 
whose fate is at stake. To share in self-rule therefore requires that 
citizens possess, or come to acquire, certain civic virtues … The 
republican conception of freedom, unlike the [laissez-faire] liberal 
conception, requires a formative politics.”149 
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David M. Rasmussen disagrees with Dallmayr that we have been brought to our 
troubled times by “liberalism, that is, liberalism in its best form as political 
liberalism…”, whose principle of justice is toleration. From Rasmussen’s 
perspective, an informed political liberalism has an overarching theory of 
modernity which is deontological, yet tolerant of various theories of the good 
life “out of respect for their various claims to validity and their various ways of 
promoting justice.”150 In response, Dallmayr grants that tolerance is liberal “in 
the sense of the classical virtue of ‘liberality’ or generosity”, but questions 
modern liberals who see it predicated on ethical indifference when it comes to 
the actions of others in political society.151 Whereas Rasmussen had sought to 
overcome the ethical indifference of liberalism by turning to Hegel’s concept of 
recognition, Dallmayr argues that we may wish to go even beyond this concept 
insofar as it is a form of ‘cognition’ or ‘knowledge’ which harks back to the 
Cartesian cogito, and suggests the Heideggerian notion of ‘being-with’ is an 
improvement upon conceptions of ‘knowing-with’. Without getting into 
philosophical disputes about the primacy of ‘the right’ or ‘the good’, Dallmayr 
notes that while Rasmussen remains critical of any notion of ‘the good’, he 
himself regards goodness “not [as] a doctrine or proposition but a frame or 
horizon of significance—a frame without which Kantian morality and also David’s 
‘deontology’ would not get off the ground.”152 
In his response to Bernard Flynn, who applauds the civic republicanism in his 
text but questions the notions of ‘self-abnegation’ or ‘self-surrender’ that he 
finds in it, Dallmayr speaks instead of “self-deflation”, “self-overcoming” and 
“self-transformation”, registers his preference for civic republicanism over 
political liberalism, and notes the much older pedigree the former has. He also 
provides a brief history of civic republicanism which is worth quoting at some 
length: 
“Cicero—a learned civic republican—celebrated citizenship in a good 
or virtuous republic … He drew his inspiration mainly from the Greeks, 
particularly Plato and Aristotle … From Greece and Rome, civic 
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republicanism has travelled a long distance. Basically, its history can 
be read as a progressive streamlining or flattening-out of the Platonic 
agon [between the city of pigs and the city of justice and goodness in 
Plato’s Republic] … Significantly, Machiavelli relied for republican 
inspiration on the historian Livy, rather than on Cicero; as a corollary, 
the latter’s emphasis on civic virtues was replaced by the stress on 
virtu, a kind of manly virility and self-assertiveness animated by a 
love of glory … In more recent times, a fresh strong impulse to civic 
republicanism was provided by Hannah Arendt … [who sidelined] 
Aristotelian ethics and Ciceronian civic virtues in favour of a 
celebration of virtu: the display of individual virtuosity in the public 
realm.”153 
We shall consider this account of the civic republican tradition in subsequent 
chapters as it relates to both Arendt and Cicero, but to return to Dallmayr, his 
worry is that civic republicanism (and, for that matter, political liberalism) has 
become merely a theory or doctrine, which is “not quite adequate in ‘troubled 
times’”.154 That said, in his more recently published Post-liberalism: Recovering 
a Shared World, he seeks to understand “a paradigm shift occurring under our 
very eyes”, a shift away from the privatised ethics of laissez-faire forms of 
liberalism toward “the practice of shared ‘public freedom’ in a relational 
democracy and commonwealth”, and he draws favourably again upon the civic 
republican tradition: 
“Since ancient times, it is customary to distinguish between at least 
three types of legitimate regimes: monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy (or republic). Of these, the first two are hierarchically or 
vertically ordered, invoking a metaphysical warrant for public 
authority. By contrast, democracy is horizontally structured, invoking 
‘only’ a human warrant. With his deep and correct insight, 
Montesquieu perceived democracy as a new public paradigm anchored 
in equality and even the ‘love of equality’ among citizens. To be sure, 
democracy also exhibits authority, but the latter cannot be 
permanent or absolute and must always be based on the consent or 
covenant of citizens. In order to avoid domination or bullying, citizens 
must respect each other as equals (as well as different) …”155 
Quite apart from any troublesome claims about metaphysical or human 
warrants, the reader might wonder here, concerning the three basic forms of 
government, whether Dallmayr regards not only monarchy and aristocracy but 
 
153 Bernard Flynn, 2009. ‘Review of In Search of the Good Life’. Philosophy and Social Criticism 
35(9) pp.1127–1132; Dallmayr, ‘Sehnsucht Dorthin’. pp.1139–1140. 
154 Dallmayr, ‘Sehnsucht Dorthin’. p.1141. 
155 Dallmayr, Post-Liberalism. p.1. 
95 
also democracy as ‘hierarchically’ ordered or structured. He goes on in his 
introduction, I think rightly, to criticise certain excesses of laissez-faire 
liberalism, and it seems to me that he would criticise certain excesses of 
democracy as well, but could constraints on such excesses be ‘non-hierarchical’? 
While Montesquieu certainly did perceive a ‘love of equality’ among citizens in a 
democracy, he also warned democratic citizens against the corrupting “spirit of 
extreme equality”, in which they desire all to be equal in every respect, 
“want[ing] to manage everything themselves, to debate for the senate, to 
execute for the magistrate, and to decide for the judges”.156 Michael Walzer, an 
overt and thoroughgoing democrat, is nevertheless prepared to countenance 
such constitutional constraints on democratic decision-making. In his Philosophy 
and Democracy, he considers the role of philosophers in this, beginning from, 
but not ending with, Rousseau’s republican theory: 
“The claim of the philosopher … is that … he knows what ought to be 
done. He cannot just do it himself, however, and so he must look for a 
political instrument … clearly, the people raise the greatest 
difficulties. If they are not a many-headed monster, they are at least 
many-headed, difficult to educate and likely to disagree among 
themselves … majorities in any genuine democracy are temporary, 
shifting, unstable. Truth is one, but the people have many opinions; 
truth is eternal, but the people continually change their minds … They 
may not know the right thing to do, but they claim a right to do what 
they think is right (literally, what pleases them). Rousseau himself 
pulled back from this claim, and most contemporary democrats would 
want to do so too. I can imagine three ways of pulling back and 
constraining democratic decisions … First, one might impose a formal 
constraint on popular willing: the people must will generally … 
Second, one might insist on the inalienability of the popular will and 
then on the indestructability of those institutions and practices that 
guarantee the democratic character of the popular will: assembly, 
debate, elections and so on … [And] third … the people must will what 
is right … Often enough, they get it wrong, and then they require the 
guidance of a legislator or the restraint of a judge … this third 
constraint surely raises the most serious questions about Rousseau’s 
fundamental argument, that political legitimacy rests on will 
(consent) and not on reason (rightness) …”157 
We have already seen Benhabib use Rousseau’s republican theory as a heuristic 
device in setting out her own cosmopolitan theory of democratic iterations. Her 
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theory is one that “permits us to think of creative interventions that mediate 
between universal norms and the will of democratic majorities”. It seems to me 
that this formulation turns ‘democratic majorities’ into ‘them’, and so perhaps a 
philosopher’s instrument as Walzer says here, although sometimes in Benhabib’s 
theory it is (temporary, shifting, and unstable) democratic majorities who are 
iterating. Whatever the case may be, Benhabib’s theory appears to rely upon 
republican theories (Rousseau’s and Kant’s) which rest upon a theory of the will 
in one form or another, and it seems to me that Walzer is right here to suggest 
that political legitimacy rests not on will but on reason, and often enough, the 
people ‘get it wrong’ in willing, and so require the guidance of law or the 
restraint of a judge; institutional or constitutional, rather than philosophical, 
guidance or restraint, even if some judges sometimes find themselves “in the 
grip of a philosophical doctrine”.158 It is beyond the scope of my project to 
examine or criticise ‘will-based’ republican theories such as Rousseau’s or 
Kant’s, as well as their theories of the will; suffice it to say in this regard that a 
prior theory of the will is not a prerequisite for engaging with the civic 
republican tradition, whether in theory or practice. But to return to Walzer’s 
argument, he goes on to consider what the institutional or constitutional 
features of such constraints on democratic decision-making might look like: 
“Popular legislation might be reviewed democratically [by a specific 
group of citizens] … More often, however, groups of this sort are 
constituted on aristocratic rather than democratic grounds. The 
appeal is from popular consciousness, particular interests, selfish or 
shortsighted policies to the superior understanding of the few … 
Ideally, the group to which the appeal is made must be involved in the 
community of ideas, oriented to action within it, but attuned at the 
same time to philosophers outside. In but not wholly in, so as to 
provide a match for the philosopher’s withdrawal and return … In the 
United States today, it is apparent that the nine judges of the 
Supreme Court have been assigned something like this role.”159 
We can see from this passage that Walzer acknowledges an aristocratic element 
in the democratic constitution of the US, and indeed that such a mixture of 
aristocracy and democracy is something that happens most often in the 
constitutions of political societies to check any possible excesses in democratic 
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decision-making. It is sometimes called constitutional democracy. This notion of 
a mixed form of government is a hallmark of the civic republican tradition, and 
in fact Dallmayr, not unlike Walzer, would also countenance constraints on any 
excesses of (pure) democracy as Montesquieu warns against, in Interlude B of his 
Post-Liberalism, where he wishes John Milbank and Adrian Pabst’s The Politics 
of Virtue—a text in which the authors argue for a mixed form of government—
the largest possible readership.160 
1.4.2 International Political Society 
In the first section of this chapter, we considered Beardsworth’s defence of 
Habermasian cosmopolitanism against the Arendtian arguments of Owens, in 
which he claimed that “once a norm emerges within history, it can act as a norm 
beyond history” and that “this is the case for liberal individualism and 
progressive universalism.”161 We also considered Benhabib’s cosmopolitan 
project in which she interpreted Kant’s second definitive article for perpetual 
peace as pushing the law of nations toward a model of constitutionalization, 
“that is, toward the subjection of all sovereigns to a common source of law”, 
and in which she argued that cosmopolitan norms were morally constructed, as 
distinguished (I think) from acting as norms beyond history.162 We also noted 
Waldron’s wariness of philosophers’ attempts at “the thunderous imposition of 
positive law from on high” and considered Devetak’s contextualist investigation 
of critical international theory and his recovery of a historical mode of critique 
which was well-suited for challenging the universalist conclusions reached, or 
constructions made, by philosophers which might lead to such attempted 
impositions.163 In this sub-section, we continue reviewing this tension between 
‘universalism’ and ‘contextualism’ as both relate to international political 
society. 
In Peace Review, Dallmayr reviewed Rawls’ The Law of Peoples by way of 
investigating the history of the term ius gentium (‘the law of peoples’) in Roman 
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law, arguing that “the phrase from the very beginning harbored a mixture of 
contextually ‘ethical’, abstractly ‘moral’, and practical-political considerations, 
as well as a blending of ‘positive’ law and philosophy”, which, along with ius 
civile (‘city law’), was later “augmented or supplemented” by a strand of law 
called ius naturale (‘natural law’) derived from Stoic philosophy.164 By the time 
his narrative reaches Justinian’s Digest in the sixth century CE, Dallmayr adds 
that ius naturale is “seen as rational or philosopher’s law” and correctly points 
out that: 
“On both ethical and legal grounds, philosophers’ reflections clearly 
cannot simply substitute themselves for the agency and competence 
of concrete populations. Moreover, even if they were to substitute 
themselves, their precepts would lack the traction or leverage needed 
to mold and transform actual human conduct. It is for this reason 
that, especially in times of historical change or upheaval, the law of 
peoples (ius gentium) has tended to serve as a go-between or 
mediating agent between local or city law and rational philosophers’ 
law, an agent able to stretch the former’s parochialism while 
harnessing the latter’s aloofness.”165 
Dallmayr notes that the ius gentium did not provide such a service following the 
rise of Christianity, retreating into the background in legal discourse as ius 
naturale was foregrounded and closely conjoined with (or subordinated to) 
eternal or divine law in the writings of figures such as Gratian and Thomas 
Aquinas. But with the great social, economic, cultural, and political changes 
bringing humanity into the modern age, the ius gentium re-asserted itself, 
sometimes in the writings of jurists as ius inter gentes (‘law between peoples’) 
to reflect the emergence from the overlapping systems of public authority in the 
Middle Ages of relatively autonomous political units (‘states’). Dallmayr regards 
Francisco de Vitoria as the leading figure in terms of rediscovering and 
reformulating the ius gentium in early modernity, who defined it as “what 
natural reason has established among all peoples (or nations)”, but it was Hugo 
Grotius shortly afterwards, when the scientific revolution had begun, who was to 
provide what Lassa Oppenheim called “the science of the modern law of 
nations.”166 As Dallmayr rightly says, the extent of Grotius’s innovations should 
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not be exaggerated, but what he did bring to bear upon the ius gentium that 
was new was the application of scientific methods—a priori (‘naturalist’) and a 
posteriori (‘positivist’) demonstrations—in terms of proving or validating the 
principles of natural reason. The naturalists, Dallmayr says: 
“…reduced ius gentium almost entirely to philosophers’ law, or the 
rationalist law of nature…, a tendency that earned them the by-name 
of ‘deniers of the (actual) ius gentium’ … [From Grotius onwards, ius 
gentium] was increasingly strapped into the dilemmas of Cartesian 
and post-Cartesian thought … a priori norms and a posteriori ‘facts’. 
To some extent, while reformulating the very nature and competence 
of human reason, Immanuel Kant still paid tribute to these dilemmas, 
especially in his distinction between ‘noumenal’ and ‘phenomenal’ 
domains and between rational norms and ‘mere’ customs or 
conventions.”167 
By way of conclusion, Dallmayr identifies Rawls’ The Law of Peoples as standing 
clearly in the rationalist camp, proceeding in much the same way—a priori 
demonstration—as Descartes or Kant did. He goes on to observe that the binary 
divisions set up by early modern philosophy have been problematised in the 
twentieth century, that globalisation has brought about “embryonic forms of a 
global community” whose rules and practices cannot be identified with the 
“edicts of a select group of philosophers”, and that pre-Westphalian notions of 
ius gentium are re-surfacing which have “passed through the straining filter of 
modernity and its emphasis on human rights and freedoms”.168 In these 
circumstances, Dallmayr still finds much of worth in Rawls’ text, but argues that 
it “… now needs to be … integrated and ‘sublated’ (aufgehoben) in a more 
densely textured, cross-cultural ius gentium.”169 
Quite apart from any philosophical or scientific methods which might be applied 
to them, both the ius gentium and ius naturale, as James Turner Johnson notes, 
have been important influences upon the just war tradition, “the predominant 
moral language through which we address questions pertaining to the rights and 
wrongs of the use of force in international society.”170 Dallmayr does provide in 
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his account some discussion of Vitoria’s arguments about justice and injustice in 
warfare, accentuating their similarities with the peaceable arguments of 
Erasmus “against warmongering and military savagery”.171 Although Erasmus can 
well be construed as an ethicist of warfare, he does not usually appear in 
accounts of the just war tradition along with Vitoria and others, and indeed 
despite his praise of Vitoria, it seems to me that Dallmayr generally disapproves 
of the moral language of just and unjust wars as with Erasmus, even as he 
approves of pre-Westphalian (or pre-scientific) notions of the ius gentium which 
he sees re-surfacing, and from which (but not only from which) this moral 
language developed.172 
In a development of the binary divisions described by Dallmayr in his historical 
account of the ius gentium, contemporary just war scholarship is also marked by 
a division between universalist or philosophical approaches on the one hand and 
contextualist or historical approaches on the other.173 Jeff McMahan is perhaps 
the pre-eminent scholar of just war today who employs a universalist or 
philosophical approach. Not unlike Rawls, McMahan’s philosophical reasoning is 
largely a priori, and he has recently proposed the institution of a global court fit 
to judge the justice or injustice of any resort to war taken by states.174 Behind 
McMahan’s proposal is the conviction held by many philosophers who study the 
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morality of war that, much like a bank security guard confronted with a bank 
robber, soldiers on the battlefield are moral unequals: those fighting a just war 
have a right to fight and those fighting an unjust war do not, making it morally 
permissible for ‘just combatants’ to do things that would be morally 
impermissible for ‘unjust combatants’ to do.175 But again, not unlike Rawls, 
McMahan is very conscious of the practical limitations with which his 
philosophical reflections are confronted. Soldiers may often not be in a position 
to judge well enough the justice or injustice of the decisions of their political 
leaders concerning the waging of actual wars, since they may not often have all 
of the relevant information to make an informed judgment, and McMahan 
identifies other “excusing or mitigating conditions” which mean that, in 
practice, soldiers on both sides are treated as moral equals, but it is moral 
uncertainty about political leaders’ decisions to wage war that is the condition 
he seeks to remove through the institution of a global court that would judge 
the justice or injustice of particular wars in a disinterested way, providing moral 
guidance to soldiers on either side as to when or how they should be fighting. As 
well as moral uncertainty, another practical limitation with which McMahan is 
confronted is the fact that, in a world where the international law of armed 
conflict and international criminal law rest upon the consent of states, the 
prospects for a global court of the kind he proposes are very bleak, its institution 
certainly “impossible in the near future”, although he does suggest that it may 
still be instituted unofficially (“a court-like institution”) to provide, if not the 
authority of law since it would lack the consent of those to whom it applies, 
epistemic authority based upon the provenance of the moral code by which it 
operates, that is: 
“…the work of people with recognized expertise in moral reasoning 
and experience in the formulation of principles for the regulation of 
conduct, such as just war theorists, moral philosophers, and 
distinguished legal and political theorists.”176 
The court-like institution in McMahan’s project seems to have, at the level of 
philosophy, certain similarities with Benhabib’s project of creating “quasi-legally 
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binding obligations … in the absence of an overwhelming sovereign power with 
the ultimate right of enforcement”, but as Walzer suggests, it does not go quite 
as far as what Benhabib says Kant was pushing the ius gentium towards in his 
second article for perpetual peace (“the subjection of all sovereigns to a 
common source of law”): 
“McMahan’s suggestion here is that we act to change the reality of 
war by eliminating moral uncertainty and ignorance. If there were a 
court that could tell soldiers that their war was unjust, then they 
would have no excuses—or, at least, they would have one fewer 
excuse … it is hard to see how McMahan’s court, which isn’t really a 
court, would interfere with the self-determination of existing states. 
It appeals only to the conscience of individuals, which is … what we 
all do when we argue about just and unjust wars … The doctrine of 
‘excusing conditions’ is, in my view, a pale reflection of the reality of 
war, but it serves a useful purpose: it allows McMahan and the 
growing number of philosophers who agree with him to recognize, in 
their own way, the moral equality of soldiers on the battlefield.”177 
It seems to me that the more conscious moral philosophers or cosmopolitan 
theorists are of the practical limitations with which they are confronted, the 
more the substance of their position converges with that of their philosophical or 
theoretical opponents; McMahan’s philosophical precepts seem insufficient to 
establish the moral inequality of soldiers on the battlefield and Benhabib’s must 
be fed into the self-determination of democratic peoples through iterations or 
re-iterations.178 On their own, as Dallmayr says, such philosophical precepts lack 
the traction or leverage needed to change actual human conduct, and in the 
case of McMahan, it is unclear to me that such change could come about purely 
on the basis of the ‘epistemic authority’ of specialists (assuming the specialists 
themselves would agree on the justice or injustice of each and every particular 
war), no matter how eminent.179 Johnson, in agreement with Walzer as regards 
the moral equality of soldiers on the battlefield, notes that, contrary to present 
circumstances where it seems various moral experts assume a primary role in 
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178 It is interesting to note here that in a conference dedicated to discussion of Walzer’s 
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judging whether a particular use of force is justified or not, in the traditional 
understanding of just war (or what he also calls the classical understanding, 
which he takes to be rooted in the thought of Aquinas), it is the sovereign ruler 
who holds the final repository of responsibility for this judgment on behalf of 
citizens, as well as responsibility for ensuring the conditions that uphold the 
common good of international society.180 As he says: 
“Within this [classical] frame specialists in moral thinking, along with 
specialists working from other perspectives, may (and should) offer 
advice, but final judgment rests with the sovereign, because the 
responsibility for the good of the community rests on him (or her, or 
in rare cases, them). The conception of just war here … is that of a 
‘praxis of judgment’, not a list of criteria to be employed as a kind of 
checklist, whether by those with the responsibility of government or 
by others who may wish to advise or criticize them.”181 
Again, it seems that McMahan would not disagree with Johnson as to where final 
judgments rest in practice; their disagreement, rather, would (probably) be at 
the level of moral philosophy. Described in terms of what Devetak said in 
relation to Bourke’s conception of historical prudence, Johnson is not arguing for 
an amoral politics but for the legitimacy of political morality, and in line with 
various scholars already discussed in this chapter, John Kelsay has articulated 
this political morality in terms of the virtues.182 Contrary to some of the 
caricatures of realism and just war thinking that he sees in the contemporary 
scholarship, Kelsay argues for scholars to see the connections that exist between 
the two perspectives: 
“…the link between just war thinking and a realist perspective on 
political practice has to do with what an older form of reasoning 
would have termed political prudence—a kind of practical wisdom by 
which one ties the realities of particular situations to virtues of 
justice, temperance and courage.”183 
Although Devetak and Brown in their work do touch upon the relation of 
phronesis or prudentia to the other primary virtues, their focus it seems to me is 
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perhaps too tightly fixed upon it to the detriment of the other virtues, whereas 
Kelsay’s formulation here highlights for us the intimacy of the relation all the 
primary virtues have together. He rightly notes later in his article that “in 
relation to justice, temperance and fortitude, prudence involves a habitual focus 
on the assessment of facts, so as to determine the form these other ‘cardinal’ 
virtues should take in a given circumstance”, and in turning to the words of 
Aquinas, also connects it to the importance of both “taking counsel” and actions 
“concerning the means by which one may obtain a due end … not only the 
private good of an individual but also the public good of the multitude.”184 In the 
previous section, we saw Morgenthau providing counsel to the Americans as 
regards what Brown called “the kind of unarticulated knowledge that 
experienced practitioners develop” in international politics, and Walzer has 
spoken about the various counsels given by scholars to statespersons at this time 
in a way which I think also seeks to draw some of the connections between 
‘realist’ and ‘just war’ perspectives on political practice that Kelsay is drawing 
in his article: 
“There were many political scientists in [the 1950s and 60s] who 
preened themselves as modern Machiavellis and dreamed of 
whispering in the ear of the prince; and a certain number of them, 
enough to stimulate the ambition of others, actually got to whisper. 
They practised being cool and tough-minded; they taught the princes, 
who did not always need to be taught, how to get results through the 
calculated application of force … only a few writers argued for the 
acceptance of prudential limits; moral limits were, as I remember 
those years, never discussed.”185 
One of the issues here it seems to me is that ‘realism’ and ‘just war’ are often 
understood by scholars as sects or competing ‘isms’—constraining Walzer in this 
article to speak as though they were—and this is what Kelsay is seeking to 
overcome by speaking the language of virtues instead. What is required it seems 
to me is not a facile equation like prudential limits (prudence) = ‘realism’ and 
moral limits (justice) = ‘just war’, but rather a greater understanding of what 
the virtues of prudence and justice (and the other virtues) actually mean. This is 
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one of the things I hope to be providing in my project through a consideration of 
Cicero’s writings. 
But let us return here to Kelsay’s article and his turn to Aquinas in explicating 
the virtue of prudence. As mentioned above (p.103), the sovereign ruler for 
Aquinas has responsibility for the public good of the citizens they are sworn to 
protect, and also that of international society. In drawing this connection 
between prudence and justice both nationally and internationally, Kelsay argues 
that: 
“A realistic analysis [of actual conflicts] will not move too quickly in 
directions that sacrifice order in the name of justice, even as it will 
not give approval to forms of order that entrench injustice. It will 
urge that policymakers sworn to protect the interests of particular 
states are not likely (and indeed, ought not) to move too quickly to 
sacrifice their national interest in the name of an as yet unachieved 
international order. Rather, such realism will point to areas where 
national and international interests overlap, and will look for ways to 
increase those.”186 
Kelsay’s counsel of prudence here seems very similar to that of Brown’s as set 
out in the previous section, where he argued that the task—by no means a 
theoretical or an easy one, entailing a level of personal responsibility the 
shouldering of which many must find very difficult to imagine themselves 
shouldering (including myself)—is (for statespersons) to “find ways in which 
states can be good international citizens, pursuing their national interests, while 
trying at the same time to act in the [international] common interest.”187 
Beardsworth, also cognisant of the importance of exercising prudence in the 
international sphere, expresses a similar point, but in more dichotomous or 
cosmopolitan terms: 
“… to transcend the system of states towards supranational 
organization undermines political responsibility towards the cultural 
identities of states and sub-states. Inversely … to reduce 
contemporary life to the requirements of various forms of localism 
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ignores political responsibility towards the effective and legitimate 
management of global problems.”188 
Around the same time as he was crossing swords with Beardsworth on this matter 
of ‘transcending the system of states towards supranational organization’, Brown 
was breath-taken when he saw Morgenthau using the same language as 
Beardsworth; this ‘founding father’ of realism in IR had argued in The 
Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory that the fact of nuclear power 
requires a principle of political organisation “transcending the nation-state”.189 A 
closer look, however, at the difference in language between Beardsworth and 
Morgenthau here I think is appropriate. Beardsworth, writing from what is often 
called a ‘universal standpoint’, argues for actually transcending the system of 
states towards something ‘supranational’—his personal preference is for 
‘transcendence’ towards it rather than ‘reduction’ to various forms of localism—
whereas Morgenthau is merely calling for theorists to prepare the ground for 
statespersons, the persons making such decisions, by coming up with a principle 
of political organisation—and with no mention of the term ‘supranational’ it 
seems to me because he is not writing from a ‘universal standpoint’. I think he 
has articulated this task of the IR theorist as he understands it very carefully 
indeed, and this is a point we will return to in the conclusion of this chapter. 
Although she says that she is engaged in a mediative rather than a reductive 
project, Benhabib in developing her theory of democratic iterations also speaks 
the language of transcendence: she asks whether “democratic representation 
[can] be organized so as to transcend the nation-state configuration”, tells us 
rights claims within democratic republics “must be viewed as transcending the 
specific enactments of democratic majorities under specific circumstances”, and 
that “the fundamental limitedness of every rights claim within a constitutional 
tradition” lies in its “context-transcending validity”.190 But as we have seen, it is 
a hallmark of the virtue of prudence to pay attention precisely (but not only) to 
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contexts, the very circumstances and places where cultures, identities, and 
rights claims occur and can only occur, with a view to improving human 
conditions both domestic and international. In his most recently published text, 
Walzer, in setting out what he emphasises is a foreign policy for the left, I think 
has shown well an appreciation of the simultaneity to which Brown referred 
above—although as he correctly points out in this text, “global justice begins as 
a human, not a leftist, project; the particular work of the left comes later”—and 
again it is worth quoting him here at some length: 
“The people who talk about transcending the state system are mostly 
those living in securely established states with recognized borders … 
People without states (Palestinians, Kurds, and Tibetans, for 
example), and those living in predatory states or in failed states that 
cannot defend their borders or populations against sectarian militias 
and mercenary adventurers—none of these people are interested in 
political transcendence or world government. They have a different 
dream. They want a state of their own … There is too much loose talk 
about transcending the state system, when the greatest need of the 
world’s poorest and most oppressed people is full participation in that 
system … [Here, then, is a provisional program of foreign policy for 
the left:] first, gradual completion of the state system to provide 
security for citizens; second, a slow process of political alliance 
among states to create wider and wider zones of peace; third, the 
improvement of existing international institutions; and fourth, the 
creation of a space for the political engagement of individual men and 
women, without regard to their citizenship. I won’t pretend that this 
is a revolutionary program. Each of its parts can only be approached 
incrementally. Indeed, a historian friend told me that it sounded like 
a very old-fashioned program—something like the vision of global 
order that inspired liberals and leftists in the aftermath of World War 
II. Those were years of optimism, and in this darker time, it may help 
to recall what we once hoped to achieve.”191 
1.5 Conclusions 
1.5.1 Philosophy Within History 
In a forum dedicated to discussion of his Just and Unjust Wars on its thirtieth 
anniversary, Walzer said in response to the contributors: 
“There are a few cases where I am genuinely uncertain whether I 
should acknowledge deep philosophical differences or deny that 
anything at all is at stake—we are simply speaking in different 
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philosophical idioms. If the latter is the case, then what we might 
have, but can’t quite hear in our own words, is deep philosophical 
agreement.”192 
As we saw in the introduction to this project, Antiochus of Ascalon regarded 
virtually all the philosophical disagreements between the Academics, 
Peripatetics, and Stoics as being merely a matter of terminology rather than 
substance, and in building his own syncretic system of philosophy from what he 
took to be these three schools’ ‘deep philosophical agreement’, touched off 
what we now call a period in the history of philosophy known as ‘Middle 
Platonism.’ And then, of course, there were philosophical disagreements as to 
whether Antiochus’s syncretic system of philosophy contained ‘the truth’ or not. 
I have cited and spoken in a few different philosophical (and non-philosophical) 
idioms in this chapter, but I want to suggest to the reader that all the 
philosophers mentioned nevertheless stand with Antiochus and his critics in a 
broad tradition of philosophy, and this regardless of whether there is ‘deep 
philosophical agreement’ behind their words or not. Furthermore, there appear 
to be traditions within this tradition. For example, Beardsworth spoke of a 
phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Heidegger, as well as a Kantian or 
post-Kantian tradition of critique, and both Benhabib and O’Neill stand in a 
Kantian morally constructivist tradition. But if enlightenment, on Kant’s telling, 
was ‘man’s’ emergence from ‘his’ unwillingness to use ‘his’ own reason, it is 
unclear to me why enlightened subjects today would understand themselves as 
needing recourse to a tradition, philosophical or otherwise.193 And if reason, on 
Hegel’s telling, itself has a history, and only the philosopher can discern the 
direction and meaning of history for the betterment of society, does the 
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philosopher—or do the rest of us—actually need tradition, philosophical or 
otherwise? The next chapter will address this question, and the notion of 
tradition as such, through Arendt’s writings. 
Philosophy seems to have stepped into the public sphere in a very particular way 
in Kant’s writings, significantly developing in the process Hobbes’s notion of 
‘publique reason’.194 We saw Garsten refer to this as ‘the rhetoric of public 
reason’ and a ‘rhetoric against rhetoric’ which aims to silence the controversies 
that always seem to arise in public life. Such silencing required for Kant, Garsten 
argued (using Kant’s words), “a sovereign judge whose authority ‘no one can 
question’ and whose judgments offer ‘relief’ from ‘endless disputes’”, and we 
saw O’Neill argue that this authority, the authority of critical reason, is 
something constructed amongst ourselves through our agreement, thereby 
securing its legitimacy, rather than being an authority which is imposed on us. 
While a question might remain as to whether any actual public has constructed 
such an authority and thereby secured its legitimacy, O’Neill also argues that it 
is a hypothetical agreement to which we are already committed, insofar as we 
invoke standards of reasonability whenever we debate and argue in public life. 
This may or may not assume prematurely the existence of enlightened subjects 
in any actual political community, and we might note here as Rawls does that 
reason and reasonability are not the same thing, but O’Neill also refers to Kant’s 
‘philosophy of history’ (see p.105n192) and his Critique of Judgment and focuses 
also upon possible political communities, which still seems to leave the question 
of the authority of critical reason in actual political communities open, 
especially amongst those citizens who have not been persuaded of Kant’s 
philosophy.195 
But howsoever this matter of the authority of critical reason might be or turn 
out to be, it seems to me that Beardsworth’s broad conception of critical 
philosophy does a very good job indeed in terms of bringing it down to earth. In 
contrast to many poststructuralists or postmodernists who, in Habermas’s words, 
have abandoned—or who at least might seem to have abandoned—the normative 
or ethical orientation of philosophy in an ‘ethics of radical passivity’, he insists 
 
194 Garsten, Saving Persuasion. pp.44–45. 
195 See p.105n191; O’Neill, The Public Use of Reason. pp.65–90.  
110 
that critical philosophy is indeed ethical, that it is disposed to society as a 
whole, that it reflects upon actuality in such a way as to further the betterment 
of society, and that it promotes, in one way or another, better human 
relations.196 But Beardsworth also argues that it is a question of critical 
philosophers not only reflecting upon but also apprehending our actuality and his 
own apprehension is along the lines of Hegel’s philosophy of history through 
Marx. Devetak argues that history in Marx becomes a story about reified 
abstractions such as economic and social relations, and it is these abstractions, 
rather than actual persons, which are taken to be the bearers of freedom and 
necessity. Although his account of history focuses on economic and social 
relations, it may seem that Beardsworth avoids Devetak’s critique here by 
turning to Habermas, who he describes as focusing on “the normative dimension 
of the dignity of the person and on the latter’s freeing and empowering 
potential for individuals contra states if institutionalized and codified at the 
global level”, but it seems to me that we are still in the realm of abstraction 
here; rather than actual persons, Beardsworth refers to ‘the person’, and it is 
unclear to me who ‘the person’ is holding the freeing and empowering potential 
for us all, if it is not a critical philosopher who has apprehended our actuality, 
and who would still remain thereby vulnerable to Devetak’s critique. 
This matter I think also speaks to the tensions that Benhabib seeks to mediate. 
We saw in her work a cosmopolitan project derived from the philosophies of 
Kant, Habermas and Derrida which seems to fit very well within Beardsworth’s 
conception of critical philosophy. But although her project is certainly a moral 
one in Kantian terms, there is perhaps a question as to how far it is an ethical 
one. In the words of the editors of the Oxford Handbook of IPT, it seems to me 
to be more of a ‘meta-normative’ project that posits a radical disjunction 
between ‘the moral’ and ‘the ethical’ (or ‘universalism’ and ‘contextualism’) 
and seeks to mediate between them from a Kantian ‘universal standpoint’. This 
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standpoint, moreover, seems to be informed by other philosophers: as well as 
providing a discourse-theoretic (i.e. a Habermasian) justification of it, Benhabib 
also uses the Hegelian language of ‘objective spirit’ in explaining the 
provenance of cosmopolitan norms, and in explaining her Derridean theory of 
democratic iterations, argues that the actuality of l’affaire du foulard attests to 
a dialectic of rights and identities. As with Beardsworth, it seems to me that 
there remains a question of the extent to which Benhabib is privileging 
philosophical apprehension, and/or a philosophy of history, in her mode of 
critique. 
Is it necessary to subscribe or assent to a dialectical philosophy or philosophy of 
history to engage in critique? Devetak’s work I think is an important contribution 
to the literature which argues that it is not. His contextualist account of the 
philosophical sources upon which critical international theorists often draw I 
think well reveals the construction over time of an intellectual persona that has 
mastered the self-reflective and dialectical social philosophies from the 
enlightenment onwards; a persona, Devetak argues, which sometimes presents 
as holding privileged access to higher moral truths and norms, enabling critical 
theorists’ superintendent activities in shaping society for the better, or in an 
emancipatory direction. In his investigations, Devetak recovers a rival mode of 
critique developed in the Renaissance which fed into a civil and jurisprudential 
enlightenment; a mode of critique less attached to metaphysical or post-
metaphysical abstractions and more historically sensitive and politically attuned 
through mastery of the studia humanitatis and ars historica. I think this is an 
important recovery, an ‘intellectual treasure’ as Devetak says, but it seems to 
me that more can be said about it. First, he makes significant use of the Latin 
term persona in his argument but there is no discussion in his text of what he 
means by this term. We shall consider its meaning through the writings of Arendt 
and Cicero across the next two chapters. Second, Devetak is certainly right that 
the Ciceronian curriculum of the studia humanitatis was “intended to cultivate 
the civilizing practices through which peace, liberty and free government were 
to be achieved”, but in his text he mentions only in passing that one of the 
subjects in the curriculum was moral philosophy—a subject that remained very 
much on it in what Dallmayr called ‘the good-sense tradition’ throughout the 
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Enlightenment.197 Cicero’s De Officiis has always been a key text in this regard 
and it is one that we shall consider in some detail in chapter three. 
It seems to me that Devetak and Dallmayr hold at least three things in common; 
both recommend a turn to the studia humanitatis in terms of promoting, in one 
way or another, better human relations, both recognise some of the innately 
pedagogical aspects of these studies, and both are sceptical of those 
philosophers who present or understand themselves as having privileged access 
to higher moral truths. Yet we have seen Dallmayr call for a ‘sublation’ of Rawl’s 
The Law of Peoples, his critique of (i) Ricoeur’s ethical theory for its 
‘metaphysical realism’ and (ii) Rasmussen’s turn to the Hegelian concept of 
recognition, with a suggested improvement of both through Heidegger’s 
metaphysical or post-metaphysical philosophy of Dasein, and all of this it seems 
to me may be vulnerable to Devetak’s historical mode of critique. That said, 
Dallmayr does seem to me to have an excellent sense of the limitations of 
philosophy. Despite his various Heideggerian emphases on ‘being’ throughout his 
Post-Liberalism, he leaves ‘be’ uncapitalized in the title of the text’s final 
section in the final chapter, choosing to emphasise instead simply ‘Learning [to 
be] Human’. I think this is marvellous. He speaks rightly in this section of 
“philosophers as human beings” which, although common sense to most, might 
occasionally be overlooked in academia. But not unlike Beardsworth, if Dallmayr 
enjoins in his concluding comments a search for the human, then it seems his 
work may still be vulnerable to Devetak’s historical mode of critique. Searching 
for ‘the human’ appears to involve the perils of ‘venturing into philosophical 
(and theological) terrain’ and becoming—I think often imperceptibly to those 
who so venture—troublingly remote from lived practice. As political theorist 
Stephen K. White put it, quite aptly in relation to Heidegger, and quite 
beautifully, it risks presenting to everybody else “a reverential tarrying in the 
neighbourhood of thinking”, and although Dallmayr’s work so often manages to 
steer clear of the perils of philosophising and finds its way back really well and 
with extraordinary skill to the lived practices of human beings, I argue in this 
project that it is Cicero, due in large part to his practical experience, who is 
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especially outstanding in our history, as far as his theoretical writings on politics 
go, at doing this.198 
1.5.2 Virtuous Conduct 
In the second section of this chapter, I sought to foreground an approach to 
ethics which has hitherto been marginalised in IPT, virtue ethics, as it is an 
approach which is fundamental to Cicero’s theoretical writings on politics. As a 
person-centred rather than rules-based approach to ethics, it is rarely associated 
with Kant, who is generally understood to offer us the rules-based approach 
known as deontology. But I also pointed out through Nussbaum’s argument that 
Kant himself had much to say about the virtues, even though he is often 
portrayed as being more ‘rigorist’ when it comes to morals or ethics. As regards 
Benhabib’s project, it seems to me that she holds Kant to be more rigorist in 
these matters, more concerned with abstract (or meta-normative) principles 
than with exercising moral judgments in the world, such that in his Perpetual 
Peace, for example, she says that he “moves from the language of morals to that 
of juridical right”. Whatever the correct interpretation of Kant’s philosophy (and 
philosophical sketches) might be, as Dallmayr indicated, the question of morals 
seems to be outstanding in Benhabib’s own theory of democratic iterations: with 
the incorporation into her project of Derrida’s work in the philosophy of 
language, it no longer quite fits within (rigorist) Kantian or Habermasian 
parameters. Norval in her review of Habermas’s The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere I think is correct to suggest that this is a question of virtue; 
a question that neither rigorist interpretations of Kant nor Habermasian 
discourse theory, the latter of which is concerned with the methods by which 
moral principles are justified rather than with the substantive content of those 
principles (with the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what’), addresses, and it is one I 
address in the third chapter of my project through a consideration of Cicero’s 
writings about the four primary virtues in the De Officiis. 
In Dallmayr’s work, we saw an account of virtue ethics, or what he more 
helpfully called the Aristotelian tradition of virtuous praxis, in which he rightly 
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noted two key aspects of ethical development: participation in public or political 
affairs and the nurturing of virtuous conduct through education or pedagogy so 
that it becomes more stabilised. In contrasting the philosophies of Aristotle and 
Kant, Dallmayr says that the former “emerges as the proper guide because he 
does not talk of moral doctrines but of ‘virtues’ and ‘goods’ which are the 
attributes of praxis”, and while it is beyond the scope of my project to compare 
Aristotle’s with Cicero’s writings on virtue—or indeed Cicero’s with Kant’s, who 
we have seen did talk of moral doctrines but also talked of virtues and goods—I 
do hope to show in subsequent chapters that it is Cicero, again due in large part 
to his own practical experience in public life, who is a yet more proper guide; a 
more proper guide, that is, to virtuous conduct in political societies as 
distinguished from ethical or moral philosophising, even as he produced texts 
appropriate to the latter as well.199 
Norval, like Dallmayr, is concerned with the ethical development of citizens in 
public settings, but unlike Dallmayr and following Habermas, she seems to retain 
a modern liberal understanding of society such that aversion to it is taken to be 
a ‘good’ (or ‘the right’) thing. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, what 
Cicero most emphatically does not have is an aversion to society. Aversion might 
well be a good conception to hold if one takes society to have ‘massifying’ 
effects on its members, but this seems to me to be a faulty conception of 
society in the first place, rooted in certain strands of modern liberal thinking. In 
the next chapter, we shall see that Arendt holds some similar concerns to 
Emerson, Habermas and Norval as regards society, but it seems to me that there 
is a better conception of it available, one which I introduce in the next chapter 
through a consideration of Arendt’s writings on this matter and develop through 
Cicero’s in chapters three and four. It is a conception of society which allows us 
not only to retain a conception of self-reliance—which has always been, and still 
is, a hallmark of virtue ethics—but also to understand that aversion to society is 
an unnecessary and undesirable trait, as Dallmayr I think suggests (p.71). With a 
better conception of society, I hope to show that aversion to it is, in fact, to 
recall Norval’s words, part of the problem. 
 
199 Dallmayr, Post-Liberalism. p.63. An indication of this might be seen in the extent to which Kant 
himself used Cicero as a moral guide in his own writings. Nussbaum, Kant and Stoic 
Cosmopolitanism. 
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Regarding the conduct of statespersons, we saw Dallmayr, Devetak and Brown all 
draw attention to the virtue of phronesis as it is set out by Aristotle, or in Latin, 
the virtue of prudentia. Part of this virtue, as Kelsay says, involves ‘taking 
counsel’, and we saw Devetak discussing the role of some historians in the 
Renaissance in providing it based on their study of the past (and often their own 
experiences in public office as well). Brown rightly warned against the ever-
present danger of hubris, whether in statespersons or scholars, and Walzer also 
pointed with seeming disapproval to some realists in IR in the 1950s and 60s who 
seemed a bit too eager to be “whispering into the ear of the prince”. 
Nevertheless, I think Kelsay is right that taking counsel is an important aspect of 
the virtue of prudence on the part of the statesperson, that counsel may 
legitimately come from historians, moral theorists or indeed scholars specialising 
in both, and that it is an education in the virtues, or the humanities more 
generally, which might help in tempering anybody’s over-eagerness. 
We saw that Brown raised a concern about Morgenthau’s ‘pulling rank’ when the 
latter asked readers in the preface to the second edition of his Politics Among 
Nations to appreciate the ‘twenty years of labour’ that had went into its 
production and judge the whole argument, rather than the whole argument 
based on a judgment of only this or that part of it. Brown argued that such pleas 
are not conducive to genuine intellectual progress, that wisdom cannot be 
claimed for oneself but can only be recognised by others, and that there is some 
substance to the claim that ‘classical realism’ is ‘wisdom literature’, reliant 
upon authority rather than argument. I think Brown is entirely correct that 
wisdom cannot be claimed for oneself and can only be recognised by others, but 
did Morgenthau claim wisdom for himself? It seems to me that he was appealing 
to his own authority in speaking about these matters, that is, to his character 
(ethos), rather than to his (putative) wisdom. And he also appealed to the 
argument (logos) of the text itself in the same preface, which I think means he 
was not relying only upon his own authority, and was still making a contribution 
towards ‘genuine intellectual progress’, insofar as that is understood in terms of 
scholars engaging as equals in (non-Hegelian) dialectic. And it seems to me he 
was also appealing to the emotions of his readers (pathos) in saying that he was 
‘begging their favour’, and so drawing in his preface upon all three of the parts 
of rhetoric as set out by Aristotle (although evidently without success, at least in 
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Brown’s case). Whether or not Morgenthau’s appeal to his ethos within the walls 
of the academy was appropriate or effective, it does seem to me that in his 
doing so, he was engaging in the sort of argumentation that had been going on 
within these walls far more frequently prior to the early seventeenth century, 
that is, before formal logic (including non-Hegelian dialectic) had come to 
displace rhetoric in the field of humanistic studies and the tasks of scholars in 
the fields we now call social or political theory had come to be understood as 
more rigoristic and less practical—and indeed it is still a sort of argumentation 
undertaken by many (though I think still too few) scholars today in these broad 
fields of study. While it is beyond the scope of my project to consider either 
Aristotle’s or Cicero’s writings on rhetoric, I hope to show the reader in 
subsequent chapters that it holds a legitimate place in the civic republican 
tradition, and not only because speech and persuasion are unavoidable aspects 
of the human condition. 
1.5.3 The Civic Republican Tradition 
Although I certainly do not agree with everything that Morgenthau says in his 
work, it seems to me that he is very articulate, and that this is a direct 
consequence of his humanistic education. In the passage that Brown quotes from 
The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory, he is very careful to say that 
the theorist’s task is limited only to “preparing the ground” for statespersons, 
and he is careful not to specify what “the principle of political organisation that 
has dominated the modern world from the French Revolution to the present 
day” is such that it is no longer valid alongside the existence of nuclear power. It 
is true that he talks of a principle of political organisation that ‘transcends the 
nation-state’, but it seems to me that his is not the kind of loose talk of which 
Walzer is critical. If Brown is right that Morgenthau displayed the virtue of 
phronesis (or prudentia) in his writing of this article, then, as Kelsay puts it, it 
was done in such a way as to determine what form the other primary virtues 
take on that occasion. Although Morgenthau’s transcendence-talk may on the 
surface sound intemperate or extreme, it was spoken not only in the extreme 
situation that is the existence of nuclear power, but also specifically to IR 
theorists, and only as a theoretical task; he made no call for statespersons to 
‘transcend the nation-state’ and thus I think he showed a certain level of 
moderation in his reasoning and speech. 
117 
Brown argues that Morgenthau calls for “a new principle of political 
organisation”. From the passage quoted (current restrictions prevent me from 
accessing the book in which Morgenthau’s chapter appears), I cannot see that he 
is calling for a new principle. Implicit in this passage, I believe, is Morgenthau’s 
own belief that an investigation by IR theorists of principles of political 
organisation in history, prior to those which have developed from the French 
Revolution to the present, may be of some help in addressing our quandary. The 
civic republican principle of political organisation is of course not new and 
Daniel Deudney, for example, has picked up on it in terms of meeting 
Morgenthau’s challenge to IR theorists.200 While I do not follow Deudney in 
investigating how the principle might help in the control of nuclear arms, I do 
hope in this project to be providing some more clarity as to what the principle 
itself looks like through a consideration of Arendt’s writings and then of 
Cicero’s. 
In this chapter, we first encountered the civic republican tradition in Kant’s 
writings through the work of Benhabib. Kant’s version of civic republicanism was 
tied to his metaphysics of morals and involved the public use of reason in terms 
of securing the legitimacy of one’s claims. We saw Garsten refer to this as the 
rhetoric of public reason, which aims to silence the controversies that are the 
very stuff of politics and obscure the alienation of citizens’ own judgments 
about public affairs to the sovereignty of critique. Again, the standard of critical 
reason allows one, as Kant says, “to secure himself against … injurious 
deceptions, which must finally lose for him all their illusory power”, which 
sounds to me like this standard-bearer is harbouring a dogma of one sort or 
another that reduces their receptivity to fellow-citizens, but for Kant the verdict 
of critical reason is not dictatorial, “being simply the agreement of free 
citizens”, that is to say, the agreement of self-legislating citizens who are in 
possession of the standard of critical reason. We saw O’Neill support this claim 
by arguing that the authority of critical reason is something we construct 
amongst ourselves, thereby securing its legitimacy, and we saw Garsten 
disagree, arguing that the rhetoric of public reason engenders frustration and 
resentment in those citizens who have not been persuaded of Kant’s critical 
 
200 Daniel Deudney, 2007. Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the 
Global Village. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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philosophy. Such persuasion we have seen requires engaging citizens’ practical 
judgments, which in turn, as both Devetak and Dallmayr argue, is best cultivated 
through the studia humanitatis. 
Benhabib seems to stand in the same Kantian constructivist tradition as O’Neill 
and provides a theory of democratic iterations which she argues can allow for 
successful mediations between cosmopolitan norms and the self-determination 
of democratic republics. Although she acknowledges that democratic debates 
about citizens’ rights are carried on within certain limits, Benhabib’s theory 
does not address the institutional or constitutional nature of these limits, 
something we saw Dallmayr and Walzer approach, and something we shall 
consider in subsequent chapters through Arendt’s and Cicero’s writings. 
Benhabib’s theory, rather, addresses how one might mediate between 
cosmopolitan norms and the will of democratic majorities through iterations or 
re-iterations of that democracy’s existing norms and principles. She used the 
‘will-based’ republican theories of both Kant and Rousseau as heuristic devices, 
the latter of which we have seen Walzer question as a ground for political 
legitimacy, and as already mentioned, Benhabib’s theory in any case appears no 
longer to sit strictly within Kantian or even Habermasian discourse-theoretic 
parameters, since it also incorporates Derrida’s work on iterations in the 
philosophy of language. Drawing upon Derrida’s work, Benhabib says that every 
iteration “transforms” meaning, but she also describes iterations as varying, 
repositing, resignifying, enhancing, appropriating, reappropriating, dissolving, 
and preserving meaning, with all of these leading into her account of democratic 
iterations as “political repetitions-in-transformation, invocations that also are 
revocations”. We recall Beardsworth’s description of Derrida’s work as setting 
up a ‘general metaphysics of temporalisation’, and Benhabib does say that it is 
in the process of human beings iterating that the various and seemingly 
contradictory events she describes takes place. But quite apart from whether 
they occur as a result of the process itself or the judgments of any one or other 
of us human beings who are involved in that process (and this may well mark out 
the difference between ‘jurisgenerative processes’ and ‘jurisgenerative politics’ 
in Benhabib’s theory), iterating a term/concept/norm, according to Benhabib, 
involves both invoking and revoking it, and it seems only when this is done 
creatively or productively (perhaps suggesting the judgments, and politics, of 
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actual human beings after all), the meaning of the term/concept/norm either 
transforms on the one hand or stops making sense on the other, and either way, 
it “loses its authority on us”. Benhabib is careful and, if not entirely consistent, I 
think nevertheless correct to protect cosmopolitan norms from such Derridean 
cracks, and we shall consider some of the ancient sources of these norms in 
subsequent chapters, where I also provide, through a consideration of Arendt’s 
and Cicero’s writings, some more shape to the civic republican tradition in which 
Benhabib’s heuristic models stand, including more shape to two touchstone 
terms within it: tradition and authority. In doing so, I not only seek to move 
scholarly focus from the ‘how’ (processes) to the ‘who’ (human beings) as 
regards these matters, but also hope to stay the reader’s assent or subscription 
to any Derridean generalisations in the philosophy of language that might lead to 
unwary attempts at the transformation, dissolution or revocation of the 
meanings of certain guiding norms and principles of the political societies in 
which citizens continue living, speaking, acting, thinking, and exercising 
judgments in the world. 
The political or normative (or jurisgenerative) aspect of Benhabib’s argument is 
that only productive or creative iterations result in “the augmentation of the 
meaning of rights claims” and “the growth of the political authorship by ordinary 
individuals, who thereby make these rights their own by democratically 
deploying them.” But it seems to me that ordinary individuals are not usually 
schooled in Derrida’s philosophy of language such that in their democratic 
iterations their political authorship is grown in the way Benhabib is perhaps 
suggesting her theory is built to enable, and again, even if they were, it is 
unclear that they, or indeed anybody au fait with Derrida’s philosophy of 
language, would be giving in their iterations ‘good reasons in the public sphere’ 
along the lines Habermas enjoins. That said, Benhabib’s theory does seem to 
retain Habermas’s (and indeed Derrida’s) aversion to any ethical approach which 
takes into consideration the virtues—or put differently, the characteristics or the 
content of the capacities (creative, productive, or otherwise)—of those 
iterating, and it seems to me that it is just such an approach that would be 
required in avoiding what Benhabib calls jurispathic processes. 
What Benhabib has called democratic iterations or jurisgenerative politics that 
go on through processes of argument, contestation and revision in democratic 
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republics, Garsten has called the politics of persuasion, and it seems to me that 
both are describing what may properly be understood as that which is carried on 
within the tradition of politics we call civic republican (even as Benhabib’s 
project, in spite of its Derridean influences, might also be said to sit within a 
tradition of political liberalism). And as Dallmayr said, the civic republican 
tradition has a history that is much older than the Enlightenment, so we need 
not be beholden only to the republican theories of this time such as Kant’s or 
Rousseau’s. The civic republican tradition is one in which citizens deliberate 
amongst themselves and arrive at their own judgments about public affairs in 
what Sandel has called a formative politics (or, perhaps, what Benhabib has 
called normative learning processes). These politics, this sharing in self-
government, require the learning and acquisition of civic virtues, education in 
which, as Devetak says, is intended to “cultivate the civilizing practices through 
which peace, liberty and free government” are achieved, and which both 
Devetak and Dallmayr emphasise have traditionally been acquired through the 
studia humanitatis. We saw Dallmayr begin his own brief history of the civic 
republican tradition with Cicero, “a learned civic republican” who “celebrated 
citizenship in a good or virtuous republic”, but then he doubled back to Plato 
and Aristotle and framed the rest of his account of the civic republican tradition 
as one of a flattening out of the Platonic agon. While it is certainly correct that 
Cicero drew inspiration from Greek philosophy (and not only Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s), he also drew inspiration from the mos maiorum, the ways of his 
ancestors, and as we shall see in subsequent chapters, the latter contributes to 
his political thought in a way which I think makes it very distinctive from that of 
Greek philosophers. As touched upon above, Benhabib acknowledges that there 
are certain limits to democratic decision-making in democratic republics, and 
one of the distinguishing features of Cicero’s theoretical writings on politics is 
how he sets out such limits in his account of a mixed constitution, again 
different from that of Greek philosophers or political theorists, which is 
regarded by the character Scipio in his De Re Publica as the best practicable 
form of government in terms of maintaining the sharing in self-government, the 
public space, free politics, the commonwealth, the res publica, in existence. 
Mixed government, as we shall see in the next chapter, is also that of which 
Arendt seems to approve as the best practicable in terms of guaranteeing the 
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plurality of persons, and we saw both Walzer and Dallmayr approving of a mixed 
constitution in one form or another as well. 
We saw in the final section of this chapter that it was in the tradition of civic 
republican politics at Rome that a strand of law was developed by jurists called 
the ius gentium, ‘the law of peoples’, giving legal expression to an already 
existing international political society. Since it developed from customs or 
agreements between nations or peoples reaching back into the mists of time, it 
seems to me that Dallmayr’s claim about what “the phrase” mixed or blended 
“from the very beginning”, although excellently put, unduly de-emphasises the 
historical or customary features of this strand of law. But whatever its ‘origins’, 
we shall consider in the final chapter of this project Cicero’s own treatment of 
the ius gentium. As Dallmayr says, natural law was a later addition to Roman law 
derived from the writings of Stoic philosophers, and again, Cicero also has 
recourse to natural law in his writings which we shall consider in the final 
chapter, but important for us to underscore here is Dallmayr’s claim that, then 
as now, “philosophers’ reflections clearly cannot simply substitute themselves 
for the agency and competence of concrete populations”, and even if they 
could, they would still lack the “traction or leverage needed” to influence 
actual human conduct. The traction or leverage of which Dallmayr is speaking 
we have seen Garsten call rhetoric, the art of speech and persuasion which 
engages practical judgments, and which historically has always been part of the 
civic republican tradition and a key subject in the studia humanitatis. We shall 
consider the importance of speech and persuasion for politics in Arendt’s 
writings in the next chapter and see some of the ways it fits into Cicero’s 
political thought in the final chapter, but returning to the literature reviewed in 
this one, we also considered some of the work carried out in contemporary just 
war scholarship, which emerges inter alia from the ius gentium. Once again, the 
just war tradition has a long history; as Jed W. Atkins says, “just war theory 
owes a great debt to the Roman republican tradition. In fact, many of the 
individual specifications of just war theory can be found in the works of Cicero”, 
and we shall be considering some of these specifications in chapter three.201 
Finally, this sub-section concluded with a consideration of the virtue of 
prudence as it was set out or understood from some ‘communitarian’ and 
 
201 Jed W. Atkins, 2018. Roman Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.177. 
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‘cosmopolitan’, or else ‘particularist’ and ‘universalist’, positions and it was 
seen that some ‘communitarians/particularists’ have ‘cosmopolitan/universalist’ 
concerns and vice versa. Subsequent chapters I hope will further illustrate the 
limited usefulness of these distinctions, which I do not use in this project. As 
Walzer put it (some while ago now): 
“A particularism that excludes wider loyalties invites immoral 
conduct, but so does a cosmopolitanism that overrides narrower 
loyalties. Both are dangerous; the argument needs to be cast in 
different terms.”202 
1.5.4 Concluding Remarks 
Given the breadth and variety of the literature reviewed in this chapter, it will 
probably help the reader’s understanding and certainly help the rest of my 
project if I express in tabular form a series of distinctions which make it easier 
to summarise the room for improvement I find. Some of the distinctions will 
probably be familiar to the reader (some of them are traditional), but I wish to 
emphasise that they are distinctions made for analytical purposes only. They are 
more or less useful for organising our experiences, neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’, and 
I make no claims as to their truth or falsity. In the words of Patrick Thaddeus 
Jackson, the following table is made up of “deliberate caricatures”; it 




Republican institutions Liberal institutions 
 
202 Michael Walzer, 1996. ‘Spheres of Affection’. Martha C. Nussbaum and Joshua Cohen (eds.), 
1996. For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism. Boston: Beacon Press. p.127. 
203 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 2011. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy 
of science and its implications for the study of world politics. London: Routledge. pp.143 and 
145. 
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Persuasion (rhetoric) Demonstration (non-Hegelian 
dialectic) 
Exercising judgments (including about 
persons) in the world 
Deducing decisions (including about 
persons) from ideologies, 
philosophical systems, or theories in 
the world 
Discretion in exercising judgments in 
the world 
No discretion in exercising judgments 
in the world (obeying rules without 
exception) 
Trust in the authority of persons in 
political societies 
Distrust in the authority of persons in 
political societies 
Of some arguments in IPT related to exercising judgments in the world, where 
is there room for improvement? Behind many of the arguments in IPT related to 
exercising judgments in the world, it seems to me, are some presuppositions 
about or conceptions of politics which place too much emphasis on the qualities 
listed in the ‘impersonal’ column in this table, and the room for improvement I 
find in the literature reviewed in this chapter is in the direction of supposing or 
conceiving of politics as placing some more emphasis on the qualities listed in 
the ‘personal’ column. Expressed impersonally, ‘the political is (partly) 
personal’.204 Needless to say, this is not to exclude or disallow any of the 
qualities listed in the impersonal column, and nor is to suggest that philosophy 
cannot help us in understanding politics. Rather, it is to include and allow a 
greater appreciation of persons as persons in the study of politics—touchstones 
of the writings of both Arendt and Cicero, as we shall see—and to suggest that 
there are limits as to how far philosophy can help us in understanding politics. 
 
204 I thank the second wave of feminism for the expression and Cian O’Driscoll for its variation. 
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Chapter 2 Exercising Judgments in the World 
and Hannah Arendt’s Theoretical Writings on 
Politics 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I concluded with a series of distinctions intended to 
highlight the qualities I think would go into a better conception of politics, one 
that is more attuned to persons as persons and to exercising judgments in the 
world, and which might usefully be articulated in a variation of a famous phrase: 
‘the political is (partly) personal’. As we shall see in this chapter, Arendt’s 
theoretical writings on politics are situated more on the left- than on the right-
hand side of the table, and we begin with a consideration of her writings on 
tradition. In the previous chapter, I drew the reader’s attention to a broad 
tradition of philosophy in which stood the numerous philosophers discussed 
therein, as well as a certain incongruence between the very notion of tradition 
and the very notion of philosophy, especially of the enlightenment variety, since 
enlightenment is so often understood in terms of the subject casting off 
traditions of all kinds and relying only upon his or her own reason instead. I also 
asked the reader whether we in fact need tradition if we accept Hegel’s 
philosophy which says that reason itself has a history and only the philosopher 
can discern its direction and meaning for the betterment of society. In the first 
section of this chapter, I approach this question through a consideration of 
Arendt’s writings on tradition. As we shall see, her writings on this topic can be 
very obscure; in (hopefully) bringing some clarity to them, I have sub-divided 
this section in two. The first sub-section questions an assertion which Arendt 
makes in passing: “the undeniable loss of tradition in the modern world…”.1 This 
assertion is one of very many instances in Arendt’s writings where the definite 
article and any object are missing from the term, which it seems to me indicates 
that what she means to say on these occasions is tradition as such. I consider a 
selection of (what I take to be) her claims about tradition as such in this sub-
section and argue not only that we do in fact need it but also that it has not 
been lost in the modern world. 
 
1 BPF. pp.93–94. 
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Whereas the first sub-section considers what Arendt has to say about tradition as 
such, the second sub-section retains and develops the arguments I have made 
therein to question Arendt’s own arguments that a ‘definite’ tradition—what, 
following Jerome Kohn, we may provisionally call ‘the great Western 
philosophic-political tradition’ or ‘the great tradition of political and philosophic 
thought’, or following convention in the secondary literature on Arendt, simply 
‘the tradition’—has come to a “…definite end” in the modern age.2 Even as she 
does not actually define ‘the’ tradition herself, through a consideration of 
Arendt’s writings about its ‘end’, with particular attention paid to Cicero as he 
appears (or not) in different versions of her story over time, I argue that ‘the 
tradition’ not only endures, but also that Arendt’s writings themselves stand 
comfortably in it. Indeed, I hope that this last point will become even clearer to 
the reader by the end of my project. 
The second section considers Arendt’s focus on persons in her writings, 
beginning with her account of the continuing relevance of the Latin term 
persona in contemporary discourse both inside and outside the academy, before 
going on to consider the matter of personal responsibility in relation both to the 
controversy touched off by her Eichmann in Jerusalem and the consequent sets 
of lectures she gave on moral philosophy. In the previous chapter, Dallmayr 
observed that Arendt side-lined the civic virtues as found in Aristotle and Cicero 
in favour of a celebration of Machiavellian virtù in her writings, but I highlight 
here some evidence from her lectures on moral philosophy that she did indeed 
support classical accounts of the virtues, and in particular, she turns to Cicero in 
intimating to her students what it was that led a few persons living under the 
Nazi regime to resist the new ‘values’ which had been imposed on them, and 
despite the seemingly easy ‘exchange of values’ of so many others all around 
them: humanitas. Following an account of Arendt’s treatment of this term 
through her essays on Karl Jaspers, I consider the connections she makes 
between humanitas and culture and the threats she sees to both in what she 
calls ‘society’ which, although a main subject in the next section, is introduced 
here in relation to the Latin term persona through her story about the French 
revolution. The second sub-section continues from the first by looking at 
Arendt’s writings around statespersons, beginning with an account of the virtues 
 
2 BPF. pp.viii and 18; PP. p.vii. 
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that she saw in the conduct of Winston Churchill and John F. Kennedy, and 
concluding with a consideration of her own understanding of the virtue of 
phronesis. 
The final section of the chapter considers Arendt’s writings on political societies 
and is sub-divided in three. The first sub-section looks at the extent to which we 
can say, with Margaret Canovan, that Arendt offers us a ‘new’ republicanism. I 
draw out several similarities between Arendt’s writings and Cicero’s on civic 
republican institutions, before going on to illustrate the relation of authority and 
freedom that she sees in the various councils that sprung up during the different 
revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—what she categorised as 
‘the council system’—as well as in the American founding, both cases recalling 
the same relation of authority and freedom in the Roman republic. The second 
sub-section picks up the discussion of Arendt’s understanding of ‘society’ as 
introduced in the first section by investigating her distinction between ‘the 
social’ and ‘the political’, where I highlight numerous problems with her 
distinction and show that, through a consideration of the Latin term societas in 
her writings, we can see that she did in fact write of political societies. The final 
sub-section considers Arendt’s argument that we have become aware of ‘a right 
to have rights’, as well as the extent to which we can see, despite her ‘realism’ 
in the international sphere as emphasised by Owens in Between War and 
Politics, a conception of international political society in Arendt’s writings. 
In this chapter, the questions to which I am responding are: What can some of 
Hannah Arendt’s theoretical writings on politics contribute to the arguments 
addressed in the previous chapter, and how are these writings of Arendt’s 
related to Cicero’s theoretical writings on politics? As mentioned in my 
Introduction, Arendt provides a double function in my argument, and this is 
reflected in these two questions: a ground-clearing function in relation to the 
first chapter, and a preparatory function in relation to the next two. My 
response to the first question, in a nutshell, is that Arendt contributes a rich 
understanding of the notion of tradition as such which brings (despite the 
difficulty of her style) some clarity to what philosophers or political theorists 
mean when they speak of this or that tradition of philosophy. She also 
contributes to the arguments addressed in the previous chapter by providing an 
important—a humanistic—critique of the philosophies of history upon which many 
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of those arguments are based, as well as an account of the deleterious effects 
such philosophies have had on political thinking. Yet another contribution she 
makes to the arguments addressed in the previous chapter is her own 
understanding of some of the virtues discussed therein, such as phronesis and 
moderation. And yet another is her understanding of the civic republican 
tradition, which fills out some of the discussion about this tradition in the 
previous chapter and leads us into the second question to which I am responding 
in this one. Like Cicero, Arendt distinguishes carefully between power, 
authority, and freedom, a threefold distinction which is a hallmark of the civic 
republican tradition, recognising the need for authority in maintaining public 
freedom, the res publica. And like Cicero, she believes that human beings are 
naturally sociable, that virtues are necessary in public life, that speech and 
persuasion are fundamental and indeed unavoidable aspects of it, and that 
republican institutions are necessary for nurturing all of these. Beyond that, 
however, as we shall see, the relation of Arendt’s writings to Cicero’s can be 
perplexing; it is very often obscured by her obscure language. As such, I think it 
is impossible for us to arrive finally at a secure judgment about this relation. 
And the reason for this impossibility seems to be given by Arendt herself in 
response to Albrecht Wellmer, when he inquired as to why she is not more 
Hegelian in her writings: 
“At least you see one thing which I also see as questionable: namely, 
if I don’t believe in this or that theory, why don’t I write a refutation 
of it? I will do that only under duress. That is my lack of 
communication.”3 
If there are aspects of Cicero’s theoretical writings on politics that Arendt does 
not believe in, we remain very much in the dark as to what they are, but I do 
hope to show in this chapter that there certainly are a great many aspects of his 
writings that she does believe in. 
 
3 TWB. p.464. 
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2.2 Traditions, Politics and Philosophies 
2.2.1 ‘The undeniable loss of tradition in the modern world’? 
Working out what Arendt means to say about tradition is by no means an easy 
task. Without the definite article and any object, she tells us many times of its 
break or loss, usually in terms of its break being irreparable or its loss being 
undeniable, or other words to similar effects. It seems to me that Arendt does 
mean to claim, at least sometimes, that tradition as such in the modern world 
has been lost undeniably or broken irreparably. Sometimes she seems to 
attribute tradition’s break or loss to the modern age in general, sometimes to 
this or that thinker who has lived during it, and sometimes to the totalitarian 
enormities of the 1930s and 40s. But a problem, as I understand it, is that Arendt 
provides very little by way of argument that tradition as such has been broken or 
lost in the modern world, even if the notion itself often seems to shape much of 
what she has to say. Such claims about tradition’s break or loss have a strong 
tendency to appear in Arendt’s writings as assertions or allusions—or put 
differently, poetry—rather than arguments. In this sub-section, I consider a 
selection of Arendt’s writings around tradition as such and argue both that we 
need the help of tradition as such in exercising judgments in the world and, 
thankfully, it has not been lost in it.  
According to Arendt in Tradition and the Modern Age: 
“Before the Romans such a thing as tradition was unknown; with them 
it became and after them it remained the guiding thread through the 
past and the chain to which each new generation knowingly or 
unknowingly was bound in its understanding of the world and its own 
experience.”4 
 It is not that tradition as such did not exist before the Romans; it is merely, 
according to Arendt, that it was ‘unknown’ before them. And if it exists in the 
world before, during and after the Romans, it may well do so ‘unknowingly’ to 
generations bound to it in their understanding of the world and their own 
experiences. We are not told in this passage what Arendt herself believes about 
 
4 BPF. p.25. 
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the worth of tradition as such, just as we are not told when, in What is 
Authority?, she says: 
“…the undeniable loss of tradition in the modern world does not at all 
entail a loss of the past, for tradition and past are not the same, as 
the believers in tradition on one side and the believers in progress on 
the other would have us believe…”.5 
Insofar as tradition and progress are not mutually exclusive, it is probably 
believers on ‘the far side’ of each to whom Arendt is referring here (it must be 
very few indeed, I think, who equate tradition and past and believe we have lost 
them together, and fewer still that would have the rest of us believe it). As well 
as describing it as a guiding thread in Tradition and the Modern Age, Arendt 
provides another description of tradition as such and its relation to the past in 
her discussion of the Romans in What is Authority?, where I think we can see this 
time an indication that she finds worth in it: 
“… precedents, the deeds of the ancestors and the usage that grew 
out of them, were always binding. Anything that happened was 
transformed into an example, and the auctoritas maiorum [the 
authority of the ancestors] became identical with authoritative 
models for actual behavior, with the moral political standard as such 
… Tradition preserved the past by handing down from one generation 
to the next the testimony of the ancestors, who first had witnessed 
and created the sacred founding and then augmented it by their 
authority throughout the centuries. As long as this tradition was 
uninterrupted, authority was inviolate; and to act without authority 
and tradition, without accepted, time-honored standards and models, 
without the help of the wisdom of the founding fathers, was 
inconceivable.”6  
Arendt refers here to ‘the deeds of the ancestors’ and auctoritas maiorum, but 
the Romans also spoke often of mos maiorum, the mores or ways of the 
ancestors, which they upheld as authoritative, and this also helps to explain why 
they held great respect for old age as such. Arendt acknowledges in this essay 
that this respect for the auctoritas of the elders was due to their accumulated 
wisdom and experience of the world but says also that it was “because [they] 
had grown closer to the ancestors and the past”.7 In any event, we can see from 
 
5 BPF. pp.93–94. 
6 BPF. pp.123–124. 
7 BPF. p.123. 
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this passage that tradition, authority, and the past are all closely intertwined in 
Roman thought. We shall consider Arendt’s writings on authority in more detail 
below, but here, it seems to me that she is praising authority and so tradition, 
or at least ‘this’ tradition, in her choice of the term ‘inviolate’. But she also 
seems to be implying that ‘this’ tradition was interrupted. In its context, she is 
speaking of a tradition of politics, with notions of tradition and authority in 
matters of thought and ideas—such as the tradition of philosophy and authority 
of philosophers I highlighted in the previous chapter—being essentially derivative 
from this tradition, or what she also calls here “the political realm”.8 And as we 
shall see below, she says in the same essay that the Americans were successful 
in resuming this tradition of politics, the political realm. But we also have in the 
passage quoted above what I think is an excellent description of tradition as 
such, which I would nevertheless like to vary slightly: tradition preserves the 
past by handing down from one generation to the next the testimonies of the 
ancestors. This is what I understand tradition as such to mean and I wonder how 
the past may be preserved if not by tradition. In my own understanding, what is 
transmitted in tradition is the testimonies of, not ‘the Truth’ told by, those who 
have lived before us.9 Arendt says in her preface to Between Past and Future—
speaking, we should note, in the present tense—that tradition is a thing “…which 
selects and names, which hands down and preserves, which indicates where the 
treasures are and what their worth is…”, and it is part of my argument that this 
is whether or not some in the modern world have ‘lost’ or ‘forgotten’ (if they 
had ever ‘found’ or ‘remembered’) that which has been handed down and 
preserved.10 I understand tradition to be something that helps us in exercising 
judgments in the world (it does not, like ‘the Truth’, coerce) and as we shall see 
below, for Arendt—and as I argue in this project, for the rest of us—it is also help 
that we need. 
 
8 BPF. p.124. Cf. HC. p.7, where Arendt describes the Romans as “perhaps the most political 
people we have known”.  
9 Cf. a line of Lessing’s which Arendt says is “the most profound thing that has been said about the 
relationship between truth and humanity”: “Let each man say what he deems truth, and let truth 
itself be commended unto God.” MDT. p.31. Cf. also BPF. p.259, where Arendt says a profound 
thing about this herself: “Conceptually, we may call truth what we cannot change; 
metaphorically, it is the ground on which we stand and the sky that stretches above us.” 
10 BPF. p.5. After several readings of this Preface, I remain convinced it is simply a defence—
however elaborately expressed—of ‘this tradition of politics’, the civic republican tradition. 
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I have found Arendt explicitly saying ‘tradition as such’ only once, talking about 
Hegel in Tradition and the Modern Age: 
“He it was who for the first time saw the whole of world history as 
one continuous development … and this implied that he himself stood 
outside all authority-claiming systems and beliefs of the past, that he 
was held only by the thread of continuity in history itself. The thread 
of historical continuity was the first substitute for tradition; by means 
of it, the overwhelming mass of the most divergent values, the most 
contradictory thoughts and conflicting authorities, all of which had 
somehow been able to function together, were reduced to a unilinear, 
dialectically consistent development actually designed to repudiate 
not tradition as such, but the authority of all traditions.”11 
It seems to me that Arendt, quite apart from the worth she herself finds in it, 
does mean to imply here that tradition as such has been ‘repudiated’ in the 
modern world (whoever the ‘repudiators’ might be). This may not have been 
Hegel’s design, which she says was to repudiate the authority of all traditions, 
but elsewhere she describes “the Hegelian system of historical revelation” as 
“perhaps the most terrible and, humanly speaking, least bearable paradox in the 
whole body of modern thought”, in which the two ‘worlds’ of Plato (‘the 
rational’ and ‘the actual’) are thrown together into a single moving whole and 
Absolute Truth is taken to be immanent in history itself, working itself out in a 
process of dialectical necessity, regardless of the judgments of actual human 
beings.12 At various places in her work, Arendt indicates her disapproval of the 
Hegelian system in which dialectical movement is seen as a universal law, i.e. a 
law of nature and history.13 In The Concept of History, for example, she 
identifies history as the central concept of Hegel’s metaphysics, describes 
metaphysics under his pen as a “transformation” into ‘the philosophy of history’, 
his philosophy of history’s “sharp opposition” to all previous metaphysics which 
 
11 BPF. pp.27–28. 
12 MDT. p.92; OR. p.48.  
13 She of course attributes to neither Hegel nor Marx any later interpretations (or perversions) of 
their work, but still questions Hegelian dialectics as a methodology. For example: “What is of 
importance … is that this thinking can take off, so to speak, from one single point, that a 
process that can essentially no longer be halted begins with that first proposition, that first 
thesis. This thinking, in which all reality is reduced to stages of a single gigantic developmental 
process—something still quite unknown to Hegel—opens a path onto truly ideological thinking, 
which in turn, was also something still unknown to Marx. This step from dialectic as method to 
dialectic as ideology is completed once the first proposition of the dialectical process becomes a 
premise in logic from which everything else can be deduced with a consequentiality totally 
independent of all experience.” PP. pp.74–75. 
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“had looked for truth and the revelation of eternal Being everywhere except in 
the realm of human affairs”, and concludes by suggesting that his philosophy of 
history—and “the concomitant decrease in interest in purely political thinking”—
has been refuted by our own experience of the twentieth century.14 
Arendt is sceptical of Hegel and the German idealists in general, all of whom she 
says “believed in all earnest that the results of their speculations possessed the 
same kind of validity as the results of cognitive processes”.15 As with the 
humanist traditions described by Devetak and Dallmayr in the previous chapter, 
she looks rather to the words and deeds of concrete actors, of ‘men of action’, 
in understanding both past and present. In What is Authority?, for example, 
Arendt looks to the American founders and identifies the American founding as 
being the only one in the modern age to successfully “repair” the “Roman 
foundations of the political realm”, “renew the broken thread of tradition” and 
“restore, through founding [a] new political [body], what for so many centuries 
had endowed the affairs of men with some measure of dignity and greatness.”16 
Published a few years later, however, we find some obscure passages in On 
Revolution which might seem on the face of it to contradict this understanding. 
Noting the American founders’ variation of Virgil’s magnus ordo saeclorum to 
novus ordo saeclorum, Arendt claims that, in their variation, they: 
“…had admitted that it was no longer a matter of founding ‘Rome 
anew’ but of founding a ‘new Rome’, that the thread of continuity 
which bound Occidental politics back to the foundation of the eternal 
city and which tied this foundation once more back to the 
 
14 BPF. pp.68, 77 and 86. Emphasis added. Around the same time as writing The Concept of 
History (the early 1950s), Arendt delivered a lecture to the American Political Science 
Association in which she also made this last point, but in more forthright and controversial 
language: “Who would dare to reconcile himself with the reality of extermination camps or play 
the game of thesis-antithesis-synthesis until his dialectics have discovered ‘meaning’ in slave 
labor? Wherever we find similar arguments in present-day philosophy, we remain either 
unconvinced because of the inherent lack of a sense of reality or begin to suspect bad faith.” 
EU. p.444. In a conference held in 1972, Albrecht Wellmer questioned whether there was a 
Hegelian element missing in Arendt’s distinctions, to which she responded: “I would say that by 
such fancy methods you have eliminated distinctions and have already done this Hegelian trick 
in which one concept, all of its own, begins to develop into its own negative. No it doesn’t! … 
this would be precisely the trap—in my opinion—into which I refuse to go.” TWB. pp.464–465. 
Emphases in original. 
15 LM1. p.16. 
16 BPF. p.140. Cf. OR. p. 197: “Historically speaking [with regard to the American revolution], it was 
as though the Renaissance’s revival of antiquity that had come to an abrupt end with the rise of 
the modern age should suddenly be granted another lease on life…”.  
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prehistorical memories of Greece and Troy was broken and could not 
be renewed. And this admission was inescapable.”17 
Virgil’s line here from the fourth Eclogue, magnus ab integro saeclorum nascitur 
ordo—and it is this full line Arendt uses as her epigraph for the chapter entitled 
‘Foundation II: Novus Ordo Saeclorum’ in On Revolution—is commonly translated 
as ‘the great order of the ages is born anew’. Novus ordo saeclorum (which 
appears on the Great Seal of the US) is commonly translated as the ‘new order 
of the ages.’ In this context, the reader might wonder from what Arendt is 
saying in the above passage, in this newer version of her story about the 
American founders, whether the thread of tradition had not been renewed (or if 
it was lost rather than broken, whether it had not been retrieved) in their 
founding of a ‘new Rome’, which would make it consistent with her claim in 
What is Authority?. We may note here the fact that the American founders 
retained the Latin in their variation of Virgil’s great line, and further support 
that Arendt herself viewed them as renewing (or retrieving) the thread of 
tradition is to be found in many places in On Revolution, for example, when she 
says that they were “nourished by the classics” and had “gone to school in 
Roman antiquity”.18 But she also says in it that: 
“…the reason why [the American founders] turned to antiquity for 
inspiration and guidance was most emphatically not a romantic 
yearning for past and tradition … they prided themselves on their 
‘enlightenment’, on their intellectual freedom from tradition … When 
they turned to the ancients, it was because they discovered in them a 
dimension which had not been handed down by tradition—neither by 
the traditions of customs or institutions nor by the great tradition of 
Western thought and concept. Hence, it was not tradition that bound 
them back to the beginnings of Western history but, on the contrary, 
their own experiences, for which they needed models and precedents. 
 
17 OR. p.213. Has Arendt in the last sentence here fallen into Hegel’s trap, nine years before she 
told Wellmer that she refused (any longer) to fall into it (note 14 above)? Cf. TWB. p.36: “The 
greatness of Hegel’s system, and the reason why it was so extremely difficult to escape its 
influence if one wanted to remain within the scope of traditional philosophy at all, lies in his 
incorporation of the two ‘worlds’ of Plato into one moving whole. The traditional turning from the 
world of appearance to the world of ideas or, conversely, the turning from the world of ideas 
back to the world of appearance, takes place in the historical motion itself and becomes the 
form—although not the content, which is the realization of the Absolute—of the dialectical 
movement.” In any event, notice that she chose not to say ‘the thread of tradition’ in this 
passage. 
18 OR. p.203. 
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And the great model and precedent … was for them … the Roman 
republic and the grandeur of its history.”19 
It is perhaps unsurprising that Arendt, trained in phenomenology, accounts for 
the American founders’ recourse to antiquity primarily in terms of their own 
experiences. But let us note her presuppositions here: (i) they were bound back 
to the beginnings of Western history; and (ii) they had recourse to antiquity for 
its authority, for its inspiration and guidance. Arendt at this point is 
presupposing two enduring parts of what she calls ‘the Roman trinity’: tradition, 
authority (ii), and religion (i).20 But what of tradition in this passage? The reader 
will recall from the quotations on pages 125 and 126 that Arendt understands 
tradition both to be tied to our experiences and to consist of models, and here 
in On Revolution she tells us that the American founders turned to Roman 
antiquity because they needed models for their experiences. Meeting that need, 
could it be that the American founders had recourse to Roman antiquity because 
the model and precedent of the Roman republic had been transmitted to them 
by tradition? I think it very plausible indeed, and despite the obscurity of 
Arendt’s language in the above passage, it seems to me that she does not deny 
the possibility; all that she (emphatically) denies is that they had a romantic 
yearning, a sentimentality or nostalgia, for past and tradition. 
In looking more into Arendt’s obscure language around tradition (and authority), 
let us move forward a few years in her writings again, to Men in Dark Times, 
where in an essay on the work of Walter Benjamin, we can see this matter of 
‘the undeniable loss of tradition in the modern world’ still very much on her 
mind: 
“Insofar as the past has been transmitted as tradition, it possesses 
authority; insofar as authority presents itself historically, it becomes 
tradition. Walter Benjamin knew that the break in tradition and the 
loss of authority which occurred in his lifetime were irreparable, and 
 
19 OR. p.198. Again, notice that Arendt chose not to say the great tradition of ‘politics’ or even 
‘political thought’ (on the latter of which, see the next sub-section). 
20 Here as elsewhere, Arendt derives religio (which means reverence or obligation) from religare 
(which means to bind together). Some ancient sources do support this derivation, but others 
support a different one, including one of Cicero’s dialogues (Nat. D. 2.57), in which the Stoic 
character Balbus associates the word ‘religious’ with scrupulousness and choosing, and derives 
religio from relegere, which means to review; to go through or over again in reading, speech or 
thought. For a brief account of this matter (eloquently concluded), see Sarah F. Hoyt, 1912. 
‘The Etymology of Religion’. Journal of the American Oriental Society. 32(2). pp.126–129. 
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he concluded that he had to discover new ways of dealing with the 
past. In this he became a master when he discovered that the 
transmissibility of the past had been replaced by its citability and that 
in place of its authority there had arisen a strange power to settle 
down, piecemeal, in the present and to deprive it of ‘peace of mind’, 
the mindless peace of complacency … This discovery of the modern 
function of quotations, according to Benjamin … was born out of … the 
despair of the present and the desire to destroy it … Still, the 
discoverers and lovers of this destructive power originally were 
inspired by an entirely different intention, the intention to preserve; 
and only because they did not let themselves be fooled by the 
professional ‘preservers’ all around them did they finally discover that 
the destructive power of quotations was ‘the only one which still 
contains the hope that something from this period will survive …”21  
How far, or in whom, Arendt believes the past has been transmitted as tradition 
we are not told here. Although speaking again of tradition in the present tense, 
she still seems to presuppose its irreparable break in the modern world (that is, 
to the best of her own and Benjamin’s knowledge), and the ‘strange power’ to 
deprive a complacent present of ‘peace of mind’ with citations or quotations 
from the past she can see only in those, like Benjamin, who think poetically; an 
aptitude that she describes in this essay as a “gift”, and moreover, a gift that is 
“extremely rare”.22 Arendt in this passage shares some of Benjamin’s despair of 
the present, but steers away from his desire to destroy it and chooses to 
emphasise instead the importance of preserving the past for the sake of the 
present (and future), a task of tradition as such, even if she thinks here with 
Benjamin that, in the present, the only hope of such preservation is in the gift of 
those who think poetically.23 Walzer has provided us with some helpful 
comments regarding the worldly products of these extremely rare persons who 
have been gifted with the ability to think poetically: 
“Poetry leaves in the minds of its readers some intimation of the 
poet’s truth. Nothing so coherent as a philosophical statement; 
nothing so explicit as a legal injunction; a poem is never more than a 
partial and unsystematic truth, surprising us by its excess, teasing us 
by its ellipsis, never arguing a case.”24 
 
21 MDT. p.193. 
22 MDT. p.205. 
23 Cf. Pierre Pachet and Catherine Temerson, 2007. ‘The Authority of Poets in a World without 
Authority’. Social Research 74(3). Hannah Arendt’s Centenary, Political and Philosophical 
Perspectives, Part I. pp.931–940. 
24 Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy’. p.382. 
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Magnus ab integro saeclorum nascitur ordo. While of course the poetry of others 
may be used in arguing one’s case, one is not thereby thinking poetically, which, 
it seems to me, can only be carried out by the exceedingly few poets among us, 
and I believe Arendt is one of these exceedingly few. Still, how might one cite or 
quote something without thereby transmitting it? In a brief essay which 
implicitly touches upon some of the similarities and differences between Arendt 
and Benjamin, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl says that Arendt: 
“…knew that she lived in ‘dark times’, times in which a long tradition 
had unraveled and scattered in a vast mental diaspora to the ends of 
memories of men. But she viewed the rupture as a sign that the 
threads, the thought fragments, were to be gathered, freely and in 
such a way as to protect freedom, and made into something new, 
dynamic, and illuminating. She was heiress to an aphoristic technique; 
the capita mortua of the broken tradition were assembled with this 
technique, reincarnated, full-bodied and vital … when the past is not 
transmitted as tradition, it can be freely appropriated; and when such 
free appropriation presents itself historically, it becomes the occasion 
for dialogue … It was Hannah Arendt’s peculiar gift to be able to open 
up our words and find in them the surviving threads of our 
tradition.”25 
I am unable to expound Arendt’s aphoristic technique, to which I think she 
alludes beautifully in the final section of her essay on Benjamin, entitled ‘The 
Pearl Diver’. But I do want to suggest that if Young-Bruehl is right here about 
Arendt—and despite the irony in her use of the phrase ‘capita mortua’, ‘the 
heads of the dead’, which without irony can be said to be ‘pearls of wisdom’, I 
believe she is—then it makes ‘the undeniable loss of tradition in the modern 
world’ a questionable assertion. If we do not presuppose tradition as such to be 
lost or broken in the modern world, then I think it is very difficult to understand 
the testimonies of the ancestors, the pearls of wisdom, quoted by Benjamin and 
others, including Arendt, as not being handed down from one generation to the 
next. It seems to me that quotations and citations, and not only citations and 
quotations, are eminently transmissible. 
 
25 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, 1977. ‘Hannah Arendt’s Storytelling’. Social Research 44(1). pp.183–
190. It is useful to note Young-Bruehl’s choice of the term ‘heiress’ here; one who inherits and 
continues that which has been handed down to them by a predecessor. In other words, Young-
Bruehl is saying that Arendt stands in a tradition of aphoristic technique. 
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Young-Bruehl is also speaking here of Arendt’s authority: she gathers the threads 
of tradition ‘freely and in such a way as to protect freedom’ (see pp.169–172), 
and she presents them historically, occasioning dialogue—which itself, since at 
least Socrates, is steeped precisely in our traditions. Indeed, Arendt’s handling 
of Socrates in The Life of the Mind provides us with some more evidence that 
tradition has not been lost in the modern world. She turns to him as the best 
model of a thinker, saying that “the best, in fact the only, way I can think of to 
get hold of the question [what makes us think?] is to look for a model…” and that 
“I hope the reader will not believe that I chose Socrates at random.”26 
Regrettably, we are not told of the way in which Arendt’s choice of Socrates was 
not random. Instead, she talks about whether her choice is “historically 
justifiable” to others, saying nothing about what influenced it.27 While she is 
certainly exercising her own judgment when it comes to her choice of Socrates 
as the best model of a thinker, it looks very much to me like she has arrived at it 
non-randomly, she has been guided to it, by tradition. And unlike in her essay on 
Benjamin a few years earlier, it seems to me that Arendt has now found some 
hope that her audience, virtually all of whom think non-poetically, are either 
able or willing to believe in tradition as well. 
In concluding this sub-section, let us consider how Arendt concludes that first 
volume of The Life of the Mind: 
“Let me now at the end of these long reflections draw attention … to 
what in my opinion is the basic assumption of this investigation … the 
assumption that the thread of tradition is broken and that we shall not 
be able to renew it. Historically speaking, what actually has broken 
down is the Roman trinity that for thousands of years united religion, 
authority and tradition. The loss of this trinity does not destroy the 
past, and [the process of dismantling metaphysics and philosophy with 
all its categories] is not destructive; it only draws conclusions from a 
loss which is a fact … of our political history, the history of our 
world.”28 
Arendt does not say here that her opinion is that the thread of tradition is 
broken and that we shall not be able to renew it; her opinion is that it is ‘the’ 
 
26 LM1. pp.167–168. 
27 LM1. pp.167–168. 
28 LM1. pp.211–212. 
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basic assumption (of ‘this’ investigation). But whose basic assumption?29 She goes 
on to speak historically—and switching metaphors—of the Roman trinity having 
‘broken down’ and—switching metaphors again—describes this as a ‘loss’ which is 
a ‘fact’ of our political history. But given the rest of my argument in this sub-
section, and the fact that she is again concerned to ‘not destroy’, i.e. preserve, 
the past, I argue that, for Arendt here, tradition has not been lost in the modern 
world. But what about for the rest of us? Is Arendt’s hope that we are able or 
willing to believe in tradition not unreasonable? Is she right about ‘the’ basic 
assumption? If she is, can what has ‘broken down’—by Hegel’s design or not—be 
fixed, or what has been ‘lost’ retrieved? She goes on immediately after the 
above passage to say that: 
“What has been lost is the continuity of the past as it seemed to be 
handed down from generation to generation, developing in the 
process its own consistency. The dismantling process has its own 
technique, and I did not go into that here except peripherally. What 
you then are left with is still the past, but a fragmented past, which 
has lost its certainty of evaluation … If some of my listeners or readers 
should be tempted to try their luck at the technique of dismantling, 
let them be careful not to destroy the ‘rich and strange’, the ‘coral’ 
and the ‘pearls’, which can probably be saved only as fragments.”30 
The issue of ‘seeming’ in the first sentence speaks to the ‘value of the surface’, 
the ‘reversal of the metaphysical hierarchy’ which Arendt promotes near the 
beginning of the text; this is the ‘worldly’ aspect she believes has been lost in 
modernity.31 But what of tradition itself? Insofar as we understand ‘process’ to 
mean a natural ‘series’ which includes variations or changes, and insofar as we 
understand ‘consistency’ to mean a state of being ‘held together’ as distinct 
from a state of being ‘without logical contradiction’, then I think Arendt has 
described in this first sentence—although not without some irony—tradition as 
such, even as I question whether it has been lost in the modern world.32 Earlier 
 
29 Cf. LM1. p.11: “these modern ‘deaths’—of God, metaphysics, philosophy…” according to Arendt 
are “the common unexamined assumption of nearly everybody.”  
30 LM1. pp.211–212. Emphasis in original. 
31 LM1. pp.26–30. As discussed here and in more detail below (pp.33–34), Arendt seems 
suspicious about use of the term ‘value’. The phrase ‘value of the surface’, as she says at this 
point in the text, is biologist Adolf Portmann’s rather than her own. 
32 Cf. BPF. pp.57–63. Arendt says here that with the rise of modern science, there has been a shift 
in emphasis in our investigations from ‘the what’ to ‘the how’, from “interest in things to interest 
in processes, of which things were soon to become almost accidental by-products.” This 
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in this chapter, I varied slightly another of Arendt’s descriptions of tradition as 
such, one that was written without irony: tradition preserves the past by 
handing down from one generation to the next the testimonies of the 
ancestors.33 I also pointed out that dialogue is something steeped in our 
traditions. It seems to me that traditions never speak with one voice; there is 
always a plurality built into each tradition, which is to say that they are made up 
of more than just this or that person’s testimony. Such testimonies become (if 
they were not already) part of a dialogue or conversation and it is in this sense 
that the continuity of the past develops its own consistency over time; the 
testimonies are ‘held together’ through the social activities of human beings, 
through what Arendt calls elsewhere simply ‘talk’, either amongst ourselves or 
across generations.34 The key aspect here, what should be the key focus, is 
persons rather than historical ‘processes’ or metaphysics (or post-metaphysics). 
In the passage quoted on p.136, Arendt spoke of ‘the most contradictory 
thoughts and conflicting authorities, all of which had somehow been able to 
function together’ before they were reduced to a single, world-historical, 
dialectical process in a philosopher’s system. This ‘somehow’, I argue, is a 
tradition of politics, a civic republican tradition, highlighted by Dallmayr and 
Devetak in the previous chapter, and it is one we shall consider in the final 
section of this chapter and the final chapter of this project. 
Arendt goes on in this passage to mention her technique for dismantling 
metaphysics and philosophy with all its categories. We have already seen Young-
Bruehl’s comments on this technique. I think it correct to understand it as 
‘thinking poetically’ (or at least, thinking poetically is ancillary to the 
technique), and we have already seen that such an ability is an extremely rare 
gift, so Arendt’s warning to her readers here is understandable. But notice also 
that she uses the second person: what you then are left with after Arendt’s 
 
includes both in the historical and social sciences, the latter of which she says “prescribe 
conditions, conditions to human behaviour” in the language of processes which “sounds 
frightening … because they have decided to treat man as an entirely natural being whose life 
process can be handled the same way as all other processes” without regard to “single entities 
[like individual human beings] or [our] individual occurrences and their special separate causes”. 
33 It seems to me that one might complete poet René Char’s aphorism, which Arendt quotes on 
many occasions, including at the very beginning of her preface to Between Past and Future, 
accordingly: “…our inheritance was left to us by no testament…”, but with many testimonies. 
BPF. p.3. 
34 TWB. p.439. 
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dismantling in The Life of the Mind is still the past, but a fragmented past, 
which has lost its ‘certainty of evaluation’. But for whom? Again, with the phrase 
‘certainty of evaluation’, I think Arendt is writing in an ironical vein. As 
mentioned already and as discussed in more detail below, she makes it clear 
elsewhere in her writings—and not the least in the previous paragraph at this 
point in them—that she has not much truck with finding ‘value’ in things, and I 
cannot recall finding her ‘evaluating’ anything herself. We should also note that 
certainty need not be epistemic; it denotes merely a firmness of conviction. We 
do not know how Arendt might have described ‘certainty of evaluation’ without 
irony here, nor how far she felt secure in her own ‘certainty of evaluation’ of 
the past (although I hope to have shown in this sub-section and to show in the 
next as well that she did have some), but in any event, she is pointing here to 
her reader’s lost certainty of evaluation. And interestingly, observe the doubt 
that comes in at the end of the passage. Arendt acknowledges that ‘saving’ the 
past without its having been fragmented beforehand—preserving it—is at least 
possible in others, no matter how improbable it might seem to Arendt herself. 
Again, there is hope here in Arendt’s The Life of the Mind that the past may also 
be preserved by those not able to think poetically. Admittedly, it is only a 
glimmer—she seems firmly convinced that ‘the’ basic assumption holds fast in 
the modern world—but it seems to me to be there nevertheless, and I think it 
good to draw the reader’s attention to it. 
I have argued in this sub-section that tradition as such has not been lost in the 
modern world. Testimonies of those who have lived before us, it seems to me, 
have been handed down from one generation to the next; they have been 
transmitted through history to the American founders, to the poets, and to us, 
and I think an important question is: what are we doing with them? After all, 
insofar as we are keeping such testimonies alive, handing them down from one 
generation to the next, according to Arendt, they “could save all things and 
bring them into harmony.”35 
 
35 BPF. p.18. 
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2.2.2 The ‘…definite end’ of ‘the tradition’? 
If tradition as such has not been lost or broken in the modern world, Arendt does 
argue that “our” ‘definite’ tradition came to a “no less definite end” in the 
modern age (than its beginning; as mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, she does not herself define ‘the’ tradition).36 Due not least to the 
various formulations Arendt uses to talk about this tradition across her writings, 
we are left quite in the dark as to what she takes it to be. I “grapple” with her 
writings on this matter, as Jerome Kohn did also in his introduction to the 2006 
edition of Between Past and Future.37 Kohn has helpfully spoken of “the great 
Western philosophic-political tradition” and “the great tradition of political and 
philosophic thought” in terms of trying to pin down what Arendt means to say.38 
But her own vagueness on the matter I think is understandable, given her (and 
our) perplexities around what remains the differences between politics and 
philosophy.39 Still, I think it useful to grapple with Arendt’s writings on this 
matter. For the sake of brevity, I shall follow convention in the secondary 
scholarship and refer mostly and simply in this sub-section to ‘the tradition’, and 
trust that the reader is aware without my using scare quotes every time that 
there are problems in calling it ‘the’ tradition. Through a consideration of 
Arendt’s writings about its ‘definite end’ in relation to Cicero as he appears (or 
not) in different versions of her story over time, I argue, contrary to what she 
might seem to say, that ‘the tradition’ in fact endures. 
In one of the earliest versions of her story about its end, we find Arendt telling 
us that Cicero was an “exception” to the tradition, since, as we shall consider in 
more detail in the subsequent chapters, he stoutly defended the practical life of 
the citizen vis-à-vis the theoretical life of the philosopher: 
“… since Socrates no man of action, that is, no one whose original 
experience was political, as for instance Cicero’s was, could ever 
hope to be taken seriously by the philosophers … Neither the radical 
 
36 BPF. p.17. 
37 BPF. p.viii. 
38 BPF. p.viii; PP. p.vii. 
39 Cf. Margaret Canovan, 1992. ‘Philosophy and Politics’. Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her 
Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.253–274; Frederick M. Dolan, 
2000. ‘Arendt on philosophy and politics.’ Dana Villa (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to 
Hannah Arendt. pp.261–276. 
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separation between politics and contemplation, between living 
together and living in solitude as two distinct modes of life, nor their 
hierarchical structure, was ever doubted after Plato had established 
both. Here … the only exception is Cicero, who, out of his great 
Roman political experience, doubted the validity of the superiority of 
the bios theoretikos over the bios politikos … Rightly but futilely 
Cicero objected that he who was devoted to ‘knowledge and science’ 
would flee his ‘solitude and ask for a companion in his study, be it in 
order to teach or to learn, to listen or to speak’. Here as elsewhere 
the Romans paid a steep price for their contempt of philosophy, which 
they held to be ‘impractical’. The end result was the undisputed 
victory of Greek philosophy and the loss of Roman experience for 
occidental political thought. Cicero, because he was not a 
philosopher, was unable to challenge philosophy.”40 
There is clear agreement here between Arendt and Cicero. She regards him as 
saying rightly that human beings, including philosophers (or at least those 
devoted to knowledge and science), are naturally sociable. In the passage from 
Cicero Arendt approvingly quotes here—and I also agree with it—he is drawing 
upon and opposing arguments being made in his own time by philosophers such 
as the Epicureans that human beings are naturally solitary creatures, whilst 
supporting the claim that we are naturally sociable, an argument being made (in 
different ways) in his own time by philosophers such as the Peripatetics and the 
Stoics, as we shall see in the next chapter.41 ‘Greek philosophy’, or at least 
certain schools thereof, provide important support for both Arendt’s and 
Cicero’s views of our being naturally sociable, and this is an awkward fact for 
the story Arendt wishes to tell here about the pernicious effects of ‘Greek 
philosophy’ in the tradition. Still, she clearly regards Cicero as saying the right 
thing here. But we should also consider what Arendt takes to be the futility of 
his efforts to, as she puts it, reverse the hierarchical structure of the bios 
theoretikos and the bios politikos, the validity of this structure first appearing in 
(Arendt says it was established by) the writings of Plato. Again, we shall consider 
across the next two chapters of this project some of the detail of Cicero’s 
response to this question, not about the validity or otherwise of a hierarchical 
structure of the different kinds of lives one may lead, but about the different 
kinds of lives one may lead; for now, I merely invite the reader to reflect upon 
the extent to which we can feasibly say his arguments in support of the active 
 
40 PP. pp.83 and 85–86. 
41 Off. 1.158. 
143 
life of the citizen have been futile and in which field(s) of activity: philosophy, 
politics, and/or the tradition. 
Arendt here regards the Romans, including Cicero, as having paid a ‘steep price’ 
for their ‘contempt’ of philosophy, which they held to be ‘impractical’, although 
we are not told what she thinks the steep price actually was. In grappling with 
this matter, let us consider some of the other versions of her story about the 
tradition. The above passage comes from an early version that was only 
posthumously published (this century); Arendt wrote it in the early 1950s as part 
of an intended book, which was later abandoned.42 We find the ‘official’ versions 
of her story about the end of the tradition in Between Past and Future, 
published in 1954, where, in What is Authority?, she touches again upon the 
relation of Romans to Greek philosophy: 
“It was more than patriotism and more than the current revival of 
interest in antiquity that sent Machiavelli to search for the central 
political experiences of the Romans as they had originally been 
presented, equally removed from Christian piety and Greek 
philosophy. The greatness of his rediscovery lies in that he could not 
simply revive or resort to an articulate conceptual tradition, but had 
himself to articulate those experiences which the Romans had not 
conceptualized but rather expressed in terms of Greek philosophy 
vulgarized for this purpose.”43  
As far as I am aware, from the sources available to us, ‘the Romans’ in the last 
sentence here could only have been Cicero and Lucretius, and of these two, it is 
only Cicero Arendt names in her endnote to this passage.44 She seems here to be 
somewhat displeased with ‘the Romans’ either for not conceptualising their 
political experiences originally (was this the steep price?), or for failing to 
handle Greek philosophy with sufficient subtlety or refinement in doing so (or 
 
42 PP. p.vii. 
43 BPF. p.138. For more current scholarship on the relation of Romans to Greek philosophy, see for 
example: Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes (eds.), 1989 and 1997. Philosophia Togata I: 
Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society; and Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at 
Rome. Oxford: Clarendon Press; J.G.F. Powell (ed.), 1995. Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve 
Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Raphael Woolf, 2015. Cicero: The Philosophy of a Roman 
Sceptic. London: Routledge; Jed W. Atkins, 2013. Cicero on Politics and the Limits of Reason: 
The Republic and Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Walter Nicgorski (ed.), 2012. 
Cicero’s Practical Philosophy. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press; Gareth D. 
Williams and Katharina Volk (eds.), 2015. Roman Reflections: Studies in Latin Philosophy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
44 BPF. p.287: “It is curious to see how seldom Cicero’s name occurs in Machiavelli’s writings and 
how carefully he avoided him in his interpretations of Roman history.” 
144 
was this the steep price?). But I find it all but impossible to imagine an articulate 
conceptual tradition not deriving from Greek philosophy (in which Aristotle tells 
us that it was Socrates who discovered ‘the concept’), so the latter option seems 
to me the more likely, and I hope to have indicated in my introduction to this 
project that Cicero’s handling of Greek philosophy was indeed both subtle and 
refined (and as we shall touch upon again in the next two chapters).45 In The Life 
of the Mind, Arendt chooses to speak more directly of Cicero on this matter and 
expresses his articulation of Greek philosophy in Latin in different terms: he 
(with Lucretius on the Epicurean side) was the first in “conceptual language” to 
have “transformed Greek philosophy into something essentially Roman—which 
meant, among other things, something essentially practical.”46 Cicero, then, at 
least on Arendt’s telling, appears to have inaugurated an ‘articulate conceptual 
tradition’ which Machiavelli could and I think did draw upon (and she does not 
deny this in the passage from What is Authority? quoted above), as could and did 
Augustine, who she claims elsewhere in the text “was the only great philosopher 
the Romans ever had”.47 Even if she is right on this, which I doubt, it was thanks 
to Cicero, who, very far indeed from being contemptuous of philosophy, wrote a 
protreptic to it, Hortensius (now lost), which Augustine tells us deeply moved 
him and directly inspired his own philosophical pursuits. Prior to Cicero, 
philosophising and conceptualising were simply impossible in Latin; it appears 
that in his writings he imbued an ‘articulate conceptual tradition’ in the very 
language Romans spoke, and so in the very thoughts possible for those Romans 
like Augustine, or those Florentines like Machiavelli, who had no Greek 
themselves. 
 
45 LM1. p.170. 
46 LM1. pp.153–154. The awkward fact of Cicero’s sharp opposition to the Epicureans in 
philosophy is ignored in this text, with both Cicero and Lucretius speaking as one in providing 
‘The Roman Answer’ to Arendt’s question (what makes us think?). She is relying at this point on 
sweeping statements made in Hegel’s Philosophy of History lectures that collapse the schools 
of Hellenistic philosophy (“Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism”) into each other as having 
the same “general purport” of “rendering the soul absolutely indifferent to everything which the 
real world had to offer” (Hegel’s words, quoted by Arendt). Whilst ataraxia—tranquillity or ‘peace 
of mind’—might have been the ‘general purport’ of the Epicureans, Stoics and Pyrrhonian 
sceptics (and this is a debatable claim in itself), it was certainly not that of the Academic 
sceptics, the school to which Cicero was affiliated, and nor was it that of the Peripatetics, whose 
writings leading into the Hellenistic period—although admittedly sparse until after the 
rediscovery and publication of Aristotle’s library at the end of the first century BC—Cicero also 
drew upon intelligently and selectively in his own work. Gisela Striker, 1996. Essays on 
Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs.6 and 9. 
47 BPF. p.126. 
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Whereas Cicero—albeit approvingly excepted from it—was clearly on Arendt’s 
mind regarding the ‘definite end’ of ‘the tradition’ in an earlier but only 
posthumously published version of her story, in Tradition and the Modern Age, 
the main ‘official’ version (although as Kohn correctly says, every chapter in 
Between Past and Future is informed by this notion of the definite end of the 
tradition), his name does not appear at all.48 In this essay, the focus is mainly 
upon Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, who are portrayed as figures trying to 
think standing at ‘the end’ of the tradition, and all of whom are “Hegelians 
insofar as they saw the history of past philosophy as one dialectically developed 
whole”.49 We saw in the previous sub-section that Arendt described Hegel’s 
philosophy of history as, ‘humanly speaking, the least bearable paradox in the 
whole body of modern thought’, and she portrays Marx, Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche in this essay, despite their reliance upon ‘the Hegelian system of 
historical revelation’, as ‘humanists’ of a sort. Marx “desired to assert again the 
dignity of human action”; Kierkegaard “wanted to assert the dignity of faith 
against modern reason and reasoning”; Nietzsche “wanted to assert the dignity 
of human life”; and the three of them “… all question the traditional hierarchy 
of human capabilities, or, to put it another way, they ask again what the 
specifically human quality of man is; they do not intend to build systems or 
Weltanschauungen on this or that premise.”50 My concern here is not with these 
nineteenth century figures, nor with the validity or otherwise of Arendt’s 
interpretations of them; rather, it is to emphasise the similarity of her aims—or, 
to put it differently, to emphasise what she is doing with her interpretations in 
this “exercise in political thought”—as compared with those standing in the 
humanist traditions deriving from Cicero discussed in the previous chapter. 
These figures also had no intention of building systems or worldviews on this or 
that premise, just like Arendt. 
 
48  Now that we have her posthumously published writings and see that Cicero was clearly on 
Arendt’s mind as regards the ‘definite end’ of ‘the tradition’, I think it is curious to see his name 
carefully avoided in her ‘official’ story about it, and more curious still to see it used almost 
immediately afterwards, in the first sentence of the next essay, The Concept of History: “Let us 
begin with Herodotus, whom Cicero called pater historiae and who has remained father of 
Western history.” Perhaps Cicero is being used here to dethrone Thucydides, or perhaps he is 
being used to remind readers of his very existence after his deafening silence in the previous 
chapter (or perhaps both). BPF. p.41. 
49 BPF. p.28. 
50 BPF. pp.30 and 38–39. 
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That said, and as with Cicero, Arendt construes Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 
as preoccupied with reversing hierarchies of concepts, which does not sit very 
well with her claim that they were all railing against the abstractions of 
philosophy. Still, working in the shadow of Hegel—who appears very often as 
non-traditional in Arendt’s writings (‘He it was who for the first time…’)—the 
rebellion of Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche against the tradition is portrayed 
as “no deliberate act of their own choosing”, and their writings as: 
“… like guideposts to a past which has lost its authority. They were 
the first who dared to think without the guidance of any authority 
whatsoever; yet, for better and worse, they were still held by the 
categorical framework of the great tradition. In some respects we are 
better off. We need no longer be concerned with their scorn for the 
‘educated philistines’, who all through the nineteenth century tried to 
make up for the loss of authentic authority with a spurious 
glorification of culture. To most people today this culture looks like a 
field of ruins which, far from being able to claim any authority, can 
hardly command their interest. This fact may be deplorable, but 
implicit in it is the great chance to look upon the past with eyes 
undistracted by any tradition, with a directness which has disappeared 
from Occidental reading and hearing ever since Roman civilization 
submitted to the authority of Greek thought.”51  
This is yet another obscure passage of Arendt’s; I shall consider its different 
points in a different order to which she has put them and with reference to some 
of her other writings (the final words of the passage, in which Cicero seems to 
be present although not named, I have already addressed on pp.140–141). We 
saw in the previous chapter that Kant adopted as a slogan for enlightenment the 
phrase sapere aude, ‘dare to be wise’, from the Roman poet Horace, and we 
saw—it seems with Arendt as well—that he certainly was not the first to ‘dare to 
think without the guidance of any authority whatsoever’, drawing significantly 
upon Cicero’s (and others’) writings, which have been handed down from one 
generation to the next, in arriving at his own moral theory. Whether Marx, 
Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche in arriving at their own theories thought without the 
guidance of any authority whatsoever I doubt, but as mentioned above, that is 
not my concern here. Instead, let us turn next to Arendt’s claim that there is a 
chance ‘to look upon the past with eyes undistracted by any tradition.’ There is 
an informative, if rather convoluted, exchange between she and J.M. Cameron 
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in the New York Review of Books concerning this matter (one of the convolutions 
being that it sometimes appears they are discussing tradition as such rather than 
‘the tradition’). In his review of Between Past and Future, Cameron raises some 
doubts about the coherence of Arendt’s proposal that we ‘look upon the past 
with eyes undistracted by any tradition’: 
“[For Arendt] the tradition that has since the ancient world 
determined our ways of thinking about public affairs is dead, and we 
are therefore like men who have to learn a new language … [I argue 
that] we need to be aware of traditional ways of thinking and feeling 
in order to demonstrate the novelty of this or that phenomenon … 
Above all, the past weighs upon the minds of the living, whether or 
not we perceive this weighing as a nightmare … simply through the 
language we use. In their denseness, their complexity … our languages 
give us the essence of the human past … The very character of 
thought and discourse robs Miss Arendt’s proposal of sense. And of 
course she herself pays not the slightest attention to this proposal.”52 
I think Cameron is wrong that the tradition ‘determines’ our ways of thinking 
about public affairs and that Arendt as a matter ‘of course’ thinks and writes 
standing in it; it seems to me that she thinks and writes standing in it as a 
matter of her own freely exercised judgment and choice. Still, I think he is 
entirely correct to observe that she is not looking upon the past with ‘eyes un-
distracted by any tradition’, and indeed it is questionable that such a proposal 
even makes sense. Arendt does not deny in her response that she thinks and 
writes standing in the tradition, choosing instead to emphasise Cameron’s failure 
to distinguish properly between past and tradition. She acknowledges that 
“some past”, “not necessarily” its essence, is “alive and present” in every “form 
of speech”, and says that: 
“… the point at issue is not the past but tradition, and the distinction 
between them: Tradition orders the past, hands it down (tradere), 
interprets it, omits, selects, and emphasizes according to a system of 
pre-established beliefs … If I say that no tradition can claim validity 
today, I do not say that the past is dead but that we have no reliable 
guide through it any more, from which it follows that tradition itself 
has become a part of the past. To take an example which may be 
plausible because it involves a good deal of tradition: I can read 
Aquinas—agreeing or disagreeing with what he has to say—without 
following the tradition of Thomist thought in the Catholic church. I 
also can trace this tradition as part of the past. The result may well 
 
52 J.M. Cameron, 1969. ‘Bad Times’. New York Review of Books. Issue: November 6th.  
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be a rediscovery of Aquinas and the destruction of Thomist tradition. 
Everything turns here on the distinction between tradition and 
past.”53    
Cameron argued that Arendt took the tradition, not the past, to be dead, and in 
response, Arendt has chosen to use the metaphors of life and death in relation 
to the past rather than ‘the’ tradition (the only ‘definite’ tradition in her 
response to Cameron is ‘the tradition of Thomist thought in the Catholic 
church’), leaving the possibility open that ‘the tradition’ is ‘alive and present’ 
and that it may be at least her reliable guide. Mischievously, she goes on 
(seemingly) to disparage the Thomist tradition of the Catholic church in which 
Cameron stands by pointing to its possible ‘destruction’ with a ‘rediscovery’ of 
Aquinas, thus admitting that the Thomist tradition has not become (merely) a 
part of the past, and underscoring, it seems to me, the conditional I have 
italicised for the reader in this passage (whether in terms of the Thomist or any 
other tradition, including ‘the tradition’). For his part, Cameron is allowed the 
final word: 
“I did not, evidently, understand what she had to say about tradition 
and the past. I still do not understand it, for I do not understand her 
explanation. The natural languages constitute tradition in Miss 
Arendt’s sense since they do in relation to the past all that Miss 
Arendt says tradition does. Where Miss Arendt seems to me, if I may 
say so, confused is in her supposition that there are two ways of 
understanding the past, one in accordance with tradition and another 
which is free from tradition … I take Miss Arendt to be arguing that we 
can stand outside all traditions and understand the past; and I think 
the nature of thought and language is such as to make this an absurd 
enterprise.”54 
I think Cameron makes an important point here that the natural languages 
themselves constitute traditions (although I would add that it is not only the 
natural languages that do so), but as far as I am aware, Arendt never says that 
we are unqualifiedly free from tradition; she either qualifies this freedom or 
uses negative adjectives (undistracted, unburdened, unguided etc.). In any 
event, towards the end of her response to Cameron’s initial review of her work, 
Arendt parenthetically asks “Why should he not wish to hold fast to tradition and 
maintain for instance that without tradition, the ordering guide to lead us safely 
 
53 Hannah Arendt, 1970. ‘Distinctions’. New York Review of Books. Issue: January 1st. 
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through the past, we shall lose our past as well?”, and argues that because he 
fails to distinguish between past and tradition they cannot even arrive at this 
controversy.55 A few years later in The Life of the Mind, however, and doubtless 
with this exchange in mind, Arendt turns the question she asked of Cameron into 
her own proposition, albeit with typical paradox. After announcing that “we” 
are about to begin “speculating” about “the possible advantage of our situation 
following the demise of metaphysics and philosophy”—and after casting “the 
common unexamined assumption” of the ‘demise’ of metaphysics and philosophy 
into some doubt— she speculates that the possible advantage: 
“…would be twofold. It would permit us to look on the past with new 
eyes, unburdened and unguided by any traditions, and thus to dispose 
of a tremendous wealth of raw experiences without being bound by 
any prescriptions as to how to deal with these treasures … The 
advantage would be even greater had it not been accompanied, 
almost inevitably … by the disrepute into which everything that is not 
visible, tangible, palpable has fallen, so that we are in danger of 
losing the past itself together with our traditions.”56 
I hope to have shown in this chapter so far that Arendt’s speculation on our 
behalf here is not only absurd but unnecessary. And yet again, she is speaking of 
our traditions as ‘alive and present’, even as she believes they are in danger of 
being lost—perhaps because, after Hegel, they have lost their authority for 
some. The ‘disrepute’ of which Arendt speaks she says was almost inevitable; 
what saves it from (dialectical) necessity in her understanding I think are the 
freely exercised judgments and choices in the world, the free opinions, of actual 
human beings.  
It seems to me that Arendt is very often thinking and speaking politically. 
Despite her own constant and I think consistent protestations to the contrary, 
many continue to look upon Arendt as a philosopher, but I believe this to be a 
mistake, albeit an understandable one. Two marks of her unwavering 
commitment to political theory as distinguished from philosophy (political or 
otherwise) are that: (i) even in old age when she turned to her work on The Life 
of the Mind, and even in private conversation with a friend, she could not bring 
herself to describe its subject-matter as ‘philosophical’ but rather dealing 
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merely with “transpolitical things”; and (ii) both volumes of this most 
‘transpolitical’ of her texts actually conclude with ‘political things’.57 Bearing in 
mind, then, her status as a political thinker and writer, even when discussing 
the philosophers (as Young-Bruehl put it: “She did not tell the Story of 
Philosophy, she told the stories of the philosophers”), let us take another look at 
the passage quoted on p.143.58 If, as Arendt strongly suggests, she herself 
deplores persons’ factual lack of interest in culture, then it seems to me likely 
that her intended consequence of putting before her readers the prospect of 
availing themselves of ‘the great chance to look upon the past’ was that those 
un-interested would be swayed by her wooing and partake in it, as she had done, 
was doing, and continued to do for the rest of her life. Even if those un-
interested understood themselves to be engaging it with ‘eyes un-distracted by 
any traditions’, the fact would remain that they would be engaging it, and 
although Arendt does not often do so very explicitly, I argue that of itself this 
engagement could retrieve—not for Arendt, in whom it was never lost, but for 
anyone who took the chance she placed before them—some sense of what she 
calls in this passage ‘authentic authority’: something that is emphatically not 
absolute or dogmatic, something we shall be considering in the rest of this 
project, and something with which, as Kohn counter-factually but I think rightly 
says, “the horrendous evils of totalitarianism could never have occurred”.59 
But let us conclude this sub-section with Arendt, Cicero, and the tradition. 
Despite her portrayal of him as an exception to it and yet his factual influence 
upon it, she speaks of the tradition’s “formidable unanimity about the proper 
relationship between philosophy and politics [i.e. hierarchical, with philosophy 
above politics]”, which was challenged at what she takes to be the tradition’s 
end in the writings of Marx, including in the “explosive content” of his thesis 
that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world … the point, however is 
to change it.”60 It is of course unsurprising to Arendt and to us that Marx 
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expressed himself in terms of ‘changing the world’, and I dare to say that Cicero 
might have rendered the same insight as something like this: ‘philosophers end 
up only contemplating in the world; the point, however, is to act in it.’61 In fact, 
we find Marx’s famous final thesis on Feuerbach expressed in so many words and 
in so many places in Cicero’s oeuvre, as well as in that of several others in the 
tradition both before and after him, including in Arendt’s. In a lecture she 
delivered in 1954, as well as in What is Freedom?, Arendt speaks of “the 
philosophical tradition of political thought”, and although of all her formulations 
I think it is this one which gets us closest to what she had in mind to oppose in 
her writings, as far as I am aware she never named explicitly what must be—and 
must always have been since the inception of philosophy—its counterpart: the 
political tradition of political thought.62 Although never having held public office 
herself, as Margaret Canovan puts it, Arendt stands “in the tradition of 
Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Burke, and Tocqueville [and I suggest Cicero can and 
should be added to the front of such a list], rather than in that of Plato or 
Hegel.”63 But this is only to say that Arendt stands very comfortably in ‘the 
tradition’, which I hope to have shown in this sub-section has certainly not come 
to a ‘definite end’ in the modern world. 
2.3 Persons 
2.3.1 Arendt on Persons 
Twenty-one years after drawing upon the words of cultural historian Jacob 
Burkhardt to describe the beginning of ‘the tradition’ as like “‘a fundamental 
chord’ which sounds in its endless modulations through the whole history of 
Western thought”, and at its ‘definite end’ sounds irritating and jarring in a 
world whose “sounds—and thought—it can no longer bring into harmony”, Arendt 
was awarded Denmark’s Sonning Prize for her contributions to European 
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civilization, and in her acceptance speech, reminded her audience of the 
etymological origin of the word ‘person’, which: 
“…has been [unanimously] adopted almost unchanged from the Latin 
persona by the European languages … It is, of course, not without 
significance that such an important word in our contemporary 
vocabularies, which all over Europe we use to discuss a great variety 
of legal, political, and philosophical matters, derives from an identical 
source in antiquity. This ancient vocabulary provides something like 
the fundamental chord which in many modulations and variations 
sounds through the intellectual history of mankind.”64 
It seems, then, that Arendt might have been persuaded after all by Cameron’s 
claim that the natural languages constitute (at least ‘something like’) traditions; 
traditions in Europe alive and present and in unanimous agreement about the 
fundamental importance of the Latin term persona. Arendt turns to the term in 
trying to explain to her audience why she “tend[s] to shy away from the public 
realm” by “personal temperament and inclination—those innate psychic qualities 
which form not necessarily our final judgments but certainly our prejudices and 
instinctive impulses”.65 She accepts the award as a “felicitous intrusion” into her 
life, as “a piece of good luck”, but admits that it troubles her as one who has no 
ambition to be a public figure, and she provides the audience with an account of 
the theatrical origins of the meaning of persona: 
“ … [It] originally referred to the actor’s mask that covered his 
individual ‘personal’ face and indicated to the spectator the role and 
the part of the actor in the play. But in this mask, which was designed 
and determined by the play, there existed a broad opening at the 
place of the mouth through which the individual, undisguised voice of 
the actor could sound …”66   
Persona came to refer to the actor playing the role as well, and in time it was 
also carried over into Roman legal terminology. The Law of Persons in Rome was 
“the body of legal rules relating to a person’s rights, capacities and obligations 
as an individual, as a member of the community”; a persona was a bearer of 
rights and duties, endowed by the body politic with ‘legal personality’ and thus 
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answerable to a court of law for their actions if necessary.67 Arendt, of course, 
strongly insisted on this aspect of personal responsibility in political society and 
on the fundamental importance of courts of law in maintaining it: 
“…there exists still one institution in society in which it is well-nigh 
impossible to evade issues of personal responsibility, where all 
justifications of a nonspecific, abstract nature—from the Zeitgeist 
down to the Oedipus complex—break down, where not systems or 
trends or original sin are judged, but men of flesh and blood like you 
and me, whose deeds are of course still human deeds but who appear 
before a tribunal because they have broken some law whose 
maintenance we regard as essential for the integrity of our common 
humanity.”68 
“The focus of every trial is upon the person of the defendant, a man of flesh and 
blood with an individual history, with an always unique set of qualities, 
peculiarities, behavior patterns, and circumstances”, and this institution, as 
Arendt says, “presupposes the power of judgment” in persons such that they can 
be held personally responsible for their actions to the wider society of which 
they are a member; that they “be capable of telling right from wrong even when 
all they have to guide them is their own judgment”.69 She was troubled by what 
she saw as a lack of this power or capability as evidenced in the actions of many 
under the Nazi and Stalinist regimes, and offered to report on the trial of Adolf 
Eichmann for the New Yorker in 1961, amongst other things to see his own 
faculty of judgment, or lack thereof—at any rate, his person—held responsible in 
a court of law. Yet, while still in line with many of her previous claims that this 
inability to think and/or judge was a problem for modern persons and societies 
everywhere and not just for those living under the Nazi and Stalinist regimes, 
Arendt seems to me to have attenuated these claims somewhat in the postscript 
to a revised edition of her Eichmann in Jerusalem, published in 1964, having 
considered the content of the controversy touched off by the first edition which 
had been published the year before. In this postscript, Arendt admitted her 
surprise at the controversy her book had touched off: she “would never have 
suspected [general moral questions] would haunt men’s minds today and weigh 
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heavily on their hearts”.70 This haunting and weighing would in time produce 
something salutary in the legal world which Arendt did not foresee, as we shall 
consider in some more detail below (pp.195–196), but at this point in time she 
maintained that the content of the controversy showed “a quite extraordinary 
confusion” over these questions, and this led to two series of lectures she gave 
in 1965 and 1966, entitled Some Questions of Moral Philosophy and Basic Moral 
Propositions.71 
In the previous chapter, Dallmayr distinguished between the virtues as set out by 
Aristotle and Cicero on the one hand and virtù as set out by Machiavelli on the 
other, and said that Arendt had side-lined the former in favour of a celebration 
of the latter, but he deliberately did not say that she paid the former no heed, 
and here I wish to highlight some of the heed that she did pay. In the first 
lecture of Some Questions of Moral Philosophy, Arendt seemingly disdains the 
term ‘values’ by noting that, prior to the nineteenth century, they had “more 
correctly” been called ‘virtues.’72 She goes on to ask whether the things or 
principles from which all virtues “are” ultimately derived were mere ‘values’ to 
be exchanged against other ‘values’ and observes that the Nazi regime had 
announced a new set of ‘values’ and had designed a new ‘legal’ order in 
accordance with them.73 In the second lecture, she notes that virtues “are the 
result of some training or teaching” and that the original names for morals and 
ethics, mores and ethos—sounding in a fundamental chord down the centuries 
without new terms ever replacing them—“… may in a sense be more adequate 
than philosophers have thought.”74 It seems to me Arendt is saying here that 
tradition, in a sense—and perhaps, insofar as virtues are the result of some 
training or teaching, ‘authentic authority’ as well—is more acceptable in quality 
for matters pertaining to ethics and morals (as distinguished from theories of 
ethics and morals) than (some) philosophers may have thought; what troubles 
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her are not mores as such but that persons switched their mores—‘exchanged 
their values’—seemingly with ease and without qualms. 
As regards the few who exercised moral judgments for themselves under Nazi 
rule, who were not swept up by the ‘wave of coordination’, Arendt has 
something significant to say in her course on Basic Moral Propositions: 
“…we are concerned in this course with [these few]. What prevented 
them from acting as everyone else did? Their noble nature (as Plato 
would suggest)? What does nobility consist of? We follow Plato and 
recognize them as those to whom certain moral propositions are self-
evident. But why? First, who were they? … Those who resisted could 
be found in all walks of life, among poor and entirely uneducated 
people as among members of good and high society … we are 
concerned with the behavior of common people … not with saints and 
heroes … For if there is any such thing as what we call morality for 
want of a better term [such that it is different from mores], it 
certainly concerns such common people and common happenings.”75 
I think one of the significant things here is that Arendt is encouraging her 
students above all to look for models, for exemplary figures in acting morally, 
for persons before theories.76 We saw Dallmayr in the previous chapter doing 
something similar in his In Search of the Good Life: A Pedagogy for Troubled 
Times; his searching question began ‘to whom should we look for moral 
guidance’ (pedagogy being partially rooted in the Greek term for ‘guide’, 
agōgos) and he provided account of some exemplary figures. But another 
significant thing in this passage I wish to highlight for the reader’s attention is 
Arendt’s statement that ‘we follow Plato and recognise’ those few who resisted 
conforming to the Nazis’ new ‘values’ which had been imposed on them, ‘as 
those to whom certain moral propositions are self-evident.’ In Some Questions of 
Moral Philosophy, Arendt presents to her students a truly remarkable passage in 
Cicero’s Tusculanae Disputationes, “as it were in self-defense”, which I think 
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indicates why she says in Basic Moral Propositions that ‘we follow Plato’ in these 
matters.77 In this dialogue, Cicero’s student says to him, “I prefer before heaven 
[mehercule] to go astray with Plato—I know how much you esteem him and I 
admire him on the strength of your testimony—rather than hold true views with 
his opponents”, to which he replies, “Well done [Macte virtute]! I should not 
myself be unwilling to go astray with such a man.”78 As Arendt says, for Cicero 
“there comes a point where all objective standards … yield precedence to the 
‘subjective’ criterion of the kind of person I wish to be and live together with.”79 
And that ‘subjective’ criterion—at least for Cicero, his student, Arendt, and her 
students—seems to be the kind of person that follows such a man as Plato in 
these matters. Twelve years prior to Basic Moral Propositions, in The Crisis in 
Culture, Arendt cites the exact same passage from Cicero, describes the Roman 
sense of humanitas, “of the integrity of the person as person”, in terms of 
“human worth and personal rank”, and tells us that: 
“What Cicero in fact says is that for the true humanist neither the 
verities of the scientist nor the truth of the philosopher nor the 
beauty of the artist can be absolutes; the humanist, because he is not 
a specialist, exerts a faculty of judgment and taste which is beyond 
the coercion which each specialty imposes upon us … Cicero says: In 
what concerns my association with men and things, I refuse to be 
coerced even by truth, even by beauty”.80 
I imagine that there should be much debate about the accuracy of Arendt’s 
interpretation of what Cicero is saying in this passage from the Tusculanae 
Disputationes, but whatever the content or outcome of such debate might be, I 
think she concludes the essay with great eloquence, seeing humanitas in her 
readers: 
“As humanists … we can rise above specialization and philistinism of 
all sorts to the extent that we learn how to exercise our taste freely. 
Then we shall know how to reply to those who so frequently tell us 
that Plato or some other great author [like Cicero] has been 
superseded; we shall be able to understand that even if all criticism 
of Plato is right, Plato may still be better company than his critics. At 
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any rate, we may remember what the Romans—the first people that 
took culture seriously the way we [humanists] do—thought a 
cultivated person ought to be: one who knows how to choose his 
company among men, among things, among thoughts, in the present 
as well as in the past.”81 
  Arendt (somewhat unlike the Romans) speaks in the last sentence here of an 
ideal, which of course does not preclude learning how to choose one’s company 
among persons, among things, among thoughts, in the present as well as in the 
past; it does not preclude cultivation of the mind and person. Her conclusion in 
this essay speaks to several points I have already raised in this chapter. Arendt is 
relying on the authority of tradition, the help of the wisdom to be found in the 
testimonies which have been handed down from one generation to the next, and 
more than settling down in a complacent present to deprive it of peace of mind 
some citations or quotations from the past, it seems to me that she is not only 
transmitting them but also encouraging her readers in consulting them for 
ourselves. She has a healthy scepticism of any ‘absolutes’ emerging from 
specialists in a given field, and she looks instead to the words and deeds of 
concrete persons, actual human beings, for inspiration and guidance. And here—
and there, but probably not everywhere (she is only human)—I think she chooses 
her company well. 
“The realm of humanitas”, Arendt says, is one created by reason and in which 
“freedom reigns”.82 It is a realm that is “worldly” yet “invisible”, “reach[ing] 
into all the countries of the globe and into all their pasts”, and where all can 
“come to out of his own origins”.83 A worldly aspect of humanitas is that it “is 
never acquired in solitude … [and] can be achieved only by one who has thrown 
his life and his person into the ‘venture into the public realm’”, this venture in 
which humanitas is acquired “becom[ing] a gift to mankind”.84 The reader might 
recall here what Dallmayr said in the previous chapter about Aristotle and how 
the virtuous life requires participation in public affairs, but these words of 
Arendt’s about humanitas are sung in praise of Karl Jaspers, published in Men in 
Dark Times. They are followed in this text, however, by her essay which 
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questions Jaspers’s status as a world citizen and raises some fears about “the 
forbidding nightmare of tyranny” that would be world government.85 Arendt tells 
us in this essay that, “from a philosophical viewpoint”, “the danger inherent” in 
globalisation seems to be the destruction “of all national traditions” and the 
burial of “the authentic origins of all human existence”; origins upon which she 
says all human thought depends for its existence and out of which all can come 
to our humanitas.86 Although she is not surprised in this essay that the common 
reaction to globalisation is “political apathy, isolationist nationalism or 
desperate rebellion against all powers that be rather than enthusiasm or a desire 
for a revival of humanism”, I hope to have shown in this chapter so far that it is 
indeed the latter which Arendt has and that she had come to harbour some hope 
that others might have or at least come to have as well.87 
 Key to humanitas for Arendt is the fact, word and concept of culture, the latter 
two of which, as she says in The Crisis in Culture, are rooted in the Latin verb 
colere—to cultivate, to dwell, to take care, to tend and preserve.88 Noting that 
Cicero appears to have been the first to use the term in relation to cultivating 
the life of the mind (excolere animum), she goes on to observe that cultural 
products, products that enable us to train or cultivate the mind, share with 
political ‘products’, words and deeds, “the quality that they are in need of some 
public space where they can appear and be seen; they can fulfil their own being, 
which is appearance, only in a world which is common to all”.89 While she knows 
well that we are all in need of some entertainment as a simple matter of fact of 
the life process, and regards it as “sheer hypocrisy or social snobbery” to deny 
that we can be entertained by the same things as “the masses of our fellow 
men”, she still regrets the extent to which she can see the entertainment 
industry changing the products of culture such that they become usable, 
exchangeable, applicable, evaluable, ingestable or consumable, i.e. changing 
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them into (commercial) products of entertainment.90 Cultural products, being 
beautiful, have precisely the opposite of these qualities, and as such, Arendt 
argues, should be tended to and taken care of in a way that they endure in a 
world common to all and for all to see. Whereas cultural products should serve 
us as “permanent appurtenances of the world”, products of entertainment are 
consumed in passing: 
“The products needed for entertainment serve … as the phrase is, to 
while away the time, and the vacant time which is whiled away is not 
leisure time, strictly speaking—time, that is, in which we are free 
from all cares and activities necessitated by the life process [including 
entertainment activities] and therefore free for the world and its 
culture—it is rather left-over time … left over after labor and sleep 
have had their due. Vacant time which entertainment is supposed to 
fill is a hiatus in the biologically conditioned cycle of labor … Under 
modern conditions, this hiatus is constantly growing; there is more 
and more time freed that must be filled with entertainment.”91  
Arendt attributes the commodification of cultural products to what she calls the 
“socialisation” of the world, the fact that we are a “labouring society” or a 
“society of labourers”.92 But in a separate essay on this matter, she seems to call 
into question her claim in the above passage that the increasing time we are 
coming to have at our disposal must be filled with entertainment, and at the 
same time sees the disappearance of culture into entertainment as a choice 
(however circumscribed) rather than a destiny: 
“…a society of laborers … neither know nor need a public, worldly 
space existing independently of their life process, while, as persons, 
they of course do require such a space and would be able to construct 
it as soon as any other human beings under different temporal 
circumstances … The rather common view that democracy is opposed 
to culture, and that culture may flourish only within aristocracies, is 
correct insofar as democracy is taken to signify the socialisation of 
man and world—which is by no means how it must necessarily be 
understood. In any case, it is the phenomenon of society, and that of 
good society no less than that of mass society, which is threatening to 
culture.”93 
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Arendt has a very bleak view of what she calls ‘society’ (or ‘the social’) and 
what she takes to be its pernicious influence upon both culture and politics (or 
‘the political’). We shall encounter some of her arguments as to why very shortly 
and quite a few problems with her understanding of society (or ‘the social’) 
when we consider it in more detail in the next section, but for now, suffice it to 
say that she understands ‘society’ as an essentially modern phenomenon. We 
shall also consider in the next section her writings on the age-old distinction 
between basic forms of government—by the one (monarchy or tyranny), the few 
(aristocracy or oligarchy), or the many (democracy or mob rule)—and her support 
for a mixture of more than one of these, a ‘non-basic’ form of government, as 
the best practicable for maintaining the public, worldly space in existence 
independently of our life processes, but here, we are concerned with her focus 
upon persons. Arendt it seems to me is concerned to tend to and to take care 
of—to preserve—certain cultural products of the past which, for she and many 
others, are still here in the present, they do not ‘look like a field of ruins’, and 
she is also arguing it is obvious, qua persons, both that we need this worldly 
space where culture and politics appear, and that we are able to take care of it 
like any and all human beings, if only we attend to our circumstances, if only we 
“think what we are doing”.94  
And our circumstances, according to Arendt, are adversely affected by what she 
calls ‘society’. We find some indications as to why she holds such a bleak view of 
it in On Revolution. Of the persons who threw themselves into the ‘venture into 
the public realm’ that was the French Revolution, she tells a tragic story tinged 
with deep irony about the “hideous process” that involved the hypocrisy of “high 
society” and the “hunt for” and “futile and pernicious war” against it—and later 
against the Revolution’s own children—which was declared by Robespierre.95 
According to Arendt: 
“The violence of terror, at least to a certain extent, was the reaction 
to a series of broken oaths and unkept promises that were the perfect 
political equivalent of the customary intrigues of Court society, 
except that these willfully corrupted manners … had by now reached 
the monarch as well … Wherever society was permitted to invade, to 
overgrow, and eventually to absorb the political realm, it imposed its 
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own mores and ‘moral’ standards, the intrigues and perfidies of high 
society, to which the lower strata responded by violence and brutality 
… That the wretched life of the poor was confronted by the rotten life 
of the rich is crucial for an understanding of what Rousseau and 
Robespierre meant when they asserted that men are good ‘by nature’ 
and become rotten by means of society, and that the low people, 
simply by virtue of not belonging to society, must always be ‘just and 
good’. Seen from this viewpoint, the Revolution looked like the 
explosion of an uncorrupted and incorruptible inner core through an 
outward shell of decay and odorous decrepitude…”96 
The problem with the mores of Court society according to Arendt was not that 
they had been easily exchanged for different mores, but that they had been 
wilfully corrupted to the point of the habitually unjust behaviour of persons in 
that society which was carried over into the political realm, engendering 
violence and brutality. It seems, then, at least on Arendt’s telling, that not only 
justice but also prudentia was a victim of this wilful corruption. But it is 
important to point out that, very shortly before the above passage, she says that 
“probably no living man, in his capacity as an agent, can claim … to be 
uncorrupted [and] incorruptible” and quotes historian of the revolution R.R. 
Palmer’s words that “the hunt for hypocrites is boundless and can produce 
nothing but demoralisation”, to which one might also add terror—at least insofar 
as boundaries to the hunt are unrecognised or imprudently unset.97 It seems to 
me that Arendt is suggesting in her story about the French revolution that 
virtues and vices are to be found everywhere insofar as one is paying attention 
to persons as distinguished from non-persons like ‘high society’ or ‘the low 
people’. She provides an account of “the profound meaningfulness” of the Latin 
term persona in her story here as well, and while she says that Robespierre in his 
hunt to unmask all hypocrites knew what he was talking about when he spoke of 
“vices surrounded with riches”, she also says that “the men of the French 
Revolution had no conception of persona, and no respect for the legal 
personality which is given and guaranteed by the body politic.”98 For Arendt, the 
passion for unmasking, “the demand that everybody display in public his 
innermost motivation, since it actually demands the impossible, transforms all 
actors into hypocrites; the moment the display of motives begins, hypocrisy 
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begins to poison all human relations.”99 Arendt obviously never condones 
hypocrisy, but she regards the passion for unmasking as anti-political, its 
satiation imprudent, and I think it may be for this reason she suggests to her 
readers that hypocrisy is one of the “minor vices”—contrasted with, for 
example, injustice, imprudence, intemperateness, and cowardice—and turns to 
Machiavelli in trying to explain to her readers why ‘the one-who-is’, or the 
‘unmasked’, might have been hiding his vices because “he felt they were not fit 
to be seen” in the world (hypocrisy being the vice that pays compliment to 
virtue, and ‘the one-who-is’, the political actor, [ideally] having the world 
rather than themselves at the centre of their attention).100 
In the conclusion to her acceptance speech for the Sonning Prize, Arendt notes 
that personae are not inalienable (which of course she experienced for herself in 
being stripped of German citizenship) and says that: 
“It is in this sense that I can come to terms with appearing here as a 
‘public figure’ for the purpose of a public event. It means that when 
the events for which the mask was designed are over, and I have 
finished using and abusing my individual right to sound through the 
mask, things will again snap back into place. Then I, greatly honored 
and deeply thankful for this moment, shall be free not only to 
exchange the roles and masks that the great play of the world may 
offer, but free even to move through that play in my naked ‘thisness’, 
identifiable, I hope, but not definable and not seduced by the great 
temptation of recognition which, in no matter what form, can only 
recognise us as such and such, that is, as something which we 
fundamentally are not.”101 
Arendt’s conclusion here necessitates, and so I hope excuses me in the reader’s 
eyes for taking, a slight detour on to ‘trans-political’ things. What Arendt 
fundamentally is may be Arendt’s concern, but it is not the world’s, and who she 
is we learn from her appearance in the world, from her deeds and her words in it 
as spoken through the various roles or masks that the great play of the world 
may offer. Arendt regards being and appearance as coinciding in human beings, 
but in sharp contrast to Heidegger, she argues for the priority of being-of-the-
world, for the priority of appearance vis-à-vis being, and carrying out the various 
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roles or wearing the various masks that the great play of the world may offer she 
sees as a specifically human way of being-of-and-in-the-world: 
“Living things make their appearance like actors on a stage set for 
them … I can flee appearance only into appearance … the 
philosophers’ ‘conceptual efforts’ to find something beyond 
appearances have always ended with rather violent invectives against 
‘mere appearances’ … Men … present themselves in deed and word 
and thus indicate how they wish to appear, what in their opinion is fit 
to be seen and what is not. This element of deliberate choice in what 
to show and what to hide seems specifically human. Up to a point we 
can choose how to appear to others … we may make [such choices] 
because we wish to please ourselves or because we wish to set an 
example, that is, to persuade others to be pleased with what pleases 
us. Whatever the motives may be, success and failure in the 
enterprise of self-presentation depend on the consistency and 
duration of the image thereby presented to the world.”102 
 Our personae are what we (not inalienably) have as ethical, social, and political 
beings. It seems to me that Arendt is saying in her acceptance speech for the 
Sonning prize that she moves through the great play of the world in her naked 
‘thisness’ above all in the same way that the rest of us do, i.e. with clothes on, 
and in accepting the prize she was—to return to her metaphor—clothed by her 
professional persona (and turning away from the metaphor again, a new 
dress).103 Her opinion as regards the rather violent invectives of philosophers 
against ‘mere’ appearances is perhaps best seen in her appraisal of the French 
existentialists. Arriving in Paris to seek a publisher for The Origins of 
Totalitarianism in 1955, Arendt wrote to her husband that it would be 
“senseless” to see “Sartre et al. … They are entirely wrapped up in their 
theories and live in a world Hegelianly organised”, and although she admired 
Albert Camus for standing “head and shoulders above” the others in his 
commitment to reason and his hailing of “the old virtues”, she suggested in a 
presentation shortly before her trip that the French existentialists’ entrance into 
political life as revolutionaries “more often than not looks like a very 
complicated game of rather desperate children” unfamiliar with political reality 
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(the priority of appearances vis-à-vis being), which she tells us more than once is 
not the nursery.104 
Personally, I have no doubt whatsoever that Arendt’s great honour and deep 
gratitude in accepting the Sonning prize was sincere—as she said in her 
acceptance of Hamburg’s Lessing prize, an honour “…reminds us emphatically of 
the gratitude we owe the world”, “…a world and public to which we owe the 
space into which we speak and in which we are heard”—and, as already 
indicated on p.152 when she presented to her students some exemplary figures 
acting morally, I have no doubt whatsoever that her deliberate choices in how 
and what she presents in the world, what she thinks fit to be seen in it and what 
not, are made to persuade others to be pleased with what pleases her rather 
than merely to please her self.105 
2.3.2 Arendt on Statespersons 
It seems to me significant that Arendt begins Some Questions of Moral 
Philosophy with a laudation of Winston Churchill: 
“…the greatest statesman thus far of our century … He has been 
called a figure of the eighteenth century driven into the twentieth as 
though the virtues of the past had taken over our destinies in their 
most desperate crisis, and this, I think, is true as far as it goes. But 
perhaps there is more to it. It is as though, in this shifting of 
centuries, some permanent eminence of the human spirit flashed up 
for an historically brief moment to show that whatever makes for 
greatness—nobility, dignity, steadfastness, and a kind of laughing 
courage—remains essentially the same throughout the centuries.”106 
‘The virtues of the past’ are spoken of at the very outset of the first lecture, 
followed shortly afterwards, as we have seen, with their elevation vis-à-vis 
‘values’. I think it important to note here that, even if Arendt stands accused of 
some contextualists’ charge that she is engaging in ‘the mythology of perennial 
questions’, she leaves ‘some permanent eminence of the human spirit’ as a 
mere possibility or suggestion for her students to ponder before moving on to 
speak of other things, and it is probably a mark of her status as a political 
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thinker that she begins these ‘questions of moral philosophy’ by praising 
Churchill. In her biography of Arendt, Young-Bruehl notes that “writing a Moralia 
was not her mode” and that she had admitted as much in her private 
correspondence, saying during the Eichmann controversy to sociologist Hermann 
Meier-Cronemeyer “that [the writing of Eichmann in Jerusalem] was [as you say] 
an approach toward ‘the groundwork for creating new political morals’ is true—
though I would never, out of modesty, use such a formulation”.107 But she does 
touch upon the matter in Collective Responsibility: 
“From the Nicomachean Ethics to Cicero, ethics or morals were part 
of politics, that part that dealt not with the institutions but with the 
citizen, and all the virtues in Greece or in Rome are definitely 
political virtues. The question is never whether an individual is good 
but whether his conduct is good for the world he lives in. In the 
center of interest is the world and not the self … ‘What is important in 
the world is that there be no wrong; suffering wrong and doing wrong 
are equally bad.’ Never mind who suffers it; your duty is to prevent it 
… This vicarious responsibility for things we have not done, this taking 
upon ourselves the consequences for things we are entirely innocent 
of, is the price we pay for the fact that we live our lives not by 
ourselves but among our fellow men…”108 
The reader may recall at this point Arendt’s arguments as set out in the previous 
section about the futile demands of others that we parade our innermost 
motives in public (‘is this individual good?’) and about personae (pp.160–163), 
and they may also see a certain tension between the language she is using here 
as regards ethics and politics as compared with Dallmayr’s language in describing 
their relation in the previous chapter (p.76, although we should note that 
Dallmayr said ‘If confined to the personal level, ethics functions in a more 
private context…’), but what I wish to point out here is that Arendt moves from 
a past fact to a present question in this passage; a fact, moreover, that extends 
far beyond Cicero in the tradition, as I think evidenced, for example, in the 
conduct of Winston Churchill vis-à-vis the grave threat to the world emanating 
from the Nazis. In her brief—and far from exhaustive—list of things that she says 
go into ‘whatever makes for greatness’, Arendt associates one of the primary 
virtues with Churchill, courage (who himself said that courage “is rightly 
esteemed as the first of human qualities, because it guarantees all the others”), 
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but in her praise of John F. Kennedy, she names what she sees as “the two 
highest virtues of the statesman—moderation and insight”: 
“Most conspicuous in his handling of the Cuba crisis and the civil rights 
conflict were the extremes to which he did not go. He never lost sight 
of the thinking of his opponents, and as long as their position itself 
was not extreme, and hence dangerous to what he felt were the 
interests of the country, he did not attempt to rule it out, even 
though he might have to overrule it. It was in this spirit, which 
derived from his ability to grasp his opponents’ thinking, that he 
greeted the student demonstration which picketed the White House 
after he decided to resume nuclear testing.”109 
Kennedy could understand the opinions of the students demonstrating against his 
decision to resume nuclear testing, and without ‘ruling out’ their opinions or 
their right to demonstrate, ‘over-ruled’ them as part of the “awesome 
responsibilities” he had sworn to meet in ensuring the nation’s security.110 He 
displayed the virtue of moderation in not going to any extremes, whether in his 
words or his deeds, in handling the crises of his day. As for insight, this is the 
term Arendt uses to translate phronesis, which we have seen Dallmayr speak of 
in terms of one who “ponders the consequences of actions soberly and reforms 
them in light of the horizon of ‘goodness’ and wellness (eudaemonia)”; we have 
seen Morgenthau speak of it (or prudence) as “the weighing of the consequences 
of alternative political actions”; and we have seen Kelsay describe it as “a kind 
of practical wisdom by which one ties the realities of particular situations to 
virtues of justice, temperance and courage”. All of these descriptions I think 
come well at phronesis or prudentia in different ways, and Arendt herself 
describes phronesis briefly as “meaning nothing other than [!] the greatest 
possible overview of all the possible standpoints and viewpoints from which an 
issue can be seen and judged”, but in a separate paper, she provides a 
(conditional) definition: 
“If we wanted to define, traditionally, the one outstanding virtue of 
the statesman, we could say that it consists in understanding the 
greatest possible number and variety of realities … as those realities 
open themselves up to the various opinions of citizens; and, at the 
same time, in being able to communicate between the citizens and 
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their opinions so that the commonness of this world becomes 
apparent. If such an understanding—and action inspired by it—were to 
take place without the help of the statesman, then the prerequisite 
would be for each citizen to be articulate enough to show his opinion 
in its truthfulness and therefore to understand his fellow citizens.”111 
 Arendt evidently wanted to define, traditionally and conditionally, the one 
outstanding virtue of the statesman, but as already seen in the first section of 
this chapter, she had her own doubts that “we” want to do so, even as I hope to 
have unsettled any doubts about tradition as such among “us”, and I am 
promoting study of the virtues. But in returning to a consideration of what 
Arendt is saying here about the ‘one outstanding virtue of the statesman’, I 
think it is useful if we look at how she distinguishes it from the kind of wisdom 
normally associated with philosophers. In The Promise of Politics, there is an 
essay on Socrates in which Arendt considers the “enormity” of Plato’s demand 
that the philosopher become ruler of the polis: 
“The sophos, the wise man as ruler, must be seen in opposition to the 
current ideal of the phronimos, the understanding man whose insights 
into the world of human affairs qualify him for leadership, though of 
course not to rule. Philosophy, the love of wisdom, was not thought to 
be the same at all as this insight, phronesis. The wise man alone is 
concerned with matters outside the polis, and Aristotle is in full 
agreement with this public opinion when he states: ‘Anaxagoras and 
Thales were wise, but not understanding men. They were not 
interested in what is good for men [anthrōpina agatha].”.112  
Arendt is well-known for opposing the notion of ‘rule’ in politics, but as we can 
see here, she is certainly not against the notion of leadership in them, and it is 
the phronimos whose insights into the world of human affairs who qualifies for 
leadership. In another version of this paper, Arendt describes philosophy as “the 
concern with truth regardless of the realm of human affairs” and we can see 
here that she understands the phronimos to be concerned precisely (although 
not only) with the realm of human affairs (thus the ‘enormity’ of Plato’s claim 
about philosopher-kings), with ‘what is good for men’ as distinguished from ‘the 
good’.113 Brown in the previous chapter said Morgenthau displayed the virtue of 
phronesis (although he did not call him a phronimos), and insofar as he did so in 
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his action, i.e. in the publication of his paper on ‘The Intellectual and Political 
Functions of Theory’, we might say in Arendt’s terms that Morgenthau’s insights 
into the world of human affairs qualify him for leadership in his field, i.e. the 
field of international studies. But let us return to this virtue as it is manifest in 
statespersons. Not only is the phronimos an understanding person—it seems to 
me an outstandingly understanding person, insofar as he or she can understand 
the greatest possible number and variety of citizens’ opinions (I do baulk at 
Arendt’s use of the term ‘realities’ in this context)—he or she is also able to 
communicate between the citizens and their opinions so that the commonness of 
this world becomes apparent. To express this in Latin terminology: not only does 
the prudens have extraordinary abilities in terms of ratio, he or she also has 
extraordinary abilities in terms of oratio. And Arendt concludes her traditional 
and conditional definition of this one outstanding virtue of the statesperson by 
underscoring the tallness of this ‘order’: without the help of such persons who 
display these extraordinary abilities in their conduct, the prerequisite would be 
for everybody else to be displaying them. This it seems to me implies that 
Arendt realises that some sort of political organisation is required to secure 
conditions in which people can develop these abilities and display them in their 
actions to whatever extent, and it is her writings on this that we shall now 
consider.  
2.4 Political Societies 
2.4.1 Arendt’s ‘New’ Republicanism 
We saw on p.148 that Canovan regards Arendt as standing in a civic republican 
tradition, but she also claims that Arendt provides us with “a new 
republicanism” in her writings, a “version … significantly different from any of 
the models she inherited”.114 The “essential” difference, for Canovan, is 
Arendt’s emphasis on plurality, which “transforms … the classical element” of 
her republicanism, even as she acknowledges that Arendt presented this 
emphasis not as an “original insight” but as “‘pearl-diving’ in the deep waters of 
the past.”115 Perhaps the clearest of Canovan’s claims for the significant novelty 
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of Arendt’s republicanism and its essential difference from any previous models 
is that: 
“Her own political thought is conceived as an attempt to salvage and 
articulate ancient republican experiences by rethinking the traditional 
concepts in a way that takes account of human plurality and 
recognises politics as something that happens in the space between 
plural men.”116 
We have seen Young-Bruehl construe this way in terms of Arendt’s aphoristic 
technique, ‘thinking poetically’; an opening up of our words rather than a 
rethinking of our concepts; and as Arendt gathering the surviving threads of 
tradition and making something new, dynamic and illuminating out of them. 
Both Canovan and Young-Bruehl agree that Arendt produced something new in 
her writings, but they also seem to agree, on some level, that it was not entirely 
new. It was not new in the sense of being ‘unprecedented’ or without previous 
models of any kind; what Arendt produced was both old and new at the same 
time. What might help in understanding this paradox I hope to have begun 
addressing in the first section of this chapter: neither tradition as such nor ‘the 
tradition’ have been lost or broken in the modern world. In this sub-section, the 
same theme is developed as we consider what Arendt would have called ‘that 
part of politics that deals not with the citizen but with the institutions’ (see 
p.162), although as we know, whether through the language of ‘individual–
collective’ or ‘agent–structure’ or any other, each is always somehow dependent 
upon the other. 
In terms of her republicanism, it seems to me that Arendt approved of and had 
great respect for the traditional framework in which we think about the basic 
forms of government, i.e. by the one, the few or the many—even as she 
criticised the concept of ‘rule’ as distinguished from government in this 
framework, and even as she argued that the phenomenon of totalitarianism 
could not be comprehended within it.117 We saw Dallmayr describe these basic 
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forms of government in the previous chapter as monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy, and Arendt I think correctly observes that all forms of government, 
including democracy, “in one way or another constrain the free will of their 
citizens”, even as she makes no claim as to what she thinks is the ‘best’ of these 
basic forms.118 That said, and again apart from when she construes them as 
‘forms of rule’, Arendt does not express any doubt about the arguments made in 
our history—particularly by Aristotle and Polybius, and later “insisted upon” by 
Cicero—advocating a non-basic, ‘mixed’ form of government, i.e. a judicious 
mixing of more than one of the three basic forms, as the best practicable for 
maintaining the public space between persons—public freedom, the res publica—
in existence.119 Since the Romans, the term we have always used to describe 
such mixed forms of government is ‘republican’, and we have already seen 
Dallmayr and Walzer, both democrats, supporting such non-basic forms. We find 
some of Arendt’s own support for mixed government in On Revolution, a text in 
which we have already seen her linking the American founding back to Rome’s. 
She connects in this text the constitutional debates of the American founders to 
“the age-old notion of a mixed form of government which, combining the 
monarchic, aristocratic, and the democratic elements in the same body politic, 
would be capable of arresting the cycle of sempiternal change … and establish 
an immortal city.”120 With her reference to ‘an immortal city’, we see Arendt’s 
focus here not on Greek but on Roman ways of republican thinking, or more 
specifically, not on Aristotle’s or Polybius’s but on Cicero’s. She describes mixed 
government elsewhere as meaning “no more than the combination or integration 
of three fundamental traits which characterise men in so far as they live with 
each other and exist in plurality”, and as we shall consider in more detail in the 
final chapter, these traits for Cicero are potestas (‘power’, the ‘monarchic’ 
element in a mixed form of government), auctoritas (‘authority’, the 
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‘aristocratic’ element) and libertas (‘freedom’, the ‘democratic’ element).121 
Let us consider Arendt’s own writings around power, authority, and freedom. 
As already mentioned, Arendt criticises the notion of rule which is to be found in 
Greek conceptions of power. Instead of the Greeks, she turns to the Romans in 
developing her own conception: 
“Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in 
concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a 
group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps 
together. When we say of somebody that he is ‘in power’ we actually 
refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in 
their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated 
to begin with (potestas in populo, without a people or group there is 
no power), disappears, ‘his power’ also vanishes.”122 
Arendt is relying here upon the authority of Cicero, or more specifically, a 
passage taken from his De Legibus, ‘On the Laws’.123 Ulrich Gotter, in his 
investigation of Greek and Roman concepts of power, explains that: 
“Potestas had a limited range of application. It designated a quality 
that attached to Roman office … every aspect of potestas was 
emphatically part of Rome’s legal discourse. Roman law 
simultaneously guaranteed and limited its exercise. A good translation 
of potestas into English would therefore be ‘the right [ius] to give 
orders’”.124 
Through the law, the Roman people vested potestas in the offices of the 
magistrates, the citizens’ consensus making the incumbent magistrates’ 
commands right (ius). ‘Raw power’ in Rome was not potestas, but vis, which we 
usually translate into English as ‘force’ or ‘violence’, and in line with this Roman 
understanding, Arendt is also very careful to distinguish power from violence in 
her writings. I think it is misleading, then, for Canovan to give her readers the 
impression that there is significant novelty in Arendt’s distinction between 
power and violence by saying that it “is particularly striking in the context of the 
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republican tradition, for … this had been overwhelmingly a militaristic 
tradition…”.125 Not only does this conceal what should be obvious differences 
between international and domestic affairs on the one hand and the conduct of 
soldiers and citizens on the other (Canovan conceals the latter by having 
Rousseau, who saw the solidarity of soldiers on the battlefield as a good model 
for citizenship, represent the republican tradition as a whole so as to contrast 
Arendt with it); it distorts the peaceable strand of the republican tradition in 
the international sphere as seen primarily in the writings of Cicero and 
continued by figures such as Vitoria, Grotius and Kant in the modern age—what 
we call today the just war tradition.126 But in a segue back to discussing domestic 
politics, Canovan admits (to the attentive reader) that Arendt’s distinction 
between power and violence, as well as her understanding of citizenship and her 
writings on plurality and the public space in-between persons, are, after all, 
firmly in the republican tradition of Rome (or what she now calls ‘republican 
traditions’), even if this ‘oldness’ may be less than obvious. She goes on rightly 
at this point to place Arendt in the republican tradition as represented by 
Montesquieu and the American founders, who also understood power to arise 
from common action and mutual trust rather than as belonging to any individual. 
In the republican tradition, as Arendt says, and as Canovan quotes her as saying, 
government “is essentially organised and institutionalised power.”127 
An essentially Roman aspect of Arendt’s republicanism is also involved in her 
conception of authority. As she states, both the word and concept originated in 
Rome; auctoritas had no equivalent in Greek. However, in What is Authority? 
she begins her own tentative, Plato-inspired definition by asserting that it 
“always demands obedience”, before asserting further that the relation between 
the one who commands and the one who obeys is “authoritarian”, and from the 
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perspective of the Roman understanding of auctoritas, this is not right.128 As 
Gotter puts it: 
“Auctoritas was a personal quality. It derived from the rank, status, 
and dignity of an individual or a social group enjoyed in the Roman 
commonwealth … [Auctoritas] referred to the ability of individual 
senators to assert themselves in political deliberations. 
Communication in the sphere of auctoritas did not rest on command 
or obedience, but anticipated consent … Ultimately, the senate had 
no means effectively to enforce its will; it had no competence of its 
own to see to it that its preferences were followed and had to 
delegate this responsibility to the respective magistrates.”129  
As above, it was the Roman people who invested potestas, the right to give 
orders, in whoever was occupying the various magistracies at a given time. In 
distinguishing it from potestas, Mommsen very well described auctoritas as 
“more than advice and less than a command; an advice which one may not 
safely ignore”, which is a description Arendt also quotes, and Oakeshott provides 
us with another excellent one: 
“…to exercise auctoritas was to advise, to give guidance, to educate 
… [it] could be supplied by men steeped in the traditio which joined 
the present generation to its roots in the original foundation … as the 
Romans thought of it, it supplied something indispensable for the care 
and custody of res publica. It was a spring of political initiative, not a 
reservoir of political power; for, to have auctoritas was, precisely, 
not to have power (potestas); it was to be a teacher, not a 
commander.”130   
Arendt, like the Romans, distinguishes power from authority, but it seems to me 
that she unhelpfully obscures her own distinction by implying that one who 
exercises authority is one who issues a command. That said, I hope to have 
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shown so far that Arendt herself was ‘steeped in traditio’ and that we need the 
help of authority and tradition in maintaining the public space, public freedom, 
the res publica, in existence. We have already seen Young-Bruehl speak of 
Arendt’s own authority: she presented her arguments historically and gathered 
the threads of tradition freely and in such a way as to protect (public) freedom, 
the res publica. And Arendt’s own writings on freedom, as Canovan says, are 
more than ordinarily obscure, but however she thinks of it, she certainly 
understands it as involving both our capacity to begin something new in the 
world and a worldly condition in which we are able to exercise this capacity, i.e. 
to act: 
“[Arendt] stresses the ‘miraculous’ quality of human freedom, our 
ability to interrupt predictable chains of events and to do things that 
are utterly unexpected … And … freedom as a worldly condition 
persists only where ‘new beginnings are constantly injected into the 
stream of things already initiated’ … [Arendt has a] vision of freedom 
as a condition in which people are continually joining together in 
dynamic association … One of the implicit conditions for freedom in 
Arendt’s sense is that human spontaneity and the great power 
generated by cooperation should be exercised within the bounds of … 
‘lasting institutions’: within a public space guarded by constitutional 
arrangements upheld by the public commitments of citizens.”131 
I think Canovan provides us here with a good working precis of Arendt’s own 
understanding of freedom, but once again, it seems to me that there is no 
significant novelty in it, nor essential difference between it and Roman libertas, 
a mark of which Cicero describes as “to live just as one pleases” and ties to the 
institutional arrangements upheld by cives which guarantee its condition in the 
world, the civitas.132 We shall consider Cicero’s writings on this in more detail in 
subsequent chapters, but here, we may begin to see the relation of authority 
and freedom, like I believe the Romans saw this relation, in Arendt’s own 
understanding. In What is Authority?, this relation first appears as a distinction 
between “liberal and conservative writers”, writing in the shadow of the 
nineteenth century’s unilinear view (or philosophy) of history.133 The modern 
liberal writer is “concerned with history and the progress of freedom rather than 
with forms of government”, which leads them to “[ignore] that authoritarian 
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government committed to the restriction of liberty remains tied to the freedom 
it limits to the extent that it would lose its very substance if it abolished it 
altogether, that is, would change into tyranny”.134 The modern conservative 
writer, according to Arendt, sees history instead as a process of doom “which 
started with the dwindling of authority [or ‘lasting institutions’], so that 
freedom, after it lost the restricting limitations which protected its boundaries, 
became helpless, defenseless, and bound to be destroyed”, which is to say that, 
with the dwindling of authority in an age of mass democracy, a very short step 
becomes more apparent to the modern conservative which leads from 
democracy to tyranny or totalitarian domination: the submergence of the island 
that is public (or in the case of the latter, both public and private) freedom.135 
Arendt’s main concern at this point is in distinguishing totalitarian domination 
from tyranny, a distinction she regards both modern conservative and modern 
liberal writers (in general) as failing to appreciate. That said, here I think she 
deliberately does not say modern conservative writers ignore forms of 
government as modern liberal writers tend to do; she seems to be less critical of 
modern conservative than modern liberal writers in this respect because the 
former more easily recognise the importance, the indispensability, of authority 
in maintaining public freedom, the worldly condition in which we are able to 
exercise our ‘inner’ freedom, our capacity to act. As she says elsewhere, “the 
principle of authority is in all important respects diametrically opposed to that 
of totalitarian domination … authority, no matter in what form, is always meant 
to restrict or limit freedom, but never to abolish it.”136 When Arendt uses the 
terms ‘restrict’ or ‘limit’ in this context, I understand her to mean something 
like ‘slow’, ‘check’ or ‘curb’. This, it seems to me, is what advice and guidance 
normally do and should be intended to do; they certainly do not remove or 
abolish the freedom of whoever is receiving the advice and guidance. And we 
saw Walzer in the previous chapter refer in this context to the guidance of a 
legislator and the restraint of a judge. 
Both freedom and authority are absent in a totalitarian regime—or more 
accurately, with the absence of the latter, it becomes far easier, through the 
 
134 BPF. p.96. 
135 BPF. p.97. Emphasis added. 
136 OT. p.529. Emphasis added. 
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exercise of unchecked power, to abolish the former in toto. Time and again, it 
seems to me, Arendt’s concern is to “tie together” liberal and conservative (or 
more vaguely: left and right) opinion, nurture the “relationship between both” 
which is precisely a hallmark of the tradition of politics, the civic republican 
tradition, she champions: the relation of authority and freedom.137 
I wish to provide two illustrations of this relation in Arendt’s understanding, the 
first being found in her writings on the council system. My concern here is not to 
draw out the differences she posits between it and the party system and nor is it 
to assess the accuracy of her understanding of the various councils that sprung 
up in the revolutionary upheavals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Rather, my concern is to show the relation of authority and freedom in her own 
understanding of the councils, and this in the context of her emphasis on the 
spontaneity, the ‘new beginning’ character, of their organisation. Indeed, it 
seems to me that it is often because of Arendt’s emphasis in her writings on the 
plurality of human beings and actions as new beginnings that scholars are 
sometimes given to misunderstand her as either neglecting or regarding as 
relatively unimportant the institutional aspects of politics on the one hand, or as 
recommending a kind of radical democracy or anarchism on the other.138 But as I 
hope to have already shown, while Arendt was certainly against the notion of 
‘rule’ in politics, she was certainly not against the notions of leadership and 
government. In relation to anarchism, she points out in On Revolution the 
shortcomings of Proudhon and Bakunin after they were faced with the actual 
phenomenon of the councils: 
“…the truth is that these essentially anarchist political thinkers were 
singularly unequipped to deal with a phenomenon which demonstrated 
 
137 BPF. pp.100–101. At an academic conference held in 1972, Hans Morgenthau asked Arendt: 
“What are you? Are you a conservative? Are you a liberal? Where is your position within the 
contemporary possibilities?”, to which she replied, “I don’t know … the left think I’m a 
conservative, and the conservatives sometimes think I am left, or I am a maverick or God knows 
what … I don’t belong to any group … I never was a socialist. I never was a communist … I 
never was a liberal …”. TWB. pp.470–471.  
138 See for example: Anthony F. Lang Jr. and John Williams (eds.), 2005. Hannah Arendt and 
International Relations: Readings Across the Lines. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Chs.8 and 9; 
Andrew Schaap, 2020. ‘Inequality, Loneliness, and Political Appearance: Picturing Radical 
Democracy with Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière.’ Political Theory. pp.1–26; Ferdinando 
G. Menga, 2014. ‘The Seduction of Radical Democracy. Deconstructing Hannah Arendt’s 
Political Discourse.’ Constellations 21(3). pp.313–326; Brian Smith, 2019. ‘Anarcho-
Republicanism? Arendt and the Federated Council System’. Science & Society 83(1). pp.87–
116. 
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so clearly how a revolution did not end with the abolition of state and 
government but, on the contrary, aimed at the foundation of a new 
state and the establishment of a new government … The councils … 
were always organs of order as much as organs of action …”139 
Writing from an anarchist perspective, Brian Smith regards this criticism as both 
odd and surprising in the context of Arendt’s support for the council system and, 
through an interview she gave which was published in Crises of the Republic, 
develops what she means here by ‘state’ and argues that it is a ‘state’—what 
Arendt calls a sort of ‘council-state’—to which Proudhon and Bakunin could have 
assented; one that is “highly divisible and decentralised”, comprising a 
federation of councils which “would not be ordered hierarchically, but 
horizontally.”140 Arendt in fact refers in this interview to “the mere rudiments … 
for a new state concept” that she sees in the federal system and a “new form of 
government” that she sees in the council system, and as regards the latter, she 
says that: 
“[it] seems to correspond to and to spring from the very experience of 
political action … [it] begins from below, continues upward, and 
finally leads to a parliament … if only ten of us are sitting around a 
table, each expressing his opinion, each hearing the opinions of others 
… it will become clear which one of us is best suited to present our 
view before the next higher council … In this fashion, a self-selective 
process is possible that would draw together a true political elite in a 
country.”141 
Smith may be correct to observe that this “mode of organization” supplants the 
“ostensive aims” of anarchists, but his claim that it was pioneered by the 
American and French revolutionaries seems to me to be inaccurate; as I hope to 
have shown in the first section of this chapter, it forms part of a much older 
tradition of politics.142 Nevertheless, despite her criticisms of Proudhon and 
Bakunin, and her rudimentary conception of a council-state drawing together a 
political elite for a given country, Smith seeks to recruit Arendt to the 
 
139 OR. pp.265–266. 
140 CR. p.233. Smith, Anarcho-Republicanism? pp.96–98. Smith re-describes ‘state’ here as 
‘federation of councils’ or ‘cartels’, and talks of ‘political constitution’, ‘political form’, or ‘social 
collective of the future’ instead of government, or what he calls ‘governmental politics.’ His 
quotations from Proudhon, Bakunin and Rocker at this point in support of a kind of federalism 
seem to me to collapse the republican distinction between power and authority as I have set it 
out above. 
141 CR. pp.230–233. 
142 Smith, Anarcho-Republicanism? p.96. 
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anarchist’s cause. Kimberley Hutchings, on the other hand, provides a less one-
sided view than Smith’s in saying that Arendt’s politics “veer between 
conservatism and anarchism, elitism and radical democracy”, but it seems to me 
that there is no veering at all: Arendt is a civic republican, concerned with tying 
both ‘sides’ together as the only means of maintaining (or, in the case of the 
councils, establishing and then maintaining) public freedom.143 In the previous 
chapter, Dallmayr rightly voiced a concern that civic republicanism is understood 
today as merely a “theory”, but I think a larger concern here is that it has come 
to be understood as merely one ideology amongst others, and as Arendt says: 
“Ideologies [are] isms which to the satisfaction of their adherents can 
explain everything and every occurrence by deducing it from a single 
premise … Ideologies are known for their scientific character: they 
combine the scientific approach with results of philosophical 
relevance and pretend to be scientific philosophy. The word 
‘ideology’ seems to imply that an idea can become the subject matter 
of a science … An ideology is quite literally what its name indicates: it 
is the logic of an idea … The ideology treats the course of events as 
though it followed the same ‘law’ as the logical exposition of its 
‘idea’. Ideologies pretend to know the mysteries of the whole 
historical process … As soon as logic as a movement of thought [in the 
world]—and not as a necessary control of thinking [in individuals’ 
minds]—is applied to an idea, this idea is transformed into a premise 
… The tyranny of logicality begins with the mind’s submission to logic 
as a never-ending process, on which man relies in order to engender 
his [own] thoughts. By this submission, he surrenders his inner 
freedom as he surrenders his freedom of movement when he bows 
down to an outward tyranny. Freedom as an inner capacity of man is 
identical with the capacity to begin, just as freedom as a political 
reality is identical with a space of movement between men.”144 
No such outlandish attempts to explain everything or coerce by logic are made in 
the civic republican tradition and nor I think in the course of politics are they 
 
143 Kimberley Hutchings, 1996. Kant, Critique and Politics. London: Routledge. p.61. Cf. OR. p.226: 
“…the notion of democrats versus aristocrats did not exist prior to the revolutions … in the act of 
foundation they were not mutually exclusive opposites but two sides of the same event, and it 
was only after the revolutions had come to their end, in success or defeat, that they parted 
company, solidified into ideologies, and began to oppose each other … Terminologically 
speaking, the effort to recapture the lost spirit of revolution must, to a certain extent, consist in 
the attempt at thinking together and combining meaningfully what our present vocabulary 
presents to us in terms of opposition and contradiction.”  
144 OT. pp.615–622. When I speak of ‘civic republicanism’, I mean to refer to a principle or a 
tradition, and not an ideology. 
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normally made by conservatives or anarchists, ‘elitists’ or radical democrats.145 
Ideologies are an affront to politics properly understood, which proceed for 
Arendt, and for the civic republican tradition in which she stands, through 
speech and persuasion rather than force (whether physical or logical) and 
violence; the faculty of judgment in all concerned remains intact in this 
tradition, whereas ideological thinking, at least on Arendt’s account, bulldozes 
one’s judgment, removes one’s discretion.146  
Freedom is plainly present in the spontaneous organisation of the councils in 
Arendt’s understanding and I think it is important for us to notice the “self-
selective process” she sees engendering in this spontaneity: first in the 
formation of the councils themselves, and then as it happened in the exchange 
of opinions through which she saw authority being generated to protect public 
freedom: 
“the men who sat in the councils were also an elite … of the people 
and sprung from the people … those who organised themselves were 
those who cared and those who took the initiative … Once elected and 
sent into the next higher council, the deputy found himself again 
among his peers, for the deputies on any given level in this system 
were those who had received a special trust.”147  
We have already seen that it is through mutual trust, which is also called good 
faith, that Arendt sees power being generated, and that government is organised 
and institutionalised power. Within this atmosphere of mutual trust, the council 
members according to Arendt were ‘self-selected’.148 In relation to all others 
 
145 The noun ‘elite’ is derived from the Latin verb eligere: to select, to choose, to pluck out. The 
debate about basic forms of government between the pure aristocrat and the pure democrat 
revolves around who should choose the ‘elite’, the select few. It is through the judgments of 
persons that an elite is chosen, even in democracies (that is, except for those direct 
democracies in which selection of the few is by lot, because all concerned agree that they are 
all equally capable of governing and being governed). It seems to me that it can only be the 
most thoroughgoing anarchist who is not ‘elitist’, at least insofar as we understand an elitist to 
be one who believes a given collective should be led or governed by an elite, a select(ed) few 
seen as ‘best’ suited for leading or governing. Cf. OR. pp.279–285; TWB. p.450. 
146 Cf. Bernard Crick, 2005. ‘A defence of politics against ideology’. In Defence of Politics. London: 
Continuum. Ch.2. 
147 OR. p.282. 
148 As with ‘elite’, it is worth pointing out here some of the roots of the term ‘council’ itself. 
Consilium, as Zetzel notes in his introduction to Cicero’s De Re Publica, “is an extraordinarily 
flexible term … It represents both the necessary intelligence needed to guide a commonwealth, 
whether in a single person or a group (and hence shades into concilium, ‘council’), and also the 
specific virtue of aristocratic government.” The senses of consilium he identifies in the text are: 
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concerned, they were an ‘elite’; they had freely chosen themselves into politics, 
accepting the responsibility that unavoidably comes along with that choice, and 
those elected by council members to enter the next higher councils had 
exhibited their authority once more, had “…inspire[d] enough confidence in 
[their] personal integrity, courage and judgment [to be entrusted] with 
representing [their] own person[s] in all political matters.”149 Arendt’s sympathy 
toward the council system may well have been “romantic” and she did indeed 
remain vague as to how it might have developed into a sort of ‘council-state’, 
but it seems to me nevertheless that her understanding of it involves not only 
“the combination or integration of three fundamental traits which characterise 
men in so far as they live with each other and exist in plurality” (p.170), but 
also, through what Gotter called the ability of individuals “to assert themselves 
in political deliberations” (p.173), wooing or anticipating the consent of their 
peers (and we might recall Garsten’s phrasing at this point, “the legitimising 
power of consent, by which authority and freedom can be made to co-
exist”[p.89]), the eventual emergence of ‘council-statespersons’ most “able to 
communicate between the citizens and their opinions so that the commonness of 
this world becomes apparent” (pp.166–167).150 Despite the spontaneity of their 
formation in different times, places and circumstances, Arendt observed “the 
curious stubbornness with which this system is suggested each time the people 
comes to raise its voice”.151 One of the things that might account for this 
curiously stubborn repetition of spontaneous action in different contexts I hope 
to have been indicating throughout the chapter: a tradition of politics that we 
call civic republican, which entails a necessary relation of authority and 
freedom. 
 
“counsel, judgment, plan, planning, policy, deliberation, deliberative function, deliberative 
responsibility, council.” Rep. p.xxxviii. Cf. OR. pp.282–283. 
149 TWB. p.137. 
150 TWB. p.465. It is worth pointing out here a similarity between Arendt’s understanding of the 
council system and the principle of subsidiarity, which holds that social and political issues 
should be dealt with at the most immediate (or local) level that is consistent with their resolution. 
The council system on Arendt’s understanding “could constitute the solution to one of the most 
serious problems of all modern politics, which is not how to reconcile freedom and equality, but 
how to reconcile equality and authority”, and the similarity I point out here may be less 
surprising when we consider that Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America—written by a 
thinker who exerted a strong influence upon Arendt—may be viewed as an examination of the 
same principle. OR. pp.282–283. 
151 TWB. p.137. 
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While Arendt certainly regretted the repeated failure of the council system to 
develop into a new sort of state and form of government, she was still highly 
impressed with the course of the American revolution as contrasted with the 
French, so for the second illustration of the relation between authority and 
freedom, let us return to her account of the American founders. In the final 
section of The Life of the Mind: Willing, she says, “let us put … aside” the 
“professional thinkers, whether philosophers or scientists”, and “fasten our 
attention on men of action, who ought to be committed to freedom because of 
the very nature of their activity, which consists in ‘changing the world’, and not 
in interpreting or knowing it.”152 Regarding the point when the course of events 
had “carried [the American founders] into a full-fledged ‘revolution’”, Arendt 
tells us that: 
“This was the moment when those who had started as men of action 
and had been transformed into men of revolution changed Virgil’s 
great line, ‘Magnus ab integro saeclorum nascitur ordo’ (‘the great 
order of the ages is [re]born as it was in the beginning’) to the Novus 
Ordo Saeclorum (the ‘new order’), which we still find on our dollar 
bills. For the Founding Fathers, the variation implied an admission 
that the great effort to reform and restore the body politic to its 
initial integrity (to found ‘Rome anew’) had led to the entirely 
unexpected and very different task of constituting something entirely 
new—founding a ‘new Rome’.”153 
This passage, admittedly, is yet another very obscure one of Arendt’s. In it, the 
agency of the American founders is heavily circumscribed, not unlike how it was 
in the older version of the story she had told about them in On Revolution 
(quoted on pp.129–130). We are told here that the American founders did not 
transform themselves from men of action into men of revolution but ‘had been’ 
transformed; we are not told of their but of ‘the’ variation made to Virgil’s 
great line; and ‘the’ variation implied not their but ‘an’ admission, i.e. ‘an’ 
acknowledgement of the truth, ‘for’ them (but not necessarily for us), that not 
their but ‘the’ great effort to reform and restore the body politic to the 
integrity of its beginning ‘had led’ to the ‘very different’ task of founding an 
entirely, which could also be to say an unprecedentedly, new order. But at the 
same time, according to Arendt, no longer was such ‘an’ admission 
 
152 LM2. p.198. 
153 LM2. p.207. 
182 
‘inescapable’, like she had said in On Revolution; instead, it was merely 
‘implied’ by ‘the’ variation of Virgil’s great line. Fate or necessity looms large in 
Arendt’s story here, again not unlike how it did in On Revolution, but just as 
with the glimmers of hope in The Life of the Mind I have already highlighted, I 
believe we can (just about) see judgments, choices and the freedom behind 
them present in her use of the verb ‘implied’ and her discarding of the adjective 
‘inescapable’.154 Once again, it seems to me that Arendt understood the 
American founders to have been relying on the authority of Roman antiquity and 
to have renewed the thread of tradition: to have freely and consciously 
constituted a new Rome. Although she evidently has much familiarity with the 
abstruse arguments of the professional thinkers around freedom and necessity, 
by far her greatest concern is with the historical-political world: 
“When men of action, men who wanted to change the world, became 
aware that such a change might actually postulate a new order of the 
ages, the start of something unprecedented, they began to look to 
history for help. They set about rethinking such thought-things as the 
Pentateuch and the Aeneid, foundation legends that might tell them 
how to solve the problem of beginning … The foundation legends, with 
their hiatus between liberation and the constitution of freedom, 
indicate the problem without solving it … In any event, wherever men 
of action, driven by the very momentum of the liberation process, 
began to prepare in earnest for an entirely new beginning, the novus 
ordo saeclorum … they ransacked the archives of Roman antiquity for 
‘ancient prudence’ to guide them in the establishment of a Republic 
… What they needed was … a lesson in the art of foundation, in how to 
overcome the perplexities inherent in every beginning.”155 
It seems to me that to overcome a perplexity is not necessarily to solve it, with 
any proposed ‘solutions’—or what Arendt also refers to in The Life of the Mind 
and elsewhere as ‘answers’—to that perplexity perhaps safely being left to the 
discussions between ‘professional thinkers’ in contradistinction to the words and 
 
154 It would take us too far from the task at hand to examine the philosophical complexities of the 
‘freewill versus determinism’ debates, which I think we might safely leave to those professional 
thinkers we call metaphysicians—whose subject, incidentally, even after the thundering 
pronouncements of a Nietzsche, a Carnap, a Heidegger, or an Arendt, is still handed down, it is 
a tradition of metaphysics, and studied in the universities to this day. Cf. LM1. pp.9–10. It is 
curious to see Arendt state here that “one almost suspects Kant was right when … he 
prophesied that men will surely return to metaphysics ‘as one returns to one’s mistress after a 
quarrel’ … I do not think this very likely or even desirable …”. Kant was right in his prophecy, 
one almost suspects, but for the one that is Arendt—perhaps understandably, given the times in 
which she lived, thought and wrote—its fulfilment is not very likely or even desirable (but still 
right, one almost suspects). 
155 LM2. pp.207–210. Emphases added. 
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deeds of ‘men of action’, upon the latter of which and whom our attention has 
been fastened here. Here and elsewhere, Arendt borrows the words of 
Harrington and speaks of the American founders, or the men of revolution into 
whom they ‘had been’ transformed, and through (if not by) whom she says a 
novus ordo saeclorum was ‘postulated’, as ‘ransacking’ the archives of antiquity 
for ‘ancient prudence’, but qua men of action or men of revolution, Arendt still 
sees in them their need for a lesson in the art of foundation, when face to face 
with their political experience of liberation and the formidable task of 
constituting public freedom. Once again, it seems to me that we can see here 
the relation of authority and freedom in Arendt’s understanding—and this time 
as a historical-political relation.156 And this, it seems to me, is of the essence of 
what we call ‘civic republicanism’. On Arendt’s telling, with which I am very 
much inclined to agree, despite the obscurity of her language, the American 
founding provides us with a modern example of a new beginning actually taking 
place with the help of the authority of the old. Magnus ab integro saeclorum 
nascitur ordo.157 And something similar happens, it seems to me, in Arendt’s 
writings themselves; Canovan and Young-Bruehl are quite right to see ‘oldness’ 
and ‘newness’ in them at the same time.158 
2.4.2 Arendt on ‘Society’ 
Although I hope to have shown the reader that Arendt’s politics are civic 
republican, her theoretical distinction between ‘the social’ and ‘the political’, 
 
156 Whether the relation of authority and freedom in the various ‘council systems’ were historical-
political, whether like the American founders they also had the help of the authority of those who 
had lived before them, whether they were ‘knowingly or unknowingly’ in the business of 
renewing the thread of tradition, would require an investigation of the persons and events 
themselves which is beyond the scope of my project—as indeed is an investigation of the 
American revolution and founders. My concern with both the councils and with the American 
revolution and founding is only with Arendt’s understanding of these persons and events. 
157 I believe the insight to be found in Virgil’s great line from the fourth Eclogue can also be found in 
so many different places in modernity, for example, here in one of Arendt’s favourite lines from 
Goethe: “For the soil again will grow them, as it ever has before”. Jonas, Gleanings p.31. Or 
indeed here, in these lines from W.B. Yeats’ Byzantium: “…Those images that yet / Fresh 
images beget…”. Cf. Diana Arbin Ben-Merre, 1979. ‘The Poet Laureate and the Golden Bird: A 
Note on Yeats’ Byzantium Poems’. The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies 5(1). pp.100–103. 
Alternatively, or additionally, there might well be a ring of truth to philosopher Philip Merlan’s 
claim that “if an idea emerges repeatedly in different ages but not as a result of direct influence, 
it is probably rooted in some fundamental need”. Philip Merlan, 1975. ‘The Stoic Oikeiōsis and 
Sartre’s “Situation”’. Journal of the History of Philosophy 13(1). p.1. 
158 A recent Guardian editorial I think touches upon this matter as well, in terms of what John Keats 
called ‘negative capability’: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/01/the-
guardian-view-on-truth-and-art-fiction-as-a-guide Accessed 24th September 2020. 
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notorious and notoriously difficult to understand, it seems to me mis-shapes 
them. We have already seen Arendt’s bleak view of what she calls ‘society’. Her 
idiosyncratic conception of ‘the social’ seems to have been precipitated by 
various modern events, including the writings of Rousseau and Marx, but we find 
her in The Human Condition going back to ancient Greece and Rome in trying to 
clarify her reasons for distinguishing it from her conception of ‘the political’.159 
The following passage needs to be quoted at some length:  
“All human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live 
together, but it is only action [rather than work or labour] that cannot 
even be imagined outside the society of men … only action is entirely 
dependent upon the constant presence of others … This special 
relationship between action and being together seems fully to justify 
the early translation of Aristotle’s zoon politikon by animal socialis, 
already found in Seneca, which then became the standard translation 
through Thomas Aquinas: homo est naturaliter politicus, id est, 
socialis (‘man is by nature political, that is, social’). More than any 
elaborate theory, this unconscious substitution of the social for the 
political betrays the extent to which the original Greek understanding 
of politics had been lost. For this, it is significant but not decisive that 
the word ‘social’ is Roman in origin and has no equivalent in Greek 
language or thought. Yet the Latin usage of the word societas also 
originally had a clear, though limited, political meaning; it indicated 
an alliance between people for a specific purpose, as when men 
organize in order to rule others or to commit a crime. It is only with 
the later concept of a societas generis humani, a ‘society of man-
kind’, that the term ‘social’ begins to acquire the general meaning of 
a fundamental human condition … [For] Plato and Aristotle … the fact 
that man cannot live outside the company of men … was something 
human life had in common with animal life, and for this reason alone 
it could not be fundamentally human. The natural, merely social 
companionship of the human species was considered [by Plato and 
Aristotle] to be a limitation imposed upon us by the needs of 
biological life, which are the same for the human animal as for other 
forms of animal life.”160 
Much might be said of this pungent passage and although I shall say some of it in 
the next chapter, let us begin addressing it here. More than once, we seem to 
find Arendt admitting that society is a very condition, a sine qua non, of politics, 
 
159 While I agree with Ron H. Feldman when he says that “Arendt uses her experience as a Jew 
and her perspective as a conscious pariah standing outside the mainstream of Western society 
to analyze and gain an understanding of that society”, and that “Arendt places the modern 
Jewish experience at the center of her critique of modern society”, my concern in this section is 
with Arendt’s understanding of society as such, and with what she conceptualises as ‘the 
social’. JW. p. xliv. 
160 HC. pp.22–24. 
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yet she makes a move here to re-describe it in terms of ‘action’ in the ‘constant 
presence of others’. Whether she means to say that the ‘special relationship’ is 
between one actor and ‘constantly present others’, or between two 
abstractions, ‘action’ and ‘being together’, is unclear, but regardless, she leaps 
three and a half centuries forward from Aristotle’s zoon politikon to Seneca’s 
animal socialis, and then another twelve to Aquinas, in giving her account of 
how ‘the original Greek understanding of politics’ came to be lost. Across the 
next two chapters of this project, we shall be discussing Cicero’s use of the Latin 
term societas, a legal term, in his theoretical writings on politics—so far as we 
can tell, the first political thinker to do so—which Arendt seems to overlook in 
her first leap. We shall see the tendentiousness of her description of societas in 
the above passage become even more glaring, and we shall see as well that 
Cicero was the first (so far as we can tell) to use the phrase societas generis 
humani. But for now, let us observe some incongruities between what Arendt is 
saying here in The Human Condition about societas and what she says 
elsewhere, in her posthumously published writings. In The Tradition of Political 
Thought, she speaks correctly and rightly of “the Roman notion of human 
community as a societas, the living-together of socii, men allied on the basis of 
good faith”, and in Introduction Into Politics, shows that her own understanding 
of ‘society’ is essentially modern when she says, again correctly and rightly, that 
societas “has nothing to do with society [as Arendt understands it] but rather 
with a cooperative community that fostered relationships between partners.”161 
In The End of Tradition, as we saw in the first section of this chapter, Arendt 
praised Cicero’s “great political experience” and his arguments in support of the 
practical life of the citizen over the theoretical life of the philosopher, quoting 
appreciatively a line of his from the De Officiis where he argues that human 
beings are naturally sociable: even if all our needs and wants were to be met by 
the work of some magic wand, we would still flee our solitude so we could be 
with others, whether to listen or to speak, to learn or to teach. But Arendt here 
in The Human Condition—seemingly devoted at this point, it must be said, to 
Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies rather than the lost ‘original Greek 
understanding of politics’—wishes to argue that this natural sociability is not 
‘fundamentally human’. Yet in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, she 
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relies on Kant’s argument that our sociability is ‘fundamentally human’ so that 
she can use his notion of ‘enlarged mentality’ in developing her theory of 
judgment: 
“We find [in The Critique of Judgment] … sociability as the very 
origin, not the goal, of man’s humanity; that is, we find that 
sociability is the very essence of men insofar as they are of this world 
only. This is a radical departure from all those theories that stress 
human interdependence as dependence on our fellow men for our 
needs and wants. Kant stresses that at least one of our mental 
faculties, the faculty of judgment, presupposes the presence of others 
… Communicability obviously depends on the enlarged mentality; one 
can communicate only if one is able to think from the other person’s 
standpoint; otherwise one will never meet him, never speak in such a 
way that he understands.”162 
It is true, as Canovan says, that Arendt usually spoke the language of ‘the human 
condition’ rather than ‘human nature’ so as to “challenge the hubristic fantasies 
of totalitarianism and modernity and to stress that we are all subject to 
conditions which we cannot escape”, but as we can see here, incongruous with 
her writings in The Human Condition, she is very keen to stress to her students 
that ‘the very essence of humanity’ is sociability.163 As we have already seen, 
Kant’s theories were not thought up without the guidance of any authority 
whatsoever; they derive significantly from Stoic philosophy and from Cicero’s 
writings, and this includes, it seems to me, his arguments about the natural 
sociability of human beings.164 While such arguments of Kant’s may well be a 
radical departure from strictly ‘utilitarian’ theories past and present, they do 
not depart radically from other theories in the tradition, as we shall see in the 
next chapter. But for now, let us return to Arendt’s earlier writings to consider 
how she deals with this—our—empirical messiness.     
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Much of Arendt’s opposition to ‘the social’ in modernity is bolstered by how she 
portrays the private and public spheres in the Athenian polis. The private sphere 
is the Athenian household, a realm of subjection where the biological necessities 
of life are mastered, which in turn liberates the patriarchal head of the 
household for the activities of the Athenian public sphere: 
“Of all the activities necessary and present in human communities, 
only two were deemed to be political and to constitute what Aristotle 
called the bios politikos, namely action (praxis) and speech (lexis), 
out of which rises the realm of human affairs … from which everything 
merely necessary or useful is excluded … To be political, to live in a 
polis, meant that everything was decided through words and 
persuasion and not through force and violence.”165 
The reader may recall at this point Garsten’s argument in the previous chapter 
that persuasion rather than force is the presumption of democratic politics. Both 
Garsten and Arendt I think are completely right that a fundamentally meaningful 
aspect of politics is that things are decided through words and persuasion rather 
than force and violence (consider cognate terms such as polite or politesse), and 
we shall be considering some of Cicero’s theoretical contributions to this 
endeavour across the next two chapters. But to return to Arendt, she seems to 
be on a different page to Garsten in certain parts of On Revolution, for example, 
when she sets out what she says the American founders saw as a threat to 
politics from democracy (quoting words from Federalist no.50), insofar as 
democracy is understood as a (pure) form of government: 
“Democracy, then, to the eighteenth century still a form of 
government, and neither an ideology nor an indication of class 
preference, was abhorred because public opinion was held to rule 
where the public spirit ought to prevail, and the sign of this 
perversion was the unanimity of the citizenry: for ‘when men exert 
their reason coolly and freely on a variety of distinct questions, they 
inevitably fall into different opinions on some of them. When they are 
governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they are to be so 
called, will be the same.’ … these sentences hint at least at the 
decisive incompatibility between the rule of a unanimously held 
‘public opinion’ and freedom of opinion, for the truth of the matter is 
that no formation of opinion is even possible where all opinions have 
become the same. Since no one is capable of forming his own opinion 
without the benefit of a multitude of opinions held by others, the rule 
of public opinion endangers even the opinion of those few who may 
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have the strength not to share it … public opinion, by virtue of its 
unanimity, provokes a unanimous opposition and thus kills true 
opinions everywhere.”166 
We saw in the previous chapter that Habermas had described the critical use of 
public reason as creating a forum in which private citizens ready themselves ‘to 
compel public authority to legitimate itself before public opinion’, and that Kant 
had described the verdict of critical reason as being ‘simply the agreement of 
free citizens’ in civil society. It seems to me that, even though the American 
founders spoke of it as a ‘common passion’, it is the kind of indivision in these 
rationalist arguments of both Kant and Habermas, whether construed as public 
opinion or the verdict of critical reason, which Arendt is concerned in this 
passage to oppose because it is harmful to the generation of public spirit in 
citizens, and which Garsten in the previous chapter was concerned to oppose 
because it engenders frustration and resentment in those citizens who do not 
share ‘civil society’s’ ‘opinion’ or ‘verdict’. That said, it seems to me that this is 
a problem deriving from modern liberalism in one form or another, rather than, 
as Arendt seems to imply here, a problem deriving from democracy as a form of 
government. We saw in the previous chapter that Walzer, in obvious and full 
support of democracy as a form of government, distances himself from terms 
which suggest indivision such as can be found in Rousseau’s theory, like ‘the 
general will’, and emphasises instead the ‘many-headed’ nature of the people, 
the plurality of citizens’ opinions, and the temporary, shifting, and unstable 
nature of majorities in a democracy. This seems to me to be a good 
understanding of democracy as a form of government, which engenders (or 
should engender) a kind of politics in which, as Garsten says, persuasion is the 
presumption, rather than force or violence.  
As Arendt puts it in terms of “Greek self-understanding”, force and violence 
were used to decide things in spheres other than the polis, either in the private 
household or in the ‘international’ sphere (war), being used in these spheres for 
mastering ‘needs’ and ‘wants’.167 But she says that, within the polis, the public 
and private spheres became blurred over time due to the “profound 
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misunderstanding expressed in the Latin translation of ‘political’ as ‘social’”.168 
According to Arendt, this misunderstanding resulted in a wrongful blending of 
the private and the public spheres in modernity, with politics becoming a sort of 
“gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping.”169 She says that the 
Greeks understood a life lived in private to be ‘deprived’ of the fundamentally 
human experience of action and speech in the public sphere, and that the 
Romans looked on privacy as offering “a temporary refuge from the business of 
res publica”, before going on to observe that we struggle in the modern age to 
understand the private sphere as one of deprivation, partly because of its 
“enormous enrichment … through modern individualism”.170 But at an especially 
obscure point in drawing her distinction, Arendt says that “it seems even more 
important that modern privacy is at least as sharply opposed to the social 
realm—unknown to the ancients who considered its content a private matter—as 
it is to the political, properly speaking.”171 Ancient privacy was not like modern 
privacy, according to Arendt. The latter she says was “discovered” by Rousseau, 
“its most relevant function, to shelter the intimate”, as the opposite of the 
social realm.172 Yet she says that it is to the social realm, as with ancient 
privacy, that modern privacy (or ‘its content’) is “more closely and authentically 
related”.173 In short, Arendt seeks to connect privacy or the private sphere to 
what she calls ‘the social’ and disconnect ‘the social’ from publicness or the 
public sphere, or from what she calls ‘the political’. 
Why? Again, I think Canovan is right to trace Arendt’s understanding of ‘the 
social’ to her concerns with totalitarianism, and as mentioned above, it seems to 
have been the writings of Rousseau and Marx, and the (right or wrong) zeal of 
some others in their wake, which precipitated her distinction between ‘the 
social’ and ‘the political’. For Arendt, Rousseau’s ‘discovery’ of the modern 
private sphere’s function of sheltering the intimate: 
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“… was directed … against the levelling demands of the social, against 
what we would call today the conformism inherent in every society … 
for society always demands that its members act as though they were 
members of one enormous family which has only one opinion and one 
interest”.174 
We see ‘society’ on Arendt’s account connected here to the privacy of the 
ancient Greek household, which was ruled despotically by a patriarch’s ‘one 
opinion and one interest’. She regards it as “decisive that society … excludes … 
spontaneous action or outstanding achievement” between individuals like a 
despot, in the modern age conquering the public sphere where men in ancient 
Athens had once shown who they were as individuals through action and speech, 
and where “each was more or less willing to share in the burden of jurisdiction, 
defense, and administration of public affairs.”175 Regardless of the extent to 
which we can see persons still capable of showing who they are through action 
and speech in the public sphere and being more or less willing to share in what 
Arendt calls here ‘the burden’ of politics (if not ‘the political’), we should note 
that, in line with Emerson, Habermas and Norval as set out in the previous 
chapter, she seems to have a monistic, or at least a ‘de-pluralising’ or 
‘totalising’, view of what she calls ‘society’. And the private despotism of the 
ancient Athenian patriarch appears again without human form as ‘society’ in one 
of her critiques of Marx’s historical materialism: 
“…in the rise of society it was ultimately the life of the species which 
asserted itself … [In Marx] socialised mankind is that state of society 
where only one interest rules, and the subject of this interest is either 
classes or man-kind but neither man nor men. The point is that now 
even the last trace of action in what men were doing … disappeared. 
What was left was a ‘natural force’, the force of the life process 
itself, to which all men and all human activities were equally 
submitted … and whose only aim, if it had an aim at all, was survival 
of the animal species man.”176 
It seems that it is from Marx’s writings that Arendt puts forward the claim that 
‘democracy’ is opposed to culture insofar as it is taken to signify ‘the 
socialisation of man and world’, and that we need not understand democracy in 
this Marxian way (p.159). I certainly agree that there is no need for us to 
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understand ‘democracy’ to be opposed to culture, nor is there a need for us to 
rely only upon Marx for our understanding of the term ‘democracy’, and I am 
questioning in this sub-section the very notion of ‘society’ which Arendt sees as 
underlying ‘democracy’s’ opposition to culture.177 As we have seen, this is an 
essentially modern understanding of ‘society’, one deeply implicated in Hegel’s 
philosophy of history (and I agree here with Arendt that Marx wrongly focused on 
abstractions rather than human beings as the bearers of freedom or necessity), 
but Arendt still seems to want to understand it in terms of the private sphere of 
ancient Athenians; she thinks that the force and violence characteristic of the 
ancient private sphere has been brought into the modern public sphere. ‘The 
Social Question’, she says, “we may better and more simply call the existence of 
poverty”, which is “abject because it puts men under … the absolute dictate of 
necessity”, and it was under the rule of this necessity she says that the poor 
rushed on to the public scene in the French Revolution, unleashing the terror 
that sent it to its doom.178 Despite his ‘discovery’ of the modern private sphere’s 
function of ‘sheltering the intimate’, it was Rousseau according to Arendt who 
had introduced compassion, “the capacity to lose oneself in the sufferings of 
others”, into political theory with terrible consequences, because “compassion, 
in this respect not unlike love, abolishes the distance, the in-between which 
always exists in human discourse”, making the claim instead “for swift and 
direct action, that is for action with the means of violence.”179 Thus necessity, 
force, violence, terror, and compassion are connected to Arendt’s conception of 
‘the social’; some way indeed from special relationships, Roman societas, ‘social 
companionship’ and our ‘natural sociability’ of which she speaks approvingly 
elsewhere. 
We find an indication that Arendt was not especially confident in her own 
distinction between ‘the social’ and ‘the political’ in a conference of academics 
which was held in 1972 on her work and at which she participated. Here, a 
fundamental problem with the distinction was pointed out clearly and succinctly 
by her close friend Mary McCarthy: 
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“… I have always asked myself: ‘What is somebody supposed to do on 
the public stage, in the public space, if he does not concern himself 
with the social? That is, what’s left?’ … if all questions of economics, 
human welfare, busing, anything that touches the social sphere, are 
to be excluded from the political scene, then I am mystified. I am left 
with war and speeches. But the speeches can’t be just speeches. They 
have to be speeches about something.”180 
Arendt’s immediate response to McCarthy was “You’re absolutely right, and I 
may admit that I ask myself this question”, and the gist of her subsequent 
defence of her distinction was that: 
“… what becomes public at every given period seems to me utterly 
different … there will always be conflicts. And you don’t need war … 
There are things where the right measures can be figured out. These 
things can really be administered and are not then subject to public 
debate. Public debate can only deal with things which … we cannot 
figure out with certainty. Otherwise, if we can figure it out with 
certainty, why do we all need to get together? … Let’s take the 
housing problem. The social problem is adequate housing … There 
shouldn’t be any debate about the question that everybody should 
have decent housing.”181 
Richard Bernstein was a participant in this discussion and tells us that nobody 
was convinced by Arendt’s “evasive and feeble” response.182 As he says, “the 
abstract proposition ‘everybody should have decent housing’ … is not the locus 
of any real and serious conflict. Rather, only when we come down to concrete 
details of what is decent housing, how it is to be financed [etc.] … do we face 
genuine issues of social and political conflict.”183 Such concrete details it seems 
we cannot ‘figure out with certainty’ such that they can be left only to the 
administrations of bureaucracy, which Arendt acidly calls “the most social form 
of government”.184 McCarthy rightly mentions that citizens are ‘busing’ in a given 
political society, as Arendt herself had said of the Romans when she spoke in 
The Human Condition of their retiring to the private sphere from the ‘business 
of res publica’. As we shall see in the final chapter, for Cicero, the res publica is 
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the business of the people, and the notion of its being so comes from several 
terms he uses in De Re Publica, but most especially societas. 
In this sub-section, I have highlighted various problems with Arendt’s distinction 
between ‘the social’ and ‘the political’, a distinction she had come to doubt for 
herself towards the end of her life. Although she sought to connect necessity, 
force, violence, terror, and compassion to her conception of ‘the social’, she 
mentioned none of these in relation to her understanding of societas, a “co-
operative community that fostered relationships between partners.” This latter I 
think is plain to see elsewhere in Arendt’s theoretical writings on politics, in her 
civic republicanism, and it is with this understanding in mind that I think it is fair 
to say that she did in fact write of political societies, and her distinction 
between two abstractions, ‘the social’ and ‘the political’, is one we can do 
without, and do without well. 
2.4.3 Arendt on International Political Society 
With a conception of society, then, which involves ‘a cooperative community 
that fosters relationships between partners’, is it possible to see in Arendt’s 
writings any conception of international political society? As indicated in the 
previous chapter through Beardsworth’s consideration of Owens’s Between 
Politics and War, Arendt can easily be construed as a ‘realist’ in the 
international sphere, which might suggest a resounding ‘no’ to this question. But 
as she says, she has no position that can be summed up with an -ism, and in this 
sub-section I highlight some of her writings in which we can see not only a 
conception of, but also an understanding of an existing, international political 
society. Before doing so, however, I consider Arendt’s argument that we are now 
aware of ‘a right to have rights’, which might wrongfully suggest to some 
scholars the maturity not of an international but of a global political society.  
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt provides an unsettling account of ‘The 
Perplexities of the Rights of Man’, arguing that their declaration in the 
eighteenth century “meant nothing more nor less than that from then on Man, 
and not God’s command or the customs of history, should be the source of Law”, 
and that it was only in the twentieth century they had become a practical, 
political issue when “it turned out that the moment human beings lacked their 
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own government and had to fall back on [only the Rights of Man], no authority 
was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them.”185 It 
was this new factual situation—real human beings who were rightless in fact—
rather than theoretical speculation which brought Arendt to argue that we have 
now become aware of the existence of ‘a right to have rights’: 
“Something much more fundamental than freedom or justice, which 
are the rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to the community 
into which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not 
belonging no longer a matter of choice … This extremity, and nothing 
else, is the situation of people deprived of human rights. They are 
deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not 
of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion 
… We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and 
that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s 
actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized 
community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost and 
could not regain these rights because of the new global political 
situation. The trouble is that this calamity arose … [and] could not be 
repaired, because there was no longer any ‘uncivilised’ spot on earth 
[to ‘civilise’, i.e. to organize a polity and so have rights], because 
whether we like it or not we have really started to live in One 
World.”186 
In The Rights of Others, Benhabib reads the phrase ‘a right to have rights’ from 
a universal standpoint, such that the first usage of right “evokes” or “invokes” a 
moral imperative, and the second builds upon this evocation or invocation to 
refer to juridico-civil rights.187 She acknowledges that Arendt was sceptical of 
“such justificatory philosophical discourses” and had offered rather a political 
argument that we are now aware of a right to have rights, yet she also claims 
that, in Arendt’s view, such a right “transcends the contingencies of birth which 
differentiate and divide us”.188 This might be the view of one who assented to 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy and his moral theory upon which it is built, and 
in the previous chapter, we saw Benhabib claim that Arendt was indeed a 
Kantian in moral theory, but if she was, I have not found her assenting to his 
philosophy or moral theory anywhere in her writings. Indeed, in Some Questions 
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of Moral Philosophy, Arendt raises some doubts about his moral theory.189 It 
seems to me that a close reading of Arendt’s writings reveals that they never 
transcend or abstract from the unavoidable contingencies of birth which feed 
into our politics, i.e. history and experience, and this includes in her political 
argument that we have become aware of a right to have rights. In the above 
passage, and as Benhabib also admits, human rights for Arendt are guaranteed 
only by real, actual, particular political communities. She saw, with Kant, the 
extreme importance of these communities for human beings. One of the things 
that so horrified and indeed outraged Arendt was that in her own time millions 
really had been ripped apart juridically, morally and politically from these 
communities, from these ‘contingencies of birth’ which she regards as “much 
more fundamental” than even the rights of citizens. It was “in view of objective 
political conditions”—human beings rightless in fact rather than theory—Arendt 
argued that it was “hard to say” how the concepts of man upon which human 
rights are based “could have helped to find a solution to the problem”.190 Noting 
Arendt’s argument that, in her own time, all societies formed for the protection 
of the Rights of Man and all attempts at establishing a new bill of human rights 
were sponsored by marginal figures, “a few international jurists without political 
experience or professional philanthropists supported by the uncertain sentiments 
of professional idealists”, Waldron takes Arendt to task for seeming to belittle 
the efforts of these figures: 
“Hannah Arendt can perhaps be forgiven for not foreseeing that [soft 
law] would in fact grow, fifty years later, into the dense thicket of 
human rights law whose influence is felt in every corner of the legal 
world. But we should not so readily forgive her for urging her readers 
to approach the earliest stages of this development with categories 
that simply assume that if we cannot already identify the hard 
outlines of familiar legal institutions, we should dismiss a body of 
practice that aspires to juridical status as mere claptrap.”191 
Waldron I think carries out excellent work on the emergence of positive law, 
“the question of what a normative order looks like as it is beginning to come 
into positive existence”, and we have already seen him speak of recently 
evolving customs “growing out of but also constituting a social order [that is] 
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governed by norms, even when there is no one to enforce them” (p.51), but 
while Arendt might not have looked upon the practices of international jurists, 
philanthropists and idealists in terms of “the earliest stages of development” of 
a normative order, it seems to me that she neither dismissed these efforts and 
aspirations nor regarded them as mere claptrap, but rather focused her own 
efforts on the plight of human beings rightless in fact, there and then, who were 
actually invoking their ‘right to have rights’ as members of an organised 
community which could guarantee those rights, and not invoking the 
fundamental human rights of an embryonic normative order which could not. We 
saw Beardsworth in the first chapter criticise Owens’ “use of Arendtian 
categories to forge a political realism that [is] critical of idealism” and express 
some doubt that engagement with the liberal discourse of rights is possible 
through Arendt’s “normative distinctions”, and it seems to me that Waldron is 
also rather vague in his chapter on what Arendt’s categories or normative 
distinctions are such that they exclude ‘idealism’ or practices of aspiration (she 
does, after all, speak the language of rights). Arendt was no jurist herself, but as 
a political theorist, I believe her own practices were aspirational, even as they 
were so often articulated with a studied and understandable bitterness.192  
Benhabib is right that Arendt promotes a civic form of political community 
characterised by plurality—a plurality which also ‘differentiates and divides us’, 
as Benhabib says—but it seems to me that it is one of the great and distinctive 
features of Arendt’s theoretical writings on politics that she, not unlike Cicero as 
we shall see in the next two chapters, holds on to both the individualising and 
collectivising aspects of our lives at the same time. And this because both are 
our lived experiences. Benhabib often emphasises the individualising aspects in 
Arendt’s writings, but let us consider the collectivising aspects in relation to her 
investigation of Arendt’s writings alongside those of Raphael Lemkin, one of the 
above-mentioned international jurists who was a key figure in drawing up the 
Genocide Convention passed by the UN in 1948. In this article, Benhabib 
questions what she takes to be the “ontology of the group” that Lemkin holds 
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and contrasts it with the ontologicalness of Arendt’s conception of plurality.193 
Underlying the legal concept of genocide, Benhabib argues, is Lemkin’s 
“ontology of groups”, the origin of which she says is partially rooted in “a 
Herderian belief in the group as the conditio sine qua non of all human artistic 
and cultural achievement”.194 As Lemkin puts it, groups are based upon “genuine 
traditions” and “genuine culture” and Benhabib argues that both Lemkin’s 
writings and the text of the Genocide Convention itself assume the ‘ascriptive 
group’, i.e. the group into which one is born, as constituting the key point of 
reference in relation to genocide, and goes on to contrast “such group concepts” 
with her interpretation of Arendt’s work: 
“Arendt … only harbors skepticism towards such group concepts. Yet, 
like Lemkin, she believes in the ontological value and irreducibility of 
human plurality. It is because we inhabit the world with others who 
are like us and yet always different from us that the world is 
perspectival and can only manifest itself to us from a particular 
vantage point. Nevertheless, plurality need not be constituted through 
the ‘ascribed’ groups of ethnicity, nationhood, race or religion alone. 
Quite to the contrary. It is only when ascription is transcended 
through association and human beings come together for a joint 
purpose in the public sphere that plurality, which is the human 
condition, is most strikingly revealed. I shall argue that Arendt’s 
philosophical grounding of the concept of plurality provides the 
concept of genocide with one of its strongest moral and existential 
underpinnings.”195   
I think it is important to note that Benhabib does not exclude ‘ascribed’ groups 
from constituting plurality in the world, and nor I think does she suggest that 
Arendt does so. And while Arendt may sometimes harbour scepticism towards 
‘such group concepts’—the concerns of philosophers more than lawyers or 
(some) political theorists—it seems to me that she harbours no scepticism 
towards groups as such. Benhabib’s own notion of ‘transcending ascription’ 
recalls the claim she made for Arendt’s view on p.191 above, and again, it seems 
to me that it is un-Arendtian, as is the claim that Arendt provides a 
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‘philosophical grounding’ for her conception of plurality. Benhabib is certainly 
right that Arendt attaches great importance to action, described here as human 
beings coming together for a joint purpose in the public sphere, but for Arendt 
this does not require ‘transcending ascription’. On the contrary, we have already 
seen Arendt’s deep commitment to culture and the preservation of the past, and 
I take her to be referring to such ‘ascriptive’ characteristics of groups when she 
talks about the reality of things only “within the historical-political and the 
sensate world”.196 Arendt it seems to me does not “escape the ascriptivism and 
the culturalism of Lemkin’s concept of the group”; neither she nor Lemkin are 
ontologists and both ‘ascription’ and culture (as distinguished from any isms 
based upon them) “[belong] to the indisputable facts of [our lives]”.197 Again, it 
seems to me one of the distinctive features of Arendt’s political thought that she 
holds on to human plurality, the distinctiveness and equality of each single 
human being as such, as well as our ‘ascriptive’ characteristics such as cultures 
and the groups into which we are born, at the same time. This can be seen, for 
example, when she speaks of territory in Eichmann in Jerusalem as relating: 
“ … to the space between individuals in a group whose members are 
bound to, and at the same time separated and protected from, each 
other by all kinds of relationships, based on a common language, 
religion, a common history, customs and laws.”198 
Similarly, she provides an account of our diversity and plurality in The Life of 
the Mind which is concerned not with ontology but with history and experience: 
“Human plurality … is divided into a great many units, and it is only as 
a member of such a unit, that is, of a community, that men are ready 
for action. The manifoldness of these communities is evinced in a 
great many different forms and shapes, each obeying different laws, 
having different habits and customs, and cherishing different 
memories of its past, i.e. a manifoldness of traditions … [comprising] 
the rich diversity of human beings living together on the earth.”199 
Given Arendt’s acceptance of the facts of both groups and human plurality, as 
well as her approval of arguments in history concerning the natural sociability of 
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human beings, is it possible to find any notion of a ‘plurality of groups’ or 
international political society in her writings? John Williams identifies a problem 
here, noting that Arendt’s conception of plurality as a ‘space in-between’ is 
explicated “almost entirely in the context of a territorially bordered political 
space”.200 Let us consider the ‘almost’ of which Williams speaks here. In On 
Revolution, Arendt says that the original meaning of the Roman term lex was 
‘intimate connection’ or relationship, “namely something which connects two 
things or two partners whom external circumstances have brought together”: 
“The people of Rome itself, the populus Romanus, owed its existence 
to … a war-born partnership … the Roman Republic, resting itself upon 
the perpetual alliance between patricians and plebeians, used the 
instrument of leges chiefly for treaties…”201 
Elsewhere, she describes lex as meaning ‘lasting tie’ which “very quickly came 
to mean ‘contract’, whether between private citizens or as a treaty between 
nations”; something that comes about not through command or force or the 
edicts of philosophers but through mutual agreement (what she calls in The 
Human Condition ‘the Power of Promise’).202 Very significant here is the fact 
that the contract does not erase distinctions between those contracting, but 
creates “an in-between space between formerly hostile partners”.203 The 
proliferation of such treaties between nations Arendt refers to as having “woven 
a web around the earth” which has brought about something I think might 
justifiably be called an ‘international space in-between’, but is more often, and 
more justifiably and straightforwardly, called international society.204 We find 
her in The Origins of Totalitarianism referring to it as ‘the civilised world’ and 
linking it to something the character Scipio says in Cicero’s De Re Publica: 
“If it is true that the link between totalitarian countries and the 
civilized world was broken through the monstrous crimes of 
totalitarian regimes, it is also true that this criminality was not due to 
simple aggressiveness, ruthlessness, warfare and treachery, but to a 
conscious break of that consensus iuris which, according to Cicero, 
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constitutes a ‘people’, and which, as international law, in modern 
times has constituted the civilized world insofar as it remains the 
foundation-stone of international relations even under the conditions 
of war. Both moral judgment and legal punishment presuppose this 
basic consent; the criminal can be judged justly only because he takes 
part in the consensus iuris”.205 
We shall find that there are some issues with Arendt’s use of consensus iuris in 
this context in the final chapter; here, it suffices for us to observe that she can 
see an ‘international society’, a ‘civilised world’ that totalitarian regimes 
consciously broke in upon, even as she does not name it in terms of society. She 
refers also to “the spirit of unorganised solidarity” and “the silent 
acknowledgement of common interests” of “the comity of nations” or 
“international community”, but it is important to note that she speaks of 
“international crimes” in this context as well; she sees clearly that such 
solidarity, comity or community has—such common interests have—legal 
expression.206 Although I noted above that Arendt’s writings may sometimes 
suggest that she is a ‘realist’ in the international sphere (p.193), we can see now 
in more detail what her ‘realism’ involves: an understanding of the world as it 
actually is, i.e. a world in which international law exists, a world in which we 
may sensibly speak the moral language of just and unjust wars, and a world 
where it is possible to identify international crimes and now indeed crimes 
against humanity. 
But what of Arendt’s notion of plurality in the international sphere? Is it possible 
to see it among nations or peoples in her writings? Williams speaks in his chapter 
of “the idea” of a space in-between as being important to “the Arendtian vision 
of an ideal politics”, but as I hope to have shown in this chapter so far, Arendt 
herself had no such idealistic visions; her political thought is firmly rooted in 
history and experience, which Williams construes as producing “a narrow 
definition of what politics is and can be.”207 He reads Arendt from within a 
tradition of political liberalism, which leads him to claim that “the space in-
between does not possess an institutional form, indeed to try and institutionalise 
it in any but the loosest of ways is to demolish it”, but as we have already seen 
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(p.51), Arendt argued that modern liberal writers tend to ignore forms of 
government and lasting institutions, which she regards as indispensable in terms 
of maintaining the space in-between, and such writers often confuse such 
authority with the real demolisher: tyranny or totalitarian domination.208 
Although Williams is certainly correct that Arendt’s view of international politics 
is often bleak, I hope to have shown above that it is not entirely so, and that she 
did indeed recognise that authoritative institutions such as those identified by 
the pluralist English School have went into creating a plurality of groups in the 
international sphere: a civilized world, an international society, concerned with 
maintaining international peace and security.  
2.5 Conclusions 
2.5.1 Enduring Traditions 
In the previous chapter, I asked whether it was necessary to have a philosophy of 
history to engage in critique and presented Devetak’s argument that it is not. 
Through his contextualist investigations, Devetak recovered a way of being 
critical that was predicated instead on an engagement with the studia 
humanitatis, or what has become and is called today the humanities. In the first 
section of this chapter, I have sought to show that Arendt, albeit in her own 
unique way, is one who engages in a historical mode of critique and that she has 
important contributions to make in support of Devetak’s arguments concerning 
dialectical philosophies produced during and after the enlightenment. Arendt 
argues that it was Hegel who for the first time produced a philosophy of history; 
a philosophy which was in sharp opposition to all previous metaphysics which 
had “looked for truth and the revelation of eternal Being everywhere except in 
the realm of human affairs” and, with its claim to ‘reveal’ Absolute Truth 
working itself out in a dialectical process in the realm of human affairs 
regardless of the judgments of actual human beings, had largely displaced 
political thinking and was designed to repudiate the authority of all traditions. 
As with Devetak and the humanist writers he recovers in his work, Arendt turns 
to the words and deeds of concrete actors, to persons, rather than historical 
processes or metaphysics to engage in critique and with the world, and as such, I 
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think holds a better conception of politics and presents a good, if not the only, 
model for IP theorists in terms of how to engage in critique and how to do 
political theory. 
Arendt lived through some very dark times indeed and this is clearly reflected in 
her writings. Grave and ostensibly categorical pronouncements along the lines of 
‘the undeniable loss of tradition in the modern world’ and the ‘…definite end’ of 
‘the tradition’’ may be understandable if one tries—with great difficulty and 
very little success—to imagine what she and her contemporaries experienced. 
But I have sought to show in this chapter that, despite the unspeakable horrors 
of the last century, tradition as such has not been lost in the modern world, and 
in fact we can see this through a closer reading of Arendt’s own writings. I took 
from these writings and varied slightly Arendt’s excellent description of tradition 
as such: tradition preserves the past by handing down from one generation to 
the next the testimonies of the ancestors. We saw that testimonies such as 
Virgil’s had not been lost or forgotten in the modern world when they went into 
the American founding, as well as the authority associated with them, and I 
argued that we need the help of such authoritative testimonies in exercising 
judgments in the world. Reinforced by her own experiences, Arendt said in the 
1950s that such “authority has vanished from the modern world”, and still in the 
late 1960s, in her essay on Benjamin, it seemed that she thought the only hope 
of preserving the authoritative testimonies of the past lay with the exceedingly 
few poets among us.209 But I hope to have shown, through my interpretation of 
what she says at the end of the first volume of The Life of the Mind, that by the 
end of her life Arendt had come to harbour some hope that others may be 
willing and able to preserve the past—for the sake of the present and future—as 
well. I intend my own project, such as it is, to be a contribution to this much 
larger one. 
In the previous chapter, I hope already to have shown to the reader that ‘the 
great tradition of political and/or philosophic thought’, or whatever else we may 
wish to call it, has not come to an end in the modern age, given the sheer extent 
to which scholars are still engaging with it in their own work, as well as teaching 
it to their students, but in the second sub-section of the present chapter, I 
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questioned Arendt’s own claims about the ‘…definite end’ of ‘the tradition’, 
first by considering what she had to say (explicitly or otherwise) about Cicero in 
different versions of her story over time. When she began writing on this matter 
(as evidenced in her posthumously published writings), Cicero was clearly on 
Arendt’s mind, but as an ‘exception’ to the tradition. This ‘exception’ appears 
to have been made approvingly on Arendt’s part since she agreed with him about 
our natural sociability and his championing of the practical life of the citizen 
over the theoretical life of the philosopher. But in the ‘official’ versions of her 
story about the end of the tradition that I considered, Tradition and the Modern 
Age and What is Authority?—with (or perhaps because of) some difficulties she 
found in Cicero’s ‘Roman’ handling of Greek philosophy—his name does not 
appear at all.210 Whatever Arendt’s own reasons for removing Cicero’s name from 
her stories about the end of the tradition, Hegel appears in them for her to be 
playing a key role in terms of ending it, being the first who designed to 
‘repudiate the authority of all traditions’ with his philosophy of history, but 
quite apart from his influence upon later thinkers and actors, I hope to have 
shown in this sub-section that ‘the tradition’—perhaps usefully understood as 
two traditions, the philosophical and the political traditions of political 
thought—in fact endures, and indeed Arendt’s writings themselves stand 
comfortably in it. Subsequent chapters will show some of Cicero’s place in ‘the 
tradition’.  
2.5.2 Persons and Virtues of the Past, Present and Future 
In the second section of this chapter, I set out through Arendt’s writings an 
understanding of the Latin term persona which may shed some light for the 
reader on Devetak’s use of it as it appeared in the previous chapter. Coming 
originally from the theatre, persona signifies the various ‘roles’ or ‘masks’ that 
we unavoidably take on as ethical, social, and political beings, and as Arendt 
says, there is a “profound meaningfulness” to the term, which remains of 
fundamental importance today in our discussions of a great variety of different 
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legal, political, and philosophical matters. Arendt turned to the term in her 
acceptance speech for the Sonning prize in trying to explain to her audience 
about those “innate psychic qualities” that, while not necessarily forming her 
final judgments, went into her own lack of ambition to be a public figure, and 
she spoke of the award as a piece of “good luck” for which she was fully 
prepared to don her professional persona in gratefully accepting. In the next 
chapter, we shall consider Cicero’s own use of the term persona in his writings, 
from which it seems to me at least some of what Arendt had said in her 
acceptance speech was inspired. 
Behind the various personae that the great play of the world offers are human 
beings, “men [and women] of flesh and blood, like you and me” who need a 
public, worldly space in which we can be seen and heard; a space, moreover, in 
which we can be held personally responsible for our actions to the wider society 
and body politic of which we are a part and to which we owe that worldly space 
where we can be seen and heard in the first place. These claims of Arendt’s 
seem right to me, as do her claims that courts of law both are of fundamental 
importance in terms of ensuring we meet these personal responsibilities and 
presuppose that we are “capable of telling right from wrong even when all [we] 
have to guide [us] is [our] own judgment”. But I hope to have shown throughout 
this chapter that exercising our own judgments in the world is not without help. 
Arendt not only pointed her students towards exemplary figures who acted 
morally even under the terrifying conditions of totalitarian domination, but also 
to great authors of the past such as Plato and Cicero, in whose writings we find 
much said about the virtues: qualities which Arendt speaks of in the present 
tense as being the result of some training or teaching. And it was Cicero 
especially to whom Arendt drew our attention in teaching us about the Roman 
sense of humanitas; a sense which involves refusing to be coerced by any 
absolutes emerging from any specialist fields of study. While it would be way 
beyond the scope of any PhD thesis to give an adequate account of Cicero’s 
development of the term humanitas, we shall nevertheless consider it in some 
more detail in the next chapter, through some of his writings about the studia 
humanitatis, and we shall also consider what he has to say in the De Officiis 
about the four primary virtues. 
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I also sought in the second section of this chapter to provide more content to 
these virtues through a consideration of Arendt’s writings on statespersons. We 
saw that she associated courage with greatness, that she called moderation and 
insight ‘the two highest virtues of the statesman’, and she also called insight 
‘the one outstanding virtue of the statesman’, distinguishing it sharply from the 
kind of wisdom normally associated with philosophers. Insight, on Arendt’s 
telling, marks out the ability of a person to understand the greatest possible 
number and variety of citizens’ opinions and to be able to communicate 
between them so that the commonness of this world becomes apparent; a 
person who is significantly concerned with ‘what is good for men’ as 
distinguished from ‘the good’ and through whose words and deeds show that 
they qualify for leadership. We shall be considering all these virtues and more in 
some detail as they are set out in Cicero’s writings in subsequent chapters, but 
here it is sufficient to note that Arendt recognises the necessity of the 
leadership of such persons until such times as all citizens—perhaps through what 
Dallmayr called “a large-scale pedagogical effort”—show the same abilities in 
understanding. In the meantime, it is important to secure conditions in which 
people are able to develop such abilities in understanding their fellow-citizens, 
and doing so involves what Arendt would have called ‘that aspect of politics that 
deals with the institutions and not the citizen.’ 
2.5.3 This Tradition of Politics 
We saw in the first section of this chapter that Arendt spoke of ‘this tradition’ of 
the Romans which is a tradition of politics, and that she described this tradition 
in terms of ‘the deeds of the ancestors’ held as (good or bad) examples, 
authoritative models and ‘the moral political standard as such’. In the previous 
chapter, I called this the civic republican tradition, and in the final section of 
this chapter, I sought to show some of the extent to which Arendt’s writings are 
informed by it. The first sub-section questioned how far we can say correctly 
that Arendt offers us a ‘new’ republicanism by highlighting her approval of the 
traditional distinction between three basic forms of government, the evidence in 
her writings that she supported a non-basic, mixed form of government as the 
best practicable in terms of maintaining the res publica, and various similarities 
between her conceptions of power, authority and freedom as compared with the 
Romans. We saw that public freedom for Arendt requires authority in one form 
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or another and I sought to show the necessary relation of authority and freedom 
that is a hallmark of the civic republican tradition in her understanding of the 
various councils that were formed during the revolutions of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, as well as in the American founding itself. Arendt’s civic 
republican perspective, while having much to contribute to IPT in relation to 
exercising judgments in the world, it seems to me is significantly informed by 
Cicero’s, whose writings I think provide a yet more copious account than 
Arendt’s which (although by no means exhausting it) I will set out for the reader 
in the final chapter of this project. 
Following an account of her civic republicanism, I sought to highlight for the 
reader several problems with Arendt’s understanding of ‘society’ and her 
theoretical distinction between ‘the social’ and ‘the political’, beginning with 
her problematic account of the Latin term societas in The Human Condition and 
its incongruity with some of her posthumously published work written around the 
same time or shortly before. In addition, I highlighted her support of Kant’s 
arguments about our natural sociability in her Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy, the different versions of which she delivered in 1964 and 1970, i.e. 
two or six years before she admitted at an academic conference that she was 
doubtful of her own distinction between ‘the social’ and ‘the political’.211 One of 
Arendt’s concerns with ‘society’ as she understood it was that it was ‘de-
pluralising’ in the manner of the ancient Athenian patriarch in the private 
sphere, who ruled the household as though it had “one opinion and one interest” 
and removed possibilities both for acting and for deciding things through words 
and persuasion rather than force or violence (whether on the back of intimacy 
and compassion or not), but as we shall see in subsequent chapters—and as 
Arendt herself understood as well—this is very far indeed from the Roman 
understanding of societas, which by definition is plural, denoting a partnership. 
In the final sub-section of this chapter, I considered Arendt’s argument that the 
catastrophes through which she lived have made us aware of a right to have 
rights and I sought to show the reader that her argument was not a philosophical 
one; it was an urgently political one. Human rights for Arendt are guaranteed by 
citizenship rather than ‘Man’, nature, the cosmos, or ontology, even as we may 
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see today, with Waldron, “a dense thicket of human rights law”, with Dallmayr 
“embryonic forms of a global community”, and support Walzer’s foreign policy 
proposal to nurture this thicket and these embryonic forms. Arendt may not 
have had much to say about how they are or should be nurtured, but she 
certainly had a concern for the human rights of actual human beings who turned 
out to be rightless when no authority was left to guarantee those rights. The 
most immediate concern, a political concern, is for human beings ‘to have 
rights’, and history shows us that they are guaranteed through citizenship. I 
believe Arendt would have shared Waldron’s wariness about philosophers’ 
“thunderous imposition of positive law from on high”, and supported Walzer’s 
first foreign policy proposal to complete the state system so that every human 
being’s security and ‘right to have rights’ is met. What Walzer has said about “a 
conception of rights that transcends all immediate considerations” I think may 
well apply to any given conception of human rights: “it arises out of our common 
history; it holds the key to our common future”, but it is the mark of a political 
theorist, I think, to be concerned with the present too (as Walzer puts it, 
‘justice-right-now’), and of course Arendt herself showed great concern for what 
is ‘between past and future’.212 And for Arendt, it is of fundamental importance 
that ‘ascriptive’ characteristics such as histories, cultures and the groups into 
which we are born are come to be understood by all to be very often cherished 
aspects of our lives which, cherished or otherwise, unavoidably feed into and 
shape our politics. And we saw that she understood part of that shaping to 
involve the emergence of international political society, a ‘plurality of groups’ 
formed through mutual agreements, “an in-between space between formerly 
hostile partners” which has been given legal expression such that we are able to 
identify international crimes. This speaks to Walzer’s second and third foreign 
policy proposals that we engage in a “slow process of political alliance among 
states to create wider and wider zones of peace” and “the improvement of 
existing international institutions”. Arendt’s own understanding of international 
political society, as we have seen and as we shall see again in subsequent 
chapters, is informed by Cicero’s. 
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2.5.4 Concluding Remarks 
Again, it will probably help the reader’s understanding and certainly help the 
progression of my argument on to those chapters if I provide a summary of my 
conclusions to the present one, and I will do so firstly by providing a brief 
answer to the chapter’s research questions, and secondly according to the 
qualities listed in its introduction. 
What can some of Hannah Arendt’s theoretical writings on politics contribute to 
the arguments addressed in the previous chapter? They can provide a deep and 
rich understanding of what the term ‘tradition’ means; through her deep 
engagement with history, they can provide a critique of philosophies of history; 
they can provide a unique perspective on ‘the virtues of the past’; and they can 
provide a rich account of the civic republican tradition. 
How are Hannah Arendt’s theoretical writings on politics related to Cicero’s? 
Arendt at certain points appears displeased with how Cicero handled Greek 
philosophy in his own writings, but due to her self-confessed lack of 
communication, it seems to me to be impossible to arrive at a secure judgment 
as to what, if anything, in Cicero’s theoretical writings on politics she disagrees 
with, disjoins from, or does not believe in. That said, like Cicero’s, Arendt’s 
writings stand comfortably in ‘the tradition’, and furthermore, both stand 
comfortably in a tradition within ‘the tradition’: the civic republican tradition, 
or the political tradition of political thought. Like Cicero, Arendt recognises the 
indispensability of authority as that quality which mediates between power and 
freedom in terms of maintaining the res publica, maintaining the plurality of 
persons in dynamic association. And like Cicero, Arendt recognises the 
importance of virtue in public life, the fact that deciding things through speech 
and persuasion rather than force and violence is a fundamentally meaningful 
aspect of what we call politics, and that human beings are naturally sociable.  
Let us now go through the qualities listed on the left-hand side of the table as 
set out in the introduction to this chapter. With a slight variation of Arendt’s 
excellent description—tradition preserves the past by handing down from one 
generation to the next the testimonies of the ancestors—I argue that tradition 
as such has not been lost in the modern world, as evidenced, for example, in the 
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broad tradition of philosophy and the various philosophical traditions within it 
such as those considered in the previous chapter, or in the tradition of politics 
Arendt saw resumed in the American founding. Additionally, I argue that ‘the 
great tradition of political and/or philosophic thought’, even if it cannot be 
defined, nevertheless endures, again as evidenced in the literature reviewed in 
the previous chapter, and as evidenced in Arendt’s own writings as well. As 
Arendt recognised, tradition is closely associated with authority; the testimonies 
handed down from one generation to the next guide and teach us, they help us 
in exercising judgments in the world, and my intention across the next two 
chapters is to provide some of Cicero’s. 
Arendt recognised the virtues as being the result of some training or teaching, as 
requiring guidance in their development, and although she did not have much to 
say about them herself and so might not have much to contribute to the 
discussions about virtue ethics reviewed in the previous chapter (‘writing a 
Moralia was not her mode’), I argue that she nevertheless did acknowledge and 
appreciate their existence in human beings still in the twentieth century, as 
evidenced in her appraisals of Churchill and Kennedy, that she has a unique 
perspective on ‘the virtues of the past’, and that we do well in consulting ‘the 
great authors of the past’ who wrote about them, just like Arendt did. We shall 
consider in subsequent chapters what Cicero says about the virtues in his 
theoretical writings on politics.   
While I began addressing the civic republican tradition in the last chapter, it is in 
the present chapter that I sought to give it more shape through Arendt’s 
writings, and in terms of republican institutions, more shape to the notion within 
this tradition of a non-basic, mixed form of government. I argue that, although 
we require republican institutions, and a mixed form of government is probably 
the best practicable for maintaining a public space, public freedom, the res 
publica, in existence, the actual form an actual government takes is not for 
political theorists or philosophers to decide; that is up to concrete populations. 
This argument will be developed in subsequent chapters. But I also argue that a 
significant part of what the civic republican tradition provides, as seen in 
Arendt’s writings and as we shall see in subsequent chapters through Cicero’s, 
are frameworks and intimations as regards republican institutions which help us 
in exercising judgments in the world. Walzer puts the point very admirably 
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indeed: “… we have to make judgments. I see no alternative to this ‘have to’, no 
way of deducing a decision from a theory. Theories are frameworks and 
intimations, not decision machines.”213 
We have seen that, for Arendt, who in turn was relying on the authority of 
Aristotle, deciding things through speech and persuasion rather than force or 
violence is a fundamentally meaningful part of what we call politics. Speech that 
aims to persuade engages our practical judgments—or to use Norval’s (and 
Chamber’s) terms as set out in the previous chapter: it promotes the skills 
required of democratic citizens through “face to face encounters of everyday 
talk”. I argue that this is talk that appeals, or at least should appeal, to sensus 
communis, in Gadamer’s words “a sense [in citizens] that founds community or 
communality”. Dallmayr I think said rightly that democracies exhibit authority 
and that such authority must be based on the consent of citizens, and I argue for 
an understanding of authority which is more in line with the Roman sense of 
auctoritas: a personal quality, albeit intangible and inalienable, which marks the 
ability of persons to uphold themselves in political deliberations, inspiring 
confidence in their fellow citizens, manifest in words and deeds, and the use of 
which takes the form of advice or guidance and never command, and never 
involves what Dallmayr called citizens’ “domination or bullying”, which are uses 
of force, not authority. Auctoritas is translated well and variously as ‘standing’, 
‘influence’ and ‘reputation’. All of this speaks directly to the three final 
qualities I listed in the introduction to this chapter: exercising judgments 
(including about persons) in the world, discretion in exercising judgments in the 
world, and trust in the authority of persons in political societies. We saw in 
Arendt’s understanding of the council system that it was those who inspired by 
their virtues in action enough confidence in their fellows to be elected to the 
next higher councils; those who had received a special trust, with all involved 
freely exercising their own judgments, and these activities are by no means 
restricted to the persons involved in the formations of the councils during the 
revolutions of the last two centuries. They are a fundamental aspect of the civic 
republican tradition, Cicero’s writings on which I set out in more detail in the 
final chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Cicero on the Conduct of Persons 
3.1 Introduction 
We saw in the first chapter that IPT is currently dominated by two rules-based 
approaches to ethics, usually referred to as deontology and consequentialism, 
and that ‘virtue ethics’ was a practical and person-centred approach more 
focused on moral education and the exercising of moral judgments. I sought to 
show that what was missing from impersonal ethical approaches was a 
consideration of the substantive content of the moral principles in public life, 
and that such a consideration is what would be required in avoiding, for 
example, what Benhabib called ‘jurispathic processes’ in her theory of 
democratic iterations. Scholars such as Dallmayr, Brown, Norval and Devetak 
have all, in different ways, turned to virtue ethics in this regard and one of my 
purposes in the present chapter is to provide an account—by no means 
exhaustive—of Cicero’s ‘virtue ethics’ as they are to be found (mainly) in the De 
Officiis, because I regard it as an excellent framework for those who agree with 
me that politics should be conceived of as (partly) personal. 
In the first section of this chapter, we consider some starting points from which I 
think we may best understand Cicero’s ethical project, within which sit his 
theoretical writings on politics. The first sub-section picks up on the theme of 
‘society’ that has been developed across previous chapters by considering his 
handling in the De Finibus of the philosophical arguments being made in his time 
that human beings are naturally sociable. This leads us into the second sub-
section, in which I provide an account of what Cicero means by officia in 
society, ‘duties’ or ‘appropriate actions’, as he sets them out in the De Officiis. 
In the third sub-section, we turn to one of Cicero’s speeches, the Pro Archia, in 
considering the great esteem in which he held education, and more specifically 
an education in the literary arts (or what became called in the Renaissance the 
studia humanitatis), in terms of both the private and public advantages they 
bestow. 
Having set out these ‘springs of initiative’, we move on in the second section to 
a consideration of each of the four primary virtues, again mainly from the 
account Cicero gives of them in the De Officiis. The first sub-section considers 
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what he has to say about the virtue of justice, which he divides into two parts, 
‘justice simply’ (iustitia) and beneficence (beneficentia), although he moves on 
later in the text to speak of both parts together as a single category of virtue, 
justice, which he regards as the supreme social virtue: that which builds up 
societas. Next, we consider the virtues of wisdom (sapientia) and prudence 
(prudentia) which, although described as within the ‘first’ part of ‘goodness’ or 
‘moral rightness’ (honestas), receives relatively brief treatment in comparison 
with justice in this text, whose subject-matter is the conduct of persons in 
society, officia. The third section looks at what Cicero says in the De Officiis 
concerning greatness of spirit (magnitudo animi), a virtue required of anyone 
holding public office, but on its own runs a high risk of sliding into a desire for 
pre-eminence and glory leading to the commission of deeds which are to the 
detriment of societas, unjust deeds. The final sub-section considers his writings 
on the virtue of decorum. We saw this virtue described in previous chapters as 
temperance or moderation; these are both included within the virtue of 
decorum which, following the unorthodox Stoicism of Panaetius, is a term Cicero 
brings over from the sphere of aesthetics and puts to ethical use. It is from 
within his account of decorum that Cicero provides what is usually called in the 
literature the four-personae theory, and it is in this sub-section that we consider 
its key features.  
Having provided an account of the four primary virtues as they appear (mainly) 
in the De Officiis, I move on in the final section of the chapter to consider how 
Cicero sees them manifest in political societies. The first sub-section considers 
virtuous conduct within the societas that is the res publica. After providing 
account of why Cicero says that it is the res publica which stands at the centre 
of the network of social relations in which we all stand, I move on to a 
consideration of the juridical background of the term societas, which denotes a 
partnership: an agreement between persons to contribute their resources to a 
shared endeavour. It is within this juridical context that partners (persons) are 
expected to be behaving fairly towards one another and subjected to legal 
action when they do not. But since the law on its own cannot guarantee that we 
act fairly towards one another and we must assume legal and moral 
responsibilities for ourselves as persons, I provide an account in this sub-section 
of virtuous conduct in political society based upon the civic virtues as set out in 
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the previous section. The final sub-section moves on to consider virtuous 
conduct in international political society. It begins with a consideration of 
Cicero’s account in the De Officiis of different degrees of societas, before going 
on to consider the sections in the De Officiis especially relevant to international 
political society, those that are concerned with the officia which are owed to 
non-citizens (of Rome) even in battle and which were developed by subsequent 
thinkers and writers in what we have come to call the just war tradition. The 
section concludes with a brief discussion of some of the virtues of the ideal 
statesperson in situations of war, in preparation for a more detailed discussion 
of this type of person in the next chapter. 
The question to which I am responding in this chapter is: what can Cicero’s 
theoretical writings concerning the conduct of persons contribute to arguments 
in IPT related to exercising judgments in the world? In summary, my response to 
this question is that Cicero’s theoretical writings concerning the conduct of 
persons contribute towards a deeper understanding of both Arendt’s arguments 
about the virtues and about our natural sociability, as well as the arguments 
about the same as reviewed in the first chapter, and it also contributes towards 
a deeper understanding of the notion of just war, as addressed through the just 
war scholarship of that chapter; as Atkins says, Cicero’s writings are an 
important basis upon which just war scholarship has always rested. But apart 
from this, and as mentioned above, my purpose in the present chapter is also to 
provide, in broad outline (given the sheer fecundity of his writings), Cicero’s 
framework of civic virtues and some of the starting points from which they 
spring, as an excellent resource for scholars in IPT, whether ‘communitarian’ or 
‘cosmopolitan’, whether ‘civic republican’ or ‘liberal’, who hold a conception of 
politics as (partly) personal. 
3.2 Springs of Initiative 
3.2.1 Cicero on Natural Sociability 
We saw in the first chapter that many of the philosophers and political theorists 
discussed had some conception of society in their arguments and we saw in the 
previous chapter that, despite her idiosyncratic and essentially modern 
conception of ‘the social’, Arendt’s political thought, in the end, has a close 
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affinity with the Latin term societas, which she described as meaning (or at 
least, as having meant to the Romans) ‘a cooperative community that fostered 
relationships between partners’. We also saw that she supported and indeed 
relied upon Kant’s argument in his Critique of Judgment that human beings are 
naturally sociable, and that Kant was relying in turn upon the authority of the 
Stoics and upon Cicero in arriving at his own theories. In this sub-section, we 
consider some of the testimonies of some of the authorities upon which Kant, 
and by extension Arendt, rely as regards our natural sociability, and which allow 
for a different conception of society than that held from certain modern liberal 
perspectives. 
When Arendt admitted in The Human Condition that Aristotle was not 
unconcerned with “the fact that man cannot live outside the company of men”, 
said that he saw this fact as “a limitation imposed upon us by the needs of 
biological life”, and asserted it was “something human life had in common with 
animal life, and for this reason alone it could not be fundamentally human”, she 
avoided at this point in her argument any consideration of his own that “man is 
born for citizenship (to politikon)”, that “friendly relations with one’s 
neighbours … seem to have proceeded from a man’s relations to himself”, and 
that “there is a very great pleasure in helping doing favours to friends and 
strangers and associates”, and it is considerations of his such as these that were 
studied, varied and continued by philosophers in the Peripatetic and Stoic 
traditions, as well as in the philosophy of Antiochus of Ascalon (who we have 
seen had syncretised the philosophies of the Academics, Peripatetics and Stoics). 
In all of these philosophical traditions we find arguments that human beings are 
naturally sociable.1 We saw Arendt leap over these traditions, touching down 
upon Seneca but only to leap once again on to Aquinas, in her efforts to trace 
the loss of ‘the original Greek understanding of politics’ and to distinguish ‘the 
social’ from ‘the political’, and in this section, we address some of the 
arguments concerning our natural sociability that she seems to have overlooked 
in her first leap, but which she came to rely upon later through Kant. 
 
1 HC. pp.22–24; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. 1.7, 1097b11; 9.4, 1166a4; Aristotle, Politics. 2.5, 
1263a40. 
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The Peripatetic account of oikeiotēs, ‘friendship’ or ‘natural adaptedness’, 
given by Aristotle’s student Theophrastus in a continuation and development of 
his teacher’s ethics, seems to have been related in some way to the theories of 
oikeiōsis developed by the Stoics and by Antiochus.2 Classicists tell us that the 
latter term is difficult to translate into English; it has been translated variously 
as ‘affiliation’, ‘self-extension or ‘familiarisation’’, ‘appropriation’ (in 
contradistinction to alienation), and ‘identifying with’, and Gisela Striker offers 
us a helpful transliteration: oikeiōsis may be conveniently labelled as 
“recognition and appreciation of something as belonging to one”, as ‘one’s 
own’.3 Both the Stoics and Antiochus make use of what is often called the 
‘cradle argument’: by observing neonatal behaviour, they argue, we can see that 
by nature the first impulse of human beings is oikeiōsis, a recognition and 
appreciation of one’s own constitution. As Brad Inwood explains: 
“…‘constitution’ seems to refer to the person, the compound of body 
and soul which constitutes the identifiable individual. It is most 
natural to think of it as the Stoic counterpart of what we would call 
the ‘self’. One’s constitution has both general and individual features, 
but is still one’s own self, the self to whose preservation one is 
committed from birth on … While it might be odd to say that the child 
and [that child who has become an] adult have different selves, it is 
relatively straightforward to say that they are differently constituted, 
that is, have different constitutions. It is the notion of the evolving 
constitution which enables the Stoics to develop the claim that one’s 
primal affiliation [oikeiōsis] to oneself can be both stable and 
dynamic; it is always directed to one’s constitution, but that 
constitution itself develops.”4 
There are different phases in the Stoic account of ethical development. The first 
involves this natural impulse to preserve one’s own constitution, leading one to 
select things which are in accordance with nature (e.g. a mother’s milk) and 
 
2 Brad Inwood and Pierluigi Donini, 1999. ‘Stoic Ethics’. Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap 
Mansfeld and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), 1999. The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.677; T.H. Irwin, 2012. ‘Antiochus, Aristotle and the 
Stoics on degrees of happiness’. David Sedley (ed.), 2012. The Philosophy of Antiochus. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.7; Georgia Tsouni, 2019. Antiochus and 
Peripatetic Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
3 Inwood and Donini, Stoic Ethics. p.677; Christopher Gill, 2016. ‘Antiochus’ theory of oikeiōsis’. 
Julia Annas and Gábor Betegh (eds.), 2016. Cicero’s De Finibus: Philosophical Approaches. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.9; Malcolm Schofield, 1995. ‘Two Stoic 
Approaches to Justice’. André Laks and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), 1995. Justice and 
Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. Proceedings of the Sixth 
Symposium Hellenisticum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.196.     
4 Inwood and Donini, Stoic Ethics. pp.679–680. 
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reject things which are not (e.g. pain). But as sharers in reason, these selections 
of what is appropriate and rejections of what is inappropriate become more 
steady as one’s constitution evolves and as one develops one’s reason, and the 
culmination of this development is seen, according to the Stoics, in the perfect 
virtue or wisdom of the Stoic sage, ‘the wise man’, who has come to regard 
what we select or reject from nature not as good or bad things, but as 
‘preferred’ or ‘dispreferred’ ‘indifferents’, since the only good thing according 
to the Stoics is virtue and the only bad thing is vice, and this the wise man has 
come to see for himself.5 But an earlier phase in the Stoic account of ethical 
development more relevant to my argument here involves a natural impulse to 
benefit others of one’s kind, as exemplified in a parent’s love for their child. As 
the Stoic character Cato puts it in Book III of Cicero’s De Finibus: 
“Now the Stoics consider it important to realise that parents’ love 
[amentur] for their children arises naturally. From this starting-point 
we trace the development of all human society … our impulse to love 
… is … the source of the mutual and natural sympathy between 
humans, so that the very fact of being human requires that no human 
be considered a stranger to any other … we are born to join together 
and associate with one another and form natural communities.”6 
While according to the Stoics it is only with the culmination of the development 
of one’s reason that one comes to have a rational concern for human beings as 
such in a cosmopolis, we can see here that they regard the social impulse, as 
can be seen in a parent’s love for their child, as arising naturally—what is often 
called in the literature social oikeiōsis. Contrary to what Arendt says in The 
Human Condition, ‘the social realm’ was not ‘unknown to the ancients’ (p.189). 
As Malcolm Schofield puts it, the Stoics viewed human beings as by nature “the 
most variously and ambitiously sociable of all animals”, even as we are not—or 
do not (or at least do not yet) all become—Stoic sages in a cosmopolis, forming 
 
5 Hence the (in)famous claim of the Stoics that the wise man would be happy on the rack, torture 
being only a ‘dispreferred indifferent’. Although Kant, just like Plato, strongly objected to rhetoric 
in public affairs, he had mastered it nonetheless, and I think one example of this may now be 
seen in the first chapter of my project (p.90), when we saw him label the popular philosophers 
as ‘indifferentists’, ‘feigning indifference’ to the philosophical problems that absorbed him. Kant 
well knew that he was ‘the Stoic’ of his own time, concerned with far loftier things than what they 
had called ‘indifferents’; his borrowing of the Stoics’ jargon to use against the popular 
philosophers seems to me to have been a very deliberate (and quite ingenious) rhetorical 
manoeuvre.   
6 Fin. 3.62–65. Cf. M.R. Wright, 1995. ‘Cicero on Self-Love and Love of Humanity in De Finibus 3’. 
Powell (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher. Ch.6. 
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various other kinds of associations instead (or at least in the meantime).7 
Although Arendt’s challenge to the “passion of compassion” in modern politics 
was directed specifically against Rousseau’s writings, since she saw this passion 
which was inspired by his work as abolishing ‘the distance, the in-between’ in all 
human discourse, we can see here that this does not apply to the Stoics; the 
natural impulse of a parent’s love for their child which they trace out to the 
development of all human society results in a mutual and natural sympathy 
between humans as they join—not melt—together and associate.8 This seems to 
me to be something like the kind of societas between humans of which Arendt 
might have approved. 
Whereas the Stoics held virtue to be the only good and called the things we 
select and reject from nature ‘indifferents’, Antiochus objected to their new-
fangled terminology, argued that they actually agreed in substance with the 
Academics and Peripatetics, and claimed that although virtue was sufficient for 
a happy life (eudaimonia), the happiest or completely happy life also required 
bodily goods such as health and external goods such as friendship or prosperity 
(the latter three of which, again, the Stoics called—with qualifications, to be 
sure—‘preferred indifferents’).9 Antiochus provided what Schofield has called “a 
largely neglected theory of virtue” which is “a subtle contribution to ethics in an 
Aristotelian mode.”10 Like the Peripatetics and Stoics, Antiochus also argued that 
human beings are naturally sociable, and like the Stoics but not the Peripatetics, 
argued that this natural sociability, stemming from our oikeiōsis, spread 
gradually outwards, still including but going beyond our fellow citizens in the 
polis to human beings as such. Our main account of Antiochus’s ethical theory is 
provided by the character Piso in Book V of Cicero’s De Finibus. Schofield 
provides us with a good account of what is distinctive about Cicero’s account of 
 
7 Malcolm Schofield, 1999a. ‘Social and political thought’. Algra et al. The Cambridge History of 
Hellenistic Philosophy. p.761. 
8 OR. p.79. 
9 The threefold division between goods of the mind, goods of the body, and external goods, was 
regularly associated at this time with Aristotle’s writings. Christopher Gill, 2006. The Structured 
Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.168. 
10 Malcolm Schofield, 2012. ‘Antiochus on social virtue’. The Philosophy of Antiochus. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p.176.   
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Antiochus’s theory as set out through the voice of Piso, as well as of how 
Antiochus’s theory differs from that of the Stoics: 
“The whole account of the virtues and the good offered by Piso 
focuses on humans as social animals, to a quite remarkable degree, 
without parallel in other Hellenistic presentations of ethics … [The] 
account of human sociability and of the solidarity of the human race 
itself, as what underpins the virtue of justice, is clearly indebted to 
Stoic theory, and particularly the Stoic notion of social oikeiōsis … The 
most un-Stoic element in Piso’s entire account is the implication that 
justice is fundamentally a matter of what Hume would have called 
sympathy … The Stoics took justice to be purely a matter of reason … 
Antiochus would evidently have disagreed: not that justice does not 
crucially involve rationality, but that at bottom and most significantly 
it is the most notable and important form that human sympathy takes 
… What Piso stresses (an idea not salient in most Stoic texts on the 
virtues) is that all the virtues have a social orientation, fundamentally 
because they are human virtues, and as [Piso argues,] humans are 
innately social and civic creatures.”11 
In the De Finibus (written in 45 BCE), the Stoic account given by the character 
Cato in Book III, as well as its criticism given by the character Cicero from an 
Antiochean perspective in Book IV, are set by the author Cicero as a 
conversation that took place between the two senators in a Roman country 
house in 52 BCE. Book V, on the other hand, where we find both the Antiochean 
account given by Piso and its criticism by the character Cicero, is set by the 
author Cicero at an earlier point in time, on the grounds of the (by then defunct) 
Academy in Athens in 79 BCE.12 As set out in my introduction to this project, 
Cicero employs a sceptical method in his theoretical writings, and his writing of 
the De Finibus is no exception. Through careful attention to literary settings, as 
well as in writing prefaces to separate books within a text as he deems 
appropriate, Cicero manages both to include and to remove his voice in his 
theoretical writings in interesting ways. As regards his own position on the 
different ethical theories as set out in the De Finibus, I think Julia Annas sums 
the matter up wonderfully: 
“…he shows that for him no theory is left standing as the clearly 
preferable one. Attractive as is a synthesis like that of Antiochus, we 
are, in Cicero’s view, back where we always were: trying to think 
 
11 Schofield, Antiochus on social virtue. pp.176–181. Emphasis in original. 
12 Malcolm Schofield, 2013. ‘Writing philosophy’. Catherine Steel (ed.), 2013. The Cambridge 
Companion to Cicero. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.78. 
219 
through for ourselves the arguments on each side and come to our 
own understanding of which is the best way to live … This message, 
rather than any positive doctrine, is what Cicero hopes to leave with 
his readers, and, whatever our historical interest in the theories he 
presents, it is a message that is still, and will always be, timely in 
ethical philosophy.”13 
But I think Christopher Gill is right when he says that “the fact that Cicero 
repeatedly presents [the Stoic and Antiochean] theories as the most ‘persuasive’ 
or the ones to be given greatest weight, and that he refrains from a decisive 
rejection of either of them [as he rejects the Epicurean ethical theory across 
Books I and II], is surely significant”, and it is with the Stoic and Antiochean 
theories in mind that we can perhaps best understand the account of our natural 
sociability that is to be found in the advice Cicero gives to his son in the De 
Officiis: 
“From the beginning nature has assigned to every type of creature the 
tendency to preserve itself, its life and body, and to reject anything 
that seems likely to harm them, seeking and procuring everything 
necessary for life, such as nourishment, shelter and so on. Common 
also to all animals is the impulse to unite for the purpose of 
procreation, and a certain care for those that are born. The great 
difference between man and beast, however, is this: the latter adapts 
itself only in responding to the senses, and only to something that is 
present and at hand, scarcely aware of the past and future. Man, 
however, is a sharer in reason; this enables him to perceive 
consequences, to comprehend the causes of things, their precursors 
and antecedents, so to speak; to compare similarities and to link and 
combine future with present events; and by seeing with ease the 
whole course of life to prepare whatever is necessary for living it … 
The same nature, by the power of reason, brings together one man 
with another for the fellowship both of common speech and of life, 
creating above all a particular love [amorem] for his offspring. It 
drives him to desire that men should meet together and congregate, 
and that he should join them himself; and for the same reason to 
devote himself to providing whatever may contribute to the comfort 
and sustenance not only of himself, but also of his wife, his children, 
and others whom he holds dear and ought to protect. Furthermore, 
such concern also arouses men’s spirits, rendering them greater for 
achieving whatever they attempt.”14* 
 
13 Fin. p.xxvii. 
14 Gill, Antiochus’ theory of oikeiōsis; Off. 1.11–12; Cf. Acad. 2.134, Tusc. 5.32–33, Tusc. 5.75–76, 
Off. 3.33.   
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3.2.2 Cicero on Officia 
Cicero wrote the De Officiis between October and December of 44 BCE, before 
he was killed by Marcus Antonius’s death squad in December 43 after having 
delivered the Philippics, the set of fourteen speeches against Antonius which he 
had begun articulating concurrently with the De Officiis in defence of the res 
publica. Unlike the theoretical works he had written before it, the De Officiis is 
not written in the form of a dialogue, but instead as a letter of advice to his son 
Marcus who was studying in Athens at the time—although, as ever, Cicero draws 
in his writing of this text “from [the philosophers’] fountains when and as it 
seems best, using [his] own judgment and discretion”.15 The text is made up of 
three books, the first setting out what is honourable or ‘morally right’ or ‘good’ 
(honestum), the second what is beneficial or useful or expedient (utile), with 
the third given over to a consideration of cases where what is honestum and 
what is utile appear to be in conflict. Cicero above all follows the Stoics in the 
text in holding that whatever is honestum is utile and whatever is utile is 
honestum, with any conflict between the two being only apparent. This is not to 
say that he identifies honestum and utile but, as A.A. Long puts it in relation to 
a key passage in the text, “he is saying that no individual or society can derive 
genuine benefit from actions that are not grounded in morality; the moral is an 
essential attribute of the useful.”16 The De Officiis is a work of practical ethics 
(not applied ethics, which is an application of ethical theory to practice), giving 
practical advice to his son—and of course with its publication, to a much wider 
audience—on our duties in the world. 
We normally associate the term ‘duty’ with deontology, which itself means the 
metaphysical or scientific statements (logoi) concerning duty (deon), and 
furthermore, we normally associate deontology with Kant. But as Dallmayr 
points out (p.99), Kant also reformulated the very nature and competence of 
human reason in his philosophy. When we use the term duty, it seems Kant’s 
reformulation is often assumed in the background, which I think we should not 
assume when it comes to understanding Cicero’s De Officiis, even as this text is 
 
15 Off. 1.6. 
16 Off. 3.101. A.A. Long, 1995. ‘Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis’. Laks and Schofield (eds.), Justice 
and Generosity. p.217.  
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often rightly translated as ‘On Duties’. In the Oxford World’s Classics edition of 
the text, it is translated by P.G. Walsh as ‘On Obligations’, and a more literal 
translation of officium is ‘appropriate action’, which is a term associated with 
Stoic ethics. As we shall see in some more detail below, officium is a broader 
term than (rigorist) Kantian ‘duty’, and with the hope of avoiding any 
misunderstandings in the reader along (rigorist) Kantian lines, I leave it 
untranslated in my argument, even as my own preferred translation would 
indeed be ‘duty’. 
Near the beginning of the De Officiis, Cicero says that “everything that is 
honourable [honestum] in a life depends upon … cultivation [of officium], and 
everything dishonourable [turpitude] upon its neglect”, before going on to begin 
a definition of officium itself: 
“The whole debate about officium is twofold. One kind of question 
relates to the end of good things; the other depends upon watchwords 
[praecepta] by which daily life in all its bearings may be shaped. The 
following are examples of the former: are all officia ‘perfect’? Is one 
officium more important than another? and other questions of that 
type. The officia for which advice has been offered do indeed relate 
to the end of good things, but here it is less obvious, because they 
appear rather to have in view instruction for a life that is shared. It is 
these that I must expound in these books.”17* 
Here, Cicero makes a division between ‘ethical theory’ (or what Annas on p.216 
called ‘ethical philosophy’) on the one hand, and what I (and of course many 
others) have called ‘practical ethics’ on the other, the former dealing with 
matters which are considerably more remote from lived practice than the latter. 
Although of interest to some, including myself, inquiries in ethical theory of the 
kind that Cicero illustrates in this passage by way of two examples are beyond 
the scope of my project, and in this chapter, we are concerned with the conduct 
of persons, instead of inquiring, say, into the ‘perfection’ or ‘relative 
importance’ of officia. Nonetheless, we have already seen that Cicero himself by 
no means neglects such inquiries, continuing to study and to think through the 
different ethical theories of his day in developing his own understanding about 
the best way to live, and having made this division between ethical theory and 
practical ethics, he has distinguished for the reader what he is setting out in the 
 
17 Off. 1.4–7. 
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rest of the De Officiis: ‘watchwords by which daily life in all its bearings may be 
shaped’. 
Cicero’s division in the above passage concerns two ‘kinds of questions’, the 
latter of which, questions of practical ethics, questions about choosing well in 
the world, depend upon ‘watchwords by which daily life in all its bearings may 
be shaped’, and recalling a question from the former about those that are 
‘perfect’, he goes on to distinguish between two kinds of officia: 
“ … an officium can be called either ‘middle’ or ‘perfect’. ‘Perfect’ 
officium we may, I think, label ‘right’ (recte), as the Greeks call it 
katorthoma; while the officium that is shared they call kathekon. 
They give their definitions in such a way as to define perfect officium 
as what is right (recte); while middle officium, they say, is that for 
which a persuasive reason can be given as to why it has been done.”18* 
We are dealing here again with some technical Stoic terminology. Katorthomata 
are actions undertaken only by the Stoic sage: ‘perfect’, unconditionally ‘right’ 
or ‘correct’ actions which, as Cicero tells us the Stoic philosophers had said 
about them, “fulfil all the numbers”.19 They can also be understood as a ‘sub-
set’ of kathekonta, appropriate actions, which we have seen the Stoics say are 
carried out by all from the cradle onwards (indeed, they are carried out by 
plants and animals as well). Only when one’s reason has culminated, the Stoics 
argue, when one is ‘fully enlightened’ and has attained perfect virtue or 
wisdom, are one’s actions ‘perfectly appropriate’, ‘right’ or ‘correct’, and these 
impeccable actions, moreover, are impeccable, as Griffins and Atkins put it, 
“apart from [their] consequences”.20 The De Officiis is modelled on a work (now 
lost) by Panaetius, who we have seen was less austere in his ethics than earlier 
Stoics, seeking to provide practical advice to ‘non-Sages’ like you and me on 
practising kathekonta, on making moral progress towards virtue, on actions for 
which a persuasive reason can be given in public life, a life that is shared.21 But 
of the three books of Cicero’s De Officiis, Panaetius’s version consisted only of 
the first two. Although having said he would write a book about apparent 
 
18 Off. 1.8. 
19 Off. 3.14. Cf. Fin. 3.58.  
20 Off. p.5n1. Cf. p.65n81. 
21 Cf. Woolf, Cicero. pp.156–158;  
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conflicts between what is kalon and what is sympheron (the Greek equivalents 
of honestum and utile), he seems never to have done so, and that task was 
taken up by his student Posidonius. In writing the De Officiis, Cicero sent for the 
relevant Posidonian material but found it brief and disappointing, and so was 
thrown back on his own resources in writing the third book, some of which we 
shall consider in the final section of this chapter.22  
But what of Cicero’s choice of officium as a Latin translation of the Greek 
kathekon? Some of his correspondence with his friend Atticus shows that Atticus 
had some reservations about his choice but was unable to suggest a better 
alternative, and as Andrew Dyck says: 
“In selecting officium to render kathekon Cicero surely chose the 
nearest Latin equivalent to the Greek term … The problem … was 
inherent in any translation project of this kind, in which one had to 
find a Latin equivalent for a special term already developed in Greek. 
In our case Cicero’s innovation was … successful … the Latin officium 
being proved by later usage to have been analogously extensible to 
the Greek kathekon.”23 
Cicero’s skill and historical success in ‘analogous extensibility’ I think testifies to 
the subtlety and refinement with which he handled Greek philosophy and which 
Arendt seems to have implied was lacking in his writings. One important result of 
Cicero’s translation of the Greek kathekon into the Latin officium is his 
extension of its use to include opponents with whom the civitas is at war; officia 
can be owed to non-citizens of Rome even in battle.24 In his commentary on the 
text, Dyck argues that “the problem [in Cicero’s choice of officium as a 
translation of kathekon] is not … a divergence in sense of officium from 
kathekon per se, but rather the special Stoic sense of kathekon, directed toward 
fulfilling the rational nature of the human being”, which might be a 
philosophical as much as a translational problem, but, I think as shown in its 
extension to include officia owed to non-citizens of Rome even in battle, it is 
not a social problem, which arguably was Cicero’s over-riding concern in the 
text, being in the latter case directed towards maintaining societas between 
 
22 Off. p.xx–xxi; Off. 3.8 and 3.34. 
23 Att. 16.11.4, Att. 16.14.3; Andrew R. Dyck, 1996. A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. p.7. 
24 Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. p.6. 
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civitates.25 We shall be considering such officia in the final sub-section of this 
chapter, but for now, we move on to consider some of what Cicero has to say 
about the private and public benefits of study in the liberal arts.  
3.2.3 Cicero and Studia Humanitatis 
I mentioned in the previous chapter that no PhD thesis could give an adequate 
account of Cicero’s development of the term humanitas and I did so to prepare 
the reader for the inadequacy of what I write in this sub-section, but it is 
emphatically not my intention to say that what Cicero does provide in his corpus 
is in any way ‘complete’ or ‘perfect’ or ‘the final word’ on humanitas; it is not. 
He provides no definition of the term and nor it seems to me should he have 
done. But he did use it, connected it very closely indeed with education—in the 
words of the 2018 World Congress of Philosophy and Dallmayr: Learning [to be] 
Human—and in doing so, significantly broadened its semantic range in a way 
indicated by the words (albeit rather dated) of S.J. Aubrey Gwynn: 
“The truth is that neither ‘philosopher’ nor ‘orator’ is an adequate 
term for Cicero’s [educational] ideal. Only one word gives full 
expression to that ideal—humanitas, or its corresponding epithet, 
humanus … The word … runs like a thread of gold through all the 
discussions and digressions of the De Oratore, taking on countless 
shades of meaning under the play of Cicero’s thought, but always 
recalling in its varying use the fundamental ideal of human excellence 
… To be a man in all that is most human, and to be human in one’s 
relations with all other men; that is Cicero’s ethical and social ideal, 
and his educational theory is based on the same principle.”26 
In the rest of this sub-section, we digress from Cicero’s theoretical writings on 
politics to consider his views on the studia humanitatis, mainly as he articulated 
them in one of his speeches, the Pro Archia. Aulus Licinius Archias was a poet 
and Greek immigrant to Rome, who in 62 BCE had suffered under some political 
manoeuvrings in being accused of illegally claiming Roman citizenship. The 
accusation may have been instigated by Gnaeius Pompeius Magnus (Pompey) to 
disgrace his rival Lucius Lucullus, Archias’s patron. We know very little about 
Archias and none of his work has come down to us (at least of which we can be 
 
25 Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. p.7. 
26 S.J. Aubrey Gwynn, 1926. Roman Education from Cicero to Quintillian. Oxford: Clarendon. 
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certain), but Cicero’s speech in his defence has gained enormous fame and 
popularity across the ages for containing “perhaps the finest panegyric of 
literature that the ancient world offers us”.27 Cicero summarily refutes the 
charges levelled against Archias (in less than a sixth of the speech) and spends 
the rest of his time extolling the private and public services of the literary arts 
and artists: 
“You will no doubt ask me, Grattius [the prosecutor], why I am so 
delighted with this man [Archias]. The answer is that it is he who 
enables my mind to recover [reficio] from the din of the courts and 
gives my tired ears a rest from the shouting and abuse. How do you 
imagine I could find material for my daily speeches on so many 
different subjects if I did not train [excolo] my mind with literary 
study, and how could my mind cope with so much strain if I did not 
use such study to help it unwind? Yes, I for one am not ashamed to 
admit that I am devoted to the study of literature. Let others be 
ashamed if they have buried their heads in books and have not been 
able to find anything in them which could either be applied to the 
common good or brought out into the open and the light of day.”28 
What the literary arts provide us with is not only “a ready supply of language to 
suit a variety of situations” in public life—and for Cicero this includes his 
activities in defending his clients in that most fundamental of institutions, a 
court of law—but also things that enable the recovery of our minds.29 Reficio, as 
Erika J. Nesholm says, suggests “refashioning or restoring an artifact”, rebuilding 
or making anew, repairing or making once more, the mind after all its exertions 
in public affairs.30 “So, too, excolo suggests polishing a work of art”—and we 
have already seen Arendt presenting to her readers this phrase from the Pro 
Archia, excolo animum, training or polishing or cultivating the mind—with 
Cicero’s use of it in this context “suggesting an ongoing process of continual 
refinement”.31 But it was only in 1333 that the Pro Archia was recovered by 
Petrarch in a monastic library at Liège in France—among the first in a succession 
 
27 N.H Watts, 1923. ‘Pro Archia: Introduction’. Jeffrey Henderson (ed.), 1923. Cicero: Pro Archia, 
Post Reditum in Senatu, Post Reditum ad Quirites, De Domo Sua, De Haruspicum Responsis, 
Pro Plancio. With an English Translation by N.H. Watts. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. p.2. 
28 Arc. 12. 
29 Erika J. Nesholm, 2010. ‘Language and Artistry in Cicero’s ‘Pro Archia’’. The Classical World 
103(4). pp.477–490. 
30 Nesholm, Language and Artistry. p.486. 
31 Nesholm, Language and Artistry. p.486. Animus has a very broad semantic range, translations of 
the term including soul, mind, reason, intellect, spirit, mental powers, and intelligence.  
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of recoveries leading into the sixteenth century which transformed the canon of 
Latin literature—and it is only in 1369 that we find the phrase humanitatis studia 
attested by the Italian humanists in connection with training or polishing or 
cultivating the mind (in the writings of Coluccio Salutati).32 Trying to ‘define’ 
these studies is probably as futile an exercise as trying to define humanitas, but 
in the context of the renaissance of antiquity, as Michael D. Reeve nicely puts it: 
“If it is true that the Italian humanists had no expression closer to 
‘classical scholarship’ than studia humanitatis, then Pro Archia 
provided classical scholarship in the Renaissance with its charter of 
foundation.”33 
Petrarch was drawn to the effusive praise of poets in this speech, with other 
Italian humanists particularly appreciating what Cicero says about the practical 
advantages to be had from, or the public services that are provided by, the 
literary arts more generally: 
“All literature [libri], all spoken wisdom [sapientum voces], all history 
[exemplorum vetustas], abounds with incentives to noble action, 
incentives which would be buried in sheer darkness were the light of 
the written word [litterarum lumen] not beamed upon them. How 
many pictures [imagines] of high endeavour the great authors of 
Greece and Rome have drawn for our use, and bequeathed to us, not 
only for our contemplation, but for our emulation! Indeed, I myself, 
when serving as a magistrate, have always kept these before my eyes, 
and have modelled myself on them, heart and mind, by meditating on 
their excellences.”34*  
Sketching a lamp or candle beside it in his own copy at this point, Petrarch felt 
moved to write lumen litterarum alongside litterarum lumen.35 It is through the 
light of the written word that the testimonies of the ancestors are handed down 
from one generation to the next.36 In Arendt’s words (p.129), “anything that 
 
32 The phrase studia humanitatis can be found in three of Cicero’s speeches (Arc. 3, Mur. 61, Cael. 
24), but it seems these were either not read or overlooked by Italian humanists until 1415. 
Michael D. Reeve, 1996. ‘Classical Scholarship’. Jill Kraye (ed.), 1996. The Cambridge 
Companion to Renaissance Humanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.21; 
Benjamin G. Kohl, 1992. ‘The changing concept of the studia humanitatis in the early 
Renaissance.’ Renaissance Studies 6(2). pp.185–202. 
33 Reeve, Classical Scholarship. p.22. 
34 Arc. 14. 
35 Reeve, Classical Scholarship. p.21. 
36 Such testimonies are of course often handed down also through the light of the spoken word. Cf. 
Gotter, Cultural Differences and Cross-Cultural Contact. pp.179–180.  
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happen[s] [is] transformed into an example” which helps us in exercising 
judgments in the world, and Cicero is extolling the written word and the 
beautiful forms into which written words are put in providing us with this public 
service. Unlike his other legal speeches, the Pro Archia is unorthodox, being an 
exercise much more in epideictic than forensic oratory, a speech that is made up 
of fulsome praise rather than one that merely considers the legal charges 
brought against a person. But just like all his speeches, it is an example of 
outstanding eloquence. In the above passage, for example: 
“‘There is the constant confusion … between great men of the past 
and the literature that has immortalised them, and almost 
incidentally, the authors who produced that literature.’ … The 
implication of this multivalent image is that literature can now take 
the place of the ancestors in providing a distinguished background and 
establishing one’s social and political standing. These redefined 
imagines, the quintessential symbol of elite identity, are no longer 
the exclusive province of the elite, but are more widely accessible. 
Learning and education can provide the requisite background for 
social and political success. Cicero, as novus homo, holds up these 
imagines as support for his role in Rome, adopting literature in place 
of aristocratic ancestry; and these imagines might be available to 
others who take similar advantage of them.”37 
We saw Devetak cite humanist historians of the Renaissance such as Bruni, Valla, 
Machiavelli and Giucciardini who were engaged in ‘ransacking the archives of 
antiquity’ for imagines, for exemplary figures in securing good outcomes in 
public affairs; we saw Dallmayr draw on a wide array of imagines from both 
philosophy and history in doing the same; and we saw Arendt turn to the actions 
of the American founders, to those of some good people living under the terror 
of totalitarianism, as well as to some great authors of the past such as Plato and 
Cicero, in doing the same yet again. And again, what Cicero is saying is that it is 
through the light of the written word that these imagines are made accessible to 
us; without having been fixed in time through the literary arts, the actions of 
those who have lived before us would have disappeared into oblivion. He pre-
empts at this point in the speech an objection from the prosecutor that the men 
 
37 Nesholm, Language and Artistry. pp.483–484. On Cicero as novus homo, a ‘new man’ in politics 
as distinguished from the nobiles, see for example: John Dugan, 2001. Making a New Man: 
Ciceronian Self-Fashioning in the Rhetorical Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press; T.P. 
Wiseman, 1971. New Men in the Roman Senate: 139 BC–AD 14. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
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whose praises have been sung by the great authors of the past were not 
themselves schooled in the literary arts: 
“I do admit that there have been many men of outstanding 
temperament and ability who were not well-read, but who achieved a 
natural self-possession and dignity of character because of their 
innate, almost godlike endowments. Moreover, I would even go so far 
as to say that character without learning has made for excellence and 
ability more often than learning without character. And yet I also 
firmly maintain this, that when natural disposition which is noble and 
elevated is given in addition a basis and a shaping through education, 
then something remarkable and unique comes about.”38* 
Cicero can see excellence in the actions of many who have not been educated in 
the literary arts (which include philosophy) and we saw in chapter one that 
Brown provided us with the example of Forrest Gump in this respect: a human 
being of innately magnificent character whose actions shine out for themselves 
without the help of learning and education. It seems to me that Brown 
deliberately did not say in his argument that Forrest is not a virtuous person 
(Forrest is a ‘good-natured simpleton’); he said that Forrest’s inability to 
articulate clearly why he does what he does only disqualifies him, for the 
Aristotelian, in being able to claim to be one. In this respect, Cicero and 
Aristotle appear to converge in some way, in seeing that such an ability would 
require education in what Cicero called studia humanitatis, those arts which 
provide “a ready supply of language to suit a variety of situations” in public life. 
But Brown did say that the ‘instinct’ of a virtuous person is “something that only 
the trained mind can achieve”, and if his interpretation of Aristotle on this is 
correct, it suggests that Ciceronian ethics might be different to Aristotelian 
ethics on some key point, and I suggest it may involve Cicero’s statesman-
informed or ‘Roman’ focus upon the common good more than a philosopher-
informed or ‘Greek’ focus upon the condition of the psychē of any person 
upholding it in outstanding ways, like Forrest (which of course is not to say that 
Cicero does not also have this philosopher-informed or ‘Greek’ focus). And we 
saw in the previous chapter that Arendt, more like Cicero and less like (Brown’s) 
Aristotle, pointing to the noble character of those who were “entirely 
uneducated” and who had resisted falling into line with the Nazis’ ‘new values’. 
But even as Cicero sees excellence in the actions of many who have not received 
 
38 Arc. 15. Cf. Tusc. 2.13; Rep. 3.5. 
229 
education in the literary arts, he insists that such characters, when provided 
with such education, bring about something truly remarkable and unique. And 
again, it is not only public advantages which studia humanitatis bestow; after 
listing numerous imagines which have been handed down as examples of truly 
remarkable and unique individuals whose learning contributed to their own 
excellent actions, he says: 
“But suppose one could not point to this great benefit, suppose that 
the study of literature conferred only enjoyment [delectatio]: even 
then, I believe, you would agree that this form of mental release 
[animi remissionem] broadens and enlightens the mind like no other 
[humanissimam ac liberalissimam iudicaretis]. For other forms of 
mental release are in no way suited to every time, age, and place. But 
the study of literature sharpens youth and delights old age; it 
enhances prosperity and provides refuge and comfort in adversity; it 
gives enjoyment at home without being a hindrance in the wider 
world; at night, and when travelling, and on country visits, it is an 
unfailing companion.”39* 
We saw Arendt in the previous chapter draw a sharp distinction between culture 
and entertainment, which we can see is not so sharp for Cicero here. The study 
of literature he says confers delectatio: delight, pleasure, enjoyment, 
amusement. While he is certainly not a stranger to the things that entertain “the 
masses of our fellow men”, he sees the more time-bound and place-bound 
qualities of these things when compared with the study of literature, the study 
of written words including those handed down from one generation to the next, 
which “broadens and enlightens the mind like no other” form of mental release, 
and which is a study suited to all times, places, and ages.40  
Recovering the mind; training or polishing or cultivating the mind; delighting the 
mind; a form of mental release—and Cicero elsewhere describes the study of 
philosophy in particular as medicina animi, the healing art of the mind.41 As 
Catherine Steel says, he is extolling qualities in the Pro Archia which make 
“literary activity important to all citizens … and, ultimately, [to] the whole of 
 
39 Arc. 16. 
40 Cicero mentions in the Pro Archia “playing dice and ball”, which of course pales in comparison 
with, say, the Playstation 5. It is interesting to note that what Berry translates here as a 
‘broadening’ of the mind, Arendt construes mainly as a ‘deepening’. Cf. EU. p.436, MDT. p.87. It 
seems to me that the study of literature does both.    
41 Tusc. 3.1. 
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humanity”.42 And these are not qualities that can flourish “only in aristocracies”, 
as Arendt had put it in terms of culture more generally; an understanding of 
democracy where we cultivate our minds, our imaginations, our “capacit[ies] to 
see the world through another person’s eyes”, our “capacit[ies] for genuine 
concern for others”, I think is wholly within our reach, if only we attend to the 
importance of humanistic education.43 
Although the increasing precarity of the humanities from the scientific 
revolution onwards is well-documented, and sometimes even lampooned, 
exemplary figures in this ‘good-sense tradition’ continue to extol both the 
private and public advantages these studies confer in the world.44 One such 
figure writing at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was 
American sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois, who in his The Souls of Black Folk recounts 
his experience as a teenager teaching rural African-American children in a log 
hut outside Alexandria, Tennessee. Du Bois relays how some of the childrens’ 
parents were doubtful as to the benefits of book-learning, and how he managed 
to persuade them of the continuing relevance of an education in the humanities 
by translating Cicero’s Pro Archia and connecting its teachings to local and 
everyday matters. If such defenders of this type of education form a ‘cultural 
elite’, it comprises individuals who have chosen themselves into “a tradition of 
tolerance”; a tradition which gives “vibrant testimony to the hypocrisy of white 
supremacists” who claim the antiquity of Greece and Rome as their own; is 
forever open to “other open-minded readers”, and from which only “any bigot is 
definitively excluded”, as bigotry does not comport and has never comported 
with humanitas and liberalitas.45 As Wellman puts it: 
 
42 Catherine Steel, 2013. ‘Cicero, oratory and public life’. Steel (ed.), Cambridge Companion to 
Cicero. pp.164–165. 
43 Martha C. Nussbaum, 2010. Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. p.96. 
44 For example, Dallmayr, Dialogue and Cosmopolis. Ch.4; Nussbaum, Not for Profit. 
45 Mathias Hanses, 2019. ‘Cicero Crosses the Color Line: Pro Archia Poeta and W.E.B. Du Bois’s 
The Souls of Black Folk’. International Journal of the Classical Tradition 26(1). pp.10–26. Cf. 
OT. pp.206–240, where Arendt argues that the roots of ‘race-thinking’ are to be found at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. This is, of course, a highly complex and controversial issue 
upon which others have more authority to speak than myself, and I remain ready to learn, or at 
least hope that I do. Cicero’s writings, like those of so many others, have gathered accretions in 
meaning good and bad across the centuries. To borrow some more of Hanses’ words, what I 
hope to be doing in this project is “creati[ng] … a meaningful connection in the mind of the 
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“…the entire basis of civilization in Cicero's view is man helping his 
fellow man rather than fearing and harming him. Thus humanitas 
grows directly out of communitas and the man of humanitas 
recognizes that nothing is more sacred than the welfare of his fellow 
man.”46 
This accords with Arendt’s understanding that humanitas is never acquired in 
solitude; it can come about only through ‘the venture into the public realm’, a 
venture in which humanitas is acquired becoming ‘a gift to mankind’. Through 
Piso in the De Finibus, Cicero links communitas to liberalitas (liberality or 
affability), bonitas (goodness) and benignitas (kindness): qualities, as Wellman 
says, which are all embodied in the term humanitas, which itself is a term 
“encompassing the social and moral virtues”, the four primary or ‘cardinal’ ones 
of which in Cicero’s writings we shall now consider.47 
3.3 Civic Virtues 
3.3.1 Cicero on Justice: Good Faith and Beneficence 
We begin with the virtue of justice because I agree with E.M. Atkins that for 
Cicero “it is the most important of the four primary virtues … and consequently, 
it helps to define the other virtues, which must be limited by it.”48 He sets out 
two parts of justice in Book I of the De Officiis: 
“…the most wide-reaching [latissime] [virtue] is the reasoning by 
which the fellowship of men with one another [societas hominum 
inter ipsos], and the communal life, are held together. There are two 
parts of this: justice [iustitia], the most illustrious of the virtues, on 
account of which men are called ‘good’ [boni]; and the beneficence 
connected with it, which may be called either kindness [benignitas] or 
liberality [liberalitas].”49  
 
reader”, and “I submit … that we should visualize our own relationship with Cicero as each 
reader holding their own used copy of” any of his texts, mindful that the accretion of meanings in 
these used copies across the centuries do not occur in the texts themselves. Arendt talked of 
re-discovering Aquinas; we might re-discover Cicero. 
46 Robert R. Wellmann, 1965. ‘Cicero: Education for Humanitas’. Harvard Educational Review 
35(3). pp.349–362. 
47 Fin. 5.65; Wellman, Cicero: Education for Humanitas. p.354. 
48 E.M. Atkins, 1990. ‘Domina et Regina Virtutum’: Justice and Societas in ‘De Officiis’. Phronesis 
35(3). pp.258–289.  
49 Off. 1.20. 
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Cicero’s discussion of justice in the De Officiis, as Atkins says, is unlike any 
earlier account of the virtue that has come down to us.50 The reader might note 
that his partition of ‘justice simply’ (iustitia) and beneficence (beneficentia) 
recalls some elements from the Stoic and Antiochean ethical theories discussed 
in sub-section 3.2.1, but it is important to remember that he is not ‘applying’ 
these theories in a deductive fashion, but rather using his own judgment and 
discretion about their different elements and offering practical advice or 
guidance to his son on officia in the world. Although later in Book I, Cicero will 
treat both parts of justice as a single category of virtue in relation to the other 
three primary virtues, we shall consider here each of the parts of justice in turn. 
Having made the partition at Off. 1.20, Cicero goes on immediately to give 
account of iustitia:  
“Of iustitia, the first office [munus] is that no man should harm 
another unless he has been provoked by injustice [iniuria]; the next 
that one should treat common goods as common and private ones as 
one’s own … We are not born for ourselves alone … our country 
[patria] claims for itself one part of our birth, and our friends another 
… men are born for the sake of men, so that they may be able to 
assist one another … we ought in this to follow nature as our leader, 
to contribute to the common stock [communes utilitates] the things 
that benefit everyone together, and, by the exchange of dutiful 
services [mutatio officiorum], by giving and receiving expertise and 
effort and means, to bind fast the fellowship of men with each other 
[hominum inter homines societatem]. Moreover, the keeping of faith 
is fundamental to iustitia, that is constancy and truth in what is said 
and agreed … let us trust that keeping faith (fides) is so called 
because what has been said is actually done (fiat).”51 
The second office of iustitia, treating common goods as common and private 
ones as one’s own, relates to Cicero’s defence of private property (so long as it 
is acquired with iustitia) which we shall consider in some more detail below, but 
for now, let us consider the first office and what Cicero calls a fundamentum 
iustitiae, keeping faith (fides). As Atkins says, it is fides according to Cicero 
which is “the cement of the res publica … of civic society”, the mutual trust and 
 
50 Atkins, Domina et Regina Virtutum. p.263. 
51 Off. 1.20–23. Munus can have numerous senses, including service, office, post, employment, 
function and duty. Dyck comments that “Munus is used here by variatio for officium, with which 
it is, in one of its senses, identical … However … de Muneribus would hardly have served as a 
title for our essay”. Munus has a more concrete sense than officium, perhaps something like 
duty as action. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. p.109. 
233 
trustworthiness which is in accordance with our natural sociability.52 What 
Schofield said about Cicero’s account of Antiochus’s theory as expounded by the 
character Piso in the De Finibus—that all the virtues have a social orientation—is 
highly relevant to what we find in the De Officiis as well. Whereas the virtue of 
justice in Greek philosophy often places stress on the harmony of the psychē, 
Cicero’s fixing of fides as a fundamentum of the virtue emphasises that “what 
matters is … the strength of the relationships that enable individuals to 
cooperate in a common life.”53 Acting upon what one has said and agreed, 
keeping faith, is to act justly.54 
But what of the first office of iustitia itself? ‘That no [person] should harm 
another’ I trust needs no analysis on the reader’s behalf, so let us consider 
Cicero’s qualification: ‘…unless he has been provoked by injustice’: 
“Of injustice there are two types: men may inflict injury; or else, 
when it is being inflicted upon others, they may fail to deflect it, even 
though they could. Anyone who makes an unjust attack on another, 
whether driven by anger or some other agitation, seems to be laying 
hands, so to speak, upon a fellow. But also, the man who does not 
defend someone, or obstruct the injustice when he can, is at fault 
just as if he had abandoned his parents or his friends or his country.”55 
Cicero distinguishes here between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ types of injustice (a 
fast and loose analogy might be Christian sins of commission and sins of 
omission). If one inflicts injury upon another without provocation, one has 
actively broken the first office of iustitia, that no human being should harm 
another. Cicero goes on immediately after this passage to consider the motives 
that may lead to the positive type of injustice: fear and certain kinds of desire. 
He finds desire to be the more common source of the commission of injustice 
and says that “where this fault is concerned avarice is extremely widespread”, 
but “men are led most of all to being overwhelmed by forgetfulness of justice 
when they slip into desiring positions of command [imperia] or honour or 
glory”.56 It is a desire for might (potentia) or honour or glory more than wealth 
 
52 Atkins, Domina et Regina Virtutum. pp.262 and 268. 
53 Atkins, Domina et Regina Virtutum. p.268. 
54 But cf. Off. 1.31–32, 3.92–95. 
55 Off. 1.23. 
56 Off. 1.24–26. Emphasis added. 
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that he says is particularly troubling because it usually exists “in men of the 
greatest spirit and most brilliant intellectual talent” who have slipped away 
from honestas, and we shall consider this in more detail later in this chapter, 
but here, it suffices to note that he concludes his discussion of the positive type 
of injustice by saying that such acts committed because of some sudden impulse 
are generally less serious than those which are pre-meditated.57 
The negative type of injustice evinces the social orientation of the virtue of 
justice in Cicero’s advice as well. Contrasting it with a meditation of Roman 
emperor and Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius (121–180 CE)—“Another does 
wrong. What is that to me? He will look to it. He has his own disposition, his own 
activity”—Atkins notes that “if … someone values justice precisely because it 
preserves and strengthens society, then he will be concerned not only that he 
himself acts justly, but also that others do”.58 As with the positive type of 
injustice, Cicero also considers the motives that may lead to the negative type: 
“As for neglecting to defend others and deserting one’s officium, 
there tend to be several causes of this. For some men do not wish to 
incur enmities, or toil, or expense; others are hindered by 
indifference, laziness, inactivity or some pursuits or business of their 
own, to the extent that they allow the people whom they ought to 
protect to be abandoned.”59   
The negative type of injustice corresponds to what Cicero had said earlier about 
contributing to the ‘communes utilitates the things that benefit everyone 
together’ through mutual exchange of officia. Other things being equal, it would 
be a good citizen, a citizen acting justly, who defended another from an 
unprovoked attack by yet another in the street. Such actions may often require 
courage, which we discuss in more detail below, but to return to Cicero’s 
account of the negative type of injustice, he makes reference to those 
philosophers immersed in their studies who, although fulfilling the first office of 
iustitia by harming no one, are “hindered by their devotion to learning” such 
that “they abandon those whom they ought to protect”.60 He offers more 
 
57 Off. 1.26. 
58 Atkins, Domina et Regina Virtutum. p.267 with note 13. 
59 Off. 1.28. 
60 Off. 1.28. 
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concrete examples in “some who, whether through devotion to preserving their 
personal wealth or through some dislike of mankind”, although claiming to be 
attending only to their own business and in deed harming no one, run into the 
negative type of injustice: “such men abandon the fellowship of life [vitae 
societatem], because they contribute to it nothing of their devotion, nothing of 
their effort, nothing of their means.”61 And as we have seen, such contributions 
according to Cicero are connected to beneficentia, the other half of that 
honestas which derives only from “those things that constitute the justice of 
human fellowship”: 
“Nothing is more suited to human nature than [beneficentia and 
liberalitas], but there are many caveats. For first one must see that 
kindness harms neither the very people whom one seems to be 
treating kindly, nor others; next, that one’s kindness does not exceed 
one’s capabilities [facultates]; and then, that kindness is bestowed 
upon each person according to his character. Indeed, that is 
fundamental to iustitia, to which all these things ought to be 
referred.62* 
The first caveat Cicero sets out here relates to the first office of iustitia, that no 
human being should harm another, and his account of beneficentia is shaped 
overall by the second office, that one should treat common goods as common 
and private ones as one’s own. Scholarly debates over Cicero’s defence of 
private property are complex and contentious, and an analysis of these debates 
would take up too much time and space in my project.63 But A.A. Long provides 
us with an excellent summary of Cicero’s general position on private property in 
the De Officiis: 
“Justice enters Off. as the natural and rational way for individual 
human beings to organize their lives in ways that are socially 
beneficial. ‘Human society and [connection]’ (societas hominum 
coniunctioque)—a standard phrase in the work—is the supreme utile … 
because it comprehends the particular interests of every individual … 
 
61 Off. 1.29. 
62 Off. 1.42–45, 1.60; Atkins, Domina et Regina Virtutum. p.263. 
63 For scholarship on Cicero’s account of private property, see for example: Neal Wood, 1983. ‘The 
Economic Dimension of Cicero’s Political Thought: Property and State’. Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 16. pp.739–756; Neal Wood, 1988. Cicero’s Social and Political Thought. 
Oxford: University of California Press; J. Jackson Barlow, 1995. ‘Cicero on Property and the 
State’. Nicgorski (ed.), Cicero’s Practical Philosophy. Ch.9; Martha C. Nussbaum, 2000. ‘Duties 
of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic Legacy’. The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 8(2). pp.176–206; Julia Annas, 1989. ‘Cicero on Stoics and Private Property’. Griffin 
and Barnes (eds.), Philosophia Togata I. Ch.6. 
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In his characteristic use of [communal utility], it refers to the interest 
that anyone shares in the right of all to retain what they happen to 
own. That principle, he insists, is the foundation of civil society … 
[Beneficentia] involves a voluntary disbursement of resources on 
another’s behalf. For Cicero, the communal interest presupposes a 
willingness on behalf of the wealthy to go beyond what strict justice 
requires of them in looking to another’s interests … From his use of 
communal utility … we can see that this concept does not do away 
with self-interest in its everyday sense but justifies it on the condition 
that it is coextensive with the interest of all. That condition is what 
reconciles utile, the unavoidable object of individual human 
endeavour, with the social goods specified by justice.”64 
As Dyck notes in his commentary, Cicero offers no definition of beneficium in 
the De Officiis and indeed he uses it interchangeably in the relevant section of 
Book I with officium itself, it seems to me shaping his advice in such a way that 
it pushes whoever heeds it in the direction of societas hominum coniunctioque.65 
And as we shall touch upon again in the next chapter, utile signifies any kind of 
benefit (including the security [salve] maintained by the good citizen protecting 
another from an unprovoked attack in the street [p.231]); its meaning extends 
beyond only material wealth. Beneficentia relates not only to material 
kindnesses bestowed upon others; it is “an ideal within reach of all”, rich and 
poor alike.66 Indeed, we saw Dallmayr in the first chapter understand tolerance 
in terms of the closely connected classical virtue of liberalitas or generosity, 
rather than understanding it in a modern liberal sense as Rasmussen does.67 
Nevertheless, material wealth is an obviously key aspect of beneficentia and I 
think an important point for us to note from Long’s summary is that, although in 
Cicero’s account of iustitia ‘self-interest in its everyday sense’ is not done away 
with, this is only on the condition that it is coextensive with the interest of all. 
Again, all the virtues in Cicero’s writings have a social orientation. At all times, 
it seems to me, he is concerned with maintaining the res publica in existence 
 
64 A.A. Long, 1995. ‘Cicero’s politics in De Officiis’. Laks and Schofield (eds.), Justice and 
Generosity. pp.234–238. Emphasis in original. 
65 Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. p.156n69. 
66 Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. p.159. 
67 Although they are beyond the scope of my project to investigate, I think two points are worth 
noting here. The virtue of tolerance in Dallmayr’s understanding (and my own) is distinct from 
the Medieval Latin term tolerantia, which Bejan describes as “a policy of permission without 
approval that Christians applied to ‘acknowledged evils’.” Bejan, Mere Civility. p.16. The second 
point is that liberalitas as conceived by Romans such as Cicero and Seneca contrasts with the 
Christian morality that was to follow shortly afterwards, as exemplified in Lactantius’s criticism of 
‘measured charity’. Dyck, Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. p.159. 
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and the unbridled pursuit of ‘self-interest in its everyday sense’ not only might 
suggest the vice of avaritia in the pursuer; its proliferation also runs the risk of 
bringing about what Garrett Hardin (inspired by lectures delivered by British 
economist William Forster Lloyd in 1833, as the industrial revolution was in full 
swing) called ‘the tragedy of the commons’.68 Iustitia for Cicero is “the 
reasoning by which the fellowship of men with one another, and the communal 
life, are held together”, and one of the ‘bridles’ on ‘self-interest in its everyday 
sense’ is a part of justice, beneficentia and liberalitas; acts of kindness which 
promote fellowship.  
Let us return, then, to the two other caveats Cicero sets out in relation to this 
part of justice. The second caveat is that it is important to be sure that one’s 
kindness does not exceed one’s capabilities (facultates). As the first caveat 
related to the first office of iustitia, so the second relates to the second; any 
kindness one bestows upon another must come from and be limited by one’s own 
private resources (facultates). Cicero says that “those who want to be kinder 
than their possessions [res] allow first go wrong by being unjust to those nearest 
to them; they transfer to strangers [that] which would more fairly [aequius] be 
provided for, or left to, them.”69 This seems to me to be a curiously constructed 
sentence, and we shall discuss in more detail in the next section the different 
degrees of fellowship that Cicero sets out in the De Officiis, but here it suffices 
to note that he is referring back once more to the first office of iustitia, that no 
human being should harm another, and pointing out its transgression in one who 
bestows kindnesses on strangers to the detriment of those nearest to them (sunt 
in proximos). He sees “lurking” within such liberality usually “a greediness to 
plunder and deprive unjustly, so that resources may be available for lavish gifts” 
in a quest for some sort of glory, with such pretence to beneficentia being 
“closer to sham than to either liberalitas or honestas.”70 
 
68 Roughly: by pursuing only one’s self-interest, one ends up acting contrary to the common good 
and thereby damaging one’s self-interest. Garrett Hardin, 1968. ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’. 
Science. Issue 162. pp.1243–1248. Whilst the general tenor of his argument as encapsulated in 
the article’s title is convenient for our purposes here, (and also a bit of a cliché), let me 
emphasise that I do not endorse all of the arguments Hardin makes in his article.  
69 Off. 1.44. 
70 Off. 1.44. In cautioning against any inappropriate generalisations here, I would emphasise that 
Cicero is speaking about virtues, i.e. personal qualities, and point to Dyck’s commentary on this 
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The third caveat Cicero sets out is that kindness should be bestowed according 
to the character of the person receiving it: 
“Here we should look both at the conduct of the man on whom we are 
conferring a kindness, and at the spirit in which he views us, at the 
association and fellowship of our lives together, and at the dutiful 
services that he has previously carried out for our benefit. It is 
desirable [optabile] that all such considerations should come 
together. If they do not, then the more numerous and more important 
grounds will carry more weight … I think that we must understand this 
too … no one should be wholly neglected if any indication of virtue 
appears in him; moreover, one must particularly foster those who are 
most equipped with the gentler virtues, modesty [modestia], restraint 
[temperantia], and that very iustitia which I have now been discussing 
at length. For a brave and great spirit in a man [fortis animus et 
magnus in homine] who is not perfect nor wise [sapiente] is generally 
too impetuous [ferventior]; but those other virtues seem rather to 
attach themselves to a good man.”71* 
We shall consider the other virtues Cicero mentions here later in the chapter, 
but we may recall at this point, both in the context of the above passage and for 
what is to follow, that in the De Officiis he is concerned with providing advice 
on middle officia—those officia that are within reach of all and who are 
concerned with progress toward virtue in a life that is shared—as distinct from 
the perfect officia of the Stoic sage. “[W]e do not live with men who are perfect 
and clearly wise, but with those who are doing splendidly if they have in them 
mere images of virtue”, and fittingly, towards the conclusion of his discussion of 
beneficentia in Book I, Cicero advises Marcus that in providing beneficia “the 
most important function of officium (if all else is equal) is to enrich above all 
the person who is most in need of riches”.72 
With both parts of the virtue of iustitia set out, we are in a better position to 
begin considering what Cicero says about human fellowship more generally. 
After advising his son Marcus that human fellowship is best preserved overall if a 
 
passage that “in practice, it will be very difficult to distinguish between those whose 
benefactions are prompted by ‘nature’ and those who desire glory.” Dyck, A Commentary on 
Cicero, De Officiis. p.160. 
71 Off. 1.45–46. It is unclear to me whether “all such considerations” refers only to Off. 1.45, those 
in relation to the character of the person receiving the kindness, or to all the caveats Cicero sets 
out in relation to beneficentia, Off. 1.42–45. 
72 Off. 1.46–49. 
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person’s conferral of beneficia increases the more closely the recipients are to 
that person, he goes on to talk of the universal fellowship of humanity: 
“Perhaps, though, we should examine more thoroughly what are the 
natural principles of human fellowship and community [naturae 
principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae]. First is something 
that is seen in the fellowship of the entire human race [est enim 
primum, quod cernitur in universi generis humani societate]. For its 
bonding consists of reason and speech [vinculum est ratio et oratio], 
which reconcile men to one another, through teaching, learning, 
communicating, debating and making judgments, and unite them in a 
kind of natural fellowship [naturali quadam societate]. It is this that 
most distances us from the nature of other animals. To them we often 
impute courage [fortitudo], as with horses or lions, but we do not 
impute to them justice, fairness or goodness. For they have no share 
in reason and speech … The most widespread [latissime] fellowship 
existing among men is that of all with all others [omnibus inter omnes 
societas].”73 
Here we can see “the later concept of a societas generis humani” (i.e. later 
than Plato and Aristotle) which Arendt seemed to have spoken disapprovingly of 
in The Human Condition because she saw it as something that is not 
‘fundamentally human’. What for Arendt in that text was “the natural, merely 
social companionship of the human species” we can see here for Cicero, drawing 
upon some of the arguments of the Stoics, is rooted in the ‘fundamentally 
human’ capacities we have for reason and speech, ratio et oratio. These are the 
vinculum, the social bond, which reconcile human beings to one another, and 
which we saw Dallmayr in the first chapter, “in more recent philosophical 
language” (i.e. Gadamerian), call speech and deliberation which can facilitate 
mutual understanding (pp.71–72). But Cicero’s use of cernitur and universi at 
Off. 1.50 I think suggests (despite not being technical philosophical terms) that 
he begins this passage in speaking of something that is seen with the ‘eyes of the 
mind’ by, for example, a Stoic sage.74 But he goes on in Off. 1.51 to speak of an 
already existing societas of human beings who are not Stoic sages; a societas 
which is that of ‘all with all others’—a sublunary societas and not a cosmopolis—
using the same adjective he used, latissime, in describing the virtue of iustitia 
(p.231). It is the most widespread societas across the earth as distinct from the 
cosmos, one we saw Waldron (p.51) speak of when he construed Kant’s writings 
 
73 Off. 1.50–51. 
74 Cf. LM1. pp.6–7. 
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on hospitality as referring to “the myriad processes by which humans, at all 
levels of social organisation, all over the world, come into direct and indirect 
contact with one another”. But we can see that for Cicero here it is not about 
processes; it is about ‘one’ and ‘another’ in contact, or more specifically still, 
one and another’s virtues of sociability, iustitia and beneficentia (and indeed a 
virtue deriving from these, hospitalitas), in action.75 While the different degrees 
of societas that Cicero sets out in the De Officiis at this point will be discussed 
in more detail in the final section of this chapter, we may note here that he 
concludes his discussion of beneficentia by suggesting that conferral of beneficia 
is not the result of a competition between different benefactors, that one ought 
always “to look at what each person most greatly needs”, and finally, as is right 
regarding middle officia, that one should practise them, “so that we can 
become good calculators [ratiocinatiores] of our officia”: 
“…neither doctors nor generals nor orators are able, however much 
they have taken to heart advice about their art, to achieve anything 
very worthy of praise without experience and practice. Similarly, 
advice on observing officium certainly has been handed down, as I 
myself am now handing it down, but a matter of such importance also 
demands experience and practice.”76 
In concluding this sub-section, we return to Atkins’ excellent article which 
provides us with a good summary of Cicero’s account of this most social of all 
the virtues as he sets it out in the De Officiis: 
“Cicero’s society … was bound together by a network of relationships 
of service, protection, kinship and affection, and by the social [norms] 
that governed these. On the one hand, beneficentia in such a society 
is more [‘normative’] and less spontaneous than our ‘generosity’. 
Cicero tells us that the benefactor should take into account what the 
recipient deserves in respect of his character, the closeness of his 
relationship and his previous services. Thus beneficentia is at least 
strictly limited by the idea of giving to each his own. On the other 
hand … Cicero can see justice and beneficence as playing 
complementary roles in the single task of building up societas.”77  
 
75 Cf. Off. 2.64, Nussbaum, Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism. pp.11–13. 
76 Off. 1.60. 
77 Atkins, Domina et Regina Virtutum. p.266. 
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3.3.2 Cicero on Wisdom and Prudence 
Wisdom (sapientia) Cicero says in Book I of the De Legibus is “the mother of all 
good things, from the love of which philosophy took its name in Greek”, and 
after personifying and praising philosophy (again) as “searcher out of virtue, 
expeller of vices” in Book V of the Tusculanae Disputationes, says that: 
“No one can deny that sapientia itself is ancient not only in fact but 
also in name. Through knowledge [cognitione] of things human and 
divine, and then of the origins and causes of each single thing, it 
acquired the fairest of names with the people of old. So we have 
heard the Seven [Sages of Greece in the sixth century BCE], who were 
considered and called sophoi by the Greeks and ‘wise’ (sapientes) by 
us Romans, and—many generations earlier—Lycurgus, in whose time 
Homer too is said to have lived before the foundation of this city, and 
already in Homeric times Ulysses and Nestor both were, and were 
considered, wise (sapientes).”78 
These passages highlight for us that wisdom has not always been understood as 
the property or purview of its lovers, the philosophers, who came after the 
Seven Sages and so often inquired into the properties of ‘the wise man’, the 
sophos. Precisely what sophia or sapientia was meant to be picking out in the 
Seven Sages is unclear, and insofar as any of our ‘professional’ terms make any 
sense in this context, they were variously and/or simultaneously lawgivers, 
statesmen, orators, poets, ‘philosophers’, and ‘scientists’.79 They were not 
sophoi in the sense in which Arendt meant in the previous chapter (p.167), who 
was drawing at that point on Plato’s argument about philosopher-kings, and we 
shall see in the next chapter that Cicero continues to associate sapientia with 
non-philosophers, even as he associates it with (some) philosophers as well. But 
another important point for us to notice in the above passage is the social, and 
indeed the historical, inflections in Cicero’s language as he is speaking about 
sapientia: it was the Greeks who considered the Seven Sages as sophoi and the 
Romans who called them sapientes; and both Ulysses and Nestor not only were 
(in Cicero’s judgment), but also were considered by others to be sapientes. The 
reader might recall at this point Brown’s argument in the first chapter that 
 
78 Leg. 1.58; Tusc. 5.5–7. 
79 Richard P. Martin, 1998. ‘The Seven Sages as Performers of Wisdom’. Carol Dougherty and 
Leslie Kurke (eds.). Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. Ch.6. 
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wisdom cannot be claimed for oneself and can only be recognised as such by 
others, and we shall be considering a more fundamental way in which Cicero 
understands the virtue of sapientia as being socially placed towards the end of 
this sub-section. 
Immediately after the account of our natural sociability that he sets out in Book 
I of the De Officiis (quoted on p.216), Cicero says that “the search for truth and 
its investigation are, above all, peculiar to man” and that “whenever we are 
free from necessary business and other concerns we are eager to see or to hear 
or to learn”.80 After setting out briefly how our share in reason manifests itself in 
the other virtues, and that it is from the virtues that honestas is created and 
through the virtues that it is accomplished, he affirms honestas as something 
that both attracts and is yet beyond the praise of others, something that “even 
if no one praises it, it is by nature worthy of praise”, and says: 
“You are seeing, my son, the very face and form, so to speak, of the 
honestas: if it could be seen with the eyes [of the body], as Plato 
says, it would inspire an amazing love [amores] of sapientia. 
Everything that is honestas arises from one of four parts: it is involved 
[versatur] either with the perception of truth [perspicientia veri] and 
with skill [sollertia]; or with preserving fellowship among men, with 
assigning to each his own, and with faithfulness to agreements one 
has made; or with the greatness and strength of a lofty and 
unconquered spirit; or with order and limit in everything that is said 
and done (modesty and restraint are included here). Although these 
four are bound together and interwoven [inter se colligata atque 
implicata sunt], certain kinds of officia have their origin in each 
individually. For example, in the part that we described as first, in 
which we placed wisdom [sapientia] and good sense [prudentia], 
there lie the investigation and finding out of what is true, and that is 
the peculiar function of that virtue. For when a man is extremely good 
at perceiving what is most true [verissimum] in each particular thing, 
and when he is able with great acuity and speed to see and to explain 
the reason, then he is rightly considered extremely sensible 
[prudentissimus] and wise [sapientissimus]. Therefore, the thing that 
underlies this virtue, the matter (as it were) that it handles and 
treats, is truth.”81* 
Sapientia, the ‘mother of all good things’, delivers the honestas, which Cicero 
then proceeds to set out in four parts, i.e. according to the four primary virtues. 
 
80 Off. 1.13. 
81 Off. 1.15–16. 
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Although we began this section with the virtue of iustitia, we can see here that 
it is the part of the honestas involved with sapientia and prudentia which Cicero 
describes as first in the De Officiis, although he describes it very briefly in the 
rest of the text as compared with iustitia.82 In the above passage, the four parts 
of the honestas are described first of all not by the names of the virtues 
themselves, but by their manifestations in the world; in human beings 
perceiving, assigning, preserving and so on, and we see that he then goes on to 
say that the four parts of the honestas are bound together and inter-woven. This 
recalls what Kelsay said in the first chapter as regards the virtue of prudence 
tying the realities of situations to virtues of justice, temperance and courage, as 
well as some of the binding and inter-weaving of the virtues that we saw in the 
previous sub-section in Cicero’s account of justice; and it also prepares the 
reader for yet more binding and inter-weaving in the rest of this chapter. But 
the final thing I wish to highlight from the above passage is that Cicero 
concludes it by naming the virtues of sapientia and prudentia as placed in the 
first part of the honestas, and he identifies truth as the ‘matter’ it handles and 
treats. Having already written numerous philosophical treatises highly relevant 
to this ‘matter’, Cicero provides no disquisition on truth itself in the De Officiis 
(which is about officia); he summarises instead that its pursuit “most closely 
relates to human nature” vis-à-vis the other parts of the honestas, that its 
pursuit is both natural and honestum, that a fault associated with its pursuit can 
be seen in those who rashly assent to the truth of things that have not been 
ascertained instead of taking their time and care in pondering about any given 
thing, and that another fault associated with the pursuit of truth is that “some 
men bestow excessive devotion and effort upon matters that are both abstruse 
and difficult, and unnecessary.”83 So long as these two faults are avoided, Cicero 
says, the pursuit of truth “will rightly be praised”, although it is contrary to 
officium to be drawn by an excessive devotion to its pursuit “away from 
practical achievements: all the praise that belongs to virtue lies in action”.84 It 
seems to me that we can see here, even as he himself is devoted to the pursuit 
of truth, Cicero’s fuller appreciation of the practical life of the citizen over the 
 
82 Cicero spends two chapters of Book I setting out sapientia and prudentia, and forty-one setting 
out iustitia. 
83 Off. 1.18–19. 
84 Off. 1.19. 
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theoretical life of the philosopher in the shaping of his advice, and this is 
something we shall consider in more detail below and in the next chapter. But to 
return to his account of sapientia and prudentia in the De Officiis, he has more 
to say about these virtues towards the end of Book I: 
“The foremost of all the virtues is the wisdom [sapientia] that the 
Greeks call sophia. (Good sense [prudentia], which they call 
phronesis, we realise is something distinct, that is the knowledge 
[scientia] of things that one should pursue and avoid). But the wisdom 
[sapientia] that I declared to be the foremost is the knowledge of all 
things human and divine [rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia]; 
and it includes the sociability and fellowship [communitas et societas] 
of gods and men with each other. If, as is certain, that is something of 
the greatest importance, then necessarily the officium that is based 
upon sociability is also of the greatest importance. Moreover, learning 
about and reflecting upon [cognitio contemplatioque] nature is 
somewhat truncated and incomplete if it results in no action. Such 
action is seen most clearly in the protection of men’s interests and 
therefore is concerned with the fellowship of the human race 
[societatem generis humani]. For that reason this should be ranked 
above mere learning [cognition].”85 
Cicero’s claim here, not unlike his claim in the passage quoted above from the 
Tusculanae Disputationes (p.241), is that sapientia is ‘the knowledge of all 
things human and divine’, but he is also saying in this passage from the De 
Officiis that this includes the communitas et societas of gods and men with each 
other, and so the officia deriving from this natural sociability are of the greatest 
importance as well. As Atkins puts it, Cicero understands sapientia to be 
foremost of all the virtues “in the sense that it provides the very understanding 
of the universe that explains the priority of justice”.86 It differs from prudentia, 
which is concerned only with making practical choices in the world, and which 
“ill-will [malitia] wants to mimic”, by comprehending the correct picture of that 
world “that allows prudentia to make the right choices, and that explains why 
iustitia ought to be preferred to pure inquiry itself.”87 And as we have seen, 
iustitia plays a controlling role in relation to sapientia in the De Officiis in that 
Cicero warns against an excessive devotion to pure inquiry such that it results in 
 
85 Off. 1.153. 
86 Atkins, Domina et Regina Virtutum. p.259. 
87 Atkins, Domina et Regina Virtutum. p.259; Off. 3.96. Cf. Off. 3.62–96. 
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the negative type of injustice, the abandoning of those whom one ought to be 
protecting. 
More will be said about the virtue of sapientia as it is to be found in the De Re 
Publica in the next chapter, but here, having set out this foremost of all the 
virtues in the De Officiis, whose ‘matter’ that it handles and treats is truth, 
Cicero says: 
“As for the other three virtues, their aim is necessities: they are to 
procure and to conserve whatever is required for the activities of life, 
in order both to preserve the fellowship and bonding between men, 
and to allow excellence and greatness of spirit [magnitudo animi] to 
shine out—both in increasing influence and in acquiring utilitates for 
oneself and those dear to one, and also, and much more, in disdaining 
[despiciendus] the very same things.”88 
This underscores the practical nature of Cicero’s wider ethical project; orienting 
sapientia and prudentia to the building up of societas. That Cicero says the aim 
of the virtue of iustitia is necessities I think speaks not only to his practical, 
‘Roman’ outlook on life, but also to the strategic role that this virtue is carrying 
out in the De Officiis, which seems to me to be an exercise of prudentia (and 
consilium) on his part. As Atkins shows in her article, Cicero stresses throughout 
this text various pragmatic reasons as to why not only the other virtues but also 
our officia that derive from them must be limited by iustitia; for it is precisely 
the virtue that ensures the ongoingness of the conditions in which all virtues may 
develop.89 And another point worth making about the above passage is that it 
makes plain that Cicero’s account of the virtues certainly does not ‘decisively 
exclude spontaneous action or achievement’, as Arendt in the previous chapter 
understood ‘society’ as doing in the modern age; Cicero is seeking to preserve 
and maintain precisely those worldly conditions that allow human excellence 
and greatness to shine out. As for disdaining utilitates, i.e., what Long called 
“the unavoidable object of individual human endeavour” (p.236), this would 
require what Cicero calls magnitudo animi, greatness of spirit, which we shall 
now consider.  
 
88 Off. 1.17. 
89 ‘Ongoingness’ is a term I picked up from Walzer (Arguing About War. p.43), some more features 
of which in my own understanding I hope become apparent to the reader in the next chapter. 
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3.3.3 Cicero on Greatness of Spirit and Courage 
In the first chapter, we saw Brown describe as “breath-taking” Morgenthau’s 
claim that the “perhaps most noble” task of the IR theorist today is to prepare 
the ground for a new international order, and that this was a display of the 
virtue of phronesis on Morgenthau’s part. But one might also argue that what 
Morgenthau displayed and what he was calling for in other IR theorists was the 
virtue of courage. As Kelsay said, phronesis is a kind of practical wisdom by 
which one ties the realities of particular situations to virtues of justice, 
temperance and courage, and for Morgenthau, in the reality of a world of 
sovereign nation-states, to publish an argument that some groundwork was 
required by theorists for “a new international order radically different from that 
which preceded it” I think did indeed show a certain measure of courage on his 
part. But what is meant by courage? I think Walzer was right when he said that it 
is something that ‘you never know whether you have until you need it’, and 
Kelsay refers to this virtue in his article as fortitude.90 Broadly speaking, to have 
courage or fortitude is to be brave in the face of adversity. Arendt says that it is 
“a big word”, “indispensable for political action” and “demanded of us by the 
very nature of the political realm”, and we saw in the previous chapter that she 
associated this virtue with greatness and that Churchill had ‘a kind of laughing 
courage’ (p.164). His was not simply the kind of courage (fortitudo) that Cicero 
says we impute to horses and lions (p.239); it was a greatness of spirit 
(magnitudo animi) as evidenced in his deeds, a specifically human kind of 
fortitude tied closely to our share in reason, which Aristotle called 
megalopsychia.91 
In speaking of Churchill’s courage, Arendt’s modifier—‘a kind of laughing…’—I 
think refers to the disdain for human things that we have already seen Cicero 
touching upon (pp.244–245), and he says that this is one of the two things that 
constitute magnitudo animi: 
“A brave and great spirit [fortis animus et magnus] is in general seen 
in two things. One lies in disdain for things external, in the conviction 
 
90 Regrettably, I cannot find again where Walzer says this, but I do recall it was in a YouTube 
video. 
91 TWB. p.227. 
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that a man should admire, should choose, should pursue nothing 
except what is honourable and seemly [honestum decorumque], and 
should yield to no man, nor to agitation of the spirit, nor to fortune. 
The second thing is that you should, in the spirit I have described, do 
deeds which are great, certainly, but above all beneficial, and you 
should undertake with vigour difficult and laborious tasks which 
endanger both life itself and much that concerns life.”92* 
As we have seen (sub-section 3.2.1), the disdaining of external things suggests a 
specifically Stoic orientation, one that considers only that which is honestum as 
good. Cicero is careful to distinguish here this disdaining of external things from 
the other constituent of magnitudo animi, the deeds, in Dyck’s words, “that 
constitute the glamor and usefulness” to societas of this virtue.93 We have 
already seen Cicero hold up as cautionary examples some who have displayed 
the virtue of magnitudo animi slipping into a desire for glory which leads them 
to the commission of deeds which are to the detriment of societas, i.e. unjust 
deeds, and we shall consider this in more detail below, but in returning to a 
consideration of the first constituent, a further Stoic feature of it is what Cicero 
sets out here as an ability not to yield to agitations of the spirit, and later 
renders positively as tranquillitas animi.94 He notes that there have been many 
who have sought this kind of tranquillity by abandoning public business and living 
a life of leisure, including “the noblest and foremost philosophers” whose 
outstanding abilities “perhaps” excuse them from living the vita activa, but 
repeats his concern that behind such life-choices (and in those “without a 
reason” to provide for disdaining external things) may be the causes that lead to 
the negative type of injustice (pp.234–235).95 Of those engaged in public 
business, however, he says that they must acquire this tranquillitas animi so as 
to live “without anxiety, with seriousness and with constancy”, and distinguishes 
at this point in his discussion between the military and civilian aspects of the 
vita activa: 
“Most men consider that military affairs are of greater significance 
than civic; I must deflate that opinion. For men have not infrequently 
sought war out of desire for glory … if we are prepared to judge the 
 
92 Off. 1.66. 
93 Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. p.195. 
94 Off. 1.69. 
95 Off. 1.70–71. 
248 
matter correctly, many achievements of civic life have proved greater 
and more famous than those of war.”96 
  Here we see some of the beginnings of the less militaristic and more peaceable 
strand of the republican tradition—the just war tradition—that Canovan sidelined 
in assessing Arendt’s work.97 After a comparison of military and civilian 
achievements that he provides by way of numerous examples in history in order 
to make his point, Cicero goes on to emphasise that even in warfare it is 
strength of spirit more than body that counts, that “we … must value the reason 
[ratio] which makes decisions above the courage [fortitudo] which makes 
battle”, and a mark not only of a great spirit in a human being, but: 
“… also of great intellectual talent [ingenii magni] [is] to anticipate 
the future by reflection, deciding somewhat beforehand how things 
could go in either direction, and what should be done in either event, 
never acting so that one will need to say, ‘I had not thought of that’. 
Such is the work of a spirit not only great and lofty but also relying on 
good sense and good counsel [prudentia consilioque fidentis] … It is 
also the mark of a great man [magni viri] in times of unrest to punish 
the guilty [punire sontes] but to preserve the multitude of people 
[multitudinem conservare], holding fast to what is upright and 
honesta, whatever fortune may bring. For just as some … put war 
before civic affairs, so you will find many to whom dangerously hot-
headed counsels seem greater and more brilliant than calm and 
considered ones. We must never purposefully avoid danger so as to 
appear cowardly and fearful, yet we must avoid exposing ourselves 
pointlessly to risk. Nothing can be stupider than that. When 
confronting danger, therefore, we should copy the doctor, whose 
custom it is to treat mild illnesses mildly, though he is forced to apply 
riskier, double-edged, remedies to more serious illnesses. Only a 
madman would pray for a facing storm during a calm; but when a 
storm does arise the wise man [sapientes] meets it using all his 
reason. That is particularly so when a successful outcome may bring 
more good than the period of uncertainty evil.”98 
This I think is an important passage and the first thing for us to note from it is 
the inter-weaving of magnitudo animi with prudentia and consilium, the latter 
two of which we saw Kelsay speak of together in the first chapter through the 
 
96 Off. 1.74. 
97 Which may also be seen in President Obama’s acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize in 
2009: “The soldier’s courage and sacrifice is full of glory, expressing devotion to country, to 
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writings of Aquinas. Prudentia and consilium act as limits upon magnitudo animi, 
helping to prevent this virtue from degenerating into recklessness through its 
holder slipping into a desire for glory and acting to fulfil that desire. We may 
also note here the presence of that fundamentum of justice, fides, without 
which the person of great spirit could not trust another’s counsel, and indeed it 
looks like justice is carrying out a controlling role in the rest of the passage. No 
one concerned with protecting and building up societas would expose it 
pointlessly to risk, and as a good doctor cures a body of illness, so the good 
statesperson cures the body politic of danger. And again, Cicero is tying justice, 
magnitudo animi and prudentia to sapientia; it is the wise statesperson who 
copies the doctor. The ‘riskier, double-edged remedies’ the doctor is forced to 
apply only in serious cases perhaps anticipates arguments such as Walzer’s about 
‘supreme emergency’, where the normal rules of warfare may need to be over-
ridden in extremis, for the sake of the community’s survival: 
“[Supreme emergency is] a desperate time, when the measures taken 
are ones we would avoid if we possibly could. I wish no such time on 
my own country and my fellow citizens. Let this be a theoretical 
discussion and an educational exercise … I suggest a certain wariness 
about the exercise. As hard cases make bad law, so supreme 
emergencies put morality itself at risk. We need to be careful … 
Egoists and communalists, who recognise no one’s rights but their 
own, act badly on the smallest pretext, at the first hint of danger 
(perhaps also at the first hint of advantage) to themselves. A non-
fetishized community, by contrast, sustains the discipline of its 
soldiers and the restraint of its leaders, who thus act badly only at the 
last minute and under absolute necessity.”99  
This seems to me to be good counsel, fully aware that ‘serious illnesses’ or 
supreme emergencies are possibilities and placing prudential and moral limits as 
to when any ‘riskier, double-edged remedies’ might be necessary. We saw in the 
first chapter that Walzer described some of the IR realists of the 1950s and 60s 
as ‘modern Machiavellis’, yet only a few of whom argued for prudential limits 
and none of whom argued for moral ones, and although he said that they 
practised being ‘cool and tough-minded’, it seems to me that, insofar as these 
limits were absent, their counsels would have been closer to what Cicero calls 
here ‘dangerously hot-headed’. Walzer’s, by contrast, is calm and considered, it 
 
99 Michael Walzer, 2004. ‘Emergency Ethics’. Arguing About War. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. Ch.3. 
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seems to me closer to sapientia, prudentia, iustitia, magnitudo animi, and as 
will be discussed in more detail in the next sub-section, to decorum as well. 
Cicero goes on after this passage to praise those who face dangerous 
undertakings and who sacrifice their own glory or even the goodwill of their 
fellow-citizens for the sake of the common welfare—again, the virtue of iustitia 
is playing a controlling role here—before moving on to discuss how magnitudo 
animi is manifest by statespersons in peacetime. The advice he offers here 
should be familiar to the reader: 
“In general those who are about to take charge of public affairs 
should … fix their gaze so firmly on what is beneficial to the citizens 
that whatever they do, they do with that in mind, forgetful of their 
own advantage … [and] … care for the whole body of the res publica 
rather than protect one part and neglect the rest. The management of 
res publica is like a guardianship [tutela], and must be conducted 
[procuratio] in the light of what is beneficial not to the guardians, but 
to those who are put in their charge. By consulting the interests of 
some of the citizens and neglecting others, they bring upon the civitas 
the ruinous conditions of unrest and strife. Consequently, some 
appear as populares, and others as devotees of the optimates, but 
few as champions of everyone … Electioneering and the struggle for 
positions of honour is an altogether wretched practice … we should 
consider as enemies [adversarios] those who take up arms against us, 
not those who want to protect the res publica in the way each 
considers best. It was in that way that Publius Africanus and Quintus 
Metellus used to disagree with one another, without bitterness 
[acerbitas].”100* 
 According to Cicero, it is a person of magnitudo animi who is forgetful of their 
own advantage and mindful of the entire res publica, and it seems to me that it 
would also be such a person, disdainful of external things, who finds 
electioneering and the struggle for positions of honour ‘an altogether wretched 
practice’, albeit necessary and from which they do not shrink. And again, it 
seems to me that the virtue of justice, insofar as it is flourishing, is in the 
background here carrying out a controlling role, holding the communal life 
together with citizens disagreeing in good faith, and without acerbitas. Cicero 
mentions here the populares and optimates in the Roman republic. As Griffin 
and Atkins put it, these refer to “two types of politics, not two parties”; politics 
of ‘elite’ persons, i.e. those persons who freely chose themselves into politics 
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(and many of whom switched types of politics throughout their lifetime).101 
Roughly speaking, the populares stressed potestas in populo and the optimates 
stressed auctoritas in senatu, with few championing potestas in populo 
auctoritas in senatu sit. Scholars are right of course that there is no clear 
mapping of the populares and optimates in the Roman republic on to modern 
party politics, but the vaguest of similarities I think is nevertheless discernible. 
Arendt, of course, would never admit it out of modesty, but it seems to me that 
it was the virtue of justice that was on her mind in trying to tie together and 
nurture the relationship between liberals and conservatives, or left and right, in 
contemporary politics, and that, notwithstanding the Stoic influences upon 
Cicero’s own account of it, she was a woman of magnitudo animi who almost 
always avoided the pitfalls posed by this particular virtue. As Cicero warns of 
these pitfalls and points out what is needed to avoid them: 
“…if the loftiness of spirit [elatio animi] that reveals itself amid 
danger and toil is empty of justice, if it fights not for the common 
safety but for its own advantages, it is a vice. It is not merely 
unvirtuous; it is rather a monstrosity [immanitas] which repels all 
humane feeling [humanitas] … It is a hateful fact that loftiness and 
magnitudo animi all too easily give birth to wilfulness and an 
excessive desire for pre-eminence [pertinacia et nimia cupiditas 
principatis innascitur] … the more outstanding an individual is in 
magnitudo animi, the more he desires complete pre-eminence, or 
rather to be the sole ruler. But when you desire to surpass all others, 
it is difficult to respect the fairness [aequitas] that is a special mark 
of iustitia … The greater the difficulty, however, the greater the 
splendour: there is no occasion from which iustitia should be 
absent.”102* 
As Young-Bruehl says, Arendt in her youth “was not one to be thwarted in her 
desires”, at home “her displays of … willfulness were ceaseless”, and these 
issues did not end in the early 1920s when she got expelled from school for 
(rightly or wrongly) leading her fellow pupils in a boycott of a certain teacher’s 
classes after he had insulted her, being perhaps most clearly in evidence to 
many four decades later, in the Eichmann controversy.103 But during this 
controversy, not all ‘humane feeling’ was lost in Arendt, and as she says a few 
 
101 Off. p.34n2. Based on my own understanding of this point in history, I think Griffin and Atkins 
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102 Off. 1.62–64. 
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times in Eichmann in Jerusalem, her concern to see justice being done was 
paramount, and whether or not she was harbouring a desire for glory in writing 
the text up (I doubt very much that she was), she certainly was not basking in it 
after its publication.104 The desire (cupiditas) for glory—or what Arendt had 
called in her acceptance speech for the Sonning Prize, ‘the great temptation of 
recognition’ (p.162)—Cicero says “destroys the libertas to which end every 
endeavour of men of great spirit [magnanimis viris] ought to be devoted”*, and 
to which Arendt also said men of action ought to be committed due to the very 
nature of their activity (p.181).105 And what also helps prevent one from slipping 
into this dangerous desire is the virtue of decorum, in which appears “a calming 
of all the agitations of the spirit [omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi]”.106 
3.3.4 Cicero on Decorum 
We saw in the first chapter that Dallmayr in his review of Gadamer spoke of “the 
empirical messiness deriving from contingent interests and inclinations” and also 
spoke of “the motivating force of human inclination” (p.72), which it seems to 
me can be understood, albeit very broadly, as a distinction between ‘world’ and 
‘self’, and it also seems to me that Cicero’s discussion of decorum in the De 
Officiis comprehends both sides of this distinction; as with the rest of the 
virtues, it is a virtue of persons which has a social orientation. As regards the 
motivating force of human inclination, the motus animi, he says: 
“… the force of the spirit [vis animorum], that is its nature [natura], 
is twofold: one part of it consists of impulse, called in Greek horme, 
which snatches a man this way and that; the other of reason, which 
teaches and explains what should be done and what avoided. Hence 
reason charges, and impulse yields. All action should be free from 
rashness and carelessness; nor should anyone do anything for which he 
cannot give a persuasive justification: that is practically a definition 
of officium.”107* 
 
104 Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World. p.352. 
105 Off. 1.68. 
106 Off. 1.93. 
107 Off. 1.101. There is some scholarly debate as to whether these are Cicero’s words—in context, 
unusually strong in their Stoicism—or an interpolation which has been made at a later (but not 
much later) date during transmission. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. pp.261–263. 
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Part of the teaching and explaining that reason carries out inside a ‘self’ 
involves a calming of the agitations of the animus (insofar as one’s impulses 
yield to one’s reason), and what this produces in one’s actions, Cicero says, is 
constancy and moderation, virtues of decorum, that shine out in the world for 
themselves. An example of moderation may be seen in the interview Arendt gave 
to Günter Gaus after the Eichmann controversy, when he said that some of the 
criticism of her book was based on the tone of certain passages: 
“ARENDT: I can’t say anything [about that]. And I don’t want to. If 
people think you can only write about these things in a tone filled 
with pathos … and … Let’s put it differently. I don’t want to get 
angry. 
GAUS: Does it make you angry? 
ARENDT: No, what’s the point.”108 
In the previous chapter, Arendt had said that her tendency to shy away from the 
public realm was due to her “personal temperament and inclination—those 
innate psychic qualities which form not necessarily our final judgments but 
certainly our prejudices and instinctive impulses”, and in this exchange with 
Gaus, it seems to me that we can see an instinctive impulse of anger arising in 
Arendt as her person (ethos) instead of her book (logos) is criticised (by others 
of whom Gaus is merely reporting), before she arrives at her final judgment as 
to how she will speak through an exercising of her reason which has moderated 
that impulse.109 In other words, I believe Arendt in this brief exchange has shown 
the virtue of decorum.110 
Decorum is Cicero’s translation of the Greek prepon, which Panaetius seems 
innovatively (and ‘eclectically’) to have used in relation to Stoic ethics. It is a 
term carried over from the aesthetic sphere and put to ethical use, and it means 
 
108 Regrettably, this specific exchange is missing at EU. p.16, but can be seen in the televised 
version at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dsoImQfVsO4&t=3057s Accessed 26th November 
2020. Cf. Off. 1.136–137. 
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altogether different matter. 
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‘be conspicuous’, ‘shine forth, show oneself’, or ‘beseem’.111 The reader may 
recall at this point Arendt’s argument that living beings “make their 
appearance” in the world, and more specifically, that human beings “present 
themselves in deed and word and thus indicate how they wish to appear, what in 
their opinion is fit to be seen and what not” (p.163). In her exchange with Gaus, 
it seems to me that the world was closer to the centre of Arendt’s attention 
than her self; she decided that her anger was not fit to be seen in the world at 
that point, it was not fitting for the occasion.112 Decorum has been translated 
variously as ‘seemly’, ‘fitting’, and ‘appropriate’, but as Schofield says (and says 
well), “a really satisfying English equivalent has proved elusive: decorum is what 
both is and looks just right.”113 Gill notes that decorum is presented in the De 
Officiis “as being the outward aspect of moral excellence (honestas and virtus); 
it is thus a kind of moral beauty that ‘shines out’ (elucet) in the life of the 
virtuous person.”114 In his commentary, Dyck says that Cicero’s explication of 
decorum at Off. 1.93–99 “is perhaps the most difficult section in the entire 
essay”, and Schofield I think is nearer the mark when he says that “there is not 
much difficulty in getting from the text a general sense of what Cicero means by 
decorum. But a coherent and precise philosophical understanding has proved 
hard to achieve.”115 We recall that the De Officiis is a work of practical ethics, 
providing “watchwords by which daily life in all its bearings may be shaped”. In 
this connection, arriving at a general sense of what Cicero means by decorum 
seems to me to be sufficient, and arriving at a coherent and precise 
philosophical understanding of what he means to say, although certainly and 
legitimately of interest to many philosophers, is not my aim in this sub-
section.116 With that said, let us consider what Cicero says about decorum: 
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“…we must discuss the one remaining element of honestas. Under this 
appear a sense of shame [verecundia] and what one might call the 
ordered beauty of a life [ornatus vitae], restraint and modesty 
[temperantia et modesta], a calming of all the agitations of the spirit, 
and due measure in all things. Under this heading is included what in 
Latin may be called decorum; the Greek for it is prepon. The essence 
of this is that it cannot be separated from what is honestum: for what 
is decorum is honestum, and what is honestum is decorum. It is easier 
to grasp than to explain what the difference is between honestum and 
decorum.”117 
We saw in previous chapters that the fourth primary virtue is usually called 
temperance or moderation (it is also sometimes called self-discipline), and 
again, it was an innovation of Panaetius in his own ethics to bring to prepon over 
from aesthetics and have virtues such as temperance and moderation subsumed 
within it, although this subsumption takes on a curious form in Cicero’s account. 
But before we take a closer look at it, let us consider what he says in the above 
passage as to what appears in this one remaining element of honestas. I hope 
already to have shown through the examples of Arendt (pp.252–253) and Walzer 
(p.249) something of what he means here by restraint, a calming of the 
agitations of the spirit, and due measure, and through Gill the aesthetic features 
derived from Panaetius’s ethics which lead Cicero to say that what appears in 
this element of honestas is what one might call the ordered beauty of a life. But 
he also says here that a sense of shame appears in this element of honestas. As 
Schofield puts it, verecundia is that “untranslatable quality ‘between respect 
and shame’—‘modesty’ is as good as I can do”.118 Verecundia is an especial 
aspect of the fourth virtue which marks out its social orientation; an aspect 
which involves managing the impression we create upon others through taking 
others into our consideration. Robert A. Kaster says that “the mutuality of 
verecundia, the way that its wariness looks both to the self and to the other—to 
the extent of seeing the matter as the other sees it …—is the essence of the 
emotion as a force of social cohesion.”119 Although justice is the key virtue for 
Cicero in building up societas, verecundia plays an important role here as well: 
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“… we must exercise a respectfulness [reverentia] towards men, both 
towards the best of them and also towards the rest. To neglect what 
others think about oneself is the mark not only of arrogance, but also 
of utter carelessness. There is a difference between iustitia and 
verecundia when reasoning about humans. The part of iustitia is not 
to harm a man, that of verecundia not to outrage him. Here is seen 
most clearly the essence of decorum.”120* 
Elsewhere, he describes verecundia as that “which nature has given men as a 
sort of fear of criticism that is not undeserved.”121 Kaster offers a contemporary 
example where verecundia is most often seen in action, in that of occupants in 
an elevator typically spacing themselves as far apart as possible, standing facing 
in the same direction, avoiding eye-contact, and so on. He talks of this in terms 
of one’s ‘ignorability’, with the un-ignorable person loudly conversing over their 
phone as though nobody else was in the elevator as failing to show verecundia, 
failing to avoid giving offence to others: 
“Verecundia operates in circumstances where there is in principle a 
choice to be made as to whose interests will be put to the fore and 
whose will be restrained: … it implies a voluntary stepping back from 
pressing one’s own interest (at a minimum) or a voluntary privileging 
of the interests of the other.”122  
The un-ignorable person speaking loudly into their phone in an elevator is, as 
Cicero says, being either arrogant or careless, and as Kaster says, “because the 
opportunities for offense are so rich and varied, the self-monitoring that 
verecundia entails is constant”, and this I think shows why it comes under the 
heading of the fourth virtue, associated with temperance and moderation, and 
like the rest of the virtues, requires practice. But in returning to the passage 
quoted on p.251, let us begin to consider the curious form decorum takes in 
Cicero’s account. He says that what is honestum is decorum and what is 
decorum is honestum, and he goes on after this passage to say how it is 
associated both with honestas as a whole and more specifically as the fourth 
primary virtue: 
“… first, we understand a decorum of a general kind, involved 
[versitur] with honestum behaviour as a whole, and secondly, 
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something subordinate to this, which relates to an individual element 
of what is honestas. The former is customarily defined something like 
this: what is decorum is that which agrees with the excellence of man 
just where his nature differs from that of other creatures. Their 
definition of the part subordinate to this takes decorum to be that 
which agrees with nature in such a way that moderation and restraint 
[moderatio et temperantia] appear in it, along with the appearance 
of a free person [liberali].”123 
As all the virtues have a social orientation, so all the officia carried out which 
derive from them are decorum: fitting or appropriate actions for a human being 
as a member of society, as a person. Just where human beings differ from that 
of other creatures is in our capacities for reason and speech, with our reason in 
particular being the thing that superintends our instinctive impulses, and which 
we develop through education so that the things we choose to do and choose not 
to do in society become steadier over time, as our constitutions evolve. In the 
first chapter, we saw Beiner describe the virtue of phronesis as the union of 
good judgment and the action which is the fitting embodiment of that 
judgment, and in the second chapter, we saw Arendt speaking of the ‘two 
highest virtues of the statesman, moderation and insight’, and saying that most 
conspicuous in Kennedy’s handling of the Cuba crisis and civil rights conflict 
were the extremes to which he did not go in his actions. Political events of such 
gravity cannot but give rise to instinctive impulses, and whatever Kennedy’s 
were, he was able to moderate them, on Arendt’s telling, in his words and 
deeds. Again, as Cicero puts it, all the virtues are “bound together and inter-
woven” and I think we may see this inter-weaving in what Beiner and Arendt are 
saying as regards (what Arendt called) moderation and insight.124 We may also 
have seen it in Morgenthau’s article which called for IR theorists to prepare the 
ground for statespersons (who are the ones making the relevant decisions) by 
investigating principles of political organisation appropriate to the existence of 
nuclear power. This not only showed insight on Morgenthau’s part; it also 
showed a certain level of courage (pp.245–246) and moderation (p.116). 
But in returning to what Cicero says about decorum, as well as being seen in the 
whole of honestas, he also speaks of it being customarily defined as one of its 
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four parts. He takes this latter definition from Panaetius (probably) as that 
which agrees with nature in such a way that moderation and restraint appear in 
it, along with the appearance of a free person.125 We have already covered 
moderation and restraint, as well as the associated sense of verecundia. A free 
person is understood here in more ‘republican’ than ‘liberal’ terms, i.e. a 
freedom that unavoidably comes along with accepting responsibility for one’s 
actions to the wider society of which one is a member and in which one is 
entrusted with the freedom to act in the first place.126 Here we may see some 
more of the aesthetic aspect of this virtue; acting with decorum entails “a style 
of freedom” in the person which sustains freedom’s worldly condition, i.e. the 
maintenance and development of social relationships.127 As set out through 
Arendt’s writings in the previous chapter, a fundamental aspect of this freedom 
and responsibility involves our status as persons, and it is in his discussion of the 
fourth primary virtue in the De Officiis that Cicero provides what is often called 
in the literature ‘the four-personae theory’. Before we consider what Cicero has 
to say on this, I think it useful to keep in mind a distinction that Gill makes 
between personhood and personality in approaching this part of the De Officiis: 
“Those who are concerned with personhood, as I understand this 
notion, are interested in persons as a class, and are, especially, 
concerned to define the nature and boundaries of this class by 
reference to normative criteria of personhood. Thus, in modern 
thinking, the conditions of personhood have been stipulated as, for 
instance, rationality, self-consciousness, and the capacity for 
assuming legal and moral responsibility for oneself. By a concern with 
‘personality’, I understand an interest in persons as individuals, and, 
especially, an interest in what makes each individual distinctive and 
unique. This interest is typically combined with the placing of a high 
valuation on personal individuality and uniqueness … Part of what 
makes the four-personae theory interesting and, in the ancient 
context, unusual, is that it seems to be concerned with personality as 
well as personhood, and to place value on the preservation and 
development of personal individuality … [In the four-personae theory] 
there seems to be an increased interest in actual, differentiated, 
human beings and a reduced interest in the normative ‘sage’.”128 
 
125 Cf. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. p.254. 
126 The term for freedom without such responsibility in Latin is licentia. Cf. Off. 1.148, and in this 
project, pp.328 and 350. 
127 Schofield, The Fourth Virtue. p.55. Emphasis added. 
128 Gill, Personhood and Personality. pp.169–170. 
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I think several things are worthy of note here. Gill says that those interested in 
personhood today—for example, philosophers or legal theorists or lawyers—are 
concerned with defining the nature and boundaries of a class (I would say 
‘category’), and not with defining the natures or boundaries of actual persons. 
Similarly, those interested in personality—for example, philosophers or 
psychologists or citizens—are not interested in defining the personality of actual 
persons. Earlier in this chapter, we saw Brad Inwood say that ‘constitution’ for 
the Stoics “seems to refer to the person, the compound of body and soul which 
constitutes the identifiable individual”, and in the previous chapter, we saw 
Arendt conclude her acceptance speech for the Sonning Prize by expressing a 
hope that, after the event was over, she could move through the great play of 
the world without her professional persona but still be “identifiable”, although 
“not definable”, and all of this I think speaks, or at least should speak, loudly to 
free persons, each of whom in our distinctiveness and uniqueness is not 
definable, but nevertheless identifiable and both legally and morally responsible 
for our actions to the wider society of which we are a part. We are each a 
person, “a man [or woman] of flesh and blood with an individual history, with an 
always unique set of qualities, peculiarities, behaviour patterns, and 
circumstances” who is exercising judgments in the world (p.153), and whose 
constitution is always both “stable and dynamic”, always identifiable yet always 
evolving (p.215). Inwood also said that, for the Stoics, each constitution (or 
‘self’) has both general and individual features, and through Panaetius’s 
‘eclectic’ or unorthodox Stoicism, this seems to me to be something like the 
distinction that Cicero is drawing with the first two of the four personae: 
“…one must understand that we have been dressed, as it were, by 
nature for two roles [personae]: one is common, arising from the fact 
that we all have a share in reason … Everything honestum and 
decorum are derived from this, and from it we discover a method of 
finding out our officia. The other, however, is that assigned 
specifically to individuals [singuli]. For just as there are enormous 
bodily differences (for some, as we see, their strength is the speed 
that they can run, for others the might with which they wrestle; 
again, some have figures that are dignified, others that are graceful), 
similarly there are still greater differences in men’s spirits [animis] … 
Each person should hold on to what is his as far as it is not vicious, but 
is peculiar to him, so that the decorum that we are seeking might 
more easily be maintained. For we must act in such a way that we 
attempt nothing contrary to universal nature; but while conserving 
that, let us follow our own nature, so that even if other pursuits may 
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be weightier and better, we should measure our own by the rule 
[regula] of our own nature … Everyone … should acquire knowledge of 
his own talents, and show himself a sharp judge of his own good 
qualities and faults, else it will seem that actors have more prudentia 
than us. For they do not choose the best plays, but those that are 
most suited to themselves.”129 
 Everything honestum and decorum derive from the first persona, the one we 
hold in common with every single human being as sharers in reason, the one that 
leads contemporary scholars to list ‘rationality’ as one of the key aspects of 
personhood, and the one that led to Arendt’s final judgment to moderate her 
instinctive impulse towards anger. Gill argues that:  
“we will embody this persona best if we submit our impulses to 
rational control, and if we act the ‘parts’ which nature has given us 
[as the first persona, i.e. the four primary virtues] … The combination 
of these several ‘parts’ goes to make up the harmonious whole which 
constitutes moral beauty.”130  
Although Cicero’s account of it is brief in comparison with the second persona, 
the first persona is “implicitly ubiquitous in the whole theory, and plays a 
fundamental role”.131 We can see from the passage quoted that it regulates our 
natural and unique dispositions which make up our second persona insofar as 
what we are holding on to of these dispositions is not vicious. Given that the De 
Officiis is aimed not at would-be Stoic sages but at ordinary human beings 
interested in making moral progress in their actions in a life that is shared, 
Machek argues that the relation between these two personae may be understood 
as involving a “narrowing [of] the gap between [them], in which all our 
individuating characteristics are developed so they are fully in service of virtue” 
(which, again, requires practice), with the dispositions themselves that go into 
making up our second persona being neither virtues nor vices, and so not subject 
to moral appraisal.132 This, of course, does not exclude one’s actions from being 
subject to moral appraisal, and indeed is only one interpretation of many that 
 
129 Off. 1.107–114. 
130 Gill, Personhood and Personality. p.174. 
131 Machek, Using Our Selves. p.174. I would add here that the first persona is implicitly ubiquitous 
in the whole of the De Officiis. 
132 Machek, Using Our Selves. pp.169 and 177.  
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can be made of the four-personae theory as set out in the De Officiis.133 But in 
general terms, and recalling Gill’s distinction, the theory retains an interest in 
the ‘normative ideal’ of personhood, but places at the same time significance on 
the development and flourishing of each of our individual personalities. Indeed, 
whilst conserving the first persona, it is precisely in holding on to each of our 
own peculiarities, conserving the second persona, that Cicero says decorum 
might more easily be maintained.  
The third and fourth personae are set out rather briefly in comparison with the 
second: 
“To the two personae of which I spoke above, a third is added: this is 
imposed by some chance or circumstance. There is also a fourth, 
which we assume for ourselves by our own decision [iudicio]. 
Kingdoms, military powers, nobility, political honours, wealth and 
influence, as well as the opposites of these, are in the gift of chance 
and governed by circumstances. In addition, assuming a persona that 
we want ourselves is something that proceeds from our own will 
[voluntas]; as a consequence, some people apply themselves to 
philosophy, others to civil law, and others again to oratory, while 
even in the case of the virtues, different men prefer to excel in 
different of them.” 
Whereas the first and second personae derive from what nature has provided to 
each of us, in common and individually, the third persona relates to what is 
imposed upon each of us by fortuna. The examples Cicero lists here as being in 
the gift of chance and (changing) circumstances relate to the social positions in 
which we find ourselves at any given time. As Machek puts it, it is chancy 
circumstances such as these that “the exemplary person uses in the right manner 
when deciding about the appropriate action” for them to take in any given 
situation.134 Here, we may recall Arendt’s acceptance speech for the Sonning 
Prize, when she said that the honour was a “felicitous intrusion” and “a piece of 
good luck” (p.152); it seems to me that she had Cicero’s third persona in mind 
when saying this to her audience. While all four of the personae are meant to be 
influencing our choices in life, it is only the fourth persona which derives purely 
 
133 Machek’s argument that our unique dispositions are neither virtues nor vices seems to hinge on 
how one interprets this sentence (Off. 1.110, emphasis added): “Each person should hold on to 
what is his as far as it is not vicious, but is peculiar to him, so that the decorum that we are 
seeking might more easily be maintained.” 
134 Machek, Using Our Selves. p.172. 
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from our own choice. The other three derive from either nature or fortuna, 
which themselves Cicero says should be influencing this fourth persona that we 
choose for ourselves: 
“For just as in each specific thing that we do we seek what is seemly 
according to what and how each of us has been born (as I said above), 
we must exercise much more care when establishing our whole way of 
life, so that we can be constant to ourselves for the whole length of 
our life, not wavering in any of our officia … Nature carries the 
greatest weight in such reasoning, and after that fortune. We should 
generally take account of both in choosing a type of life, but of nature 
more; for it is far steadier and more constant.”135 
In setting out the second persona, Cicero provides a list of exemplary figures 
whose individual natural dispositions, resultant actions and ways of life differed 
greatly, says that there are “countless other dissimilarities of nature and 
conduct, which do not in the least deserve censure”, and we have seen that he 
lists some careers or vocations, such as philosophy, the civil law, and oratory, to 
which the natural abilities of certain individuals are especially suited.136 In the 
next chapter, we shall be considering some of Cicero’s arguments in support of 
the practical life of the citizen, but we can see here that he fully accepts that 
there are different kinds of lives that different kinds of individuals may choose 
for themselves based upon their own natural abilities and their circumstances 
which do not in the least deserve censure, and he was not concerned to build 
what Arendt called ‘a hierarchical structure of the bios theoretikos and the bios 
politikos’ as something that governs individuals’ choices of how to live, 
separately from the other three personae, nor with developing this Peripatetic 
division into a ‘hierarchical structure’ and integrating that structure into his 
theoretical writings on politics.137 Admittedly, we have already seen him identify 
 
135 Off. 1.119–120. It is worth noting here that in her own copy of the De Officiis, Arendt placed an 
exclamation mark beside Cicero’s statement that nature is far steadier and more constant than 
fortuna. It seems to me that she did so because, after the nineteenth century, nature has been 
understood by many to be a movement (or worse, a law of movement)—which need not mean 
(or so it seems to me) that it is not steady or not constant, and in any case, it is far steadier and 
more constant than fortuna. https://blogs.bard.edu/arendtcollection/marginalia/ Accessed 4th 
January 2021. 
136 Off. 1.109. 
137 Whereas Plato saw the philosopher as having an active role to play in public life as philosopher-
king, it seems that the controversy over the bios theoretikos and bios politikos was a Peripatetic 
one: it went on between two of Aristotle’s students, Theophrastus and Dicaearchus. 
Theophrastus followed his teacher as set out in Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, taking the 
bios theoretikos to be ‘the best’ way to live, whereas Dicaearchus, by no means ruling out the 
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some of the problems that those choosing the bios theoretikos may fall into if 
they have an excessive devotion to the pursuit of truth and knowledge, i.e. the 
negative type of injustice, but he also says that many of those who have devoted 
their entire life to this pursuit, in the end, have contributed to the benefits of 
mankind, at least insofar as they wrote, spoke and taught: 
“They have educated many to be better citizens and more beneficial 
to their countries … they seem to have devoted their leisure [otium] 
to our business [negotium]. The very men, then, who have given their 
lives to the pursuit of teaching [doctrinae studiis] and wisdom 
[sapientia], provide above all good sense [prudentia] and 
understanding [intellegentia] for the benefit of mankind. Therefore it 
is better to speak at length, provided one does so wisely [prudenter], 
than to think [cogitare], however penetratingly, without eloquence. 
For speculation turns in on itself [cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur], but 
eloquence embraces those to whom we are joined by social life.”138  
One may recall at this point Beardsworth’s broad conception of critical 
philosophy as “ethical (it is disposed to society as a whole)” and critical 
philosophising as concerned “to promote, in one way or another, better human 
relations” (p.46). But it seems to me that Cicero takes us a step further here. 
Beardsworth called philosophising ‘the force of thought’ that promotes better 
human relations, whereas Cicero in this passage and elsewhere makes it clear, I 
think, that this force on its own is impotent; to be socially beneficial, ratio also 
requires oratio. 
In concluding this section, I think Raphael Woolf nicely summarises for us what 
Cicero has set out in Book I of the De Officiis as regards the four primary virtues: 
“Underlying [Cicero’s] descriptions are two convictions that structure 
much of Book I and provide a rich view of the nature of human life … 
 
bios theoretikos, saw it as a clear second-best alternative, given that ‘man’ is zoon politikon. 
Sean McConnell (p.120n7) states it clearly: “the controversia concerns the question: in what 
does eudaimonia reside: activity in accordance with intellectual or practical virtue?” Cicero’s 
engagement with this dispute is both subtle and refined, as we shall consider in some more 
detail in the next chapter, but for a more comprehensive account, see Sean McConnell, 2014. 
‘Cicero and Dicaearchus’. Philosophical Life in Cicero’s Letters. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
138 Off. 1.155–156. Cf. MDT. p.4, where in her acceptance speech for the Lessing Prize, and after 
lamenting in modernity individuals’ retreats from the world, Arendt says that “This withdrawal 
from the world need not harm an individual; he may even cultivate great talents to the point of 
genius and so by a detour be useful to the world again. But with each such retreat an almost 
demonstrable loss to the world takes place; what is lost is the specific and usually irreplaceable 
in-between which should have formed between this individual and his fellow men.” 
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First, there is no purely private virtue. Humans are first and foremost 
social animals and anything that might count as appropriate in action 
has to be weighed in the context of its social dimensions. But second, 
humans are infinitely diverse individuals, and the question of what is 
the appropriate way to act cannot be settled without reference to the 
agent’s own character and circumstances.”139 
Keeping these two convictions in mind, we can turn now to what Cicero says 
regarding the virtuous conduct of persons in political societies. 
3.4 Virtuous Conduct in Political Societies 
3.4.1 Cicero on Virtuous Conduct in Political Society 
Although Cicero seemed most drawn to both the Stoic and Antiochean ethical 
theories in the De Finibus, there is by no means any kind of ‘application’ of 
these theories in the De Officiis such that what we are reading in it are 
unreconstructed ‘cosmopolitan’ watchwords; there is in it no simple spreading 
out of our social oikeiōsis in ever-expanding circles so that we all seamlessly join 
in a cosmopolis. In Book IV of the De Finibus, the character Cicero had criticised 
the Stoicism to which Cato adhered in Book III for the obscurity of its doctrines 
and the un-persuasive, ultra-logical and unnecessarily alienating style in which 
Stoics expound them as compared with the writings of the Academics or 
Peripatetics, who were well-versed in (their own versions of) logic and rhetoric, 
and so had what Dallmayr called greater “traction and leverage” in terms of 
influencing actual human conduct.140 Even those who are inexorably driven into 
assenting to the Stoics’ conclusions once they have entered their logical 
thickets, Cicero argues, “are not converted in their hearts, and leave in the 
same state as when they came” into them (excepting a few “split hairs” and 
“logical pin-pricks”), whereas freer and more practical forms of discourse, such 
as he uses in the De Officiis (and more freely and practically still in his poetry, 
letters and speeches), is better suited to ‘changing hearts and minds’.141 
Significant elements of both the Stoic and Antiochean ethical theories are to be 
 
139 Woolf, Cicero. p.173. 
140 Cicero does admit here that some of the Stoics had written treatises on rhetoric, but he says 
that they “are perfect reading for those whose burning ambition is to keep quiet.” Fin. 4.7. Cf. 
Catherine Atherton, 1988. ‘Hand over Fist: The Failure of Stoic Rhetoric’. The Classical 
Quarterly 38(2). pp.392–427. 
141 Fin. 4.6–7. 
265 
found throughout the De Officiis, but Cicero uses them at his own discretion and 
in pursuit of a more practical kind of progress than the philosophers (un)usually 
have on their own minds, one aspect of which involves his recognition that his 
audience are in fact deeply committed to their own country which, unlike in the 
mind of a Stoic sage, holds the most privileged place in the hearts and minds of 
citizens: 
“ … when you have surveyed everything with reason and spirit [cum 
omnia ratione animoque lustraris], of all societates none is more 
serious [gravior], and none dearer [carior], than that of each of us 
with the res publica. Parents are dear [cari], and children, relatives 
and acquaintances are dear [cari], but our country [patria] has on its 
own embraced all the affections [caritates] of all of us.”142 
We shall discuss shortly, and in more detail in the next sub-section, what Cicero 
has to say about different degrees of societas in the world, and in the next 
chapter the specific ways in which the res publica is a societas, but in this sub-
section, we are concerned with what he has to say about the virtuous conduct of 
persons in the political society that is the res publica. In the first chapter, we 
saw that many of the philosophers or theorists discussed had an underlying 
conception of society in their writings which was to varying degrees informed by 
modern liberal philosophy, and we saw in the previous chapter that Arendt also 
had an essentially modern conception of society in much of her work which had 
precipitated her obscure distinction between ‘the social’ and ‘the political’, 
although she later deflated this particular distinction (or so it seems to me) by 
providing such a weak defence of it. In the initial drawing of her distinction, 
however, she had gone back to the Greeks and Romans in her investigations of 
‘the political’ and ‘the social’ in The Human Condition and had provided a 
tendentious account of the Latin term societas by insinuating that notions of 
‘rule’ and ‘crime’ were built into it (p.184). But we also saw that, in her 
posthumously published work, she had spoken much more accurately of societas 
as “a cooperative community that fosters relationships between partners” and 
she also spoke of lex as “something which connects two things or two partners 
whom external circumstances have brought together” (pp.185 and 199). Societas 
is a legal term, denoting a partnership, and before we consider Cicero’s advice 
concerning the virtuous conduct of persons in political society, it is important for 
 
142 Off. 1.57. 
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us to keep in mind this juridical background, of which Elizabeth Asmis provides a 
useful summary: 
“In Roman law, partnerships are classified as a type of obligation 
based on contract (ex contractu). All partnerships rely on ‘consent’ or 
‘common agreement’ (consensu); but some rely only on consent (nudo 
consensu), whereas others reinforce common agreement with formal 
elements, such as special wording, written records or the transfer of 
an object. All partnerships are governed by laws (iura), which 
constitute ‘the law of partnership’, ius societatis. In partnerships that 
rely only on consent, a person is legally responsible for acting 
‘according to the [ius gentium]’ or ‘the natural reason of humans’. In 
general, there can be no partnership in a dishonest endeavour: a 
partnership in crime (malificii societas) is null and void.”143 
Societas is a term appropriate to human beings in an untold variety of contexts. 
At its most basic, it may be understood as an agreement between persons to 
contribute their resources (facultates) towards a shared endeavour. Asmis 
describes in her article the underlying principle of societas as “a fair division of 
contributions and rewards”, and although one might speak in this context of a 
‘partnership in crime’, as Arendt did, such a ‘partnership’ by definition is 
outside of the law, it is criminal, and therefore null and void (however much 
‘honour’ there might be among thieves in dividing up their ill-gotten gains).144 
Partners relying only upon nudo consensu nevertheless have a legal responsibility 
to act in accordance with the ius gentium, which Asmis describes here as ‘the 
natural reason of humans’, and which coming into the modern age we saw 
Vitoria describe in the first chapter as ‘what natural reason has established 
among all peoples (or nations)’ (p.98). Asmis speaks of the ius gentium again in 
setting out some of the obligations of partners in any given societas: 
“All partners have an obligation to deal ex bono et aequo, ‘fairly’, 
with one another. Fraud or negligence makes a partner liable to 
prosecution. The type of action brought by one partner against 
another is an action on good faith (bona fide) … These trials use the 
formula ‘good conduct among good men’ (inter bonos bene agier) or 
‘the better, the more fairly’ (melius aequius). A partner who deceives 
 
143 Elizabeth Asmis, 2004. ‘The State as a Partnership: Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica in his 
Work On The State’. History of Political Thought 25(4). p.581. 
144 Cf. Off. 2.40. 
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another is not ‘a good man’. Like later lawyers, Cicero associates 
good faith with the [ius gentium].”145 
Though the civitas can enforce the civil law through the courts, the civil law 
itself, as Griffin and Atkins put it, is “an imperfect instrument for enforcing 
morality”.146 Partners, which is also to say, persons, have both moral and legal 
responsibilities for acting fairly with other members of the societas or societates 
of which they themselves are members; they are ‘enforcers’ of their own morals 
through the exercise of their natural reason. In the previous chapter, Arendt 
spoke of the “series of broken oaths and unkept promises” of persons in Court 
society in revolutionary France, of their “wilfully corrupted … mores and ‘moral’ 
standards”, of their “customary intrigues … and perfidies” which were carried 
over into the political realm and led ultimately to violence and brutality being 
visited upon them by the “lower strata”, with the likes of Robespierre, although 
having correctly sniffed out the corruption of Court society, having “no respect 
for the legal personality which is given and guaranteed by the body politic” 
(p.161). Towards the end of the Roman Republic, we find Cicero also 
complaining about corrupted mores, including in the passage from the De 
Officiis which Asmis cites at this point in her argument, where he says that good 
faith is rooted in laws that are beyond merely the ius civile. As we have seen, he 
says that good faith is a fundamental aspect of the virtue of iustitia itself, and 
after setting out some ‘hard cases’ in Rome and elsewhere where it seems not to 
have been kept, he says: 
“I see that because custom is so corrupted such behaviour is neither 
thought dishonest nor forbidden by statute and ius civile. It is, 
however, forbidden by the lex naturae. For there is a societas that is 
extremely widespread, shared by all with all (even if this has often 
been said, it ought to be said still more often); a closer one exists 
among those of the same gens, and one more intimate still among 
those of the same civitas. For this reason our ancestors wanted the ius 
gentium and the ius civile to be different: everything in the ius civile 
need not be in the ius gentium, but everything in the ius gentium 
ought also to be a part of ius civile … How great are the words ‘That I 
may not be caught or deceived because of you and my faith in you.’ 
 
145 Asmis, State as Partnership. pp.581–582. 
146 Off. p.125n2. 
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How golden are these, ‘One must act well, as among good men, and 
without fraudulence.’”147* 
Again, we shall consider how good faith is manifest in other societates than the 
res publica in the next sub-section, and we shall consider both lex naturae and 
ius gentium in some more detail in the next chapter, but here it suffices for us 
to note once more that Cicero sees good faith as the thing that cements all 
societates, including the res publica, and it relies upon each individual in a given 
societas keeping faith with their fellows, exercising the virtue of iustitia, the 
wisdom of doing so of which is to be found in customs, mores, which have been 
developed and upheld over centuries by individuals learning this lesson for 
themselves, and not infrequently the hard way. Given this fundamental aspect 
of the virtue of iustitia and yet the existence of what Woolf called “infinitely 
diverse individuals” each with their “own characters and circumstances”, Cicero 
sets out in the De Officiis a formula, or ‘rule of procedure’, the abiding by 
which means that one would “never fall away from officium”: 
“…for one man to take something from another and to increase his 
own advantage at the cost of another’s disadvantage is more contrary 
to nature than death, than poverty, than pain and than anything else 
that may happen to his body or external possessions. In the first 
place, it destroys the common life and fellowship of men [convictum 
humanum et societatem]: for if we are so minded that any one man 
will use theft or violence against another for his own profit, then 
necessarily the thing that is most of all in accordance with nature will 
be shattered, that is the fellowship of humankind [humani generis 
societatem] … It is permitted to us—nature does not oppose it—that 
each man should prefer to secure for himself rather than for another 
anything connected with the necessities of life. However, nature does 
not allow us to increase our means, our resources and our wealth by 
despoiling others.”148* 
This formula underscores the natural sociability of human beings and the 
centrality of the virtue of justice in the De Officiis. In Book I, Cicero says that 
fraud and force (fraus et vis) seem “most alien” to a human being; they mark 
out the very worst extremity of humanity because they work to destroy social 
relationships, and as we shall see in the next sub-section, this formula has 
 
147 Off. 3.69–70. The words Cicero quotes here are clauses of contracts that rely on equity 
(fairness, aequabilitas) for their fulfilment. For Cicero on equity, see pp.335–336. 
148 Off. 3.19–22. 
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important implications for societates beyond the res publica as well.149 But 
another important point to note here is that Cicero in coming up with his 
formula for virtuous conduct in political society is drawing significantly on those 
arguments of the Stoics which, as an Academic sceptic, he finds most 
persuasive, and which shapes the practical advice he is giving his son in a more 
cosmopolitan direction, even as it still relates to virtuous conduct within the res 
publica: 
“…all men should have this one object, that the benefit of each 
individual and the benefit of all together should be the same. If 
anyone arrogates it to himself, all human intercourse will be 
dissolved. Furthermore, if nature prescribes that one man should want 
to consider the interests of another, whoever he may be, for the very 
reason that he is a man, it is necessary according to the same nature, 
that what is beneficial to all is something common. If that is so, then 
we are all constrained by one and the same lex naturae; and if that is 
also true, then we are certainly forbidden by the lex naturae from 
acting violently against another person. The first claim is indeed true; 
therefore the last is true.”150 
Although self-consciously retaining the Stoics’ syllogistic way of putting a point, 
Cicero not only expresses their argument about natural law in a language more 
persuasive to non-philosophers; he also connects it more immediately to the 
conduct of actual human beings. We can also see that built into Cicero’s formula 
and the above Stoicising argument about natural law is the condition that Long 
said reconciles what is utile with what is honestum in the De Officiis: that the 
self-interest of each individual, ‘the unavoidable object of individual human 
endeavour’, must be coextensive with the interest of all. 
Justice is plainly on Cicero’s mind throughout the De Officiis, but what of the 
other virtues as they relate to the conduct of persons in political society? We 
have already seen that he recognises the social benefits to be had from those 
who have devoted their lives to the virtue of sapientia, the pursuit of truth, i.e. 
imparting their knowledge and learning to fellow citizens, which constitutes 
virtuous conduct on their part. With the virtue of magnitudo animi, however, 
Cicero again provides some warning in his advice by speaking of those who slip 
 
149 Off. 1.41. 
150 Off. 3.27. 
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from this virtue into a desire for glory, leading to conduct that has deleterious 
effects on society: 
“…such men allow themselves to be defeated neither by argument nor 
by any public or legal obligation. Only too often do they emerge in 
public life as bribers or agitators, seeking to acquire as much wealth 
as possible, preferring violent pre-eminence to equality through 
iustitia … It is not, therefore, those who inflict injury, but those who 
prevent it, whom we should consider the men of courage and great 
spirit [fortes et magnanimi]. A true and wise greatness of spirit [vera 
et sapiens animi magnitudo] judges that deeds and not glory are the 
basis of the honestum that nature most seeks. It prefers not to seem 
pre-eminent but to be so; he who is carried by the errors of the 
inexperienced mob should not be counted a great man [magnis 
viris].”151* 
Greatness of spirit in one who is not wise can be a dangerous thing, and as we 
have seen (p.238), Cicero advises that in providing beneficia one should 
particularly foster those in political society who show themselves to be equipped 
with gentler virtues such as iustitia and decorum. He observes that when we 
think people possess “all the virtues that are associated with gentleness and 
easiness of conduct … we are compelled by nature to love [diligere] them”, that 
it is from carrying out the officia deriving from these virtues that true glory is 
achieved in public life, and that the greatest effect in carrying out officia is 
achieved in being what we wish to seem.152 Cicero, as with Romans more 
generally, understood glory to be of the greatest importance in managing the res 
publica. Broadly speaking, it signifies great fame or renown bestowed upon one 
by others for great deeds undertaken in preserving and protecting the res 
publica. Glorious deeds require a courageous disposition, but as we have seen, 
Cicero regards this quality on its own to be dangerous, and so he sought (quite 
radically) to rework glory in the De Officiis, tying it much more closely to the 
other virtues, especially justice.153 Slipping into a desire for pre-eminence may 
involve desiring to be feared by others, and Cicero is at pains to emphasise how 
far more useful (and wise and just) it is to be loved rather than feared. Indeed, 
 
151 Off. 1.64–65. 
152 Off. 2.32 and 2.44. Cf. Long, Cicero’s politics in De Officiis. pp.224–233. 
153 He also wrote a treatise on it, De Gloria, which has not come down to us except for a few 
fragments. For his treatment of glory in the De Officiis, cf. Long, Cicero’s Politics in the De 
Officiis. 
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he regards the desire to be feared as that which has brought the Roman res 
publica to ruin: 
“…there is nothing at all more suited to protecting and retaining 
influence than to be loved [diligi], and nothing less suited than to be 
feared [timeri] … Fear is a poor guardian over any length of time; but 
goodwill [benivolentia] keeps faithful guard forever … those who wish 
to be feared cannot but themselves be afraid of the very men who 
fear them … The res publica we have utterly lost. And we have fallen 
into this disaster … because we prefer to be feared than to be held 
dear and loved … it is obvious that the power of goodwill is great, and 
that of fear feeble …”154 
Once again, we see Cicero limiting magnitudo animi through the other virtues, 
especially justice.155 But what of decorum? After setting out the four-personae 
theory, Cicero provides advice regarding the officia of those holding different 
positions in political society: 
“It would not go beyond my brief to say something also of the officia 
of magistrates, of private individuals [privatorum], of citizens 
[civium] and of foreigners [peregrinorum]. It is, then, the particular 
function [munus] of a magistrate to realize that he bears and carries 
through the role of the civitas [gerere personam civitatis] and ought 
to sustain its standing and its seemliness [dignitas et decus], to 
preserve the laws [leges], to administer ius, and to be mindful of the 
things that have been entrusted to his good faith [fides] … A private 
person, on the other hand, ought first to live on fair and equal terms 
with the other citizens, neither behaving submissively and abjectly or 
giving himself airs; and secondly to want public affairs [res publica] to 
be peaceful and honestum. For we are accustomed to think and say 
that such a man is a good citizen … It is the officium of a foreigner 
[peregrini] or resident alien [incoli] to do nothing except his own 
business, asking no questions about anyone else, and never to meddle 
in public affairs which are not his own [aliena re publica 
curiosem].”156* 
We can see here for Cicero that conduct which is decorum in political society 
will very much depend upon the position one holds in it and whatever persona 
relates to that position.157 And we can also see that this passage speaks to the 
tensions between republican and liberal institutions set out by Brown in his 
 
154 Off. 2.23–29. 
155 Cf. PP. pp.68–69. 
156 Off. 1.124–125. 
157 On gerere personam civitatis, cf. Quentin Skinner, 2018. From Humanism to Hobbes: Studies in 
Rhetoric and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.2. 
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discussion of civil society in the first chapter (p.85). Cicero here distinguishes 
clearly between the officia of magistrates and the officia of private citizens (his 
use of privatus refers to citizens who hold no public office), with the former 
rather than the latter bearing the role of the civitas through the constitutional 
arrangements which are upheld by all citizens, shouldering the public 
responsibilities for maintaining peace and arbitrating disputes between private 
citizens (administering ius)—all of which, as Brown says, enables civil society to 
exist in the first place. The officia Cicero sets out for private citizens here I 
think are very much in line with many liberal accounts of civil society, even as 
Habermas’s language of ‘compulsion’ might suggest to some readers (I suspect 
against his best intentions) that risks along the lines of what Montesquieu 
warned democratic citizens against (insofar as they want to sustain democracy) 
might be worth taking, i.e. pursuing a want ‘to manage everything themselves, 
to debate for the senate, to execute for the magistrate, and to decide for the 
judges.’158 Although there is a clear distinction drawn by Cicero here between 
the officia of magistrates and private citizens, it seems to me that Brown’s 
claim that republican civic virtue and civil society are in principle two opposing 
ideals is worth closer consideration by both ‘civic republican’ and ‘liberal’ 
scholars, and that Norval is indeed working along the right lines in seeking to 
develop civic virtues in members of civil society. With Dallmayr (p.92), I believe 
most modern liberals are not anarchists, and so have not “abandoned the idea of 
managed consensus”, even if Arendt is right that they tend to ignore forms of 
government, the question of who is ‘managing’. Brown says that they have 
abandoned the idea that consensus is or should be managed by “the standard-
bearers of republican virtue”, and my argument is, whatever the form of 
government, these standard-bearers are to be found in history and should be 
found in citizens themselves, by themselves with the help of education, and with 
“the degree of moral unity” in any given societas being up to its members. I 
sought to show in the previous chapter through Arendt’s writings how consensus 
and ‘a degree of moral unity’ has manifest itself and has been ‘managed’ both in 
the various councils that sprung up during some of the revolutions of the past 
two centuries and in the American founding—without ‘forcing’ anyone to be 
‘free’—and we shall be discussing these matters in more detail in the next 
 
158 It is worth noting here the novelty of Montesquieu’s ‘separation of powers’; the functions of 
magistrates and senators in the Roman republic were often those of judges as well. 
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chapter. But to return to the above passage, as regards Cicero’s advice 
concerning the officia of foreign residents, this again speaks to the republican 
context in which he is writing, but it certainly does not exclude these residents 
from social life within the boundaries of the civitas: 
“…hospitality was rightly praised by Theophrastus. For it is most 
seemly [valde decorum] (or so it seems to me) for the homes of 
distinguished men to be open to distinguished guests. Furthermore, it 
reflects splendidly on the res publica that foreigners [homines 
externos] do not in our city [urbs] go short of that kind of 
liberalitas.”159 
I believe it is in the context of Cicero’s writings that Waldron in the first chapter 
was reading Kant’s writings on hospitality as a virtue of sociability (p.51). 
Whereas Benhabib interpreted them as being about relations between 
individuals and states, Waldron interpreted them as being about relations 
between people and peoples—‘there is nothing inherently unjust or 
inappropriate about individually initiated contact among peoples’—and we have 
already seen that for Cicero the virtue of iustitia is one accessible to all as 
sharers in reason and involves ‘the reasoning by which the fellowship of men and 
communal life are held together’, whether in the societas that is the res 
publica, or the societas generis humani. Towards the end of his discussion of 
personae, he sums up the practical advice he has provided in Book I through a 
discussion of the four primary virtues:  
“…we ought to respect and revere those whose life has been 
conspicuous for its magnis and honestis deeds, who have held sound 
views about the res publica, and have deserved, or still deserve, well 
of her—just as if they had achieved a specific honour or command. We 
ought also to grant a great deal to old age; to yield to those who 
exercise magistracies; and to distinguish [dilectum] between citizen 
and foreigner [peregrini], and in the case of a foreigner as to whether 
he has come in a private or public capacity. In short, so as not to go 
into details, we ought to revere, to guard and to preserve the 
common affection and fellowship of the whole of humankind 
[communem totius generis hominum conciliationem et 
consociationem colere, tueri, servare debemus].”160* 
 
159 Off. 2.64. Cf. Tusc. 4.25–27, where Cicero discusses “infirmities of the mind” such as 
misanthropy and hostility to guests (inhospitalitas) arising from “aversion” (offensionum) to 
generis humani. 
160 Off. 1.149. 
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At least three things are worthy of note here. First, we see Cicero upholding the 
respect for old age that we saw Arendt highlighting in Romans in general in the 
previous chapter (p.129). Again, this underscores the auctoritas that Romans 
found in the accumulated practical wisdom of and experience in the world that 
certain persons gain in life and who have reached old age, but as I hope already 
to have indicated in this chapter and as we shall see in some more detail in the 
next, this by no means results in a facile rejection of ‘theory’ in favour of 
‘practice’ for Cicero, or of ‘philosophy’ in favour of ‘history’; it is, rather, a 
recognition that we always need the help of such practical wisdom and 
experience for ‘going on’ in the world.161 Second, we see his focus very much 
upon the deeds of persons, since “all the praise that belongs to virtue lies in 
action.”162 And third, although the discussion has proceeded on the basis that it 
is the res publica which is the most important societas, this has by no means 
been to the exclusion of those who are not fellow citizens in our officia; we 
ought to be revering, guarding and building up societas wherever possible across 
the whole of humankind. Philosophers may be disappointed that Cicero speaks 
here ‘in short’, but it seems to me that if his advice lacks philosophical 
precision, it is nevertheless “noble and practical”, and that it is not difficult to 
get a general sense of what he means to say.163     
3.4.2 Cicero on Virtuous Conduct in International Political Society 
Even if and as we can get this general sense, however, there is much legitimate 
scholarly debate about the passages in the De Officiis (Off. 1.50–58) where 
Cicero sets out the different ‘degrees’ (gradus) of societas among human beings, 
but these are debates amongst classicists, philosophers, ancient historians, and 
legal theorists, consideration of which has yet to find its way into IPT, and I do 
not engage with them in this sub-section.164 We began considering one of these 
degrees under the heading of the virtue of iustitia earlier in this chapter, when 
we saw Cicero speak of societas generis humani and its social bonding that is 
 
161 Cf. Sen. 17; Woolf, pp.190–192. 
162 Off. 1.19. 
163 Nussbaum, Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism. p.3. 
164 And with insufficient education in these different fields, nor could I, though I believe it is the kind 
of education that would be of immeasurable benefit in IPT. Cf. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, 
De Officiis. pp.165–181. 
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reason and speech, the two things that reconcile human beings with one 
another. We saw Dallmayr in the first chapter speaking of this societas in terms 
of “cosmopolitan coexistence and collaboration”, and that what is urgently 
needed in our own time is a “strengthening of the dispositions [in human beings] 
conducive” to it, chiefly “generosity, hospitality, mutuality and striving for 
justice” (p.71). While I sought to show that Cicero was not quite speaking about 
a cosmopolis and was speaking instead about an already existing, sublunary 
societas of ‘all with all others’, I think it is clear that Dallmayr and Cicero are on 
the same page as to what is required for building it up; the former’s list of 
dispositions here largely converge with the latter’s accounts of iustitia and 
societas, and both recognise that it requires ‘a large-scale pedagogical effort’ as 
distinct from ‘the edicts of a select group of philosophers’ or what Waldron 
called a ‘thunderous imposition of positive law from on high’. Cicero says that 
each and every human being shares in reason, and uses the Stoics’ language in 
saying that this means all of us have “the seeds” of virtue which may lead 
ultimately to a Stoic cosmopolis, but to develop, all of these seeds require care 
and attention, careful preservation and cultivation, in Dallmayr’s words a ‘large-
scale pedagogical effort’, and so long as they are not all flourishing, some 
continue to fall away from the societas of ‘all with all others’—and yet there still 
exist different degrees of societas in the world deriving from our natural 
sociability:          
“There are indeed several degrees of societas among men. To move 
from the one that is unlimited [Ut enim ab illa infinita discedatur], 
next there is a closer one of the same gens, natio and tongue, through 
which men are connected very closely to one another [propior est 
eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae, qua maxime homines 
coniunguntur]. More intimate still is that of the same civitas [interius 
etiam est eiusdem esse civitatis], as citizens have many things that 
are shared with one another: the forum, temples, porticoes and 
roads, laws and legal rights, law-courts and political elections; and 
besides these acquaintances and companionship [familiaritates 
multisque], and those business and commercial transactions that 
many of them make with many others. A tie narrower still is that of 
the fellowship between relations [societatis propinquorum]: moving 
from the vast fellowship of humankind [immensa societate humani 
generis] we end up with a confined and limited one.”165* 
 
165 Rep. 1.41; Off. 1.53. 
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We saw that Cicero spoke in Off. 1.50 of societas generis humani, and in the 
above passage we see him proceeding from it in degrees to the most ‘confined 
and limited’ societas in what Woolf has called “a model of reverse oikeiōsis.”166 
But he goes on immediately from this passage to trace social oikeiōsis back out 
from the societas between relations to arrive at the passage quoted on p.261 
above, where he says that it is the patria we hold most dear after we have 
surveyed everything with reason and spirit, and which is “at the centre of the 
network of social relations” that connect people and peoples.167 This comports 
with the watchwords he provides at the very beginning of Off. 1.50—“the 
fellowship between men and their common bonding [societas hominum 
coniunctioque] will best be preserved if the closer [coniunctissimus] someone is 
to you the more kindness [benignitas] you confer upon him”—as a practical route 
towards building societas generis humani, yet of course never losing sight of the 
latter and always nurturing the gentler virtues such as iustitia, beneficentia, 
liberalitas and hospitalitas that actually build it. 
But as Dallmayr and many others recognise, there is urgent need today for 
education to strengthen such virtues, just as there was in Cicero’s own day, and 
while we are not all joining together like Stoic sages in a cosmopolis, “revering, 
guarding and preserving the common affection and fellowship of the whole of 
humankind” (quoted on p.270) Cicero recognises in an imperfect world may 
sometimes require the use of force, but even here we find him placing both 
moral and legal limitations upon its use:     
 “Something else that must very much be preserved in public affairs 
[res publica] is the ius of warfare [iura belli]. There are two types of 
conflict: the one proceeds by debate [disceptatio], the other by force 
[vis]. Since the former is the proper concern of a man [hominis], but 
the latter of beasts [beluarum], one should only resort to the latter if 
one may not employ the former. Wars, then, ought to be undertaken 
for this purpose, that we may live in peace, without injustice [sine 
iniuria]; and once victory has been secured, those who were not cruel 
[crudelis] or monstrous [immanes] in warfare should be spared.”168* 
 
166 Woolf, Cicero. p.182. Cf. Schofield, Two Stoic Approaches to Justice. 
167 Off. 1.54–58; Woolf, Cicero. p.182. For the possible influences on this passage of Plato, 
Aristotle, as well as the Stoic and Peripatetic traditions, cf. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De 
Officiis. pp.173–174. 
168 Off. 1.34–35. 
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We have already seen that for Cicero the very bonding of societas generis 
humani consists in our shared capacities for reason and speech, through which 
conflicts are mediated and resolved, and this of course recalls Arendt’s claim 
that a fundamentally meaningful part of politics is that things are decided 
through words and persuasion rather than force or violence. By this point in my 
argument, it is my hope that the reader has come to understand more fully why I 
think it is not only reasonable but also meaningful to speak of political societies. 
But in the above passage we see Cicero (implicitly) referring to a different kind 
of societas than that of the res publica or of humankind, international political 
society, where what Arendt calls “the silent acknowledgement of common 
interests” concerning the use of force exists, “the foundation-stone of 
international relations even under the conditions of war” that allows for 
international crimes to be identified and a plurality of groups to co-exist 
(pp.199–200). This ‘foundation-stone’ she calls earlier in the same text, in 
distinction from the Rights of Man, “the customs of history” (quoted on p.190) 
which, if silently acknowledged by statespersons in international political 
society, have also been given legal expression over time, and indeed Cicero’s 
writings on the ius of war in the De Officiis and elsewhere in his corpus are 
major sources in which the ius gentium receives this expression. We shall be 
discussing the meaning of ius as well as the ius gentium in some more detail in 
the next chapter, but here we are concerned with the virtuous conduct of 
persons in international political society. 
In considering this conduct, it is useful for us to begin by recalling the juridical 
background of societas as set out by Asmis on pp.262–263 above. Whether 
through treaties or nudo consensu (which also sounds something like Arendt’s 
‘silent acknowledgement’), partners are responsible for acting according to the 
ius gentium, ex bono et aequo, ‘fairly’ with one another, as ‘good men’ do. A 
legal action brought by one partner against another is an action on good faith, 
the keeping of which we have seen Cicero say is a fundamentum of iustitia, that 
which binds a given societas together. His advice regarding the ius of warfare 
here was conditioned by the general sense of international obligation that 
already existed amongst numerous civitates across the Mediterranean at this 
point; a mutual understanding which had developed over centuries allowing each 
member of ‘international’ political society to be confident that their relations 
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with each other, even with their different cultures, could be based on good 
faith. The initiation and conduct of hostilities in this societas performed the 
function of a kind of religious-legal redress or punishment for a (perceived) 
wrong that had been committed, or good faith that had been broken. It is in this 
broader context of what the ius gentium had already established between 
different civitates that Cicero says “no war is iustum unless it is waged after a 
formal demand for restoration [of a wrong done], or unless it has been formally 
announced and declared beforehand”, and “if any individuals have been 
constrained by circumstance to promise anything to an enemy [hosti], they must 
keep faith even in that”.169 Whilst the res publica is at the centre of the network 
of social relations that binds people and peoples, we can see here that Cicero is 
no ‘egoist or communalist’, to use Walzer’s terms (p.249); he has his eyes fixed 
simultaneously upon, and a concern for preserving and building up, both the 
societas that is res publica and other societates, including that between 
different civitates, ‘international’ political society. We recall that for Cicero it 
is magistrates who bear and carry through the role of the civitas (gerere 
personam civitatis) (pp.270–271) and it seems to me that he had not only the 
societas of Rome but also ‘international’ political society on his mind in saying 
so; officia are owed to non-citizens (of Rome) even in battle. 
We have already seen that Cicero is concerned to promote the gentler virtues, 
that he places limits on those virtues which may slip easily into the commission 
of unjust deeds, and that he deflates opinions about the glory of military 
achievements in favour of civilian ones. His writings are peaceable without being 
‘pacifist’, the latter of which is a disposition no statesperson sworn to protect 
any given political societas can sustain.170 In Walzer’s words, Cicero’s writings 
“[make] war possible in a world where war [is], sometimes, necessary”, but they 
do so by embedding it in a framework of virtue that seeks to limit it as far as 
possible in the name of justice, and I think this can be seen in the very language 
 
169 Off. 1.36 and 39. 
170 Again, President Obama’s acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize is informative: “As 
someone who stands here as a direct consequence of Dr. King’s life’s work, I am living 
testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there is nothing weak, nothing passive, 
nothing naïve, in the creed of the lives of Gandhi and King. But as a head of state sworn to 
protect and defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it 
is …”. (For reference, see p.244n97). 
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he is using in the above passage.171 Whereas when Plato said in The Laws that 
“the best … is neither war nor civil war—the necessity for these things is to be 
regretted—but rather peace, and at the same time goodwill towards one 
another” he was writing about the best imaginable, Cicero in the De Officiis, 
although I think plainly in the same spirit as Plato here, is writing about the best 
practicable.172 His focus, like all expect or should expect statespersons to have, 
is fixed upon our living in peace without injustice, and rather than hot-headedly 
writing here about our officia in the face of those who are cruel and monstrous 
in battle, he leaves it merely as a possibility and an implication for the reader to 
consider for themselves and writes instead about those who are not.173 
We saw in the passage quoted on p.245 an articulation of what came in time to 
be called the ius ad bellum principle of proportionality, and in the passage 
quoted on p.273 we can see the ius ad bellum principle of last resort, although 
as Johnson put it in the first chapter, these are not ‘rules’ for statespersons to 
obey or a ‘checklist’ for them to tick off as ‘done’, but rather ‘praxes of 
judgment’, or what he calls elsewhere ‘prudential concerns’.174 In the case of 
‘last resort’, when Cicero says “one should only resort to the latter if one may 
not employ the former”, he is leaving it for the statesperson to judge whether 
the problem at hand is a situation of debate or a situation of war, since 
statespersons are the ‘proper authority’ for resorting to the latter.175 We have 
also seen in his writings what came to be called the ius ad bellum principle of 
just cause, which Johnson describes as “specifically defense of the common 
 
171 Walzer, The Triumph of Just War Theory. p.925. 
172 Plato, The Laws. 628c–d. 
173 Cf. Virgil’s Aeneid 6.847–853, ‘…parcere subiectis et debellare superbos’: it is the Roman way 
to ‘spare the vanquished and ‘war down’ [or ‘subdue’ or perhaps even ‘not spare’] the arrogant’. 
See also Cassius Dio, Historiae Romanae 36.37, who provided account of Pompey’s actions 
towards the pirates, i.e. those whose indiscriminate criminality made them hostes generis 
humani (enemies of humankind): “…[Pompey] was irresistible both on sea and on land, but his 
leniency towards those [pirates] who made terms with him was equally great, so that he won 
over large numbers by such a course”. Plutarch, The Life of Pompey 29.1–5, tells us that he 
“determined to transfer the men [who made terms with him] from the sea to the land, and let 
them have a taste of gentle life by being accustomed to dwell in cities and till the ground.” We 
are less concerned here with the historical accuracy of these accounts than with the moral 
message they mean to convey. While Dio speaks of Pompey’s leniency (clementia), it seems to 
me that his actions—even in this dire situation for which he was granted an extraordinary 
command—towards those who made terms with him also showed certain other virtues, 
including beneficentia: acts of kindness that promote fellowship. 
174 Johnson, The Just War Idea. p.177. 
175 Leg. 3.8. 
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good against serious injury, recovery of something wrongly taken, or punishment 
for wrongdoing”, and while the principle of ‘right intention’ has been largely 
informed by Christian thought, I hope to have shown in this chapter thus far that 
Cicero manifests it, this principle being described by Johnson as “not aggression, 
domination, implacable enmity, just plain cruelty and the like, but the intention 
to protect, restore or establish peace.”176 
The passage quoted above contains a sonorous fusion of what came to be called 
ius ad bellum, ius in bello and ius post bellum: ius ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ 
hostilities.177 Since the officia of statespersons and generals were often carried 
out by the same individual at Rome, we find much of the advice Cicero offers to 
his son (and by extension other would-be statespersons and generals) in the De 
Officiis regarding warfare relating not only to its initiation and peace-aiming 
conclusion but also to its conduct, and all within a framework of virtue where 
justice plays a leading role. In his discussion of the conduct of Marcus Atilius 
Regulus (consul 267 and 256 BCE) in Book III, for example, he recounts how 
Regulus was captured by the Carthaginians in 255 and sent back to the Roman 
senate, having sworn to them that he would return (i.e., to certain death) unless 
certain Carthaginian nobles who were being held captive by the Romans were 
returned. Cicero begins by praising Regulus’s greatness of spirit before going on 
to praise the fact that he kept faith with the enemy: 
“When he reached Rome, he could see the thing that was apparently 
utile, but, as events reveal, he judged it specious. It was this: to 
remain in his own country, to be at home with his wife and children, 
to maintain his rank and standing as ex-consul, counting the disaster 
that had befallen him in war as common to the fortune of warfare. 
Who can deny that such things are utile? Whom do you think? 
Magnitudo animi and fortitudo deny it. Surely you are not seeking 
authorities [auctores] still more reliable? For it is characteristic of 
these virtues to fear nothing, to disdain everything human, and to 
think nothing that can happen to a man unendurable … What, 
 
176 Johnson, The Just War Idea. p.169. Cf. Rep. 3.34a and 3.35a. 
177 It is useful to note in this connection that the virtue of prudentia has, since at least Cicero (e.g., 
Rep. 2.67, Leg. 1.60, Off. 1.11 with 1.15–16), been associated with ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’, 
or put differently: past (praeteritis), present (praesentibus) and future (futura). It may be 
described as holding a necessary connection in the present to the past with a care for the future 
(and so is closely connected to both consilium and auctoritas), or as Aquinas has it (in the 
words of Quentin Skinner), “what distinguishes prudence is the ability to learn about things in 
the future by way of considering things in the present as well as things in the past.” Quentin 
Skinner, 2002. ‘Lorenzetti and the Portrayal of Virtuous Government’. Visions of Politics Vol. II: 
Renaissance Virtues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.83.  
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therefore, did he do? Entering the senate, he revealed his 
instructions; then he refused to vote himself, saying that as long as he 
was held under oath by the enemy, he was not a senator. And 
furthermore—‘Foolish man’, someone will say, ‘to oppose his own 
utilitas!’—he even claimed that it was not utile to restore the 
captives: for they were young men and good leaders while he was 
worn out by old age. His auctoritas prevailed, and the captives were 
kept there. He himself returned to Carthage, held back by love 
neither for his country nor for his family and friends … he thought that 
his oath should be kept [ius iurandum conservandum putabat].”178 
Earlier in the discussion, Cicero had already said that a fair code of warfare had 
been drawn up in the ius fetiale which seems in some sense to have reflected 
the ius gentium, and he repeats the point in his discussion here: 
“Regulus was right [vero] not to overturn by perjury stipulations and 
agreements made with an enemy [hostiles] in war. For the enemy 
[hoste] with whom the war was being waged was rightful [iusto] and 
legitimate [legitimo]. The whole of our fetial code is about such an 
enemy [adversus] and we have many other laws that are shared [iura 
communia]. If that were not so, the senate would never have 
delivered notable men in chains to the enemy [hostibus].”179*  
It seems to me that that Carthage (at this point) was a member of international 
political society is what made them a iusto and legitimo enemy [hostis], or what 
Cicero calls by analogy with domestic affairs a ‘rival’ [competitor] instead of an 
‘enemy’ [inimicus]: 
“When, then, we are fighting for empire [imperium] and seeking glory 
through warfare, those grounds that I mentioned a little above as 
rightful grounds [iustas causas] for war should be wholly present. But 
wars in which the goal is the glory of empire are waged less bitterly. 
For just as in civilian matters we may compete [contendimus] in one 
way with an enemy [inimicus], in another with a rival [competitor] 
(for the latter contest is for honor [honoris] and standing [dignitas], 
 
178 Off. 3.99–100. Again, the historical accuracy is less our concern here than the moral message 
Cicero means to convey. Cf. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. pp.619–645. 
179 Off. 3.108. Carthage was viewed as a iusto and legitimo enemy—with whom one should fight 
according to the ius fetiale and ius gentium—during the First Punic War (264–241), but not so 
during the Third (149–146), when Scipio destroyed the city, for “the Carthaginians were 
breakers of truces, and Hannibal was cruel”. Off. 1.38. For both sides of the debate as to 
whether the Roman judgment to destroy Carthage was right or wrong, see Alberico Gentili, 
2011. Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (eds.). The Wars of the Romans: A Critical 
Edition and Translation of De Armis Romanis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The fetiales 
were a college of priests tasked with the oversight of international affairs who would approach 
the senate informing them as to the ius or otherwise of particular wars. Cf. Clifford Ando, 2010. 
‘Empire and the Laws of War: A Roman Archaeology’. Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin 
Straumann (eds.), 2010. The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and 
the Justice of Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.3. 
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the former for one’s civic life [capitis] and reputation [famae]), 
similarly the wars against the Celtiberi and the Cimbri were waged 
with inimicis: the question was not who would command [imperaret], 
but who would exist.”180* 
Imperial competition in antiquity aside, it seems to me that the distinction that 
Cicero is drawing here is between belligerents who are protected by the ius 
fetiale and ius gentium, where fighting is carried out with less bitterness (or put 
differently, [a mutually recognised level of] justice is conducted in warfare), 
and belligerents who are outside of these protections. The implication is that a 
war whose aim is the very survival of the civitas need not require such moderate 
behaviour as is required in international political society (although again, notice 
that Cicero leaves it as an implication for the reader to consider for themselves, 
rather than writing hot-headedly about such desperate situations, as I fear I am 
writing about them just now).181 Thus, while praising Roman restraint against the 
Tusculanes, the Sabines, and others, Cicero shows no remorse here for the far 
more immoderate actions of Romans in their battles against the Cimbri and the 
Celtiberi, both of whom were regarded as cruel, and their destruction 
understood as necessary for the survival of the Roman civitas. The moral and 
legal limitations upon war on this account, it seems to me, can only exist among 
the more or less civilised: civitates who have deliberated, written their own civil 
laws, and recognise that officia are owed to other cives and civitates, which is 
also to say, members of international political society—or as Arendt put it, ‘the 
civilised world’ (pp.199–200). 
Deciding whether the survival of the civitas is threatened or not involves making 
a prior judgment which is by no means straightforward or trivial. Getting it 
wrong involves committing injustice against another civitas, which in turn 
threatens the fabric that holds international political society together as a 
whole. For Cicero, such desperate situations cannot be theorised; they cannot 
be brought under a set of rules or procedures that are to be unwaveringly 
followed always. Rather, they are to be considered extremely carefully as and 
when (or better, before) they arise, and the judgments made require a great 
deal of prudentia so that conditions of absolute necessity are correctly 
 
180 Off. 1.38. 
181 Off. 1.38. 
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recognised and dealt with appropriately. To this end, Cicero is concerned to 
discover the characteristics of the ideal statesperson, some of his writings upon 
which we shall be considering in more detail in the next chapter, but here, it 
suffices for us to note that he understands there to be, in one sense, a radical 
separation between justice and necessity, but in another sense, they come 
together in the virtue (specifically the sapientia and prudentia) of the ideal 
statesperson. As we have seen, iustitia is the supreme social virtue for Cicero. It 
requires good faith (fides), mutual trust, which is only possible amongst those 
who recognise officia to one another. If, for example, a rival is seen to threaten 
the survival of the civitas, this would be taken as a sign that it recognised no 
such officia to others and could not therefore be the recipient of good faith. In 
this scenario, the rival is transformed into a deadly enemy who sits outside of 
international political society and so outside the protections of the ius gentium. 
Determining the veracity of this threat becomes all-important because it entails 
actions that would be unjust within international political society, though they 
might be necessary to save the civitas from existential threats outside of it. This 
it seems to me converges in some way with Walzer’s ‘supreme emergency’ 
argument: an extremely desperate and terrifying situation that nobody should 
wish upon any res publica, and it places a great deal of responsibility on the 
statesperson to understand what both justice and necessity are in times of war, 
and what threat means in the face of a deadly enemy disposed to wreak havoc in 
international political society, such as, for example, the Nazi and Stalinist 
regimes in fact wrought. As with Kelsay’s arguments in the first chapter, 
Cicero’s writings on warfare blend a form of ‘realism’ (the necessity of wars of 
survival) and ‘just war’ (based on shared officia), but again, it is important to 
remember that he embeds them in a framework of virtue that seeks to place 
limits on ‘realism’ as far as possible in the name of iustitia. Indeed, iustitia and 
necessity come together in the sapientia and prudentia of the ideal 
statesperson. 
3.5 Conclusions 
3.5.1 Springs of Initiative 
In the first chapter, I foregrounded an approach to ethics which has hitherto 
been marginalised in IPT, virtue ethics, since it is an approach fundamental to 
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Cicero’s writings and I think by far the best for understanding politics as (partly) 
personal when it is contrasted with the rules-based approaches that are 
deontology and consequentialism (although at the same time I sought to show 
that ‘rules-based’ philosophers such as Kant also had much to say about the 
virtues). The approach is commonly understood as being rooted in the work of 
Aristotle, who was our point of departure in the first section of this chapter in 
considering some arguments in the Academic, Peripatetic and Stoic traditions of 
philosophy that human beings are naturally sociable; arguments upon which Kant 
and at one remove, Arendt, relied upon in their own writings. I proceeded to set 
out some of the key features of the Stoic and Antiochean ethical theories as 
given by the characters Cato and Piso in Cicero’s De Finibus, both of which 
relied in different ways upon the Stoic account of social oikeiōsis in arguing that 
human beings are naturally sociable. We saw in this sub-section that, for the 
Stoics, virtue is the only good, whereas Antiochus, whilst agreeing with the 
Stoics that virtue was sufficient for a happy life, argued in a Peripatetic mode 
that the happiest life also required bodily goods such as health and external 
goods such as friendship and prosperity. While Cicero sought to impart to his 
readers in the De Finibus that no ethical theory was left standing as the clearly 
preferable one and we must come to our own understanding of what is the best 
way to live, he drew at his own discretion upon significant elements of both the 
Stoic and Antiochean ethical theories (and not only these theories) in writing the 
De Officiis.  
In the second sub-section of this chapter, I sought to distinguish for the reader 
what Cicero is doing in the De Finibus from what he is doing in the De Officiis. 
Whereas the former is written in the form of a dialogue and concerns different 
ethical theories, the latter is written in the form of a letter of advice to his son 
and is concerned with practical ethics. I also sought in this sub-section to clarify 
what Cicero means by officium. ‘Duty’ is an excellent translation of the term—to 
this day, ‘office’ still means inter alia ‘a position of authority or service, 
typically of a public nature’—although in scholarly settings, ‘duty’ tends often to 
carry rigorist Kantian connotations (which themselves I hope to have shown bear 
a certain resemblance in meaning to the Stoics’ ‘perfect’ officia as carried out 
by ‘the sage’), and so I have left it untranslated throughout the chapter. Cicero 
is providing advice in the De Officiis concerning ‘middle’ officia, those within 
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reach of all, concerning a life that is shared, and for which a persuasive reason 
can be given in public life. 
I concluded the first section of this chapter by endeavouring to draw out at least 
a little of what Cicero means by humanitas through a consideration of the Pro 
Archia. We saw that he connects the term very closely indeed to education, and 
that this speech was an important source throughout the Renaissance in terms of 
the development of the studia humanitatis. Cicero extols in this speech both the 
private and public advantages to be had from an education in the literary arts. 
Not only does reading help us unwind and provide enjoyment after exerting 
ourselves in public life; it also provides the mind with recovery and refinement, 
as well as a ready supply of language for us to be using to ‘go on’ in the world. 
And yet more than this, it is through “the light of the written word”, through 
imagines, that people and events from the past are saved from oblivion and 
become examples for posterity in exercising judgments in the world (in this, I 
think Kant was quite right in saying that examples are the ‘go-kart’ of 
judgments). We saw that Cicero through his own eloquence had woven great 
persons and deeds of the past, traditionally handed down only within the 
aristocracy, into the literary arts in such a way that exemplary figures became 
models available to all. For Cicero, it is virtue rather than birth or wealth which 
is the mark of true nobility, and he acknowledges that, although excellence of 
character may shine out for itself without the help of any literary study, it is 
when such character is paired with such study that something truly remarkable 
and unique comes about. The sub-section concluded with a brief look at how the 
humanities have been faring in our age of science (and social science) and 
technology, before returning to Cicero to give account of how intimately these 
studies are tied to notions of society, community and civic virtue. 
3.5.2 Civic Virtues 
Justice is the most important primary virtue for Cicero; that without which 
societas cannot exist. We saw that elements of both the Stoic and Antiochean 
ethical theories influenced his partition of this civic virtue into ‘justice simply’ 
(iustitia) and beneficence (beneficentia), although he still treated it as a single 
category of virtue: “the reasoning by which the fellowship of men with one 
another, and the communal life, are held together”. The first office of iustitia is 
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that no person should harm another unless provoked by injustice, the second 
that one should treat common goods as common and private ones as one’s own, 
and a fundamentum of iustitia is keeping faith, fides. Cicero distinguishes 
between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ types of injustice, the former being the 
infliction of injury and the latter being the failure to deflect it from others. We 
saw that beneficentia was itself informed by ‘justice simply’: one must ensure 
that any beneficium given to another is doing no harm, either to the benefactor 
or to anybody else; that any beneficium given to another must come from and 
be limited by one’s own resources; and that beneficia are given according to the 
character of the benefactor, with especial attention given to those equipped 
with the gentler virtues such as iustitia and decorum. Although Cicero was a 
staunch defender of private property, we saw that his commitment to the virtue 
of iustitia and the building up of societas meant that it was anathema to him for 
any pursuit of self-interest to be made at the cost of communal utility, hence for 
him the virtue of beneficentia and associated virtues such as liberalitas and 
hospitalitas are key parts of iustitia. 
While it is to be regretted that Cicero’s Hortensius has not come down to us, he 
still has much to say in his extant writings about the virtues of wisdom 
(sapientia) and good sense (prudentia), and while in the De Officiis these are 
given a relatively brief treatment in comparison with iustitia, it is this part of 
honestas that Cicero describes as ‘first’, with sapientia being ‘foremost’. We 
saw that sapientia had been attributed to human beings long before the 
philosophers came along and we shall see in the next chapter that Cicero 
continues to associate this virtue with non-philosophers as well as philosophers, 
but my concern in this chapter has been to highlight to the reader some of the 
ways in which these virtues are socially oriented in Cicero’s writings and how 
they are connected to virtuous conduct. As Atkins put it, sapientia is foremost of 
the virtues for Cicero “in the sense that it provides the very understanding of 
the universe that explains the priority of justice”, allowing prudentia to make 
the right choices, and with the priority of iustitia throughout the De Officiis, he 
makes a point of noting some faults that may result from an excessive devotion 
to the pursuit of truth: some fix their focus and efforts upon “matters that are 
both abstruse and difficult, and unnecessary”, some fall into the negative type 
of injustice by abandoning those whom they ought to be protecting, and mere 
287 
speculation (cogitatio)—or as he also puts it, speculation without eloquence—
turns in on itself. But for Cicero, it seems that this could not be for long in any 
case; our natural sociability is such that, even if the solitary thinker could have 
all their wants and needs met by the work of some magic wand, they would still 
flee their solitude to be together with others, whether to teach or to learn, to 
listen or to speak, and Cicero makes a point of praising those who have devoted 
their lives to the pursuit of truth and have imparted their knowledge and 
learning to others for the sake of societas. 
The third part of the honestas considered in this section concerned greatness of 
spirit (magnitudo animi) and courage (fortitudo). Doubtless informed by the 
intemperate passions for glory he could see all around him at the time which 
were bringing the res publica to its knees, Cicero in the De Officiis brings raw 
fortitudo within the ambit of reason and sets out how it is seen in a person of 
magnitudo animi. Such a person is disdainful of external things, does not yield to 
fortune, calms any agitations of the animus, undertakes with vigour dangerous 
tasks for the res publica, but pursues nothing except that which is honestas. It is 
also a mark of such a person to rely on prudentia and consilium, never exposing 
the res publica pointlessly to risk, and confronting all risks which external 
circumstances bring to the res publica with sapientia. In peacetime, it is the 
mark of a person of magnitudo animi to be forgetful of their own advantage and 
to be caring for the whole body of the res publica rather than only this or that 
part of it, the latter inevitably bringing about ruin to all concerned. Cicero 
regrets at this point in his discussion that champions of the ‘left’ and ‘right’ of 
his day were to be found everywhere, but few champions of ‘left-and-right’ 
were to be found; it is a person of magnitudo animi able to champion so, and 
able to disagree with their opponents in good faith. Time and again throughout 
his discussion of this virtue, however, Cicero warns against the risk inhering in it 
that, without the other virtues sufficiently developed in a person who shows it, 
can lead to a dangerous desire for pre-eminence which “destroys the libertas to 
which end every endeavour of men of great spirit [magnanimis viris] ought to be 
devoted.”* 
This section concluded with a consideration of the final part of the honestas, in 
which Cicero says appear a sense of verecundia, a kind of moral beauty, 
restraint and modesty, a calming of the agitations of the spirit, and due measure 
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in all things. Often referred to in other accounts of the virtues as temperance, 
moderation, or self-discipline, we saw that Cicero, following Panaetius, brought 
over from the aesthetic sphere the term decorum in giving account of it. 
Verecundia marks out a socially sensitive quality which involves managing the 
impression we create upon others by taking the other’s perspective into our 
consideration, sometimes involving a voluntary stepping back from pressing 
one’s interests and privileging the interests of others instead for the sake of 
social cohesion. Since the pursuit of one’s interests are unavoidable in life and 
the chances of stepping on the toes of another in doing so are so rich and varied, 
the self-monitoring in social situations that verecundia requires is constant, but 
as with all the virtues, it improves with both education and practice. Decorum 
Cicero says appears in all actions that are honestum, which speaks both to the 
features that distinguish us from other living creatures, our capacities for reason 
and speech, as well as the fact that all the virtues are bound together and inter-
woven. But it also marks out the fourth primary virtue specifically: that which 
agrees with nature in such a way that moderation and restraint appear in it, 
along with the appearance of a free person, a person who is both free and 
concerned to maintain freedom’s worldly condition. It is at this point in the De 
Officiis that Cicero provides what is called the four-personae theory, which 
considers that with which we are ‘dressed’ by nature, both in common (the first 
persona) and individually (the second persona), as well as that with which 
fortuna ‘dresses’ us (the third persona) and the ‘dress’, the role, that we choose 
for ourselves (the fourth persona): our career, métier or way of life.    
Throughout this section of the chapter, I have sought to show some of the 
different ways in which all four of the primary virtues are bound together and 
inter-related. While Cicero separates them out in the De Officiis in giving his 
advice, and while he says that it is part of the outcomes of the second and 
fourth personae that some choose to excel in one or another of these virtues, it 
is in the development of them all that excellence is most clearly seen, that 
magnitudo animi is prevented from degenerating into cupiditas gloria, sapientia 
into iniuria, prudentia into malitia, and so on. And to repeat a point I have been 
emphasising throughout, it is the virtue of iustitia that Cicero regards in the De 
Officiis as the supreme social virtue.  
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3.5.3 Virtuous Conduct in Political Societies 
In the final section of this chapter, I have sought to build on the previous one by 
providing the reader with an account of some of the watchwords that Cicero 
himself provides in the De Officiis concerning virtuous conduct in different 
societates. The first sub-section looked at virtuous conduct within the societas 
that is the res publica, beginning with a consideration of Cicero’s own that it is 
this of all societates that stands at the centre of the vast network of social 
relations amongst human beings in the world. After this, I provided an account 
of some of the juridical background to the term societas itself, which denotes a 
partnership, an agreement between more than one person to contribute their 
resources towards a shared endeavour. Partners in a societas are both legally 
and morally responsible for acting according to the civil law or, if their 
consensus has not been written as a contract, according to the ius gentium, ‘the 
natural reason of humans’. We saw Cicero deriving the keeping of faith, fides, 
from both the ius gentium and lex naturae: something that is rooted not only in 
the arguments of Stoic philosophers but also in what the natural reason of 
human beings has established amongst all peoples over centuries anyway, with 
both these strands of law speaking against what he saw as the corrupted mores 
of his time which had led some to regard the breaking of faith as neither 
dishonest nor forbidden by the civil law. Again, the priority of justice as that 
which builds up societas is on Cicero’s mind here, and given the infinite diversity 
of characters in the world which we have seen him focusing upon as a means of 
maintaining decorum (unusual in his own time), he sets out a formula or ‘rule of 
procedure’ in the De Officiis so as to fix this fundamental aspect of justice more 
securely: that it is more contrary to nature than even death or pain or anything 
else adversely affecting our bodily or external possessions for one person to 
secure an advantage for themselves at the cost of disadvantaging another, since 
it destroys the social bond which ties the whole of humankind together. The sub-
section continued with a discussion of the other primary virtues as they are 
manifest in the conduct of persons in political society and with a consideration 
of the distinction Cicero underscores between the officia of magistrates, private 
citizens, and foreign residents, as these related both to the contrast Brown had 
drawn in the first chapter between civic virtues and civil society and Norval’s 
work on ‘de-contrasting’ them. The sub-section concluded with a discussion of 
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Cicero on hospitalitas and by setting his writings on virtuous conduct within the 
res publica in the broader network of societates that exist in the world. 
This led into the final sub-section of the chapter, in which I set out for the 
reader some of Cicero’s advice on our officia in international political society. I 
began this sub-section by pointing out some close parallels between the 
arguments of Dallmayr and Cicero concerning societas generis humani, before 
moving on to consider the different degrees of societas that Cicero sets out in 
the De Officiis, one of which is international political society, the societas of 
civitates, where his advice concerning the ius of warfare is salient. We saw 
here, again, that justice had a key role in binding this societas together, with 
Cicero insisting that the laws of warfare must be preserved in public affairs and 
if circumstances are such that a promise has been made to an enemy, faith must 
be kept even in that. I sought to show here in Cicero’s writings the same kind of 
simultaneous concern for domestic, international, and global affairs as was 
apparent in different ways in the arguments of Brown, Johnson, Kelsay and 
Walzer in the first chapter. The sub-section continued by drawing some 
connections between the just war principles that have developed over time as 
they had been articulated in Cicero’s writings with the intention of showing how 
these principles may be understood within a republican framework of virtues as 
distinguished from a liberal framework of rules, before going on to consider the 
actions of Regulus that Cicero sets out as an example of virtuous conduct in 
international political society. By way of conclusion, I considered the distinction 
that Cicero draws between ‘rivals’ and ‘enemies’ in relation to warfare which 
suggests how the framework of virtue as set out in this chapter is also relevant 
to conduct towards those who are deemed outside of the protections of the ius 
gentium, i.e. those who present an existential threat to the civitas, and in 
preparation for the discussion of Cicero’s rector rei publicae, or ‘ideal 
statesperson’, in the next chapter. 
3.5.4 Concluding Remarks 
What can Cicero’s theoretical writings concerning the conduct of persons 
contribute to arguments in IPT related to exercising judgments in the world? 
Briefly stated, I argue that the framework of civic virtues which Cicero 
contributes towards a deeper understanding of the various arguments addressed 
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in the first chapter, is excellently suited to IP theorists holding a conception of 
politics as (partly) personal, that it is of continuing relevance to a great variety 
of issues across the entire breadth of IPT whether one is a ‘civic republican’ or a 
‘liberal’, a ‘communitarian’ or a ‘cosmopolitan’, and that it helps us all a great 
deal in exercising judgments in the world.  
To paraphrase Bernard Crick, boredom with established watchwords is a great 
enemy of free persons, and in troubling times it might be enough just to make 
some old platitudes pregnant again.182 In this chapter, I have developed 
numerous arguments made by scholars as set out in the previous chapters, but at 
the same time, I have sought to provide in broad outline the framework of civic 
virtues that Cicero sets out in the De Officiis as well as some of the ‘springs of 
initiative’ from whence they come. As such, it is likely that the reader will 
connect what has been said in this chapter to many more of the arguments of 
scholars as I have set them out in previous chapters, and many arguments being 
made in IPT more generally besides. I think this is as it should be. It is necessary 
that free persons retain their own discretion in exercising judgments in the 
world, and quite apart from the fundamental importance of laws and rules, 
whether in the world or in logic, it need not result in anarchy if we are trusting 
in the authority of persons, and I am suggesting to the reader in this project that 
we place our trust in Cicero’s.  
Having considered in this chapter what Arendt calls ‘that part of politics that 
deals not with the institutions but with the citizen’, we move on in the next 
chapter to consider the obverse. 
 
182 Crick, In Defence of Politics. p.1. 
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Chapter 4 Cicero on Res Publica 
4.1 Introduction 
In the first chapter, we saw Brown complexifying the relationship between civil 
society and the state, drawing out the former’s dependence on the latter for its 
existence. He went on to contrast modern notions of civil society with ancient 
republican societies and the notion of civic virtue, arguing that the former holds 
a minimalist approach to law and the abandonment of the idea of ‘managed 
consensus … by the standard-bearers of republican virtue’, whereas the latter 
implies a ‘degree of moral unity’, a positive role for law, and (presumably) 
managed consensus in one form or another by standard-bearers of republican 
virtue. I argued in the previous chapter that the opposition between ‘civic 
republican’ and ‘liberal’ perspectives on this matter is not as clear-cut as it 
might seem (as indeed indicated by Brown’s non-opposite descriptors ‘positive 
role for’ and ‘minimalist approach to’ law), that Norval was on the right track in 
seeking to develop civic virtues in civil society, and that Cicero’s distinction 
between the officia of magistrates and the officia of private citizens, the latter 
of which converging significantly with liberal notions of civil society, is an 
important one. In the present chapter, we take a closer look at what Cicero has 
to say about forms of government, the question of who ‘manages the consensus’, 
in the De Re Publica. 
Cicero wrote his treatises on politics—the De Oratore, De Re Publica and De 
Legibus—in the 50s BCE, a time of “political uproar” at Rome when his own 
political influence had been extensively curtailed by those more powerful than 
him.1 The scandal of Clodius’s act of sacrilege in 61 and subsequent acquittal of 
the charge; the passing of laws Clodius proposed in 58 which sent Cicero into 
exile; the domination of the senate by Pompey, Caesar and Crassus in pursuit of 
their interests; all of these and various other troubling issues had a de-stabilising 
effect upon the res publica.2 As Zetzel comments on these years, “the personal 
politics of the decade before the civil war gave a terrifying reality to theoretical 
 
1 Catherine Steel, 2013. The End of the Roman Republic: Conquest and Crisis. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. p.228. 
2 Steel, The End of the Roman Republic. Ch.6. 
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questions that had been discussed for generations”.3 Following his return from 
exile in 57, Cicero was warned by Pompey, Caesar and Crassus not to interfere 
with their control of the civitas, and to history’s huge and lasting benefit, chose 
to undertake a programme of theoretical writing on politics in his enforced 
otium, producing the three treatises mentioned above. Again, due to the sheer 
fecundity of his writings, our focus in this chapter is fixed mainly upon the De Re 
Publica, although we also consider some of his arguments from the De Legibus in 
the second section and touch upon the De Oratore in the third. 
The De Re Publica enjoyed great popularity in antiquity but no copy of the 
complete text is known to have survived later than the seventh century CE. 
While fragments of the text have been transmitted in the writings of others 
since its publication, it was only in 1819 that the Prefect of the Vatican Library 
discovered an erased script of the text beneath a manuscript of Augustine’s 
commentary on the Psalms (a palimpsest). Around two-thirds of Book I, half of 
Book II, a sixth of Book III, and a few leaves of Books IV–VI have been recovered 
through the palimpsest. As such, it makes the De Re Publica difficult to interpret 
overall, but there nevertheless remains a great deal for us to learn and consider 
in what is extant.  
Cicero sets the dialogue of the De Re Publica in the early months of 129, during 
a political crisis which had come about after the Gracchan land reforms of 133 
and shortly before the main protagonist, Scipio, died in somewhat mysterious 
circumstances. Doing so allowed him to avoid giving offence to any living persons 
by having them (or not) as characters in the dialogue, to evoke the literary 
models of the Platonic dialogues, and yet still speak to the political uproar of 
the 50s BCE. Although there are nine participants to the conversation, the main 
protagonists in what remains of the text are: (i) Publius Cornelius Scipio 
Aemilianus Africanus (hereinafter Scipio), consul in 147 and 134, and destroyer 
of Carthage in 146 and Numantia in 133; (ii) Gaius Laelius Sapiens (hereinafter 
Laelius), consul in 140 and Scipio’s closest friend and confidant; and (iii) Lucius 
Furius Philus (hereinafter Philus), consul in 136, and frequently mentioned along 
with Scipio and Laelius in the ancient sources. The dialogue takes place over 
three days and is set out across six books. On the first day, the interlocutors 
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discuss the best (practicable) kind of commonwealth, with the first Book being a 
discussion of the ‘theory’ and Book II setting out a narrative of Rome’s history 
showing it to be the best (practicable) kind. On the second day, the discussion 
turns to institutional organisation, with what remains of Book III showing a 
discussion between Philus and Laelius about justice and what remains of Book IV 
showing a discussion about Rome’s instituta (customary standards of social 
behaviour). Whereas Books I and II are de optimo civitatis (on the best kind of 
civitas) and Books III and IV appear to be transitional in some way, Books V and 
VI are de optimo civis, ‘on the best citizen’, very little of which has survived 
other than Scipio’s dream in Book VI, having had its own manuscript tradition 
since the text’s publication. 
The first section of the chapter considers several key themes of the text, 
beginning in the first sub-section with Cicero’s arguments in favour of the 
practical life of the citizen vis-à-vis the theoretical life of the philosopher, as set 
out in the Preface to Books I and II, and as further developed in the Preface to 
Books III and IV, all in his own voice. The second sub-section provides in broad 
outline an account of (non-Hegelian) history and philosophy as they appear in 
the De Re Publica, the former understood as providing an irreplaceable fount of 
practical wisdom, and the latter an important source of reason, which the 
ancient philosophers divided into three parts, Ethics, Physics, and Logic, all of 
which make an appearance in the De Re Publica. The third sub-section considers 
the definition of res publica that Scipio provides in Book I, and the final sub-
section looks at the different kinds of organisation a populus may take in terms 
of maintaining res publica. 
The second section of the chapter concerns laws and institutions in Cicero’s 
writings, (mainly) from the De Re Publica and the De Legibus. The first sub-
section considers the debate between Philus and Laelius in Book III of the De Re 
Publica as to whether a res publica can possibly function without justice 
(iustitia), with Philus arguing the ‘conventionalist’ account that it cannot 
function without injustice and Laelius providing the Stoics’ account of natural 
law. The second sub-section moves beyond both the De Re Publica and De 
Legibus to consider Cicero’s writings on the ius gentium, with the aim of 
distinguishing it from the Stoics’ natural law argument. The third sub-section 
returns to the De Legibus, with a consideration of the law-code that the 
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character Marcus writes for Rome (what is considered by many scholars to be the 
beginnings of what we call constitutional law), and the final sub-section 
considers Cicero’s writings on instituta, customary standards of social behaviour. 
The final section of the chapter considers what Cicero has to say, both in the De 
Re Publica and elsewhere, about the optimis civis, ‘the ideal statesperson’, the 
good statesperson. The first sub-section considers the account of this type of 
person given by the character Antonius in the De Oratore, and then Scipio in the 
De Re Publica, with the aim of showing to the reader that what Cicero provides 
us with in his writings here is an ‘ideal-type’. The second sub-section moves on 
to consider what Cicero says in two of his speeches (Pro Lege Manilia and Pro 
Marcello), one of his letters to Pompey, and the De Officiis, regarding the 
qualities of a good statesperson, with the aim of adding some of these qualities 
to our ‘ideal-type’ and enriching our understanding of some of what is already 
there in it. This section, and the chapter, concludes with a consideration of the 
culmination of the De Re Publica, Scipio’s Dream, in which Physics (re-)appears 
in imparting some important Ethical lessons.   
The question to which I am responding in this chapter is: what can Cicero’s 
theoretical writings on res publica contribute to arguments in IPT related to 
exercising judgments in the world? In summary, I argue that they contribute an 
outstanding account in the history of political thought of the principle of 
political organisation, the civic republican principle, which, for example, 
Morgenthau was calling upon IR theorists to investigate. I argue that these 
writings are of continuing relevance to IPT and that they contain very important 
watchwords concerning the institutional and constitutional checks upon personal 
politics, in whatever form of government. And I argue that these writings speak 
directly, and respond very well indeed to, Arendt’s justified concerns and 
worries about preserving plurality in the world, by having societas—by definition, 
plural—built into Scipio’s definition of res publica.   
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4.2 De Re Publica 
4.2.1 Cicero on the Practical Life of the Citizen 
We saw in the second chapter that Arendt agreed with Cicero about our natural 
sociability and that she approvingly ‘excepted’ him from her portrayal of ‘the 
tradition’, since he favoured the practical life of the citizen (the life of 
negotium) over the theoretical life of the philosopher (the life of otium). I 
sought to show at that point that Cicero certainly did not hold philosophy in 
‘contempt’ as Arendt implied, and I also developed this point in the previous 
chapter through a consideration of his writings on the four primary virtues, and 
more specifically, the fourth persona: that role in life which derives purely from 
our own choice, each of our ‘ways of life’, our occupations or careers or 
métiers. Although understanding fully that each person should be making their 
own choices in this according to their own personae—and emphasising to his son 
in the De Officiis that these choices require an extraordinary amount of care—it 
looks very much like Cicero himself (if and when push comes to shove) favours 
the practical life of the citizen over the theoretical life of the philosopher; he is 
closer to Dicaearchus than Theophrastus in the philosophical dispute about 
whether the bios politikos or the bios theoretikos is ‘the best’ way of life.4 In 
line with the second persona, however, it bears repeating his advice that “even 
if other pursuits may be weightier or better, we should measure our own by the 
regula of our own nature”, and regardless of whether a life devoted to 
‘practice’ or ‘theory’ is the ‘weightier or better’, it is clear that Cicero engaged 
in both throughout his own lifetime, whatever personae were involved in his 
doing so.5 
It is in the De Re Publica, and specifically in the Preface to Book I where he is 
speaking in his own voice, that we find I think the most comprehensive account 
from Cicero in favour of the practical life of the citizen, which is worth quoting 
at some length: 
 
4 McConnell, Philosophical Life in Cicero’s Letters; Carlos Lévy, 1995. ‘Philosophical Life versus 
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“… nature has given men such a need for virtue and such a desire to 
defend the common safety that this force has overcome all the 
enticements of pleasure [voluptas] and ease [otium]. Furthermore, 
virtue is not some kind of knowledge [quasi artem] to be possessed 
without using it: even if the intellectual possession of knowledge 
[scientia] can be maintained without use, virtue consists entirely in its 
employment; moreover, its most important employment [usus 
maximus] is the governance of civitates and the accomplishment in 
deeds rather than words of the things that philosophers talk through 
and through in their corners [quas isti in angulis personant]. 
Philosophers in fact say nothing … that does not derive from the men 
who established laws [iura] for civitates. What is the source of piety 
and religion [pietas et religio]? of ius gentium and ius civile? of 
justice, good faith and equity? of modesty and moderation, the 
avoidance of shame, and the desire for praise and honor? of courage 
in toil and danger? Surely they derive from the men who established 
such things through education and strengthened some by custom 
[moribus] and ordained others by law [legibus] … that citizen, who 
through his formal injunction and the punishments established by law 
[legumque] compels everyone to do what philosophers through their 
teaching can only persuade a few people to do [quod vix paucis 
persuadere oratione philosophi possunt], is to be preferred even to 
the teachers who make those arguments. What is so remarkable about 
their teaching that it should outrank a civitas that is well established 
through public laws and customs [iure et moribus]? For my own part, 
just as I think ‘great and powerful cities’ (as Ennius calls them) better 
than villages and forts, so too I think that the men who lead these 
cities by their consilium and auctoritas should be considered far wiser 
[sapientia ipsa] than philosophers who have no experience at all in 
public life.”6* 
We saw across the first two chapters that many philosophers in the modern age 
are not only ‘talking things through and through in their corners’, and what 
seemed to be missing in the writings of many of them was sustained attention to 
or appreciation of what Cicero says here consists (or should consist) in things 
accomplished in deeds rather than words: virtue. I set out some of his own 
writings on the four primary virtues in the previous chapter, and here we see 
that he regards their “most important employment” in the governance of 
civitates, and that he thinks those who are leading great ones—those who have 
nurtured successfully and continue to do so our natural sociability by 
establishing and strengthening ius and virtue through education, mores and laws 
(legibus)—should be considered far wiser than philosophers without any 
experience at all in public life. He goes on in the Preface to counter some 
arguments in his day which were “philosophic devaluation[s] of civic 
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responsibility” (usually coming from the Epicureans): that public life is 
dangerous, unworthy of respectable persons and only to be pursued by 
philosophers in a crisis.7 As the reader might expect, Cicero marshals here 
virtues such as bonitas, magnitudo animi, and fortitudo in arguing for the moral 
and practical necessity of living a life of negotium, of fulfilling one’s officia, so 
as to “not be subject to wicked [inprobis] men or allow them to ravage the res 
publica”, and he is astonished at philosophers’ arguments that they could be of 
any use in a crisis when they lack both the practical experience and public office 
to act with good effect in one.8 That said, he thinks that even if it were true 
that a philosopher should not step into public life unless and until the heavens 
really were just about to fall, still they should by no means neglect close study 
of public affairs if they want to be prepared to help, which of course is what the 
De Re Publica manifests, and what some philosophers, even having never held 
public office, also studied and wrote upon and thereby performed a public 
function.9         
As we saw in the previous chapter (p.262), it is such philosophers Cicero praised 
for devoting their otium to our negotium. And we also saw there as we are 
seeing in the above passage that he is very willing to associate sapientia with 
both philosophers and non-philosophers. We find a discussion regarding this, 
again in his own voice, in the Preface to Books III and IV. Unfortunately, this part 
of the text is in fragments, and so the discussion is, as Zetzel says, “tantalizingly 
uncertain”.10 In one of the fragments, Cicero distinguishes between two 
different kinds of sapientia: 
“… great sapientia existed, but there was this difference between the 
two approaches, that one group cultivated the principles of nature 
[aluerunt naturae principia] through words [verbis] and learning 
[artibus], the other through institutions [institutis] and laws [legibus]. 
This single civitas has brought forth many, if not sapientes (since this 
term is used so narrowly by them), then at least men worthy of the 
greatest praise, because they cultivated the watchwords and 
discoveries [inventa] of sapientes. And if we take the praiseworthy 
civitates which exist and have existed (since the foundation of a res 
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publica capable of lasting a long time takes greater consilium than 
anything in the world) [Atque etiam, quot et sunt laudandae civitates 
et fuerunt, quoniam id est in rerum natura longe maximi consilii, 
constituere eam rem publicam], and if we count one person to each 
civitas, then how great a multitude will we find of excellent men! If in 
Italy we consider Latium, or the Sabine and Volscian nations, or 
Samnium, Etruria, Magna Graecia, and add to them the Assyrians, 
Persians, Carthaginians, if these …”11* 
Regrettably, the text breaks off at this point, but there is still much for us to 
consider. The narrow sense of sapientia is used by the Greeks (and particularly 
the Stoics), but Cicero seems to me in this passage to be flitting in and out of 
the ‘narrow’ and a ‘broad’ sense (as discussed in more detail below). He is 
counting ‘one person to each civitas’ here I think only because the Greeks at this 
point are the topic of discussion, and they generally understood wise lawgivers 
to be single individuals from outside of the polis, whereas, as we shall see later 
in this chapter, Rome’s constitution is understood to be the work of many 
sapientes within the res publica across generations. But whatever the case may 
be, we can see here that Cicero is distinguishing between two kinds of sapientia, 
both of which can be seen in those who cultivate the principles of nature, the 
one group through words and learning and the other through laws and 
institutions; these seem to me to be the “different angles” of which Brown 
spoke in relation to Morgenthau and Kennan (p.80). Whereas Cicero expressed 
his own belief in the Preface to Books I and II that persons accomplished in the 
latter should be regarded as far wiser than the former (at least where the 
former has no experience in public affairs), we can see here that he 
nevertheless sees the virtue in both approaches; both spring from nature. But as 
expected, we find his focus very much upon sapientia of whatever sort as it 
relates to civic life, and we see this focus yet again in another fragment from 
the Preface to Books III and IV: 
“… So let’s grant that those men who discuss the conduct of human 
life [ratio vivendi disserunt] are great men (as indeed they are)—
scholars, teachers of truth and virtue [sint eruditi, sint veritatis et 
virtutis magistri]—so long as this too, the conduct of society and the 
structuring of peoples [ratio civilis et disciplina populorum], is also 
(as indeed it is) deserving of our considerable respect, whether it was 
discovered by men experienced in the varieties of public life [rerum 
republicarum varietate versatis inventa] or examined in the literary 
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leisure of men of the other sort [in istorum otio ac litteris tractata 
est]: it accomplishes (as indeed it very often has already) in good 
minds [bonis ingeniis] the creation of an unbelievable, superhuman 
virtue.”12 
Cicero is continually pointing here to the practices, the ‘in-deeds’, of people, 
whether in those who not only ‘talk it through and through in their corners’ but 
also teach ratio vivendi (which Zetzel glosses as ‘ethics’), or in those 
experienced in public affairs instituting ratio civilis (‘government’), or in those 
who bestow considerable respect and praise upon the deeds of great 
theoreticians or practitioners, and moreover, the two approaches seem to be 
drawn closely together. And sure enough, we find them combined in the leading 
characters Cicero has chosen for the De Re Publica, as he goes on immediately 
to say:  
“But if anyone has thought to add scholarly learning and a richer 
knowledge of human affairs [doctrinam et uberiorem rerum 
cognitionem] to the intellectual equipment [instrumenta animi] which 
he acquired from nature and from civil institutions [civilibus 
institutis], like the men who take part in the conversation recorded in 
this work, then everyone ought to prize them above all others. What, 
after all, can be more glorious than the conjunction of practical 
experience in great affairs of state with the knowledge of these arts 
acquired through study and learning? What can be imagined more 
perfect than Publius Scipio or Gaius Laelius or Lucius Philus? In order 
to achieve the highest glory of great men, they added to the 
traditional knowledge of their own ancestors the imported learning of 
the Socratic school. The person who has had the will and the capacity 
to acquire both—that is, ancestral traditions and scholarly learning—is 
the one who I think has done everything deserving of praise.”13 
We have already seen Cicero’s devotion to the literary arts and his appreciation 
of the public advantages they bestow, that he engaged extensively in both 
‘practice’ and ‘theory’ throughout his own life, and here we find him 
articulating a similar point once more in the De Re Publica. Civilisation itself 
comes about through human beings cultivating the principles of nature; in 
particular, the virtue of sapientia, ‘the mother of all good things’, whether it is 
cultivated and shown through words and learning or through establishing and 
working through institutions and laws. There also seems to be a ‘virtuous circle’ 
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here in which the civil institutions established by sapientes of the more practical 
kind feed into the development of the ‘intellectual equipment’ of citizens more 
generally. As Zetzel puts it: 
“Philosophers talk about paths of life; they may even imagine, in their 
otium, the institutions of civic life. But the task of changing the world 
belongs to statesmen: creating and working through actual 
institutions, ratio civilis et disciplina populorum, they make a good 
life for their fellow-citizens and thus make them good.”14 
In a letter to his brother Quintus, Cicero describes the subject of De Re Publica 
as de optimo statu civitatis et de optimo cive: on the best kind of civitas and 
the best citizen.15 By ‘statesmen’ here, as indicated by the end of his sentence, 
Zetzel also means to say (I think) ‘best citizens’ (in a democracy, those judged 
‘best’ by the people). We saw Arendt describe these ‘best citizens’ as those 
showing virtues such as courage, moderation and insight in their actions; as 
those able to communicate successfully between the citizens so that the 
commonness of this world becomes apparent; as those who understand (in 
Aristotle’s terms) ‘what is good for men’; and articulating this in the language 
Cicero is using in the Preface to Books III and IV of De Re Publica, the ‘best 
citizens’ include those cultivating the principles of nature through laws and 
institutions and are thereby engaged in nurturing what Dallmayr (p.76) calls “the 
good life of the larger community”. We shall be discussing laws, institutions and 
the optimis civis in the final two sections of this chapter, but to return here to 
Cicero’s distinction between the two kinds of sapientia, I think it is important 
for us to note that he articulates it in such a way that what he is saying does not 
have to be tied to the cultures of Rome and Greece. We have already seen in the 
passage quoted on pp.295–296 that Cicero lists numerous different civitates of 
different cultures which have produced excellence; ‘ancestral traditions and 
scholarly learning’ are available all over the world. Again, Zetzel provides us 
with some good commentary: 
“…while the combination of Greek philosophy and Roman experience 
is an absolute prerequisite for being able to offer the kinds of analysis 
of Rome that Scipio and his friends produce in De Re Publica, for 
Cicero’s argument about Rome’s development to work it is equally 
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essential that Greek philosophical knowledge not be a prerequisite for 
good statesmanship itself. Not all peoples, not even all Romans, have 
had access to Greek philosophy; and yet they managed to create 
successful governments all over the world. The desire and the ability 
to improve human society do not come from reading Plato, but from 
nature itself: the establishment of an enduring res publica is located 
in rerum natura [‘in the nature of things’], just as … all moral and 
intellectual achievements of humans are derived, via the divine spark, 
from nature. By the middle of Book 3, at the end of Laelius’s speech, 
the divine spark of nature has grown to become the natural law, an 
immanent condition of moral existence and not just a starting point 
for human inventiveness.”16 
We saw in the second chapter that Arendt observed ‘the curious stubbornness’ 
with which ‘the council system’ presented itself each time the people comes to 
raise its voice, and I suggested that one of the things that might account for this 
is the civic republican tradition to which the council members were ‘knowingly 
or unknowingly bound in their understanding of the world and their own 
experiences’ (pp.128 and 180). I also sought to show through the example of the 
American founding and Arendt’s understanding of it that it was in the civic 
republican tradition that the founding itself took place. But from Zetzel’s 
analysis here, we can now say more than this; we can say that one of the things 
that account for the curious stubbornness which Arendt observed in various 
councils being set up in different contexts, and that also account for the fact 
that the American founders looked to history for help in founding, is that the 
establishment and nurturing of an enduring res publica, of community life, is 
simply natural; the desire and ability to improve human society is in the nature 
of things, and not reducible to the writings of this or that genius or these or 
those geniuses. In this respect, Cicero offers in the Preface to Books III and IV 
the example of an early Roman, Manius Curius, “whom no-one could overcome 
with either steel or gold” and who had no access to Greek philosophy, and as 
Powell says, it is “most frustrating” that the fragment breaks off at this point.17 
Still, Cicero uses Curius as an exemplary figure elsewhere in his writings, 
including in the De Amicitia, where the character Laelius (the same Laelius in 
the De Re Publica) disposes of the Greeks’ (Stoics’) ‘narrow’ definitions of 
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sapientia and bonus and says that his ancestors judged Curius to be both wise 
and good: 
“… let [Greek philosophers] keep to themselves their name of 
sapientia, which attracts both envy and misunderstanding, as long as 
they grant that [Curius was] boni. Yet not even this will they do; they 
will say that only a sapientes [in their narrow sense] is entitled to be 
called boni … Let us therefore proceed using our own homespun 
sapientia, as the saying goes. Men who live in such a way that praise is 
bestowed on their honesty [fides], integrity [integritas], fairness 
[aequitas] and generosity [liberalitas], and who are entirely free from 
greed [cupiditas], sensual desire [libido] and presumption [audacia], 
and possess great strength of character [magna constantia], like 
[Curius]—such men let us regard as boni, in accordance with their 
reputation hitherto, and also worthy of receiving this name, since, as 
far as is humanly possible, they follow Nature, the best guide for 
living well.”18 
As both Powell and Zetzel point out, Curius is said here to have followed the 
basic watchword of Stoicism, to follow nature, but he did so without ever having 
listened to a Stoic. Reminiscent of Brown’s example of Forrest Gump, Curius is 
held up as an example here of an early Roman who was “naturally good without 
fancy philosophizing … goodness derived from an unmediated contact with 
nature”.19 Yet while Zetzel is correct that, in the fragment from the Preface to 
Books III and IV of the De Re Publica, it is a Curius or a Forrest to whom a Scipio, 
a Laelius or a Philus has given way as an example of praiseworthy character, 
“what can be imagined more perfect” than “when natural disposition which is 
noble and elevated is given in addition a basis and shaping through education” 
(pp.228 and 300)? Reading Plato and the Stoics, and indeed other sapientes from 
all cultures who have cultivated the principles of nature and shone the light of 
the written word upon those principles, is itself a cultivation of the principles of 
nature. Education remains of fundamental importance to Cicero—“literary 
activity [is] important to all citizens … and, ultimately, [to] the whole of 
humanity” (p.229)—and he regards those who have developed their natural 
dispositions through learning and who have gained practical experience in great 
affairs of state as those who should be prized above all others. 
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We shall be considering all of this in some more detail in the rest of the chapter, 
but in concluding this sub-section, we can note what Cicero has to say about 
‘when push comes to shove’ in terms of choosing how one should live: 
“…if it should be necessary to choose one path of understanding 
[prudentia] or the other, even if the tranquil pattern of life devoted 
to study and learning may seem more blessed [beatior], nevertheless 
civic life is both more praiseworthy [laudabilior] and more illustrious 
[inlustrior] …”20 
In his investigation of Cicero’s own choice of how to live, Carlos Lévy argues that 
“the profound belief in the superiority of practical life over a purely theoretical 
life never really left him”, and I would add only that what he never really left us 
was a ‘hierarchical structure’ within which to approach the question of how one 
should live.21 
4.2.2 History and Philosophy in De Re Publica 
As mentioned above, we saw in the first chapter that many philosophers in the 
modern age are not only ‘talking things through and through in their corners’. 
Beardsworth described critical philosophising as ‘the force of thought pitched 
against other more determined forces (economic, political, military etc.) to 
promote, in one way or another, better human relations’; Benhabib is engaged 
in a Kantian project (with strong notes of Habermas and Derrida) which seeks to 
develop through democratic iterations cosmopolitan norms in actual liberal 
democracies; and we saw through Devetak’s writings that both Kant and Hegel 
regarded the philosopher as having an important social role to play, either in 
making universal reason ‘public reason’, or in mediating a range of real-life 
oppositions through their expertise in dialectics and philosophy of history. We 
saw in the second chapter that Arendt had some suspicions about Hegel’s 
dialectics and his philosophy of history, and some concerns about how later 
writers interpreted his work, along with Marx’s, such that ideological thinking 
set in, completely detached from history (in a non-Hegelian sense) as well as 
experience, with the ideology pretending to know (or acting as a placeholder 
for) the mysteries of ‘the whole historical process’ and removing one’s judgment 
 
20 Rep. 3.6a. 
21 Lévy, Philosophical Life versus Political Life. p.76. 
305 
and discretion in the world (‘the tyranny of logicality’). Arendt’s account of 
ideology in The Origins of Totalitarianism is a difficult and unsettling one, but 
howsoever it may be interpreted, I have been seeking in this project to set out a 
conception of politics that requires neither Hegelian dialectics, nor any 
philosophy of history, nor any ideology; that appreciates the importance of 
rhetoric and logic, in their appropriate spheres, that recognises the need for the 
help of tradition and authority in exercising judgments in the world, and that 
pays attention, like Cicero in the passage quoted on p.294 and also like the 
philosophers of whom he is speaking in it, to virtue, some of his writings on 
which I set out in the previous chapter. In the present sub-section, we consider 
how non-Hegelian ‘philosophy’ and ‘history’ appear in Cicero’s De Re Publica. 
It is perhaps best to begin with a brief (and necessarily crude) outline of some of 
the philosophical context in which Cicero is writing. There is general agreement 
amongst contemporary scholars that the ancient tripartition of philosophy into 
Ethics, Physics and Logic can be traced back to Xenocrates (c.396–314 BCE), if 
not Plato himself, and it became a standard feature of Hellenistic philosophy 
outside of the Academy as well. Logic—the field “which studies logos in all its 
manifestations”—included not only what we refer to as logic, but also numerous 
other kinds of study, such as philosophy of language, semiotics, epistemology, 
dialectic (which “permeates all areas of enquiry, but as a collaborator or 
ancillary”), and sometimes even rhetoric as well.22 Physics comprehended areas 
of enquiry into nature (physis), such as what we would call biology, cosmology, 
philosophy of science, metaphysics and theology, and Ethics consisted of those 
areas enquiring into things specifically human, such as what we would call 
economics, political theory and moral philosophy. As Jonathan Barnes notes, this 
tripartition was the site of two general philosophical disputes: the status of 
Logic and the proper ordering of the three parts.23 The Peripatetics regarded 
Logic as merely a tool or instrument of philosophy (and philosophy they divided 
into theoretical [roughly: Physical] and practical [roughly: Ethical] sciences), 
whereas the Stoics regarded Logic as part of philosophy itself. Across his own 
 
22 Algra et al. Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. pp.xiii–xvi. Broadly speaking, the 
Academics and Peripatetics regarded dialectic as a collaborator, and the Stoics regarded it as 
ancillary. 
23 Jonathan Barnes, 1997. ‘Logic in Academica I and Lucullus’. Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfeld 
(eds.), 1997. Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero’s Academic Books. Leiden: Brill. p.140.  
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philosophica, Cicero writes treatises concerning each of the three parts of 
philosophy (for example, a text in the part called Logic is the Academica, in 
Physics the De Natura Deorum, and in Ethics the De Officiis), provides a very 
strong indication throughout his corpus that he regards Ethics as “the most 
essential part”, but often inter-weaves within each text, within whichever part 
of philosophy is its subject-matter, the other two parts.24* 
Most Stoics appear to have placed Logic as the first part in their ordering, and 
others than Cicero who ordered the three parts such that Ethics comes first 
include Seneca, Eudorus of Alexandria, and Augustine.25 In his ‘Two Stoic 
Approaches to Justice’, i.e. an Ethical and a (meta-)Physical approach, Schofield 
seems to me to be sensitive to this tripartition.26 Benjamin Straumann, in his 
criticism of Schofield’s article, argues that the Ethical approach “is founded on 
important anthropological conditions in the area of metaphysics and therefore 
excludes clear differentiation of this kind … the two approaches are occasionally 
found together, inevitably resulting in contradictions in his line of argument”.27 
Straumann here, it seems to me, is less sensitive to the tripartition, although 
sensitive to the facts that the Stoic system is densely inter-connected and so 
many of these philosophers held Logic to be the most important of the three 
parts.28 Barnes notes that “the Stoics used … [logical] arguments explicitly, self-
consciously, deliberately; they were concerned, in their philosophical writings to 
apply argument forms which their dialectical studies had investigated and 
approved. The Stoics studied logic fervently and they used it sedulously”, to 
which I would add only that Stoic dialectic was different to dialectic as it is to 
be found in the Platonist or Aristotelian traditions.29 Stoics generally, it might be 
said, in Dallmayr’s words (p.73), tend to be “over-confident thinkers—well-
 
24 Acad. 1.34; cf. Acad. 1.19, 2.91 and Leg. 1.17. 
25 Barnes, Logic in Academica I and Lucullus.  
26 Schofield, ‘Two Stoic Approaches to Justice’, Laks and Schofield (eds.), Justice and Generosity. 
Ch.7. 
27 Benjamin Straumann, 2003/2004. ‘Oikeiosis and appetitus societatis: Hugo Grotius’ Ciceronian 
Argument for Natural Law and Just War’. Grotiana 24/25. pp.41–66. 
28 Katerina Ierodiakonou, 1993. ‘The Stoic Division of Philosophy’. Phronesis 38(1). pp.57–74. 
29 Jonathan Barnes, 1999. ‘Introduction’. Part II: Logic and Language. Algra et al. Cambridge 
History of Hellenistic Philosophy. p.66; cf. Fink (ed.), The Development of Dialectic from Plato to 
Aristotle; Thomas Bénatouïl and Katerina Ierodiakonou (eds.), 2018. Dialectic after Plato and 
Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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versed in logic and epistemology—[who] settle for a robust definition or handy 
formula.” 
In this context and in these terms, the De Re Publica is a text within that part of 
philosophy called Ethics. One of the components of Logic in the text is that it is 
written in the form of a dialogue: a literary extension of dialectic. And we find 
(in what remains of the text) that Physics makes its most prominent appearance 
in Books I, III and VI. In Book I, the youthful character Tubero, a Stoic, asks his 
uncle Scipio to explain the recent sighting of two suns in the sky, which Scipio 
dismisses as unimportant given the current political turmoil, citing Socrates, 
“the first to call down philosophy from the skies and to settle it in cities” and 
whose tradition the Stoics claimed to be continuing, in support of doing so.30* 
The conversation and its topic is interrupted by the arrival of Philus and then 
Laelius, between whom it is continued, with Philus (an Academic sceptic) 
arguing Tubero’s case for cosmology’s relevance to politics since the cosmos is 
as much ‘home’ as Rome is. He sets out an explanation of the sighting of the two 
suns with the help of Archimedes’ orrery which anticipates some of the 
arguments about politics made later on, and in response, Laelius tacks 
practically, i.e. Ethical, arguing that the “most outstanding task of sapientia” is 
not in pondering about the heavens, but in teaching “the skills [artes] that make 
us useful to the civitas”.31 Just before he had done so, Scipio had responded 
astonishingly to the Physical talk of Tubero and Philus, rowing back quite a bit 
from his initial dismissal of Physics’ relevance to Ethics, and without the debate 
having been settled, Laelius requests that Scipio explain to all gathered “what 
he thinks the best organization of the civitas (optimum statum civitatis) to be”, 
setting up the rest of the discussion of Book I.32  
Quite apart from Physics’ relevance to Ethics in the text, one of the things it 
looks like Cicero is doing is using the language of Physics metaphorically. As we 
shall see below, astronomical language used by Philus to describe the motions of 
the planets, such as conversio (‘revolution’) and its root, convertere (to 
 
30 Rep. 1.14–15; Tusc. 5.10. A parhelion, or ‘sundog’, is a meteorological and optical phenomenon 
that consists of a bright spot to one or both sides of the sun, caused by the refraction of sunlight 
by ice crystals in the atmosphere. 
31 Rep. 1.17–33. 
32 Rep. 1.33. 
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revolve), are used later in the text to describe the course of politics.33 In the De 
Oratore, the character Crassus tells us that: 
“When something that can scarcely be signified by a proper word is 
expressed by means of a metaphorical one, what happens is this: the 
meaning we want to convey is clarified by the resemblance between 
this thing and the thing that we evoke by means of the metaphorical 
word (which belongs to another context).”34  
In Gallagher’s words, “just as the science of astronomy reveals order in the 
motions of the planets, so the science [or “almost a science”] of politics reveals 
order in the movements of states.”35 
As regards the almost-political-science of Book I in which Scipio sets out 
different kinds of organisation or ‘constitution’, Jed W. Atkins rightly points out 
that Cicero was drawing upon an established tradition of thought stretching back 
through the likes of Polybius, Aristotle and Plato to at least Thucydides (Zetzel 
sees it in Herodotus too), but under his pen it takes on a specifically Roman 
character which pays closer attention to what Zetzel calls (not unlike Dallmayr) 
“the untidiness of human affairs”.36 Gone is the Polybian rigidity of an 
organisational form which is elevated over human action and follows a fixed 
cyclical path, and in its place, although the language of conversio remains, a 
greater role is acknowledged for the actual persons who shape these forms, 
topics of Books IV, V and VI. 
With an (all-too-brief) account of philosophy in the De Re Publica now given, we 
can move on to an (all-too-brief) account of history as it appears in it. Having 
discussed different organisations that a res publica might take in Book I—a 
 
33 Robert L. Gallagher, 2001. ‘Metaphor in Cicero’s De Re Publica’. Classical Quarterly 51(2). 
pp.509–519. Cf. BPF. pp.41–90; OR. pp.13–52; LM1. pp.110–128. 
34 De Or. 3.155. The technical term Cicero uses for metaphor is translatio. It is interesting to note in 
this connection Arendt’s description of lawful government: “By lawful government we 
understand a body politic in which positive laws are needed to translate and realize the 
immutable ius naturale or the eternal commandments of God into standards of right and wrong. 
Only in these standards, in the body of positive laws of each country, do the ius naturale or the 
Commandments of God achieve their political reality.” OT. p.610. This seems to me not 
inconsistent with Straumann’s own description of natural law as “amenable to being codified 
and positivized”, although perhaps not consistent either. Straumann, Crisis and 
Constitutionalism. p.164. 
35 Rep. 1.37; Gallagher, Metaphor in Cicero’s De Re Publica. p.518; Atkins, Cicero on Politics. 
Ch.2.  
36 Zetzel, Selections. p.24. 
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discussion about monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and a mixture of these, 
which we will be considering later in this section—Scipio reverently (vereor) says 
that if he “continues too long in this vein” amongst all of his “good and wise 
friends [Laeli vosque homines amicissimi ac prudentissimi]”, he may begin to 
sound too much like an instructor or lecturer instead of a fellow inquirer 
(considerantis) into the subject, preparing for the account of Rome’s history 
which is the subject of Book II and in which he states his: 
“…own opinion [decerno] and belief [sensio] and judgment [adfirmo] 
that no res publica, in either its organisation [constitutione] or 
structure [discriptione] or its conduct and training [disciplina 
conferendam], can be compared to the one our fathers received from 
their ancestors and have passed on to us.”37  
He begins by speaking of Cato the Elder, to whom he was deeply attached and 
who used to say that the organisation of Rome surpassed that of all others 
because it was shaped not by a single lawgiver but by the talent of many over 
generations: 
“He said that there never was a genius so great that he could miss 
nothing, nor could all the geniuses in the world brought together in 
one place at one time foresee all contingencies without the practical 
experience afforded by the passage of time.”38 
I think this is testimony of fundamental importance, quite apart from Arendt’s 
interpretations of Hegel, his genius, and the American founders’.39 It by no 
means removes or excludes geniuses (philosophical or otherwise) from practical 
affairs; rather, it speaks to the importance of (non-Hegelian) history as a fount 
of practical wisdom, of prudentia, that no amount of genius or number of 
geniuses could ever replace. We saw Devetak in the first chapter recover for IP 
theorists a historical mode of critique and I hope to have shown in the second 
chapter that Arendt (if not Hegel) stood within “authority-claiming systems and 
beliefs of the past” and was herself engaging in this mode, albeit in her own 
peculiar way (p.131); along with her deep familiarity with the work of 
 
37 Rep. 1.70. 
38 Rep. 2.2. 
39 Arendt was also fond of quoting ‘the old Cato’: OR. pp.202 and 252, HC. p.325, PP. pp.174 and 
184, LM1. pp.7, 8, 123, and 216, TWB. pp.27, 446, 487 and 515. 
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philosophers, she had a ‘Thracian maid’ kind of common sense through her deep 
familiarity with the past more generally.40  
But let us return to Book II of the De Re Publica. With the discussion around 
constitutional theory having taken place in Book I, Scipio narrates a history of 
Rome—to show that it surpasses all others in terms of organisation, structure, 
conduct and training—in such a way that it reconciles with what has already 
been said in Book I, and he begins, “happy to make use of Cato’s own word”, 
with the “origins” of the Roman people as founded by Romulus.41 Following 
praise of Romulus’ great foresight (providentia) in choice of location and 
sapientia in marking out the natural defences of the city, elements of the mixed 
constitution discussed in Book I very quickly follow, with Romulus and Titus 
Tatius choosing leading citizens upon whose auctoritas they could rely. Scipio 
asks the group if they see that the consilium of Romulus “not only created a new 
people but brought it to full growth, almost to maturity”, and in a passage of 
the text attractive to those interested in Scipio’s method, Laelius responds 
affirmatively: 
“We do see that, and we see that you have introduced a new kind of 
analysis, something to be found nowhere in the writings of the 
Greeks. That great man [i.e. Plato], the greatest of all writers, chose 
his own territory on which to build a civitas to suit his own ideas. It 
may be a noble civitas, but it is totally alien to human life [vita 
hominum] and customs [moribus]. All the others [i.e. Aristotle and the 
Peripatetics] wrote about the types and principles of civitates without 
any specific model or form [exemplari formaque] of res publica. You 
seem to me to be doing both: from the outset, you have preferred to 
attribute your own discoveries to others rather than inventing it all 
yourself in the manner of Plato’s Socrates, and you ascribe to 
Romulus’ deliberate planning all the features of the site of the city 
[urbs] which were actually the result of chance or necessity. 
Moreover, your discussion does not wander but is fixed on one res 
publica. So go on as you have begun, I think I can foresee a res 
publica being brought to completion as you go through the remaining 
kings.”42* 
 
40 Jacques Taminiaux, 1997. The Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker: Arendt and 
Heidegger. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
41 Rep. 2.3. Cato wrote a historical work called Origines. 
42 Rep. 2.21. 
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Laelius seems to be saying here that Scipio’s historical account contains the best 
of both philosophical worlds. In Zetzel’s words, “Plato had concentrated on a 
single state, but a fictitious one; the Peripatetics had catalogued constitutions 
and political systems, but had not focused on the structural development of any 
one”, whereas Scipio is giving account of the best kind of civitas through the 
exemplum of Rome.43 Note here also Laelius’ opinion that Scipio is saying 
something ‘new’, although attributing it from the outset to what others have 
said before him, i.e. something ‘old’, whether through his attachments to Cato 
and history or to his friend Polybius and political theory, or to ‘the Socratic 
school’, the tradition of philosophy. In the context of the above passage, 
Matthew Fox argues that: 
“Rome becomes the historical proof of the correctness of Greek 
political theory, demonstrating the excellence of the mixed 
constitution, and although the speakers in the dialogue acknowledge 
the happy accident, it is clear from their discussion that Rome’s 
constitutional excellence is due not to theory, but to history; but at 
the same time, that history is not really history, but a narrative 
forced upon the traditional story in order to make it work as a 
verification of the theory … The crucial difference between Plato and 
Scipio is that Scipio has chosen a historical city, rather than an ideal 
one … Scipio is said [in the dialogue] to be occupying a compromise 
position: using the history of Rome, but at the same time shaping his 
narrative so as to draw out the congruency between the ideal 
constitution and Rome’s actual historical development.”44  
‘Ideal’ and ‘best’ are two amongst many possible translations of optimum; 
others could be ‘excellent’ or ‘good’. Atkins uses the phrase “ideal regime” in 
speaking about constitutional theory in the De Re Publica, but also qualifies it 
with “chance”, argues that the interlocutors are aiming for the “best 
practicable regime” and speaks of “relaxing reason’s reign even while continuing 
to hold it as normative”.45 However we may choose to interpret and speak about 
the text, it is clear that both philosophy and history are playing key roles in it, 
but it seems to me that Cicero is inter-weaving them rather than collapsing them 
 
43 Zetzel, Selections. p.178. On the Latin term exemplum, cf. J.G.F. Powell, 2001. ‘Were Cicero’s 
Laws the Laws of Cicero’s Republic?’ Powell and North (eds.), Cicero’s Republic. pp.28–29. On 
exempla at Rome, cf. Henriette van der Blom, 2010. Cicero’s Role Models: The Political 
Strategy of a Newcomer. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
44 Matthew Fox, 2007. Cicero’s Philosophy of History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fox’s title is 
slightly and deliberately provocative. p.1. Cf. De Or. 2.51–64. 
45 Atkins, Cicero on Politics. pp.96–99, and 116. Emphasis added. 
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into each other. There is no throwing together into a singular whole of Plato’s 
‘two worlds’, the ‘rational’ and the ‘actual’. 
In recalling some of the passages quoted from the previous sub-section, it seems 
that, for all the correctness of Greek philosophy (whether in Ethics, Physics or 
Logic), Greek philosophy is not a prerequisite for producing excellent civitates, 
since it was not always available at Rome, and never available to so many other 
excellent civitates around the world. Again, “cultivating the principles of 
nature”, whether through “words and learning” or “institutions and laws”—the 
two kinds of sapientia of which Cicero speaks in the Preface to Books III and IV—
need not be the purview of only the philosophers, though philosophers may also 
cultivate them through the former, as well as the latter through the former.  
As with his consideration of different ethical theories in the De Finibus, readers 
looking for an ‘answer’ or ‘solution’ in the De Re Publica to ‘the complex and 
troubled relations’ between history and philosophy, or between contextualism 
and universalism, or between practice and theory, will be disappointed. As 
Atkins puts it, what Cicero provides in the text is a dialogue which is: 
“an invitation to political philosophy … [a] dialogue [that] will 
communicate political teachings that its author believes are important 
while simultaneously maintaining authorial detachment requisite for 
prompting the reader to exercise his or her critical faculties.”46 
Or as Fox puts it, Cicero: 
“allows theory and practice to struggle before his readers’ eyes, 
making them aware of the difficulties, suggesting provisional 
solutions, but not providing any final version.”47 
Scholars of a more disciplinary persuasion may agree with Mommsen and Moses 
Finley that the “central idea” of De Re Publica is “as unphilosophical as 
unhistorical”, but it seems to me Atkins is much more on target in saying that 
Cicero “deftly appropriates, transforms, and, at times transcends Greek 
philosophy” in this text, and that it represents “a substantial contribution to 
ancient political philosophy with important implications for our understanding of 
 
46 Atkins, Cicero on Politics. pp.27 and 33. 
47 Matthew Fox, 2007. Cicero’s Philosophy of History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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the history of political thought”.48 I hope also to be showing that it has 
important implications for understanding in IPT, and having now (all-too-briefly) 
considered Cicero’s weaving together of history and philosophy in this text, the 
rest of this section is given over to an analysis of the political theory it contains. 
4.2.3 Scipio’s Definition of Res Publica 
In line with the argument set out in Plato’s Phaedrus about definitions, Scipio 
says to his interlocutors that in order to avoid mistakes in their discussion, 
everybody must agree first of all upon the name of the thing being discussed and 
what is signified by that name.49 Elizabeth Asmis provides some useful 
commentary here: 
“the aim of the definition is to provide an unambiguous, fixed 
standard by reference to which the issue is judged … The definition 
shows ‘what’ [res publica] is; subsequent argument based on the 
definition will show ‘what sort’ of thing [res publica] is. It is assumed 
that when we know what qualities [res publica] has, we will know 
what sort of [res publica] is best [practicable].”50 
When it is agreed that a definition of res publica is required, Scipio goes on to 
emphasise that he will be speaking as one Roman statesperson to others (along 
with some of the younger generation such as Tubero), avoiding the mistake of 
“making the subject of [his] speech … clearer than the speech itself.”51 Having 
judiciously set out this proviso for his interlocutors, Scipio defines res publica as 
follows: 
“Well then: the commonwealth is the concern of a people (res publica 
res populi), but a people is not any group of men assembled in any 
way, but an assemblage of some size associated (sociatus) with one 
 
48 Atkins, Cicero on Politics. p.2; Finley quoted in Schofield, Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica. 
p.63. 
49 Rep. 1.38; Plato, Phaedrus 237bc. 
50 Asmis, State as Partnership. p.574. 
51 Rep. 1.38. His allusion here I think is to philosophers such as the Stoics whose excessive 
precision in definition was notorious, and he reminds his interlocutors of the nature of his 
speech again at the end of it: Rep. 1.70. 
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another through agreement on law (iuris consensu) and community of 
interest (utilitatis communione).”52 
There is an inexhaustible literature on this definition stretching from antiquity 
to the present, and while Ronald Syme complained that the De Re Publica is “a 
book about which too much has been written”, I believe there can never be too 
much of a good thing.53 It is beyond the scope of my project to engage in any 
kind of depth with this vast secondary literature, but it seems to me that this 
should not prevent a consideration in IPT, in our own time, of what Scipio is 
actually saying in the text itself.54 We may begin with a consideration of the 
term res publica. As Zetzel says, it is difficult to translate into English: 
“… ‘commonwealth’ emphasises too much the material aspects of res; 
‘republic’ begs the constitutional issues which C. is careful here to 
leave open; ‘public affairs’ omits the institutional element … Heinz 
best approximated its scope as ‘including all interests of the 
community of the people’.”55 
Although I think it is excellent, I do not know if Heinz’s transliteration best 
approximates the scope of the meaning of res publica, but I am sure the reader 
would agree that, however accurate it may be, it is a bit unwieldy. For that 
reason, and Zetzel’s other reasons above, I leave the term untranslated, but 
would urge the reader to keep Heinz’s transliteration in mind whenever they see 
it used. To consider the term in some more detail, I think it is useful for us to 
look at something else Scipio says shortly after giving his definition: 
“…[the] first act [of peoples] was to establish a settlement in a fixed 
location for their homes … they called this combination of buildings a 
town or a city [oppidum eul urbem], marked out by shrines and 
common spaces. Now every populus (which is the kind of large 
assemblage I have described), every civitas (which is the organisation 
of the people [constitutio populi]), every res publica (which is, as I 
said, the concern of a people [res populi]) needs to be directed 
 
52 Rep. 1.39. For discussion of the proviso at Rep. 1.38, see Asmis, State as Partnership, pp.573–
75; Schofield, Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica, p.69; Atkins, Cicero on Politics and the Limits 
of Reason. pp.128–130. 
53 Quoted in Powell and North (eds.), Cicero’s Republic. p.1. 
54 Cf. M.S. Kempshall, 2001. ‘De Re Publica 1.39 in Medieval and Renaissance Political Thought’. 
Powell and North (eds.), Cicero’s Republic. Ch.6.  
55 Zetzel, Selections. p.127. 
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[regenda] by some sort of deliberation and judgment [consilium] in 
order to be long-lived.”56* 
It seems to me that this passage helps clarify for us what Scipio is saying res 
publica is not. It is not a territorially defined space, which is called a town 
(oppidum) or a city (urbs). Nor is he saying that it is a people (populus), a 
definition of which he has already set out and which we will consider in some 
more detail very shortly. And nor is Scipio saying that res publica is a civitas, the 
latter of which we can see in this passage corresponds more closely to the Greek 
term polis (itself having senses of both urbs and civitas).57 As Jed Atkins puts it, 
“a civitas is reducible to the citizens who constitute it in a way that a res 
publica is not”; although closely connected, a civitas is not identical to res 
publica, even as both terms (along with polis) are often used synonymously.58 
Scipio’s argument in this passage that ‘every populus, every civitas, every res 
publica’ needs to be directed by some sort of consilium in order to be long-lived 
we shall consider in the next sub-section. 
With a little more clarity given around the meaning of res publica, let us now 
consider what Augustine calls Scipio’s “brief definition” of it: res publica res 
populi, it is the concern of a people.59 Zetzel translates res here as concern “in 
order to emphasise its connection with ideas of property as well as of 
government.”60 Others’ translations of res populi have included ‘people’s thing’ 
(lit.), ‘the affairs and interests of a people’, ‘the business of a people’ and ‘the 
property of a people’. The semantic range of res is wide, and it seems that 
Scipio (in conjunction with his interlocutors) brings a few of its senses to bear 
upon the definition. But whatever the case may be—and taking the above 
renderings of res populi into account—it looks beyond doubt that, for Scipio, res 
 
56 Rep. 1.41. Cf. J.G. Powell, 1994. ‘The rector rei publicae of Cicero’s De Re Publica’. Scripta 
Classica Israelica 13. pp.19–29: “…the traditional English translation ‘rule’ is itself too strong for 
regere in many contexts; ‘direct’, ‘guide’, ‘govern’, ‘manage’, or ‘control’ would be better.” 
p.23n5.  
57 Cf. HC. p.198: “The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the 
organisation of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space 
lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be.” Arendt 
seems to me here to have provided a ‘Romanising’ account of the polis, its meaning shading 
into that of res publica. 
58 Atkins, Cicero on Politics. pp.131–132. 
59 Quoted in Schofield, Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica. p.69. 
60 Rep. p.xxxvii. 
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publica is a thing with which a given assemblage of individuals, all of whom 
comprise a people, are occupied: it takes up (at least some of) their time. 
But what is a people on Scipio’s account such that res publica is its concern? The 
two features through which he says individuals are associated—iuris consensus 
and utilitatis communio—such that they are a people were already present in all 
the major Greek political theories of his day; Scipio provides a definition of 
‘people’ already familiar to his interlocutors.61 Even so, his rendering of these 
two features in Latin makes them far from identical with those of his Greek 
predecessors.62 Let us begin with a consideration of iuris consensus. Ius is 
another difficult term to translate into English (hence why, for example, it is 
usually left untranslated in the just war categories ius ad bellum, ius in bello 
and ius post bellum, and why Benhabib and Waldron disagree over the meaning 
of Kant’s ius cosmopoliticum [pp.48–49]). It signifies ‘right’ or ‘law’ or a ‘policy 
of justice’ (as distinguished from justice simply: iustitia), and it is consensus, 
common agreement, with respect to ius which Scipio regards as one feature that 
distinguishes a people from a mere assemblage of individuals.63 Consensus has a 
broader meaning than the English term ‘consent’, covering anything between 
“mere compliance and strong commitment … what is required is not simply [the] 
assent [of individuals] but a shared position”.64 One might, as Schofield does, 
usefully render iuris consensus as a shared or communal sense of ius.65 In chapter 
two, we saw the beginnings of what Cicero is calling here iuris consensus, it 
seems to me, in the various councils that sprung up during some of the 
revolutions of the last two centuries; individuals had a ‘shared position’, acting 
in an atmosphere of mutual trust, with those who took the initiative, those who 
exhibited authority in their actions by inspiring confidence in their fellows, those 
most able “to communicate between [fellows] and their opinions so that the 
commonness of this world becomes apparent”, being entrusted by their fellows 
to ‘manage the consensus’, administer ius, in the next higher council, and the 
next again, and so on. Noting the ambiguity of the Latin, Asmis says that “the 
 
61 Schofield, Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica. p.70. 
62 Cf. Straumann, Crisis and Constitutionalism. Chs.4 and 5. 
63 Asmis, State as Partnership. p.578. 
64 Asmis, State as Partnership. p.578. 
65 Schofield, Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica. p.72. 
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phrase [iuris consensus] suggests both an agreement on the kinds of rules [which 
comprise some sort of legal system] and an agreement to abide by them.”66 In 
this sense, Arendt was not exactly wrong to speak of a consensus iuris ‘as 
international law’ that makes up ‘a civilised world’ which the Nazi and Stalinist 
regimes grievously violated, to say the least, but she was also not exactly right, 
since ‘the civilised world’ does not constitute ‘a people’ (the phrase iuris 
consensus is found nowhere else in the extant Latin literature before Cicero).  
Near the end of Book II, Scipio links consensus with justice (iustitia) by way of 
analogy with musical harmony: 
“For just as in the music of harps and flutes, and of course in choral 
singing, a degree of harmony must be maintained among the different 
sounds, and if it is altered or discordant a trained ear cannot endure 
it; and this harmony, through the regulation of very different voices, 
is made pleasing and concordant. So too the civitas, through the 
reasoned balance [moderata ratione] of the highest and the lowest 
and the intervening orders, is harmonious in the concord of the most 
dissimilar elements. What musicians call harmony with regard to song 
is consensu in the civitas, the tightest and the best bond of safety in 
every res publica; and that concord can never exist without 
iustitia.”67* 
We considered in the previous chapter Cicero’s writings on the virtue of iustitia. 
Scipio’s use of this musical analogy is not identical to Plato’s, but as in Plato, it 
does bring forth a discussion about iustitia in relation to res publica—Book III of 
De Re Publica—which we shall consider in more detail in sub-section 4.3.1. But 
here, let us return to Scipio’s definition of populus and consider the second 
feature through which persons associate such that they comprise a people: 
utilitatis communio. This has been translated variously as ‘community of 
interest’, ‘sharing in advantage’, ‘commonality of advantage’ and ‘sharing of 
benefits’. It seems to me that this aspect of Scipio’s definition of populus is 
sometimes put into a kind of competition with iuris consensus in the secondary 
literature instead of being appreciated as an equally necessary aspect of the 
definition, and so of res publica. Thus, Neal Wood, in setting out the ‘economic 
dimension of Cicero’s political thought’, omits discussion of iuris consensus, and 
in response J. Jackson Barlow, although rightly arguing that “the consensus 
 
66 Asmis, State as Partnership. p.580. 
67 Rep. 2.69. 
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about [ius] is [as] equally fundamental [as utilitatis communio]”, also says that 
“for Cicero, the iuris consensus is the prior principle by nature”.68 Similarly, 
Benjamin Straumann argues that: 
“Scipio maintains … the people have to be associated with one 
another through an agreement about ius and, furthermore, through 
commonality of interest or utility (utilitas). Associating for the 
purpose of realizing or maximising utility corresponds to weakness as 
the ‘first cause of assembly’ (prima causa cœundi). Cicero therefore 
does not entirely lose sight of weakness, utility, and the realisation of 
some common advantage but no longer seems to think it necessary for 
his account of the state … [Weakness, utility and the realisation of 
some common advantage are] present, still, but no longer necessary; 
nature would compel us to congregate even in the absence of 
weakness and common advantage.”69  
As with Barlow, Straumann’s argument here I think unduly merges the voices of 
Scipio and Cicero, the latter of whom, as we have seen, has deliberately 
removed himself from the conversation. While it is true that Scipio seems often 
to be Cicero’s ‘spokesman’ in the text, we should remain wary of attributing 
everything that he says to the author.70 But even when we take it to be only 
Scipio’s voice that we are hearing, we still see Straumann acknowledging here 
that utilitatis communio has been built into his definition of a populus. This 
suggests to me that Scipio ‘thinks it necessary for his account of the state’, and 
furthermore, just as necessary as iuris consensus. We shall be discussing what 
Scipio says about the ‘first cause of assembly’ in more detail later in this 
chapter, but in considering Straumann’s argument here about utilitatis 
communio, I cannot see where he has taken ‘realising and maximising’ from 
Scipio’s definition; the key term here is communio, which denotes a sharing in 
common, or mutual participation. It is useful for us to recall what Long had said 
in the previous chapter about Cicero and communal utility in the De Officiis 
(pp.235–236). He argued that, for Cicero, human society and connection “is the 
supreme utile … because it comprehends the particular interests of every 
individual”. Cicero’s use of communal utility in the De Officiis “refers to the 
interest anyone shares in the right of all to retain what they happen to own”, 
 
68 Wood, The Economic Dimension; J. Jackson Barlow, 1995. ‘Cicero on Property and the State’. 
Nicgorski (ed.), Cicero’s Practical Philosophy. p.228. 
69 Straumann, Crisis and Constitutionalism. p.170 with n.80. 
70 Cf. Atkins, Cicero on Politics and the Limits of Reason. Ch.1. 
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and he reconciles utile, “the unavoidable object of human endeavour, with the 
social goods specified by justice”, and more specifically, through individuals 
exercising the virtue of beneficentia. Again, Heinz’s transliteration of res 
publica is good to keep in mind here: ‘including all interests of the community of 
the people.’  
This I think can lead us into a wider point which stretches beyond the scope of 
my project. Asmis notes that utilitas “covers any type of benefit, including 
material wealth, security, freedom, power, fame, virtue [and] happiness”, 
which suggests to me two things: (i) that we should refrain, pace Wood, from 
reducing Cicero’s theoretical writings on politics to their ‘economic dimension’; 
and (ii) exploration of the ways in which these multifarious benefits—Asmis’s list 
is not exhaustive—are, or could be, or should be commonly held or shared 
(utilitatis communio), whether in theory or practice, is a broad area of research 
brimming with possibilities, insofar as we are interested in maintaining res 
publica. 
But let us return to what Scipio is saying about res publica. Relating everything 
here is yet another important aspect of his definition of populus, one we 
considered in some detail in the previous chapter: it is an assemblage of 
individuals associated with one another through a communal sense of ius and a 
sharing of utilitas. I understand the preposition or adverb ‘through’ here to 
mean ‘continuing in time towards completion of’ something, and that 
something—association, iuris consensus and utilitatis communio—which has 
never actually completed, we call politics. Use of ‘through’ in translation I think 
highlights for us, and correctly, that Scipio understands res publica to be a going 
concern of the populus; it takes up (at least some of) the time of the people. It 
is in this sense I think it extremely useful to understand the res publica in terms 
of what Walzer calls its ongoingness (p.245n89); it goes on in the world.  
Although I think she provides an excellent account of Scipio’s definitions and 
arguments concerning res publica, I would want to question the numerous 
references Asmis makes to ‘unity’ in her arguments.71 I do not think them 
 
71 Cf. Elizabeth Asmis, 2005. ‘A New Kind of Model: Cicero’s Roman Constitution in De Republica.’ 
American Journal of Philology. 126(3). pp.377–416. 
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wrong—and I think Brown (p.85) was probably closer to being right in saying that 
some “degree of moral unity” is required in maintaining res publica—but it 
seems to me very important to keep in mind that completely absent from 
Scipio’s definitions of res publica and populus is the term universitas, which in 
subsequent legal theory came to signify a collectivised legal entity endowed 
with some of the features of a whole individual.72 While Scipio’s definition of res 
publica is collectivising—and Asmis rightly notes a progressive sequence of 
definitional terms compounded by con-: cœtus, congregatus, consensus, 
communio—it is not totalising. The sequence is not rounded off by universitas, it 
is rounded off by societas, or more accurately, one of its verbal forms, 
sociatus.73 Whereas Zetzel retains in his translation the historical-political sense 
of proceedings which are active and incomplete by rendering the relevant 
passage as “…associated with one another through…”, it seems to me that this 
sense is slightly obscured by Asmis’s rendering of it as “…formed into a 
partnership by…”, even as the latter is still of course a highly appropriate 
translation. To put the matter in Arendtian terms, it seems to me that Scipio’s 
definitions (and arguments) unfold what is held in common at the same time as 
preserving the plurality of persons, which is also to say the distinctiveness of 
each person, who hold(s) it in common, and who are engaged, as Canovan 
(p.174) puts it, in “dynamic association”. Let us move on now to consider some 
of the ways in which this can take place. 
 
72 In civil and canon law, universitates included hospitals, cathedral chapters and universities, 
which were later joined by the independent city-republics or communes of Florence, Pisa and 
Siena. Cf. Skinner, From Humanism to Hobbes. pp.12–44. 
73 It is usually the verb which rounds off a Latin sentence—in this case: …cœtus multitudinis iuris 
consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. Perhaps a rough analogy could be drawn here with 
some aspects of British business law: incorporating a company turns it into a separate ‘legal 
person’ (a ‘universitas’) thus limiting the liability of its directors, whereas partners in a 
partnership (citizens in the present context) have complete personal liability, ‘jointly and 
severally’, for their business (res publica in the present context). The extent to which Oakeshott 
was relying upon Cicero in his On Human Conduct in his “borrowing” of the Latin terms societas 
(‘civil association’) and universitas (‘enterprise association’) is something I continue to ponder. 
Michael Oakeshott, 1975. On Human Conduct. Oxford: Clarendon; Nicholas Rengger, 2013. 
Just War and International Order: The Uncivil Condition in World Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p.31. Universitas appears nowhere in the Ciceronian corpus 
except in the De Natura Deorum and in his translation of (some of) Plato’s Timaeus. 
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4.2.4 Organisations for Res Publica 
In the previous sub-section, we saw Straumann considering what Scipio says 
about a people’s ‘first cause of assembly’. Scipio provides account of this 
immediately after giving his definition of populus: 
“The first cause of [a people’s] assembly [prima causa cœundi] is not 
so much weakness as a kind of natural gathering together of men 
[quasi congregatio]: this species is not isolated or prone to wandering 
alone, but it is so created that not even in an abundance of everything 
<do men wish to live a solitary existence>…”74* 
Regrettably, the text breaks off at this point (with the words enclosed by < > 
being an editorial supplement) but let us consider what has come down to us. 
Although Scipio says this immediately after providing his definitions of res 
publica and populus, I agree with Asmis that this passage does not form any part 
of his definition; it is, rather, an argument which requires justification, and 
although we cannot know how Scipio justified it at this point, we have already 
seen some of Cicero’s writings in other contexts concerning the natural 
sociability of human beings. It is of course up to the reader to deliberate and to 
arrive at their own judgments about this matter, but even as there are no ‘final 
words’ on it to be found anywhere, it feels to me to be intuitively correct that, 
even if all our wants and needs were to be met by the work of some magic 
wand, we would still flee our solitude to be in the company of other human 
beings. But to return to De Re Publica, Scipio speaks again of prima causa 
cœundi in Book IV: 
“Consider furthermore how wisely [sapienter] all the rest has been 
foreseen [provisa] in order to promote the citizens’ shared association 
in a happy and honorable way of life [civium beate et honeste vivendi 
societatem]. That is, indeed, the first cause of assembly [prima causa 
cœundi]…”75* 
It is unclear to me precisely what Scipio is saying he understands the first cause 
of assembly to be here, since the first sentence of this passage is so curiously 
constructed. Is it ‘the citizens’ shared association’? Or is it ‘the citizens’ shared 
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association in a happy and honorable way of life’? Or is it ‘how wisely all the rest 
has been foreseen in order to promote’ it?76 Or is it the activity of considering 
any or all of this? Or, in-deed, is it all of these together? I am inclined to think it 
is the latter, but let us consider ‘how wisely all the rest has been foreseen…’. 
Scipio is speaking here of both sapientia and providentia, the latter of which 
Cicero elsewhere associates with prudentia.77 And we saw Atkins’ argument that, 
for Cicero, it is sapientia which comprehends the correct picture of things that 
allows prudentia to make the right choices (p.244). It seems to me that it is 
persons who are sapiens and prudens who are able successfully to promote the 
citizens’ shared association (in what anyway would have been “a kind of natural 
gathering together”), or in Arendt’s terms, understanding persons “able to 
communicate between the citizens and their opinions so that the commonness of 
this world becomes apparent” to the citizens (pp.166–167), and the type to 
which such persons belong is the topic of the final section of this chapter. 
Arendt’s argument about ‘the one outstanding virtue of the statesman’ in the 
second chapter, it seems to me, was that without the help of such persons, 
citizens would need to become such persons themselves; and we have seen many 
scholars promoting education towards this in previous chapters. The inclusion of 
‘happy’ in the above passage, as Zetzel says, modifies in a more Aristotelian 
direction what Scipio had said at Rep. 1.39 as regards the first cause of 
assembly, and although he goes on immediately at this point to express some 
scepticism about Greek plans to have what we would call today ‘education for 
citizenship’, I think it not insignificant that Scipio modifies the first cause of 
assembly in a more Aristotelian direction only at the beginning of Book IV, the 
subject of which is instituta at Rome, which includes the education of citizens—
Jed Atkins describes instituta as “customary standards of social behaviour”—and 
we shall consider what both Scipio and Cicero have to say about instituta in 
more detail in the next section.78  
 
76 In context, I am unsure if ‘all the rest’ here definitely takes off from Rep. 4.2, where Scipio is 
praising specific aspects of Rome’s institutions, or if Rep. 4.3a is a fragment placed at the 
beginning of Book IV by the editor, no doubt authoritatively, but nevertheless not entirely free 
from doubt. 
77 Leg. 1.60. 
78 Rep. 4.3a, with note 4; Atkins, Cicero on Politics. p.155. 
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Having looked at what Scipio says about prima causa cœundi, let us now 
consider his claim that ‘every populus, every civitas, every res publica’ needs to 
be directed by some sort of consilium in order to be long-lived:  
“That consilium … must always be connected to the original cause 
which engendered the civitas; and it must also either be assigned to 
one person or to selected individuals or be taken up by the entire 
population. And so, when everything is in the hands of one person, we 
call that one person a king [rex] and that type of res publica a 
monarchy [regnum]. When it is in that of chosen [delectos] men, then 
a civitas is said to be directed by the judgment and decision of the 
aristocracy [civitas optimatium]. And that in which everything is in 
the hands of the populus is a ‘popular’ civitas [civitas popularis]—that 
is what they call it. And of these three types any one, even though it 
may not be perfect or in my opinion the best possible, still is 
supportable [tolerabile] as long as it holds to the bond which first 
bound men together in the societas of res publica; and any one might 
be better than another.”79* 
The first thing for us to note here is that the organisation of citizens, for Scipio, 
reflects where consilium is located: that which Zetzel describes as “the 
necessary intelligence needed to guide a commonwealth.”80 The second thing for 
us to note is that the three basic types of organisation—monarchy, aristocracy 
and democracy—can all very well preserve and maintain res publica (and the 
populus and the civitas) so long as the directing consilium is holding to the bond 
which first bound those persons together. As Zetzel comments here: 
“C. is not concerned with universal causes for the formation of all 
states, but with the practical concerns of particular states. Every 
state must have some direction (consilium) in order to last; and that 
direction must always be related to the particular reason for which 
the state came into being.”81  
We saw Devetak say in the first chapter that what is prudent in one particular 
situation may not be prudent in another (p.78). Unlike in rigorist interpretations 
of Kant’s principle of right, e.g. interpreting the principle as one which 
“establishes how a juridico-civil order can come into existence that would be in 
compliance with the moral law” (p.48), there can be no deductive moves from 
any ‘universal first cause’ of the formation of all states to decide right actions in 
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particular contexts, and as we have seen, what Scipio says regarding prima causa 
cœundi in the De Re Publica has been articulated in such a way that, while it is 
certainly informed by the arguments of philosophers, is also set in a conversation 
about Rome in particular, even as he is still providing watchwords about the 
basic types of organisation a res publica might take.82 Without containing any 
‘universalisms’, this I think is what Arendt nevertheless found “astounding” 
about this age-old distinction (a distinction that stretches much further back in 
time than Cicero): its adequacy to the rich diversity of human beings living 
together all over the planet, or what Zetzel calls here the practical concerns of 
particular states. Any one of the basic types may be better than any of the 
others at maintaining res publica, even if in Scipio’s opinion none of them are 
the best possible. And as I hope to have shown in the second chapter through 
Arendt’s writings, being connected or related to the past—the task of tradition 
as such—does not mean being ruled by it; in the civic republican tradition, the 
faculty of judgment in all concerned remains intact. But to return to the three 
basic types of organisation as set out in the above passage by Scipio, we saw in 
the previous sub-section that Zetzel did not want to translate res publica as 
‘republic’ because it begged the organisational questions Scipio was careful to 
leave open in his definition. This is the final thing for us to note from this 
passage: accretions of meaning across the centuries have led to the terms 
‘republic’ and ‘monarchy’ being understood as mutually exclusive, and I think it 
is useful for us to bracket this understanding whilst getting to grips with the De 
Re Publica.83 
Through both the political theory as set out in Book I and the account of Rome’s 
history given in Book II, Scipio shows ways in which constitutional change may 
occur that do not necessarily follow the rigid cycle as set out in Polybius’ 
political theory (unlike in Polybius’ anakuklōsis, conversio in the De Re Publica is 
being used metaphorically rather than literally).84 As we shall see in the final 
section of this chapter, it is the job of a sapiens and prudens to recognise this 
course and provide the steering and guidance that preserves and maintains res 
publica, whereas in Polybius’ political theory, “pretty much any competent 
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person who follows his principles could accurately predict the future”.85 Scipio 
says that the change from monarchy to tyranny “is the first and most certain”, 
happening when a king begins to act unjustly, becoming a tyrant.86 Sometimes 
the aristocracy gets rid of the tyrant, sometimes the people, both sometimes 
perfectly capable of preserving res publica, but in practice both, of course, just 
like the king, being not incorruptible. It is sometimes the case in an aristocracy 
that “the wealth of a few replaces virtue in control of res publica”, thus 
degenerating into oligarchy (“there is no uglier form of civitas”), whereas it is 
sometimes the case that a democracy degenerates into ochlocracy, or ‘mob 
rule’.87 Scipio warns against when the people: 
“bring force to bear on a just king … or have tasted the blood of the 
aristocracy … do not make the mistake of thinking that any huge 
ocean or fire is harder to calm than the violence of a mob out of 
control.”88 
Whence “the stock from which tyrants grow”.89 Leaders in each of the three 
basic types of organisation—government by the one, the few, or the many— 
“snatch the government from one another as if it were a ball: tyrants from 
kings, aristocrats or the people from them, and from them oligarchies or tyrants. 
No form of res publica is ever maintained for very long”, and it is at this point 
we find in the De Re Publica what Arendt called “the age-old notion of a mixed 
form of government which, combining the monarchic, aristocratic, and the 
democratic elements in the same body politic, would be capable of arresting the 
cycle of sempiternal change” (p.170).90 
Scipio’s account, as Atkins says, “restores political culture to its central position 
in constitutional analysis”; all virtue has a social orientation, instilling a concern 
in citizens to preserve and maintain res publica through upholding the 
institutional and constitutional arrangements which guarantee it.91 During his 
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account of Rome’s history, Scipio provides his interlocutors with a key statement 
about its mixed constitution which had developed there over generations: 
“… if there is not an equitable [aequabilis] balance in the civitas of 
rights [iuris] and duties [officii] and responsibilities [muneris], so that 
there is enough power [potestas] in the hands of the magistrates and 
enough authority [auctoritas] in the judgment [consilio] of the 
aristocrats and enough freedom [libertas] in the people, then the 
conditions of the res publica cannot be preserved unchanged.”92 
Here we see “the combination or integration of three fundamental traits which 
characterise men in so far as they live with each other and exist in plurality” 
(p.170)—potestas, auctoritas and libertas—given institutional expression. I have 
latched on a few times in this project to Arendt’s phrasing about two ‘parts’ of 
politics: that which deals with the citizen and that which deals with institutions, 
and I said that we know, whether through the language of individual–collective 
or agent–structure or any other, that each is always somehow dependent on the 
other.93 This issue it seems to me has always been salient and a definitive answer 
continues to elude us.94 As with the disciplinary disputes between philosophers 
and historians, although Cicero deals with both ‘parts’ of politics in the De Re 
Publica, those hoping to find in it a ‘solution’ to this issue will be disappointed. 
But whatever the case may be, what the De Re Publica does provide, I argue, are 
important civic republican watchwords, and those in the above passage I think 
are especially important. 
Although Scipio’s account is given in the context of Rome in particular, his 
articulation is such that he provides no ‘final answers’ as to what is an 
‘equitable balance’, what proportions of the different elements are ‘enough’. 
We have already seen that it may well be the case, i.e. in particular situations, 
that either a pure monarchy, a pure aristocracy, or a pure democracy, can 
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only indirectly, he certainly knew the work of Aristotle’s followers Theophrastus and 
Dicaearchus.” James G. Zetzel, 2013. ‘Political Philosophy’. Steel (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Cicero. pp.181–182.  
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maintain res publica, and so in each case constitute an ‘equitable balance’: all 
of one and none of the others. In Scipio’s account, so long as the directing 
consilium remains connected to the past and sustains iuris consensus and 
utilitatis communio in the societas of res publica, all is well—although as we 
have seen, it is his opinion that the basic types are unstable, too easily 
degenerating into their vicious counterparts, and the judicious mixing or 
blending of the key qualities of each basic virtuous type is what he recommends. 
This broad framework, it seems to me, is extraordinarily useful for organising 
our experiences, and indeed may well be adequate to the rich diversity of 
human beings living together in plurality—that is, in an untold variety of 
particular situations—all over the planet. It might be usefully encapsulated: 
‘wherever there is vis, there ever should be republican institutions.’ And to 
underscore the point once more, it would be for neither Scipio, nor Cicero, nor 
myself, nor any political theorist or philosopher, to decide upon these matters; 
such decisions are up to those associating. 
We saw in the second chapter that potestas was a fundamental part of Roman 
legal discourse, with the law “simultaneously limiting and guaranteeing its 
exercise”, and securing its legitimacy through iuris consensus, the right (ius) of a 
given public officeholder to give orders. As Gotter notes, assertions of potestas 
“should not require physical coercion; rather, it was expected that a command 
from someone holding a magistracy, or performing a social role that was 
endowed with potestas, was met with obedience”, and although we are all 
painfully aware of the excuses offered by many after the atrocities of the 20th 
Century that they were ‘only following orders’, we can see here, through the 
dependence of potestas on iuris consensus—which in itself we saw Canovan 
speak of in terms of constitutional arrangements upheld by the public 
commitments of citizens—why Arendt insisted that it was not obedience that was 
a “political virtue of the first order”, but rather support.95 The Latin term for 
obey, obœdire, means literally ‘to give a hearing’; what is also required of 
citizens, I am assuming in this project, is that we are exercising judgments in 
the world. 
 
95 Gotter, Greek and Roman Concepts of Power. p.200; RJ. pp.46–48. 
328 
Whereas potestas in Scipio’s account is seen as the key quality of monarchy, he 
associates auctoritas and consilium with aristocracy, institutionalised at Rome as 
the senate. Romulus was the original auctor who established the senate, and 
with his successor Numa Pompilius curtailing the people’s over-eagerness for war 
and developing in the citizens social virtues (iustitia and fides), provided a 
connection back to which the auctoritas of the senate held on as the mos 
maiorum, ‘the ways of the ancestors’, carrying out an educative role in 
stabilising the res publica.96 I sought to show through Arendt’s writings in the 
second chapter that such providing of counsel, the giving of advice or guidance, 
the exercising of auctoritas, provides a check on—or a regulation or moderation 
of—both potestas and libertas, without ever removing or abolishing them (which 
as Arendt says, would be a use of force rather than authority, and moreover, a 
tyrannical use of force). As the reader might expect in a project about Cicero, 
auctoritas is perhaps the single most important watchword to be taken from it. I 
have argued that we should understand it as an irreducibly and inalienably 
personal quality, with the person necessarily connected in the present to the 
past with a care for the future. Auctoritas provides an indispensable function in 
maintaining the worldly condition—public freedom, the res publica—in which it 
is possible for our inner freedom to find expression. 
We saw in the second chapter that Cicero describes a mark of libertas as being 
‘to live just as one pleases’, and Scipio identifies it as the key quality of 
democracy. In the first chapter, Walzer described this in terms of a people 
“claim[ing] a right to do what they think is right (literally, what pleases them)”, 
and Dallmayr fully accepted this ideal as it was manifest in modernity, “but 
surely not [in] a space outside civil and legal bonds” (pp.92 and 95). Taken to 
extremes, Scipio says that everybody ‘living just as they please’ runs the risk of 
degenerating into mob rule, ‘the stock from which tyrants grow’, and 
recommends that this is checked in some measure by auctoritas and consilium 
for res publica to be long-lived. We also saw in the second chapter that Arendt 
had much to say about this: she thought that authority had ‘vanished’ from the 
modern world; that modern liberals tend to ignore forms of government; that all 
forms of government, good or bad, in one way or another constrain the freewill 
of citizens; that the council system was a possibility in which authority may be 
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generated to protect the worldly conditions in which citizens are able to 
exercise their freewill; and that the American founders in the act of foundation 
had been relying on the authority of testimonies handed down from Roman 
antiquity.97 I sought to show through the examples given that the relation of 
authority and freedom was realised in an atmosphere of good faith and I sought 
to show in the previous chapter that a key Roman term in this respect is 
societas, a partnership, in which persons join through mutual agreement, 
contributing their resources towards a shared endeavour. As Arendt put it, 
‘democracy’ and ‘aristocracy’ in a modern act of foundation were neither 
mutually exclusive opposites nor ideologies but “two sides of the same event”, 
the Roman republic rested upon “the perpetual alliance of patricians and 
plebeians”, and we saw in the previous sub-section that Scipio says such an 
alliance cannot exist without iustitia, some of the key moral and legal aspects of 
which we shall now move on to consider.98    
4.3 Laws and Institutions 
4.3.1 A Carneadean Debate and a Refinement of Res Publica 
After providing the analogy of musical harmony at the end of Book II, Scipio says 
that the conversation “can go no further without establishing not only the 
falseness of the statement that res publica cannot function without injustice but 
also the profound truth of the idea that res publica cannot possibly function 
without justice”, setting the scene for the next day’s debate between Philus, 
who plays devil’s advocate arguing the former, and Laelius, advocating the 
 
97 Freewill in this context is Arendt’s term, is of course closely associated with Kant, and an 
investigation of which is beyond the scope of my project. For our purposes, what matters here is 
not willing but judging, which also requires freedom. Cf. Tusc. 4.7. 
98 What Arendt (p.178n143) called ‘solidified ideologies’ and “attempt[s] at thinking together and 
combining meaningfully what our present vocabulary presents to us in terms of opposition and 
contradiction” also continue amongst classicists in their understanding of this matter. Whereas 
Jed Atkins speaks of “a cloud of ideological conflict hover[ing] over the conversation of Scipio 
and his companions”, and Valentina Arena refers to the debates between optimates and 
populares in the late Roman republic as “competing ideolog[ies]”, Catherine Steel suggests that 
“though [these] strands of thought … were undeniably present, it remains to be debated the 
extent to which they were regarded as incompatible with, or in opposition to, each other.” Atkins, 
Cicero on Politics. pp.108–115; Valentina Arena, 2012. Libertas and the Practice of Politics in 
the Late Roman Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.6; Catherine Steel, 2014. 
‘Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic. By Valentina Arena. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.’ Book Review. Classical 
Philology 109(1). pp.86–88.  
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latter, in Book III.99 Their debate recalls a Greek embassy to Rome in 155 BCE 
when sceptical philosopher and head of the Academy, Carneades, set out before 
the Roman people the latter argument on one day (to their delight) and the 
former argument on the next (to their dismay). The real Scipio, Laelius and 
Philus were all present to hear Carneades’ speeches, and Cicero in the De Re 
Publica reverses the order in which the philosopher had set out both sides of this 
argument, giving justice rather than self-interest the last word (as Plato had 
done originally in his Republic). Regrettably, Books III–VI of De Re Publica are 
highly fragmentary, making it impossible to know the detail of this debate and 
how it influenced the conversation in the second half of the book in which 
institutions and the best kind of citizen are discussed, but enough remains for us 
to see (amongst other things) that its outcome produced a refinement of res 
publica. Enough also remains for us to see that Philus and Laelius discuss justice 
in both the domestic and ‘international’ spheres at the same time; we consider 
the former in this sub-section and the latter in the next. 
Many of the fragments of Book III have been preserved in the work of Lactantius 
(c. 250–325 CE), Christian author and adviser to the Roman emperor Constantine, 
who provides us with a useful summary of the argument Philus puts forward: 
“…men ordain laws for themselves in accordance with utility, that is 
to say they vary in accordance with customs and have frequently been 
altered by the same people in accordance with the times; there is no 
such thing as natural law. All men and other animate creatures are 
drawn to their own utility under the guidance of nature; and 
furthermore, either there is no justice at all, or if there is any, it is 
the highest stupidity [i.e. the opposite of sapientia], since it would 
harm itself in looking after the interests of others.”100 
We saw Cicero say in the previous chapter that each person is indeed drawn to 
their own utility—“nature does not oppose it”—and that for him the supreme 
utile is that which comprehends the particular interests of each person and all 
persons; what Long called “the right of all to retain what they happen to own” 
(p.235). And we saw in the previous section that Scipio had built utilitatis 
communio into his definition of a people, which I argued was just as necessary 
an aspect of the definition as iuris consensus. There are certain elements of 
 
99 Rep. 2.70. 
100 Rep. 3.21a. 
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Philus’ argument here that we see converging with Cicero’s own in the De 
Officiis and with Scipio’s definition of a people, but the obvious difference is the 
view Philus is putting forward about justice: either it does not exist, or it is 
extremely stupid and self-harming. This is plainly not Cicero’s own view. He 
regards sapientia as including “the sociability and fellowship of gods and men 
with each other” and understands utile at this level; it is part of the utile of 
individuals that communal utility is upheld, and that can only be upheld through 
iustitia (which we have seen also includes beneficentia and liberalitas). 
Philus also links the position he is putting forward back to the constitutional 
debates of the previous day: 
“… all those who have the power of life and death over a people are 
tyrants, but they prefer themselves to be called kings … Furthermore, 
when certain individuals because of their wealth or family or other 
resources control res publica, it is a faction, but they call themselves 
‘the best people’ [optimates]. And if the people has the greatest 
power and everything is done by its decision, that is called libertas 
but is in fact licentia. But when each fears [timet] another, both 
individuals and classes [homo hominem et ordo ordinem], then 
because no one is sure of himself, there is a kind of bargain made 
between the people and magnates, and out of this arises that 
combined form of civitas which Scipio praised; and indeed neither 
nature nor our wishes is the mother of iustitia; weakness is.”101 
With the (cynically) assumed non-existence or stupidity of justice, Philus re-
describes the constitutions discussed on the previous day according to their 
vicious manifestations and offers a ‘contractarian’ account familiar to readers of 
Polybius, the Epicureans, and some of the modern social contract theorists. 
Again, this plainly is not Cicero’s view, who sees wisdom (sapientia) rather than 
weakness as the mother of iustitia (p.240) and to be feared (timeri) rather than 
loved (diligi) as ruinous of a civitas (p.270). We saw in the second chapter that 
Arendt understood the Roman term lex as meaning ‘lasting tie’, that the Roman 
republic consisted of a ‘war-born partnership’ between patricians and plebeians, 
and that through lex was created ‘an in-between space between formerly hostile 
partners’ (p.199). She made no mention of fear or bargain in this connection, 
and we saw in the example of the council system that she was closer to Cicero 
than Philus here in seeing an atmosphere of good faith in the participants, a 
 
101 Rep. 3.23. 
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societas, “a cooperative community that fosters relationships between partners” 
(p.185).  
The discussion in Book III of De Re Publica is rather loftier than that of the 
previous day’s discussion—Physics is in the foreground—and notwithstanding the 
fact that none of them are dogmatists of any sort, in borrowing some modern 
philosophical turns of phrase in getting to grips with this part of the text, we 
might say that Philus is putting forward an argument which is holding on to an 
‘individualist ontology’ (‘justice harms itself’), whereas both Cicero and Arendt 
are holding on to a ‘social ontology’ along with Laelius. Regrettably, we have 
much more of Philus’ speech than Laelius’ in the extant fragments, but some of 
what we do have of the latter has echoed very loudly down the history of 
political thought. Here is his account of natural law, preserved by Lactantius:  
“True law is right reason [vera lex recta ratio], consonant with 
nature, spread through all people [diffusa in omnes]. It is constant 
and eternal; it summons to officium by its orders [iubendo], it deters 
from crime by its prohibitions [vetando]. Its orders and prohibitions to 
good people are never given in vain; but it does not move the wicked 
by these orders and prohibitions. It is wrong to pass laws obviating this 
law; it is not permitted to abrogate any of it; it cannot be totally 
repealed. We cannot be released from this law by the senate or the 
people, and it needs no exegete or interpreter like Sextus Aelius. 
There will not be one law at Rome and another at Athens, one now 
and another later; but all nations [gentes] at all times will be bound 
by this one eternal and unchangeable law, and the god will be the one 
common master and general (so to speak) of all people. He is the 
author, expounder, and mover of this law; and the person who does 
not obey [parebit] it will be in exile from himself. Insofar as he scorns 
his nature as a human being, by this very fact he will pay the greatest 
penalty, even if he escapes all the other things that are generally 
recognised as punishments.”102 
As Zetzel understates, “this is a noble statement that deserves frequent 
reading”, putting forward a position that some things are just naturally right; “if 
equity [aequitas], faith [fides] and justice [iustitia] do not derive from nature, 
and if all these things are measured by utility, then it is impossible to find any 
good man”.103 Even as some may disagree that these things derive from nature, 
 
102 Rep. 3.33. Parere: to appear before the eyes or mind, be evident; to be clearly known; to obey, 
be obedient to; to give way to, yield to. 
103 Rep. 3.38a = Fin. 2.59. 
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wheresoever they derive from, what Cicero supposes here to be an 
‘impossibility’ it seems to me does not fit with common sense the world over 
(see for example Dallmayr’s In Search of the Good Life), and one Cicero refutes 
in his own voice as the character Marcus in the De Legibus.104 We shall be 
discussing some of Marcus’ arguments about natural law later in this section, but 
here, it suffices to note some more of Zetzel’s commentary on the above 
passage: 
“…from the general statement of the doctrine in the present tense, 
Laelius turns to a future in which this law will be universally 
recognised on earth. As it is now, the law has no effect on those who 
disobey it, because knowledge of it is obedience to it; the punishment 
for disobedience that Laelius envisages is the counterpart of virtue’s 
self-reward: disobedience to natural law is a violation of one’s 
humanity, and by disobeying it one ceases to be fully human … [Philus 
and Laelius], as one might expect, define ‘natural’ and ‘justice’ very 
differently. Philus assumes that any natural standard of justice must 
reflect the actual behaviour of all beings; Laelius argues from the 
abstract existence of metaphysical universals to an absolute standard 
embedded in the universe itself, whether or not terrestrial beings in 
fact abide by that standard … Laelius, accepting the absence of 
absolute justice within this world, can only invoke a higher standard 
in order to promote an ideal of just behaviour.”105  
Whether anybody yet ‘knows’ and ‘obeys’ natural law or not, Laelius has put 
forward a Stoic argument that iustitia exists by nature, it is something natural, 
to oppose the argument put forward by Philus (usually made at this time by the 
Epicureans) that it only ever exists by convention, if it can be said to exist at all. 
In the terms given in the previous section, this is the Stoics’ (meta-)Physical 
approach to justice in which they find it embedded in the cosmos, whereas their 
arguments about oikeiōsis form part of their Ethical approach, in which they find 
it on the planet amongst human beings. With reference to both Chrysippus (the 
‘second founder’ of the Stoic school) and Cicero, Schofield provides us with 
some good commentary on this: 
“What is envisaged is not as in Plato or Aristotle a movement to and 
from first principles, but rather a convergence on something 
 
104 James G. Zetzel, 1996. ‘Natural Law and Poetic Justice: A Carneadean Debate in Cicero and 
Virgil’. Classical Philology 91(4). pp.297–319. “Even if this has often been said, it ought to be 
said still more often”. (p.267), Off. 3.69; Cf. Michael Ignatieff, 2017. The Ordinary Virtues: Moral 
Order in a Divided World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
105 Zetzel, Natural Law and Poetic Justice. p.307–308. 
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intermediate (human justice) from above (god) and below (animals) … 
a story about justice which left out either oikeiōsis or the conception 
of law as right reason in Zeus and humans alike would be incomplete 
… The [Stoic] discussion of justice suggests that we learn different—
and in different ways indispensable—things from the two approaches 
… [However,] it is in the end [the Stoics’] empiricism which dictates 
that for progress in understanding [Ethics] must, and [Physics] cannot, 
come first.”106 
I provided some of the Stoics’ Ethical arguments in the previous chapter, and 
here we are considering some of their Physical arguments. Laelius’ argument is 
that a human being not allowing our innate reason will be “in exile from 
himself”, which I think is strongly connected to what Arendt said about those 
who refused to fall into line with the Nazis’ new ‘values’, that is, when they 
thought to themselves that if they ‘obeyed’ the new ‘laws’, which she summed 
up as basically ‘Thou shalt kill’, they thought ‘I could not live with myself’; they 
could not, in conscientia, which Arendt describes as ‘knowing with and by 
myself’, act that way. It is ‘self-evident knowledge’ to good persons that they 
could not act that way and still live with themselves, which it seems to me need 
not be identical to knowledge reached by demonstration (and the metaphysical 
argument for natural law in the Stoics is a demonstrative one)—what Aristotle 
described in terms of exercising the intellectual virtue of episteme—for it to be 
rooted in our innate reason.107 
Following Laelius’ speech, Scipio “seemed positively ecstatic [gaudio elatus]”, 
and with account given that res publica cannot possibly function without 
iustitia, what was discussed on the previous day about constitutions is now 
refined: 
“SCIPIO: So who would call that civitas a ‘concern of the people’ [res 
populi], that is res publica, at the time when everyone was crushed 
by the cruelty of one man and there was no single bond of law or 
agreement or association of the group, which is what is meant by 
‘people’? … [In Syracuse at the time when Dionysius controlled it] 
nothing belonged to the people, and the people itself belonged to a 
single man. And so where there is a tyrant, then it is wrong to say, as I 
did yesterday, that there is a flawed res publica: the logic of the 
argument compels me to say that it is no res publica at all. 
 
106 Schofield, Two Stoic Approaches to Justice. pp.210–211. Emphasis in original. 
107 Cf. RJ. pp.44, 76–79, 88–91, 186–188, and 280–281. 
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LAELIUS: You’re completely right, and I see the direction of your 
argument. 
SCIPIO: So you see that a civitas that is completely controlled by an 
oligarchy also cannot truly be called res publica. 
LAELIUS: That is my opinion. 
… 
SCIPIO: I come now to the third type, where there may seem to be 
difficulties. When everything is said to be done through the people 
and everything is said to be in the people’s power, when the crowd 
punishes anyone it wants, when they snatch and seize and hold and 
scatter whatever they want: can you deny, Laelius, that that is res 
publica? Everything belongs to the people, and we want res publica to 
be the ‘concern of the people’. 
LAELIUS: But there is no civitas that I would more quickly deny to be 
res publica than the one that is completely in the power of the crowd 
… there is no ‘people’ unless it is bound by iuris consensus, and that 
mob is as much a tyrant as if it were one person …”108 
As Asmis says, what has changed since the previous day’s discussion is “the 
philosophical dissection of the concept of justice”, which through Laelius’ 
argument is seen to entail “an other-concern” that does not permit one person 
to abuse or rob another.109 Without getting into an esoteric debate about the 
concept of justice, the supreme other-regarding virtue, we saw Cicero in the 
previous chapter providing a formula to this effect in the De Officiis, so that one 
watching his words would never fall away from officium, the thing to which 
Laelius says natural law summons us (although perhaps for the Stoics it is only 
the sage who ‘knows’ and ‘obeys’ it so completely that ‘his’ actions are perfect 
rather than middle officia). And along with a philosophical dissection of the 
concept of justice, there appears also to have been an enrichment to the 
meaning of the term ius during the discussion of Book III. Scholars have 
interpreted this enrichment differently. Asmis argues that “along with a 
rejection of the earlier claim about [flawed res publicae], the initial definition 
[of populus] needs to be revised by a new understanding of ius, ‘law’, as ‘just 
 
108 Rep. 3.43–45. 
109 Asmis, State as Partnership. pp.588–589. 
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law’.”110 Zetzel understands the iuris consensus which goes into making up a 
populus a consensus “with” natural law after Laelius’ argument, and Straumann 
understands the consensus about ius to be consensus about constitutional law, 
which we shall be discussing later in this section.111 But I see no reason for these 
different interpretations to be mutually exclusive; so long as we are 
understanding iuris consensus to be ongoing, it seems to me that they are 
compatible. In any case, Schofield again provides us with a good summary of 
what has happened in the text after iustitia has been embedded in res publica: 
“Where there is a set-up [constitutio] such that the people’s affairs 
are conducted as though they were not its affairs but those of the 
[governor] or [governing] party [whether that is ‘the one’, ‘the few’, 
or ‘the many’], or its interests are not adequately consulted by the 
[governor(s)], then there is no res populi, and therefore no res 
publica.”112 
In concluding this sub-section, we can say that, according to (at least) Scipio and 
Laelius, each of the basic types of organisation discussed in Books I and II of the 
De Re Publica—monarchy, aristocracy and democracy—is just, so long as the 
directing consilium “holds to the bond which first bound men together in the 
societas of res publica”.113 When it does not, when “a master [dominus] arises in 
place of a king, a faction [factio] in place of aristocracy, a confused mob 
[populo turba et confusio] in the place of a people”, the basic types have 
degenerated into tyranny, oligarchy and mob rule, respectively. The actors have 
broken faith in the societas of res publica, and having brought about a vicious 
type of civitas, the res publica has passed out of existence. But “that does not 
occur in [a] combined and moderately blended form [iuncta moderateque 
permixta conformatione] of res publica unless there are great flaws in its 
leaders”, in a civitas which has institutionalised potestas, auctoritas and 
libertas in whatever proportions are fitting, and while we shall be discussing the 
qualities of leaders in more detail in the final section of this chapter, our next 
 
110 Asmis, State as Partnership. p.589. 
111 Zetzel, Natural Law and Poetic Justice. p.311; Straumann, Crisis and Constitutionalism. p.171. 
112 Schofield, Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica. p.74. I have replaced Schofield’s use of ‘rule’ here 
with ‘govern’. Cf. p.312n56. 
113 Rep. 1.42. 
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topic of discussion concerns the relations between different people and peoples 
and how these relations are not identical to natural law.   
4.3.2 Cicero on Ius Gentium 
In the first chapter (sub-section 1.4.2), we saw that Dallmayr provided a history 
of the term ius gentium in Roman law, which “from the very beginning harbored 
a mixture of contextually ‘ethical’, abstractly ‘moral’, and practical-political 
considerations, as well as a blending of ‘positive’ law and philosophy”, and 
which was irreducible to “the edicts of a select group of philosophers”. Dallmayr 
might well be harbouring an appraisal of Cicero here, in whose writings we see 
“the phrase” ius gentium appearing for the first time in the historical record, 
but whatever the case may be, the phrase itself it seems to me is picking out 
something of which we know nothing about its ‘very beginning’. In his own study 
of it, and indeed not unlike Dallmayr, Henry Nettleship identifies ius gentium as 
both a popular and a legal rather than a philosophical phrase; pre-Ciceronian 
with no essential change taking place to its meaning under Cicero’s pen; and 
having certain points of agreement with and points of difference from both ius 
commune (“the law or usage acknowledged by the speaker or writer in common 
with certain other persons whom he is addressing, mentioning, or thinking of”) 
and lex or ius naturae (‘natural law’). It is worth quoting Nettleship here at 
some length: 
“In all these passages [from Cicero and others where it is used in a 
non-legal sense], ius gentium has the meaning of an usage quod 
semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus [‘that always, that 
everywhere, that found in all people’]: an usage universal, and which 
no one would think of impugning who was not prepared to do what is 
unnatural, or without moral precedent … [In the four passages from 
Cicero where it is used in a legal sense,] ius gentium is universal and 
unwritten, while ius civile and the laws of particular states are special 
and written … I believe that ius gentium meant the usage of the 
world, of all mankind … [Roman jurists of the Second Century BCE] 
intended to express by it such customs or usages as the Romans found, 
in the experience which they would pick up away from Italy in war or 
commerce or travel, or in their intercourse with peregrini in Italy 
itself, to be universally observed. These usages would naturally be 
connected in the main with war and commerce, and thus ius gentium, 
when the term is applied to the dealings of Romans with foreigners, is 
used mostly of the laws of war and of transactions involved in a state 
of war, or of commerce and transactions connected with it, such as 
obligationes of various kinds … Ius gentium is usage actually existing 
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everywhere: ius or lex naturae is an ideal law, a law that may or may 
not exist in universal practice, but which is in any case to be wished 
for. Thus it may often coincide with ius gentium, but may sometimes 
differ from it.”114  
This seems right to me and provides an appropriate context for understanding 
Dallmayr’s history of the term, as well as everything else that has been said 
about ius gentium thus far in my project. It picks out actual human conduct, 
observed always and everywhere as right (ius) amongst different peoples; 
conduct, moreover, as Dallmayr says, which cannot be changed purely through 
the edicts of philosophers such as those set out by Laelius in the previous sub-
section around natural law. And we saw in the previous chapter that ius gentium 
could apply not only to relations between Romans and foreigners; it could also 
apply to those between Romans and Romans. When they had joined together in 
some form of societas through nudo consensu, for example, Romans were legally 
responsible for behaving towards one another according to the ius gentium, i.e. 
‘fairly’, as ‘good conduct among good men’. Nettleship finds the phrase used for 
“transactions between one state and another … transactions between individuals 
… and [he also considers the case] of institutions or usages which are said to be 
iuris gentium”, i.e. ‘an universal usage’, humanly and planetarily speaking.115 
Cicero said “everything in the ius civile need not be in the ius gentium, but 
everything in the ius gentium ought also to be a part of the ius civile”, and was 
referring specifically at this point to good faith and equity in transacting, both 
features of the ius gentium. We have already considered fides in Cicero’s 
writings (pp.232–233); let us look at what he has to say about equity: 
“…we have to expound the entire ratio of ius. It divides into two 
primary sections, natura and lex, and the force of each category is 
separated into divine ius and human ius, one being the field of equity 
 
114 Henry Nettleship, 1885. ‘Ius Gentium’. The Journal of Philology 13(26). pp.169–181. For an 
account of Cicero’s legal uses of ius gentium in the context of his political thought more 
generally, Cf. William E. Conklin, 2010. ‘The Myth of Primordialism in Cicero’s Theory of Jus 
Gentium’. Leiden Journal of International Law 23(3). pp.479–506. The four passages where 
Cicero uses ius gentium in a legal sense are Rep. 1.2, Part. Or. 37.130, and Off. 3.23 and 3.69. 
115 In the examples Nettleship finds regarding relations between one state and another, the phrase 
is used with reference to the treatment of ambassadors, and in the case of institutions or 
usages, he finds that the sea is iuris gentium (“at sea only such usages are considered binding 
as all states are agreed upon”). He finds no evidence that the phrase was necessarily 
connected with the ius fetiale, but T.R.S. Broughton argues that the fetiales “were especially 
concerned, as part of the ius gentium, with the sanctity of envoys”, perhaps offering their advice 
and judgment to the Senate on specific cases as to whether the ius gentium had been broken or 
not. T.R.S. Broughton, 1987. ‘Mistreatment of Foreign Legates and the Fetial Priests: Three 
Roman Cases’. Phoenix 41(1). pp.50–62.    
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and the other of religion. The force of equity [aequitatis] is twofold, 
one of which rests on the straightforward principle of truth and 
rightfulness [veri et iusti], of the ‘fair and good’, as the phrase is [et 
ut dicitur aequi et boni ratione defenditur], while the other concerns 
the requiting of things done, which in the case of a kindness is called 
gratitude [in beneficio gratia] and in the case of an injury retaliation 
[in iniuria ultio]. These things belong in common to nature and to law 
[communia sunt naturae atque legis]; but peculiar to law are those 
things which are written and those which without writing are upheld 
by the ius gentium or the customs of our ancestors [sed propria legis 
et ea quae scripta sunt et ea quae sine litteris aut gentium iure aut 
maiorum more retinentur]. … Those laws which are unwritten are 
kept firm either by custom or by the agreements and, as it were, 
common consent of humans [scripta non sunt, ea aut consuetudine 
aut conventis hominum et quasi consensu obtinentur], and, this also a 
point of primary importance, it is prescribed by ius naturale such that 
we shall preserve our laws and mores [Atque etiam hoc in primis, ut 
nostros mores legesque tueamur quodam modo naturali iure 
praescriptum est].”116* 
Robert N. Gaines says in relation to this section of Cicero’s Partitiones Oratoriae 
that “cases founded on equity admit an action that is ordinarily censurable, but 
claim the actor was right in doing the deed” which, along with fides (keeping 
faith), it seems to me makes the ius of warfare and its association with the ius 
gentium more easily understandable; they govern actions of human beings which 
preserve international political society in an imperfect world.117 As Peter Stein 
says, each of the parts of law which Cicero sets out here, natura and lex, is 
concerned with human law and divine law, but only human law involves equity, 
which suggests to me that ius gentium is human law, whereas lex naturae is 
human-and-divine-law.118 As well as an account of equity and a partition of 
natura and lex, Cicero provides a further partition in this passage of human law 
into written and unwritten law. That laws are unwritten does not mean that 
they are not upheld; rather, they are held in place either by customs which have 
developed over centuries or by a kind of common consent of humans (what 
Arendt called in this connection ‘the customs of history’ and ‘the silent 
 
116 Off. 3.69; Part. Or. 37.129–130. Conklin’s translation of the final words in this passage read: 
“Indeed, it is prescribed above all that we enforce our customs and laws (leges) in accord with 
the law of nature (jus naturae).” Conklin, The Myth of Primordialism. p.484. 
117 Robert N. Gaines, 2002. ‘Cicero’s Partitiones Oratoriae and Topica: Rhetorical Philosophy and 
Philosophical Rhetoric’. James M. May (ed.), 2002. Brill’s Companion to Cicero: Oratory and 
Rhetoric. London: Brill. Ch.15. 
118 Peter Stein, 2015 (1976). ‘The Sources of Law in Cicero’. Ciceroniana Online. Vol.3. Available 
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acknowledgement of common interests’). Stein provides us with a very useful 
account which helps us make sense of Cicero’s writings on the law across the De 
Inventione, Partitiones Oratoriae and Topica, which is worth quoting at some 
length: 
“For Cicero [in the De Inventione], natura is not merely the basis for 
certain rules; it is the foundation on which all law ultimately rests (cf. 
Off. 3.72). For him law arises out of the facts of life; it is rooted in 
the nature of man and his surroundings. However the obligations 
which nature imposes are much wider than those which come within 
the scope of law. They include religious and social as well as legal 
obligations. Legal duties, like the others, are rooted in nature but 
nature merely indicates their general tenor; it does not specify their 
precise limits. Since law has to be more specific than nature allows, it 
develops for practical reasons into custom [consuetudo] … Many rules 
of law, which ultimately derive from nature, are in fact indicated 
more specifically in custom or in other ways. Consequently, there are 
few legal duties which are based directly on nature and they are 
relatively unimportant in practice … Consuetudo itself is understood 
to be law by reason of the length of time for which it has been 
observed. It is unnecessary to have a lex in such a case, because with 
the passage of time (propter vetustatem) the limits of the rule have 
become fixed (certa) … The De Inventione tended to explain custom 
as being based on immemorial usage … emphasising that customary 
rules are old. The Partitiones oratoriae stress rather the element of 
recognition and approbation as the basis of custom. What most people 
recognise to be a useful rule can become a customary rule, even 
though it has not been observed in the past … [In the Topica,] Mos, 
custom confirmed by long observance, is the third component of 
institutionalised equity. It had been developed to replace consuetudo, 
which was a wider and more general notion. Consuetudo was custom 
in the sense of convention and covered any law that was not 
formulated in lex including, for example, ius gentium. Mos was a set 
of traditional social practices, the heritage of a particular people. 
Much of its content fell outside the law, and as a pars iuris [a part of 
ius], its ambit was limited. In the disintegrating social values of the 
last century of the Republic there was a tendency to idealise the 
mores maiorum and conservative thinkers in particular stressed their 
importance.”119 
Vitoria described ius gentium as ‘what natural reason has established among 
nations (or peoples)’, and as Nettleship says, this means that it sometimes, 
although not always, coincides with the Stoics’ arguments about natural law. 
Stein’s analysis here I think helps us to understand why Cicero treats in this 
passage from the Partitiones Oratoriae ius gentium and ius naturale as different 
 
119 Stein, The Sources of Law in Cicero. pp.21– 
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things (and we shall revisit this passage as well as Stein’s analysis later in the 
chapter); some scholars, however, argue for the equivalence of both, and often 
with reference to the following passage from the De Officiis: 
“The same thing is established not only in nature, that is in the law of 
nations [Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium], but also 
in the laws of individual peoples [legibus populorum], through which 
the res publica of individual civitates is maintained: one is not 
allowed to harm another for the sake of one’s own advantage. For the 
laws have as their object and desire that bonds between citizens 
should be unharmed. If anyone tears them apart, they restrain him by 
death, by exile, by chains or by fine. Nature’s reason [naturae ratio] 
itself, which is divine and human law [lex divina et humana], achieves 
this object to a far greater extent. Whoever is willing to obey [parere] 
it (everyone will obey [parebunt] it who wants to live in accordance 
with nature) will never act so as to seek what is another’s, nor to 
appropriate for himself something that he has taken from someone 
else.”120      
Atkins argues that the above passage “suggests that [ius gentium] is equivalent 
to natural law”, and Straumann, though without specific reference to this 
passage, argues that Cicero in the De Officiis “throughout equates [natural law] 
with ius gentium, the latter being the empirical expression of natural law.”121 
We may recall at this point Dallmayr’s history, in which he distinguishes between 
philosophers’ edicts on the one hand, and the agency and competence of 
concrete populations on the other, and points in the modern age to 
philosophers’ almost entire reduction of ius gentium to ‘philosophers’ law’. 
Whilst not of course ‘deniers of the actual ius gentium’, it does seem to me that 
both Atkins and Straumann, insofar as they are seeking to equate ius gentium 
with natural law in Cicero’s writings, are in some sense engaged in prioritising 
the latter. With Nettleship’s account, and if we choose with Cicero to speak the 
language of the Stoics, we can say instead that the ius gentium is an empirical 
expression of natural law, found in the actions of actual human beings, all over 
the world. It seems to me that Cicero here in the De Officiis is backing up his 
formula (pp.267–268) by saying that it has been established in nature, that is, in 
the ius gentium, although nature’s reason which is divine and human law 
‘achieves its object’ to a far greater extent than either ius gentium or leges 
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populorum. Indeed, Atkins quotes P.E. Sigmund on this to say that natural law in 
Cicero’s writings provides a “rational standard for all legal systems and ius 
gentium [is] … an indication of its universal acceptance”, although again, it 
seems to me that there is a very big and unsure step—a philosophical step—being 
taken between saying this and saying that ius gentium and natural law appear to 
be identical.122 Atkins supports his claim that they appear to be identical with a 
speech Cicero gave to the senate in 56 BCE: 
“I may perhaps be speaking in an old-fashioned strain. Still, if this 
principle has not been prescribed by ius civile, nevertheless it has 
been ordained by the law of nature, the ius which is shared by all 
nations [lege tamen naturae, communi iure gentium]; mortals are 
able to claim by the right of usufruct nothing that belongs to the 
immortal gods.”123* 
Natural law, Atkins argues, is here “glossed as ‘the common law of nations’”, 
which it seems to me is not quite the same as saying that the former appears to 
be identical to the latter. And indeed, Nettleship also argues that, in context, 
Cicero says here lege naturae, communi iure gentium “as if wishing to explain 
the less familiar by the more familiar term” to the Senate, lex naturae being a 
recent Greek import to Rome.124  
We have covered each of the four passages in Cicero’s extant writings where he 
uses the term ius gentium in a legal sense. However, Straumann argues that we 
“find out … in the third book of the [De Re Publica]” that it is the ius gentium 
which “provide[s] the norms Cicero is going to codify in books two and three of 
[De Legibus]” as Rome’s ‘constitutional law’.125 As we have seen, Straumann 
regards the ius gentium as equivalent to natural law in Cicero’s writings, and 
although it is certainly the case that Philus and Laelius discuss justice in the 
‘international’ sphere in Book III of De Re Publica, as well as natural law, I think 
it is important to note that the term ius gentium itself is to be found neither in 
their discussion (in the fragments that have come down to us), nor anywhere in 
the De Legibus, in which natural law, lex naturae, is foregrounded and Marcus 
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writes a law-code for Rome. It seems to me that Atkins is right in saying that we 
must exercise caution when it comes to speaking about Cicero’s writings on the 
ius gentium and be mindful that he may not always have been using it with “the 
same philosophical precision”; it was a popular and legal phrase before 
philosophers started reflecting upon it.126     
The law-code for Rome as set out by Marcus in the De Legibus is the topic of the 
next sub-section, but in concluding this one, let me summarise what I have been 
trying to draw out in it. It seems to me in Cicero’s writings that, unlike the 
natural law, the ius gentium is historically and socially contingent, and I accept 
Nettleship’s argument that there was no essential change made to its meaning 
under Cicero’s pen. We might say that the ius gentium emerges as different 
nations or peoples emerge from a primordial (non-written-legal) condition and 
develop certain customs in their relations with one another which, in the 
language of the Stoics, may be said to be in accordance with the natural law; 
such customs (and usages) as ius gentium picks out are unwritten and imperfect 
expressions of it, even as Cicero’s writings on, for example, the ius of warfare 
can be understood as written expressions of it.127 Within the Stoic philosophical 
framework, the customs developed in relations between nations or peoples can 
be understood to be based ultimately on right reason, with each nation’s or 
people’s internal development of this reason giving rise to virtue in their actions 
towards one another, whether in times of peace or in times of war. But it seems 
to me that the ius gentium does not depend on the Stoic framework of natural 
law, since, as in Nettleship’s account, and as Vitoria said longer ago and Cicero 
longer ago again before him, it is what natural reason has established, in history, 
in actual human conduct, quite apart from the edicts of philosophers. As we saw 
from the fragments of the Preface to Books III and IV of the De Re Publica (sub-
section 4.2.1), not all excellent civitates have been conversant with or even 
aware of Stoic philosophy, no matter how correct that philosophy may be. 
Whether in cultivating the principles of nature through words and learning, or 
through institutions and laws, sapientia is to be found all over the planet, and 
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our evidence that this is the case is not the Stoics’ arguments about natural law, 
but the actual ius gentium.   
4.3.3 Marcus’s Law-Code for Rome 
The De Legibus is a dialogue set in Cicero’s own day, with the author as one of 
the characters (Marcus) discussing the best kind of laws for the best kind of 
civitas with his friend Atticus and brother Quintus.128 It was left incomplete and 
most likely unpublished in his own lifetime, and what has come down to us are 
the first three Books of it (although not quite completely). In Book I, Marcus 
gives an account of natural law in discussion with Atticus and Quintus, and in 
Books II and III we find some of his law-code for Rome, together with some of his 
commentary upon it, and again some discussion between he, Atticus and 
Quintus, about his law-code. Not too unlike what we found with the mixed 
constitution across Books I and II of De Re Publica, Marcus’s arguments about 
natural law in Book I of the De Legibus are connected very closely with the 
ancestral laws of Rome, although contrary to some interpretations in the 
secondary literature, it seems to me that Marcus’s law-code for Rome and 
natural law are not identical; rather, the former is presented as being in 
accordance with—it is a written and imperfect expression of—the latter.129 
The dialogue begins with a discussion between Atticus and Quintus about 
whether an old oak tree in their sight is the very same one that Cicero mentions 
in one of his poems, with Quintus telling Atticus that “no farmer’s cultivation 
can preserve a tree as long as one sown in a poet’s verse”, and Marcus 
suggesting to Atticus that “you should not be too particular in your researches 
into things that are handed down in stories of this kind”.130 The conversation 
 
128 I agree with Atkins that “even though Cicero’s character [Marcus] may be taken to represent the 
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then turns from poetry to history, with Atticus imploring Marcus to write one of 
Rome, which Marcus says he would do had he sufficient free time for such a 
large project, before it turns once more, from history to a request from Atticus 
that Marcus “write about civil law more subtly than” others had done before 
him, which he accepts, going beyond mere “pamphlets on the law about water 
running off roofs” and the like, and on to broader things, for: 
“… you must understand that in no <other> type of discussion is 
honesta <more> clear: what has been given to a human being by 
nature, what power of excellence is contained in the human mind, 
what is the function [muneris] for whose cultivation and production 
we have been born and brought into the light, what connects humans 
[coniunctio hominum], and what natural societas there is among 
them. For by unfolding these things, the source of laws and ius [fons 
legum et iuris] can be discovered”.131* 
Doubtless with an understanding that it is “the most essential part of 
philosophy”, in writing a law-code for Rome, Marcus proposes that a 
consideration of “the whole field of ethics” is required, which he divides here 
into five topics: the gifts of nature to humans; the power of the human mind; 
the function of humans; the connection of humans to each other; and the 
natural societas of humans.132 Marcus provides an account of lex in line with 
some of the arguments of the Stoics, which allows inter alia his investigation of 
nature as the source of ius to proceed by covering these five topics of Ethics in 
the rest of Book I (picking up notes of Plato, Aristotle and Antiochus along the 
way) in a culmination of a depiction of the ‘wise man’.133 But after giving his 
Stoicising account of lex, he secures the agreement of Atticus and Quintus to “go 
back” to the “source of ius” and reminds them of the whole point in their doing 
so:  
… since we want to preserve and protect that form of res publica 
which Scipio showed was most excellent [optumam] in the six books of 
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De Re Publica, and since all the laws [leges] must be fitted to that 
type of civitas, and since morals [mores] must be sown [serendi] and 
we should not rely on the sanctions of written laws [nec scriptis omnia 
sancienda], I will seek the roots of ius in nature, under whose 
leadership our entire discussion must unfold.”134* 
Dyck comments on this passage that “the point nec scriptis omnia sancienda 
confirms the implication [of Leg. 1.19] that written form is not a proprium of 
true lex”, and indeed there was no mention of written form in Laelius’s account 
of true lex in the De Re Publica either.135 What Cicero said in the Partitiones 
Oratoriae was that propria legis were “those things which are written and those 
which without writing are upheld by the ius gentium or the mos maiorum”, and 
that it is prescribed by (unwritten) ius naturale such that (unwritten) mores and 
(written) leges are preserved. What all of this suggests to me is that, for Cicero, 
laws written in any form are necessary but insufficient for preserving and 
protecting res publica; what is also required are mores, one of the themes of 
Books IV–VI of the De Re Publica which is discussed in subsequent sub-sections of 
this chapter.136 
But let us return here to the discussion going on in Book I of the De Legibus. 
Having informed Atticus and Quintus that he will be seeking the roots of ius in 
nature, Marcus goes on to provide an account of human nature according to the 
five topics of Ethics that he has set out, again along the lines of the Stoics, such 
that we all have a share in reason, and so right reason, and so lex and ius. I 
agree with Asmis here that what Marcus is saying is that all human beings have 
been given right reason, lex and ius as that towards which we are striving, even 
as we are not (or not yet) Stoic sages.137 In Marcus’s own words, “reason is 
shared by all, and though it differs in the particulars of knowledge, it is the 
same in the capacity to learn”, which I think also comports with the 
interpretation of the ius gentium provided in the previous sub-section.138 After 
staying his fellow Academic sceptics in the field of truth and knowledge (as 
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Atkins says, sceptics’ exercises contribute nothing to the practical project 
underway in the De Legibus), Marcus discusses conscientia, some of the problems 
with calling the laws of tyrants ‘laws’, and touches upon the philosophical 
controversies around moral ends about which “a judgment must be made … 
eventually”, before “very wise [prudentissime]” Quintus calls him back to the 
discussion about the best kind of laws for the best kind of civitas, instead of 
getting hung up on issues in ethical theory (a subject, as we have seen, which 
Cicero takes up a decade or so later in the De Finibus).139 It is at this point the 
Book concludes with an encomium to sapientia, “the mother of all good things”, 
beginning (as one might expect) with Ethics, moving on to Physics, and then 
Logic, and then back to Ethics again: 
“And when [the person who knows himself] realises that he is born for 
civil society [civilem societatem], he will realise that he must use not 
just that refined type of argument [subtili disputatione] but also a 
more expansive style of speaking [sed etiam fusa latius perpetua 
oratione], through which to guide peoples, to establish laws, to 
chastise the wicked and protect the good, to praise famous men and 
to issue instructions for safety and glory suited to persuading his 
fellow citizens, to exhort people to honour, to call them back from 
crime, to be able to comfort the afflicted, to enshrine in eternal 
memorials the deeds and opinions of brave and wise [fortium et 
sapientium] men together with the disgrace of the wicked. And of all 
these great and numerous things which are recognised as present in 
man by those who wish to know themselves, the parent and the 
teacher of them all is sapientia.”140 
Although I think the classicists I have been reading are certainly right that he is 
singing the praises of philosophy at the end of Book I of the De Legibus—Dyck, 
for example, says that “studium sapientiae, like amor sapientiae, is equivalent 
to philosophia”—it seems to me that, by choosing the term sapientia rather than 
philosophia, Marcus is including the achievements of philosophers in his praise 
but also extending his praise beyond them at the same time, and we may 
fruitfully compare this encomium, and more specifically for our purposes, the 
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above passage within it, to the discussions of sapientia Cicero gave in his own 
voice in the Tusculanae Disputationes, the De Officiis and in the Prefaces of the 
De Re Publica.141 We saw in the previous chapter that Cicero associated sapientia 
with the Seven Sages of Greece, who were not ‘philosophers’ in the sense we 
normally understand, and whose sapientia seems to have been of a more 
practical sort (excepting Thales). It is the virtue that delivers the honestas in 
the world, and this worldly concern it seems to me is as evident in the 
encomium at the end of Book I of the De Legibus as it is in the De Officiis (where 
we saw Cicero placing some limits so that one’s devotion to the pursuit of truth 
is not made at the expense of iustitia). Indeed, as Atkins argued, Cicero 
understands it to be a part of sapientia to realise (through knowledge of things 
human and divine) the priority of iustitia; unlike many philosophers in the 
tradition of Plato, he orients sapientia to the world. And in the Preface to Books 
I and II of the De Re Publica, we saw him favour those who manifest sapientia in 
the establishment of excellent civitates over those with no experience in public 
life, although in the Preface to Books III and IV we find him recognising and 
appreciating the virtue developed in both otium and negotium: that sapientia 
which cultivates the principles of nature through words and learning and that 
which does so through establishing and working through laws and institutions. It 
is in the context of the Preface to Books III and IV especially, where Cicero puts 
the persons who have excelled in cultivating the principles of nature through 
both words and learning and laws and institutions above persons who have 
excelled in either one of these approaches, which I think makes it easier to 
understand why it is sapientia rather than philosophia whose praises are sung at 
the end of Book I of the De Legibus.142 It is the most appropriate term of praise 
in a work in which Marcus is writing a law-code for Rome. 
Book II begins with a beautiful exchange between Marcus and Atticus about 
nature and the natural setting of the conversation (in Arpinum), and in 
preparation for the law-code for Rome he is about to provide, Marcus reminds 
Atticus and Quintus of the meaning and nature of lex as they have discussed it 
thus far and refers back again to the “very learned men [doctissimi viri]” who 
have talked about these things (not unlike Scipio in the De Re Publica, who 
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attributed the ‘new’ things he was saying to what others had said before him), 
and who have argued that “it is generally agreed that leges were invented for 
the well-being of cives, the safety of civitates, and the calm and happy life of 
humans [vitamque hominum quietam et beatam]”.143 Again, it seems to me that 
Marcus is retaining an Ethical focus here upon human beings, virtue is very much 
on his mind, and I think he remains steadfast in the course of writing his law-
code for Rome to what he said in Book I, i.e. that it is the laws that should be 
fitted to a civitas rather than the other way about (pp.345–346). Again, this 
retains a full appreciation of the extraordinary diversity of human beings 
associating all over the planet, at the same time as it sets out within a Stoic 
framework what nevertheless connects us all, reason and speech (not unlike the 
first persona as described in the De Officiis): 
“…reason, the one thing by which we stand above the beasts, through 
which we are capable of drawing inferences, making arguments, 
refuting others, conducting discussions and demonstrations—reason is 
shared by all, and though it differs in the particulars of knowledge, it 
is the same in the capacity to learn … language, the interpreter of the 
mind, may differ in words [verbis] but is identical in ideas 
[sententiis]. There is no person of any nation [gentis] who cannot 
reach virtue with the aid of a guide.”144 
As Annas argues, Marcus, influenced by both Plato and the Stoics, regards laws 
as being part of that which guides human beings towards virtue; “Law based in 
nature … is closely connected with a natural basis for justice and the other 
virtues: law directs us to activities which express and further the virtues”.145 As 
mentioned above, there is much debate in the secondary literature as to the 
relation between natural law and the law-code that Marcus writes for Rome in 
Books II and III. Atkins, like Annas, considers the influence of Plato in the De 
Legibus and argues that the laws Marcus writes for Rome are the best 
approximation to natural law (“…what is best must yield to what is practicable. 
Given human nature, the implementation of utopia is not only impossible, but 
also dangerous”), and Straumann, with extraordinary intelligence and a very 
careful eye on the influence of Roman antiquity in modernity, focuses on the 
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“inchoate constitutionalism” of the text, is inclined to view Marcus’s law-code 
as identical to natural law, personifies the mixed constitution as that which 
assumes the function of the prudens of whom Marcus speaks at Leg. 1.19, and 
describes the law-code Marcus writes for Rome as “natural constitutional law” 
(“Cicero’s solution to [what Atkins identifies as] the limits of reason is itself of 
an entirely rational nature”).146 But it seems to me that Asmis gets closest to the 
mark in linking what is said in the De Legibus back to the less austere Stoicism of 
Panaetius in terms of developing middle officia: 
“[Marcus] viewed his laws as sharing in the guiding power of natural 
law by prescribing [middle officia]. His laws are not the same as 
natural law [which prescribes perfect officia]. The actions that they 
prescribe can only be part of the perfectly virtuous actions that are 
commanded by natural law. Cicero turned to the Roman constitution, 
along with the imperfect wisdom of the Roman ancestors, as a means 
of filling in these [middle] duties. By testing his laws against natural 
law, as best he understands it, he hoped to produce a body of 
constitutional law that would be permanently valid.”147 
Use of ‘imperfect wisdom’ in this context of course helps us to distinguish it 
from the ‘perfect’ sort as expounded by Stoic philosophers, the ‘narrow’ sense 
of sapientia, but it seems to me that neither perfection nor imperfection are 
terms which Cicero himself would have used to describe the sapientia or 
prudentia of his ancestors. It may even be the case that one of the insights of 
persons who had what Laelius in the De Amicitia called Rome’s “homespun” 
sapientia is that we are “doing splendidly” insofar as we are making moral 
progress towards such ‘perfect wisdom’ as the Stoics describe in their 
philosophical system.148 How “splendidly” Marcus “did” in writing his law-code 
for Rome we might judge for ourselves, as both Quintus and Atticus do in the De 
Legibus, since a res publica can never not be ongoing so long as it exists, even if 
its constitutional law did turn out to be permanently valid. 
By way of concluding this sub-section, I think it is useful to remind the reader 
again of the whole point of Marcus’s writing a law-code for Rome: to protect and 
preserve res publica. And leading us into the next sub-section, I leave the reader 
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to consider for themselves what Scipio says at the beginning of Book IV of De Re 
Publica: 
“Consider furthermore how wisely all the rest has been foreseen in 
order to promote the citizens’ shared association in a happy and 
honorable way of life. That is, indeed, the first cause of assembly, 
and it ought to be accomplished on the authority of the 
commonwealth [et id hominibus effici ex re publica debet] in part 
through institutions [institutis] and in part through laws [legibus].”149 
4.3.4 Cicero on Institutions 
In the second chapter (sub-section 2.4.1), we saw Arendt say that government is 
“essentially organised and institutionalised power”, that a court of law remains 
an “institution” of fundamental importance in political societies (2.3.1), that 
one of the implicit conditions for freedom is that human spontaneity is exercised 
within “lasting institutions”, is “injected into the stream of things already 
initiated” (2.4.1), and we saw on p.319 that Atkins described the Latin term 
instituta as meaning ‘customary standards of social behaviour’. Modern liberal 
writers are wont to speak of ‘mere’ customs, even as custom (consuetudo) has 
always been a fundamentally important source of law (“consuetudo is law 
because although there is no lex on the matter, a rule is observed as if it were in 
a lex … Lex itself is the third stage in the evolution of law from nature through 
custom”).150 We also saw, on p.337, Stein’s analysis that mos for Cicero is a 
component of “institutionalised equity” which refers to “traditional social 
practices, the heritage of a particular people”. Instituta are things which have 
been firmly established across generations. In his investigation of what has been 
established in Western history—and the history of political thought—after the 
“inchoate constitutionalism” of the late Roman republic as seen especially in 
Cicero’s writings, Straumann says that: 
“Constitutionalism as investigated here is … not just one institution 
among many; rather, it is the basis and fundamental framework on 
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which all other institutions rest. Institutions matter, but they 
presuppose constitutionalism.”151 
 Straumann realises that institutions matter and regards constitutionalism as one 
institution among many, albeit one of especial importance in the history of our 
world and both political and legal thought. He rightly says that constitutional 
thought, constitutionalism as distinguished from constitutional practice, 
“testifies to the historically powerful effect of ideas and to the large body of 
thought that is presupposed by the constitutional institutions we inhabit in the 
West”, but rather than ponder or fight fruitlessly over whether ‘thought’ or 
‘practice’ comes first in bringing about institutions of any kind, it seems to me 
that we might better understand this phenomenon in terms of the two kinds of 
sapientia discussed by Cicero in the preface to Books III and IV of De Re 
Publica.152 Institutions, constitutional or otherwise, have developed over 
generations as the result of human beings cultivating the principles of nature 
through both words and learning and through establishing and working through 
them (as well as laws); great persons cultivating the watchwords and discoveries 
of great persons who have lived before them and in doing so accomplishing good 
things in the world. 
Straumann’s identification of constitutionalism as an institution I think also helps 
us to understand why institutions and laws are so often distinguished in Cicero’s 
writings, even as they so often appear closely together in them; both relate 
directly to the actions of human beings, but institutions especially have a 
fundamentally customary aspect. It would make little sense to write laws for 
constitutionalism; constitutional thought is simply ‘what we do’, ‘the way things 
are’, an ‘established practice’, and with Straumann, I thank Cicero especially for 
this specific institution. Institutions, like our tradition of constitutional thought 
or the ius gentium, are customary things which need not find written legal 
expression, yet still carry significant normative weight. Henriette van der Blom, 
Christa Gray and Catherine Steel provide us with a good account of the 
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institutional framework of the Roman republic, quite separately from Cicero’s 
theoretical writings on politics: 
“Political life took place in a framework of rules and conventions that, 
in the normal course of events, ensured the smooth transaction of 
business, and most aspects of social and family life were ordered by a 
wider web of the same type of rules, idealised as the mos maiorum 
(the ‘customs of the ancestors’). Yet innovation was frequent. In part 
the unsystematic nature of the constitution opened up disputed 
spaces with different and potentially conflicting sources of authority 
to which agents could appeal … As a result of this institutional 
framework the possibility of conflict was always present and became 
itself a possible source of stability within the system … The question 
to be posed is … not simply one of conflict versus cooperation, 
whether over programmes or political prizes, but whether a particular 
instance of conflict operated within an accepted framework that 
offered the possibility of an orderly resolution.”153 
This neatly captures, I think, some of the paradoxes of the human condition I 
hope to have drawn out for the reader in discussing Arendt in the second 
chapter; paradoxes, moreover, of which I think Cicero was also keenly conscious 
in producing his theoretical writings on politics. It seems to me that it is really 
the case that rules and conventions, laws and morals, matter; old and new 
necessarily co-exist in the present, as do conflict and cooperation; and mores 
can but need not be ‘idealised’—as Arendt said, by themselves they may be 
more acceptable in quality for matters pertaining to ethics and morals (as 
distinguished from theories of ethics and morals) than some philosophers may 
have thought.154 Innovation was frequent in the Roman republic because libertas 
had been established within the bounds of lasting institutions—that is, until 
individuals (‘great flaws in the leaders’ [p.333]) burst through those normative 
bounds and what Straumann calls constitutionalism emerged, a tradition of 
thought concerned with a body of law which is of a higher order than the ius 
civile, an ‘accepted framework’ of law which would make it much more difficult 
for potestas to degenerate into vis, libertas into licentia, and so the demise of 
res publica. Laws fix potestas and libertas into place, and instituta, customary 
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standards of social behaviour, strengthen mores, customary practices of human 
beings, which keep them there. 
But we have already considered Marcus’s ‘inchoate constitutionalism’ as seen in 
the law-code he wrote for Rome in the De Legibus; our concern here is with 
instituta, which Scipio says ought also to be accomplished in securing “the 
citizens’ shared association in a happy and honorable way of life”. In his 
reconstruction of the broad structure of the De Re Publica, which I think sounds 
very plausible, Zetzel argues that the conversation between Scipio and company 
on the first day (Books I and II) is concerned with the topic of administrative 
structure; on the second (Books III and IV), with institutional organisation; on the 
third (Books V and VI), with the individual citizen-statesman (optimis civis); and 
within each pair of Books, the first is a theoretical discussion, and the second 
inter-weaves the theoretical discussion with the specifics of the history of 
Rome.155 We have already considered this in relation to Books I and II (sub-
section 4.2.2); unfortunately, the rest of the Books are very fragmentary, 
making it difficult to discern the general structure of the argument, but again, 
Zetzel is convincing on what remains of the text: 
“That the framework of a true res publica must reflect the law of 
nature and eternal justice was demonstrated by Scipio at the end of 
Book 3; what Book 4 adds to that is the demonstration of the 
importance of individual and social moral values, derived from the 
natural law, in supporting and maintaining a structure that can in turn 
maintain a true and just res publica. The next stage of Cicero’s 
argument, lost in the even more fragmentary final books [V and VI], 
concentrated on precisely those individuals and their role in the res 
publica, making full use, I have no doubt, of the structure of moral 
values established in Book 4.”156 
The ‘individual and social moral values’ are instituta and mores; customary 
standards and practices of social behaviour that can, but need not, be written 
down or idealised for them to exist. The starting point for discussion of instituta 
in Book IV is the education of citizens, and as mentioned above, Scipio expresses 
some scepticism about the Greeks’ efforts to regulate the education of citizens 
by written laws, although the text regrettably breaks off before we are given his 
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account as to why.157 Other instituta that are discussed in Book IV as evidenced 
in the fragments that remain include the regulation of adult male behaviour, 
particularly that of the senatorial order, the theatre as it relates to mores, and 
the office of the censor. Instituta and mores were transmitted and maintained 
as a matter of custom, as the (non-idealised) mos maiorum, and upholding them 
happened much less through the sanctions of law (“in general, the necessity for 
a new statute is a sign of the failure of instituta”) than through shame at the 
prospect of transgressing them, which as we have seen, involved a kind of social 
self-regulation that the Romans called verecundia, “a sort of fear of criticism 
that is not undeserved”, which Zetzel notes is a virtual translation of the Stoics’ 
account of aidos.158 The specifics of Roman political society are set out in Book 
IV within a broadly Stoic framework, hence Zetzel also articulates mos maiorum 
as derived from natural law. Indeed, we saw that Cicero in the Partitiones 
Oratoriae also had linked both together; it is prescribed by (unwritten) ius 
naturae such that (unwritten) mos maiorum are preserved (pp.338–339), which 
seems to me converges quite significantly with Arendt’s writings and her concern 
to preserve the past, ‘the dimension of depth’, in all nations or peoples, even as 
she chose neither to use the language of natural law nor write a Moralia. 
Straumann, in a rationalist mode, describes this passage from Cicero in terms of 
the “validity” of mores being “based” on natural law, and argues that “the last 
word, then, rests with natural law; with a moral evaluation, not with custom”, 
but this formulation it seems to me leaves at least two things unclear: (i) who is 
providing ‘the last word … a moral evaluation’; and (ii) in what way is a moral 
evaluation not derived from mores.159 We saw Cicero in his own voice, in the 
Preface to Book I, give his opinion that honestas in citizens comes about not 
through the edicts of philosophers (Stoic or otherwise) but through another kind 
of sapientia: 
“What is the source … of justice, good faith and equity? of modesty 
and moderation, the avoidance of shame, and the desire for praise 
and honor? of courage in toil and danger? Surely they derive from the 
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men who established such things through education and strengthened 
some by custom [moribus] and ordained others by law [legibus]”.160 
He also develops this point in the Preface to Book V. After quoting a line from 
the poet Ennius (‘The Roman state stands upon the morals and men of old’ 
[Moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque]), he says: 
“That verse, in its brevity and its truthfulness, he seems to me to 
have spoken as if from an oracle. For if the civitas had not had such 
morals [morata], then the men [viri] would not have existed; nor, if 
such men [viri] had not been in charge, would there have been such 
mores as to be able to establish or preserve for so long a res publica 
so great and commanding so widely. And so, before our time, 
ancestral mores provided outstanding men [praestantes viros], and 
great men [excellentes viri] preserved the mores of old and the 
instituta of our ancestors.”161* 
As Zetzel says, by this point in the dialogue, Cicero is concerned not with 
constitutions and individuals, but with institutions and individuals, with mores 
instead of iura or leges, even as the latter are as necessary as the former for 
preserving and protecting res publica.162 I mentioned a ‘virtuous circle’ earlier in 
the chapter (pp.300–301), and in this passage it seems to me that we can see it 
described counter-factually by Cicero in his account of Roman history; roughly 
speaking, no inherited mores in the civitas, no good conduct from men; no good 
conduct from the men in charge (whatever the form of government), no mores 
in the civitas. We saw Arendt describe in the second chapter some of the results 
of ‘no good conduct from the men in charge’, the wilfully corrupted mores of 
Court society in revolutionary France, and indeed this is also what Cicero goes 
on at this point to lament at Rome. In his own time, he says, they had inherited 
the res publica “like a wonderful picture that had faded over time” but whose 
colours they had failed to renew, “the mores themselves hav[ing] passed away 
through a shortage of virtuous human beings [viri]”*, and that it was “because 
of our own vices, not because of some bad luck, that we preserve the res 
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publica in name alone but have long ago lost its substance”.163 Asmis provides us 
with a useful summary here: 
“However much Cicero despairs of the present, he wants the Romans 
to assume responsibility for the current state of affairs. Each Roman is 
to give account of himself as though accused of complicity in the vices 
that have destroyed the state. What is at stake is each person’s own 
civic existence [caput].”164 
The reader may see in this summary of Cicero’s thoughts something which 
produced strong echoes in Arendt’s writings, who was also despairing of the 
present, very keen for citizens to recognise their civic responsibilities, and 
understood that a key aspect of this involved holding on to what she called ‘the 
virtues of the past’, the mores and instituta, which she had once took to be “a 
matter of course”.165 These are the responsibilities of all citizens, but 
underscored here it seems to me is the importance of what Scipio had said 
earlier in the De Re Publica, i.e. that the directing consilium, those persons in 
charge, in whatever form of government, must be “hold[ing] to the bond which 
first bound men together in the societas of res publica”; it must be preserving 
and protecting, which as Cicero indicates in his metaphor of a faded picture and 
as we shall consider in some more detail shortly, is also to say renewing and 
cultivating, in accordance with the natural law, the mores, the instituta of that 
societas. Indeed, we find Marcus discussing this when he is setting out his law-
code for Rome in Book III of the De Legibus: 
“…if the senate is recognised as leader in public deliberation [publici 
consili], and if the remaining orders are willing to have the res publica 
guided [gubernari] by the deliberation of the leading order, then it is 
possible through the blending of rights, since the people have the 
power and the senate has authority [potestas in populo auctoritas in 
senatu sit], that that moderate and harmonious order of the civitas be 
maintained, especially if the following law is obeyed; for what follows 
is ‘Let the senatorial order be free from fault; let it be a model to 
others’ … That is hard to accomplish without the proper education and 
training … [but] if we can hold to that, we hold on to everything. For 
just as the whole civitas is habitually corrupted by the desires and 
faults of its leaders, so it is improved and reformed by self-restraint 
[continentia] on their part … if you will turn your thoughts back to our 
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early history, you will see that the character of our leaders has been 
reproduced in the whole civitas … Immoral [vitiosi] leaders are all the 
more damaging [perniciosus] to the res publica because they not only 
harbour their own vices but they instil them into the civitas … they 
are more harmful as examples than for their failings … there are 
relatively few men … who can corrupt or reform the mores of the 
civitas …”166 
As Arendt showed in her example of the council system, it is those whose virtue 
qualifies them for leadership, and a key responsibility such virtuous persons hold 
is the maintenance and development of the mores and instituta of the civitas. 
Van der Blom et al. mean by the ‘institutional context’ of the Roman republic 
“the rules and organisational structures by which political decisions were 
reached and implemented”, such as the assemblies of citizens, the magistrates, 
the senate, procedures of deliberation, and the law.167 In the first chapter 
(p.95), we saw Walzer (before he raised serious questions about Rousseau’s 
notion of will as the fundament of political legitimacy) say that one might insist 
upon the “indestructability of those institutions and practices [mores] that 
guarantee the democratic character of the popular will: assembly, debate, 
elections and so on”.168 The general point here, it seems to me, is that it is of 
fundamental importance that those instituta and mores which ensure the 
ongoingness of the res publica, of what Garsten calls a ‘politics of persuasion’, 
are carefully preserved and protected; some but not all of which may be written 
into law, constitutional or otherwise. In the context of Cicero’s political 
thought, Garsten has referred to these institutions as ‘institutions of 
controversy’: 
“In Cicero’s view, a mob magnified popular sentiment and radicalized 
popular demands rather than evaluating them in light of more 
fundamental interests. Lacking deliberation, it was often unwilling to 
grant authority to the best citizens and more likely to splinter into 
parties led by popular demagogues … Usually consilium of the sort 
described in De Re Publica emerged not from a lone orator but from 
some public deliberation in which orators played a role. ‘The people’ 
in [Scipio’s] special sense … in being a ‘partnership’ … would have the 
spirit of trust and fellow feeling that rhetoricians since Aristotle had 
declared necessary for effective persuasion … [Cicero] emphasized … 
the trust and independence of mind that would make deliberation 
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about the specifics of justice possible …  The function of deliberative 
bodies was to preserve the spirit of justice among a people, and this 
in turn required distance from the narrower interests and temporary 
enthusiasms of public opinion … Thus the political institutions that 
Cicero judged most legitimate were those most likely to preserve the 
possibility of some form of deliberation, most able to facilitate 
controversy in the way that the practice of oratory does at its 
best.”169     
We saw Walzer in the first chapter (p.96) observe that it is most often an 
‘aristocratic’ sort of constraint on (pure) democratic decision-making which goes 
into a democracy’s (mixed) constitution (also known as constitutional 
democracy); an appeal from “popular consciousness, particular interests, selfish 
or shortsighted policies to the superior understanding of the few”, and although 
in context he was discussing judicial review of popular legislation by the 
Supreme Court in the US, it seems to me that what he said still holds some 
similarities to what Garsten is saying here in terms of checking or slowing 
‘radicalised popular demands’ and ‘temporary enthusiasms of public opinion’.170 
It seems to me that what both Walzer and Garsten are considering here are 
constitutional and/or institutional limits upon pure democratic decision-making—
from which even Rousseau pulled back—the legitimacy of which Benhabib also 
seemed to admit in setting out her theory of democratic iterations (p.52), and 
we saw in the previous section that Scipio gave no strictures in terms of what 
proportions the aristocratic element and the democratic element in a mixed 
form of government should take, other than that it should be an equitable 
balance, fitting to the particular circumstances. As regards the democratic 
element, in the second chapter (pp.187–188), and not unlike Walzer, we saw 
Arendt oppose the notion of a unanimous ‘public opinion’ in favour of freedom 
of opinion and a plurality of opinions, which, insofar as deliberation is going on 
in the exchanging and forming of different opinions through speech and 
persuasion, conduce public spirit, ‘a spirit of trust and fellow feeling’, in the 
civitas.171 We also saw her endorsement of the council system and the American 
founding in which the generation of authority occurred in an atmosphere of 
mutual trust through such deliberation, and as such, the ‘smooth transaction of 
business’ was assured; everything was decided through speech and persuasion 
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rather than force and violence. This, as Garsten argues in the above passage, is 
a very fundamental concern of Cicero’s: to ensure the institutions which allow 
things to be decided through speech and persuasion rather than force and 
violence—institutions which facilitate controversy and mutual understanding 
(p.71)—prevail. 
We saw in the previous section that Scipio named auctoritas and consilium as 
the aristocratic element that should go into a mixed form of government. 
Consilium is ‘the necessary intelligence needed to guide a commonwealth’; that 
which, as Garsten says, can preserve the spirit of justice among a people, the 
very thing which ensures the ongoingness of the res publica. Consilium requires 
‘exerting one’s reason coolly and freely’ (p.187); a “space vacated” by ‘public 
opinion’ or the ‘verdict’ of critical reason; an independence of mind and some 
distance from the plurality of policies which are presented in the proceedings of 
politics (‘in but not wholly in’ [p.96]).172 It involves, or so it seems to me, a very 
careful consideration of those policies in relation to a variety of more 
fundamental, broader and longer-term issues which directly affect the 
ongoingness of the res publica. Construed in this way, consilium is no easy task, 
but it is certainly one I think towards which education should be oriented, and 
we often call this—supplementing specialist fields of education such as law, 
philosophy, politics, and so on—education for citizenship. Whether and how the 
council system (and the corollary principle of subsidiarity) as set out in the 
second chapter could develop citizens’ deliberative capacities in this direction, 
and in doing so generate public spirit in citizens, is a matter of course very 
worthy of investigation, but if and while these capacities remain insufficiently 
developed in citizens, we expect, like Walzer, to find them institutionalised in 
some other way to ensure the ongoingness of res publica. As to auctoritas, I 
have argued that we should understand it as a personal quality, and I argue here 
that this should be the case howsoever it is institutionalised; it is that quality 
which, through the words and deeds of the person, the auctor, inspires 
confidence in his or her fellows, and the use of which takes the form of advice 
or guidance and never command. In his excellent investigation of both Cicero’s 
and Sallust’s writings in relation to Arendt’s, Dean Hammer has provided an 
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account of auctoritas which ties together much of what I have already set out in 
relation to it so far. He is worth quoting here at some length: 
“Auctoritas, for Cicero, answers to [the concern for truth and fidelity 
to promises and agreements], not by fixing something permanently in 
time, but by ensuring the bonds of trust and mutual accountability by 
which negotiations can occur. The assurance … is oriented both to the 
past, as negotiations occur within a context of precedents, rules, and 
procedures, and to the future by ensuring that new promises are kept 
and protections assured … Auctoritas is endangered, in Cicero’s 
analysis, by authorship without history, when either the populace or 
elites abrogate the trust by which the negotiation of power can occur. 
Cicero is referring in part to the attempt by individuals to remove 
themselves from these agreements by acquiring sovereign power … 
With the breakdown of auctoritas is the loss of power to stabilize, or 
… to ensure the validity of, negotiations of power. The alternative to 
auctoritas is either stalemate or violence as parties seek, or block, 
power so that negotiations do not have to occur … For Cicero, the 
[inefficacy] of claims of auctoritas is tied to the loss of politics as a 
public thing. The Roman people are suppressed by violence, the voice 
of the people replaced by hired crowds and mercenary gangs, the 
senate ‘abolished’, the courts ‘closed’, and the sentiment of affection 
replaced by fear … absent a partnership of power, and in particular 
the central role of auctoritas in giving context and continuity to those 
agreements, the public realm and the power of the people was 
unsustainable … Sallust associates auctoritas with the mos maiorum … 
Auctoritas is built on memory; a claim of both genealogy and conduct 
… The past authorizes how one judges the present, rather than 
present circumstances affecting how one interprets and uses the past 
… The danger of words losing their ability to orient action, of history 
having no claim, is that the Republic is reduced ‘to extremes’ because 
there is no longer a starting point, no longer a common ground, no 
longer trust … no longer integrity to language by which discussion can 
maintain itself … [For Sallust] what is required is a people imbued 
with a sense of history, in some sense identifying the role of the 
people in recalling and renewing the originating spirit of the 
community … Both Cicero and Sallust are correct. The bond of 
participatory communities is trust, whether a trust in the possibility of 
negotiation or a trust in the meaning of words.”173 
Cicero in his account of the troubles of his time emphasises the dwindling 
auctoritas of the senate, and Sallust in his history emphasises the people as heirs 
to the founding of the res publica and as the agents, instead of the senate, 
capable of renewing its founding principles. But whatsoever the emphasis placed 
on the senate or the people, both authors emphasise the fundamental 
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importance of being connected to the mores handed down from one generation 
to the next for the res publica to be ongoing. Although I have argued that 
auctoritas is a personal quality, what Hammer’s account here should drive home 
to the reader, I argue, is that it is necessary for it to be institutionalised, insofar 
as we want to maintain res publica. The ‘bonds of trust and mutual 
accountability’ to which he refers are of course what Scipio was referring to 
when he said that the directing consilium of any res publica should be ‘holding 
to the bond which first bound men together in the societas of res publica’, a 
holding which it is exceedingly important to maintain always through the cut and 
thrust of everyday politics, and one which requires connection to the past, in 
the present, with a care for the future; it both maintains and relies upon 
instituta and mores.  
It bears repeating, however, that even as authoring without history loses 
connection to the past, the ‘dimension of depth’ connection to which ensures 
the continuity of res publica, authoring within history involves a certain amount 
of paradox as well.174 After linking his investigation of Cicero’s and Sallust’s work 
to Arendt’s, Hammer construes the latter as turning: 
“… on two seemingly contradictory concerns: the loss of a notion of 
beginning, as the distinctively human capability of bringing something 
new into being, on the one hand, and the loss of remembrance, as a 
continuity of tradition that gives stability and durability to community 
life, on the other.”175 
I sought to show to the reader in the second chapter some of the ways in which 
Arendt held on to both seemingly contradictory concerns simultaneously (‘on the 
one hand and on the other’), as well as the fact that neither our capabilities of 
bringing something new into being nor our capabilities of remembering the past 
have been lost in the modern world. Arendt captured the paradox highlighted by 
Hammer here very well indeed when she spoke of freedom as a worldly condition 
persisting only when ‘new beginnings are constantly injected into the stream of 
things already initiated’, i.e. institutions, including the constitutional 
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arrangements upheld by citizens, but also including various ‘unwritten rules’: 
customs, mores, traditions, the fruits of remembrance which I agree with Arendt 
may in a sense be more acceptable in quality for matters pertaining to ethics 
and morals than some philosophers may have thought, and upon which all human 
thought depends for its existence (pp.154 and 158) (‘every thought is an after-
thought’ [p.23]). Maintaining the worldly condition of freedom necessarily 
requires authoring within rather than without history. Hammer goes on: 
“Auctoritas … is not just about protecting the sanctity of the past; the 
negotiation of this tension of authoring within history is actually 
critical to any orientation to the future as a touchstone of politics.”176 
 
The tension of which he speaks is between tradition and continuity on the one 
hand and authoring and augmenting on the other. As we saw in the second 
chapter, Arendt herself was authoring within history, her theoretical writings on 
politics being both ‘old’ and ‘new’ at the same time, and she was very 
concerned to preserve and protect the ‘coral’ and ‘pearls’ of the past. Young-
Bruehl portrayed this as Arendt opening up our words and finding in them the 
surviving threads of our tradition; of gathering these threads ‘freely and in such 
a way as to protect freedom’. And Hammer says in connection with both 
Arendt’s and Cicero’s writings that “preserving and renovating appear as forms 
of political action that do not follow from foundation but are ongoing aspects of 
founding”.177  
This I think speaks to the historical account of the Roman res publica given by 
Scipio in Book II of the De Re Publica and the understanding of Rome’s 
development being not the result of a single lawgiver but of numerous sapientes 
across the generations. And Zetzel describes the Preface to Books III and IV of 
the De Re Publica—if only we could see it in its pre-fragmentary condition—as 
having “offered some insight into both how notions of justice (and morality in 
general) evolve and how leaders turn those notions into institutional practice”, 
and we have already seen that Cicero reserves higher praise for those who 
establish such things relative to those who cultivate them through words and 
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learning, and his highest praise for those practised and learned in both 
approaches.178 But Zetzel, drawing upon Scipio’s description of the auctor as 
moderator rei publicae, also points to the paradox of authoring within history 
which Cicero confronts in writing de optimo statu civitatis et optimo cive: 
“… it needs to be recognized that strong individual initiatives within 
the framework of the res publica are problematic at best. The 
institutionalization of the moderator is in itself paradoxical: he must 
break with tradition in order to preserve it, he must revise the 
instituta in order to maintain them. Any theory of republicanism must 
take account of the fact that virtue is not universal: ‘Men begin to 
develop bad habits and to break the laws.’ That is not Cicero, but 
Machiavelli (Discorsi 3.1); and he, like Cicero, recognized the need for 
reformation and reconstitution, the continuing role of the statesman 
in maintaining and restoring the social fabric … To bring the res 
publica back to its principles involves a discontinuity within the res 
publica itself … and yet, as [Cicero] recognized, if that were not done 
then the res publica was lost in any case … Cicero places an 
astonishing burden of both learning and virtue on his statesmen…”.179 
This passage I think lends strong support to Straumann’s arguments about 
constitutionalism, but Zetzel also recognises the paradox of authoring within 
history along with Cicero, Machiavelli, Arendt, Hammer and many others: even 
as ‘virtue is not universal’ and constitutional law is a formidably important 
bulwark against this fact, there is still the necessary and continuing role of 
statespersons in maintaining and protecting res publica; we continue to live 
under governments of laws and persons, or better, the rule of law and 
government of persons.180 A common image used in antiquity is to understand the 
statesperson as like a gardener and the res publica as like a plant. It is the 
statesperson’s job to tend to the plant: to look after it, to cultivate it, to renew 
it, to maintain it, to ensure that it flourishes. 
All of this I think suggests (amongst many other things) that the officia of 
statespersons are of an extraordinary complexity; they shoulder “awesome 
responsibilities” (p.166). But I also think it is important to keep in mind that 
these are officia and responsibilities of statespersons, those persons holding 
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public office in a duly constituted res publica—which makes their officia and 
responsibilities legitimate, they are the iura of statespersons—and not, say, the 
officia and responsibilities of philosophers, political theorists, or private 
citizens. And given the extraordinary complexities and awesome responsibilities 
involved in maintaining res publica, it should come as no surprise to the reader 
that Cicero was very concerned indeed to consider carefully what the qualities 
of such statespersons, the ‘best citizens’, in whatever form of government, 
should be.  
4.4 Rector Rei Publicae 
4.4.1 An ‘Ideal-Type’ 
The first time we hear of Cicero’s ‘ideal statesperson’ is in the De Oratore. The 
character Antonius is making an argument that there is an art peculiar to the 
orator, just as there are arts peculiar to the general, lawyer (or jurisconsult), 
poet, musician, grammarian, philosopher, and so on, and before he reaches his 
account of the orator’s art, he offers (conditional) definitions of some of these 
other ones, including that which is peculiar to statespersons: 
“…if we were inquiring about what sort of person it is who has brought 
to bear his experience [usum], knowledge [scientiam], and energy 
[studium] in the guidance [moderandam] of res publica, I would 
define him as follows: I would say that a man who understands the 
means by which the well-being of res publica is achieved and 
increased, and can make use of those things, is to be accounted a rei 
publicae rector and an author of public policy [consili publici 
auctorem]; and in this category I would mention Publius Lentulus … 
Tiberius Gracchus senior, Quintus Metellus, Publius Africanus, Gaius 
Laelius and innumerable others both at home and abroad.”181* 
Although Antonius has not used the term, it seems to me that there are 
numerous parallels between his account and the more practical kind of sapientia 
Cicero describes in the Prefaces in the De Re Publica. In preparing the 
interlocutors for his definition, before all the other qualities Antonius lists, it is 
experience in the guidance of res publica which he mentions first; virtue consists 
entirely in its employment and its most important employment is in the 
governance of civitates. But it is not a competition; such a person has also 
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brought his or her knowledge and efforts together with their experience in the 
guidance of res publica, just as Cicero says that those persons who have added 
to both their natural abilities and their experience ‘scholarly learning and a 
richer knowledge of human affairs’ ought to be prized above all others. In the 
list of exemplary figures that Antonius provides to exercise the judgments of his 
interlocutors, we find the names of statespersons who appear in the De Re 
Publica, either as exemplary figures or as characters in the dialogue itself, and 
he ends the list by underscoring the fact that the art peculiar to statespersons is 
not specific to the culture of Rome, and nor are outstanding statespersons as 
such, just as Cicero had done in the Preface to Books III and IV of the De Re 
Publica. 
Also worthy of note in Antonius’s account is that the art peculiar to 
statespersons is distinguished from that peculiar to other persons, such as 
generals, lawyers, music theorists, grammarians, poets and philosophers.182 
Powell argues that “rector rei publicae is intended simply as the name of a 
profession, on all fours with that of general, lawyer, musician and the rest … the 
only possible sense of rector rei publicae that fits this context is, quite simply, 
‘politician’ or ‘statesman’.”183 He also refers to it as naming a “professional 
occupation”, and earlier in this chapter, we saw that res publica was defined by 
Scipio as res populi, as a thing with which a given assemblage of persons, all of 
whom comprise a people, are occupied; it takes up (at least some of) the time of 
the people.184 Bracketing capitalist connotations and understanding these terms 
in a broader sense, we can say that an occupation is a way of spending time, and 
a profession is a way of spending time that requires skill, skill being a good 
translation of the Latin term ars (‘art’). Again—and despite capitalist 
connotations of the term—it seems to me that this ‘art’ finds place today in 
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education for citizenship; and in Cicero’s writings rector rei publicae is optimis 
civis. 
Antonius’s (conditional) definition of rector rei publicae, however, is made only 
in passing, and the next time we encounter this type of person explicitly in 
Cicero’s writings is in Book II of the De Re Publica. In providing his historical 
account, Scipio arrives at the sixth century BCE and Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, 
last king of Rome who, having begun acting unjustly, had transformed into a 
tyrant, and it is at this point Scipio introduces the rector as antithesis of the 
tyrant: 
“Let there be opposed to this man another, who is good [bonus] and 
wise [sapiens] and experienced [peritus] about the interests and the 
worth of the civitas, almost a guardian [tutor] and manager 
[procurator] of res publica; for in that way let anyone be described 
who is a guide [rector] and helmsman [gubernator] of the civitas. 
Make sure you recognize this man; he is the one who can protect the 
civitas by his consilium and exertions. And since this conception 
[nomen] has not yet been treated in our conversation, and we will 
often have to consider the type to which this man belongs in our 
remaining discussion…”185* 
Regrettably, there is a gap in the text at this point; we can see from what 
remains, however, that Scipio is engaged in describing the type of statesperson 
who is the opposite of a tyrant, and again, it seems to me that that which helps 
one make sure one recognises such a person is education for citizenship. While 
the context may suggest that what Scipio is describing is a good monarch, the 
Latin term rex is nowhere to be seen here (Romans had some bad experiences 
with kings); what he is describing, rather, is a type of person. As Powell argues, 
the function of this passage: 
“… is to establish the existence of a [category] of persons designated 
as rectores and helmsmen of the state, all entitled to be called 
guardians and [managers]: a category which includes the [sub-
category] of good monarchs but also includes others as well. In other 
words, the argument is that kings can indeed be good rectores, but so 
can plenty of other people…”186 
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This comports, as Powell says, with the examples of rectores provided by 
Antonius in the De Oratore, none of whom were monarchs at Rome. But more 
than just pointing to specific persons to clarify what he means by rector rei 
publicae, Cicero is engaged both in the De Oratore and the De Re Publica in 
explicating a type of person. As Jonathan Zarecki notes, Cicero never uses the 
term rector in relation to a living Roman and all usages of the term itself appear 
in his philosophica. It is in this sense that I mean to say that rector rei publicae 
is an ‘ideal-type’; “Cicero’s rector exists only in theory, not in practice”, even 
as he points to examples to enrich the meaning of this new term.187 I have placed 
‘ideal-type’ in scare quotes because I have borrowed the term from Weber 
whilst leaving behind its philosophical or scientific underpinnings. Although 
similarities in meaning remain—for example, I regard the rector rei publicae in 
Cicero’s writings as providing, in Jackson’s words, a “specialized conceptual 
filter that focuses our scholarly attention on particular aspects of actually 
existing things to the detriment of other aspects of those same things”—I do not 
seek to provide, in Weber’s words, “a systematically correct scientific 
demonstration … [or a] logical analysis of the content of an ideal and of its 
ultimate axioms”.188  
That said, let us return to a consideration of the qualities of the rector. We see 
from Scipio’s account that he or she is a good (bonus) and wise (sapiens) person 
who is experienced, that is to say, practised, in the interests of res publica (i.e. 
‘including all interests of the community of the people’). It may well be the case 
that some Stoic elements are included in the meanings of bonitas and sapientia 
at this point, but here in Book II, when Scipio is giving an historical account of 
Rome as an exemplum of the best kind of res publica, I think it very likely 
indeed that the ‘homespun’ meanings of these terms as set out by Laelius in De 
Amicitia (p.303) are involved. But in returning to Scipio’s description, other 
terms are given in relation to rector rei publicae as well: such a person is like a 
tutor or procurator of res publica, and we saw in the previous chapter that, 
some years later, Cicero used both these terms again in providing advice to his 
son in the De Officiis concerning those who are about to take charge of public 
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affairs (p.250). Rectores’ responsibilities for the res publica are like those of 
guardians and managers; educational and functional.189 
We find later in Book II that the rector is not only a sapiens, but also a prudens. 
As we saw in the second chapter, Arendt described the phronimos as the 
understanding person whose insights into the world of human affairs qualify 
them for leadership, and indeed this comports with Scipio’s earlier description 
of the rector as gubernator, ‘helmsman’, which also suggests leadership.190 We 
also saw, earlier in this chapter, that I suggested it is a person who is both 
sapiens and prudens able successfully to promote ‘the citizens’ shared 
association in a happy and honourable way of life’. In discussing the prudens, 
Scipio offers as a kind of image from nature at this point the mahout, a person 
who works with, tends to, and trains an elephant; a huge and potentially 
destructive creature, although familiar with the customs of human beings and 
directed by the mahout through gentle instruction and touch.191 The text is 
fragmentary here, making it difficult to interpret, but in tracing some of the 
influence of Plato in the text, Atkins argues that we can see in it something of 
Scipio’s understanding of human nature: 
“Echoing Socrates’ account of tyranny in [Plato’s] Republic, Scipio 
suggests [in this passage] that the beast that lurks within the human 
soul is composite rather than simple. Human beings are a complex mix 
of passions and reason; human nature lacks transparency. The 
Machiavellian and Polybian view of human beings as invariably rational 
and self-interested actors and hence predictable is jettisoned … [and] 
the plasticity and unpredictability of human nature is affirmed.”192 
Like Zetzel’s (p.364), Atkin’s argument here I think provides very strong support 
for the institutions of constitutionalism and constitutional law. But recalling that 
laws are necessary but insufficient for the maintenance of res publica, I think it 
also provides very strong support for maintaining mores and instituta in any 
given political society, responsibilities for which are held by all citizens but 
especially rectores of the res publica. And further evidence that the rector is 
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not restricted to the category of persons who are ‘good monarchs’ appears at 
this point when Laelius says to Scipio that, insofar as they are seeking the 
prudens, the person of practical wisdom, “there is a fine supply of them among 
those present”.193 
Turning from political psychology to political theory and tracing not only the 
influence of Plato but also the Stoics at this point in Scipio’s account, Jean-Louis 
Ferrary argues that “the image of the mahout illustrates the spirit of reason 
within the soul of the prudens, but implicitly also the role of the prudens or 
rector within the city”.194 Much as the rational part of the soul (mens, ‘mind’) of 
the prudens successfully controls the irrational part, rectores of res publicae 
direct citizenries, although crucially, the manner in which they can do so 
depends itself upon the general character of the citizenry, hence the 
fundamental importance of not only education in general, the development of 
citizens’ rational capacities, but also the importance of the civic responsibilities 
of all concerned in maintaining mores and instituta which guarantee both the 
power of the people—power, we recall (p.171), which vanishes when the people 
crumbles apart, often pulverized by demagogues—and the authority of the 
senate. Scipio (again drawing upon Plato) had earlier given an account of some 
of the excesses which can occur in ‘laissez-faire’ ‘societies’, one of which being 
that citizens become unable to bear even the very least amount of authority 
without getting angry, resulting eventually in disregard for the authority of the 
laws themselves and the emergence of tyranny.195 And Ferrary notes that “the 
opposite of a people which gives birth to tyranny is the people of the mixed 
constitution, accepting without resentment the [auctoritas] of the Senate”.196 
Not only does this speak to Canovan’s understanding of Arendt on freedom—that 
citizens uphold the constitutional arrangements which guarantee its condition in 
the world (p.174)—it also underscores the importance of Marcus’s law in the De 
Legibus, ‘‘Let the senatorial order be free from fault; let it be a model to 
others’’ (pp.357–358). Of those citizens taking the initiative in public affairs, 
freely choosing themselves into politics, it is those who are virtuous who 
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produce the ‘virtuous circle’ mentioned earlier. And in returning to the De Re 
Publica and Scipio’s image of the mahout, after a gap in the text, we find that 
the conversation is still focused on the prudens, and this virtuous circle is 
described in terms of a mirror: 
“LAELIUS: Now I see what kind of responsibilities you are placing in 
the charge of that man I have been waiting for. 
SCIPIO: There is really only one, because practically all the rest are 
contained in this one alone: that he never cease educating and 
observing himself, that he summon others to imitate him, that 
through the brilliance of his mind and life [splendore animi et vitae] 
he offer himself as a mirror to his fellow citizens. For just as in the 
music of harps and flutes, and of course in choral singing…”197 
In short, those who qualify for leadership—those who show virtue in their 
actions—set an example to their fellow-citizens. With the reader keeping in mind 
the Platonic and Stoic influences at this point, the citizens themselves, 
considering the character and life of the prudens, “see better the divine 
element which is the true self of every man and they recognise their soul in his—
whence the idea of the mirror”, although at no point of course is it wholly ‘seen’ 
or ‘known’ by anybody; both the prudens and the citizens who are looking at he 
or she “never cease educating and observing” themselves.198 From setting out 
this fundamental responsibility of rectores, Scipio goes on to provide the musical 
analogy we have already considered (p.317), in explicating how concordia is 
ensured, ‘the tightest and the best bond of safety in every res publica’. As 
Ferrary argues, “the musical analogy shows that out of diversity there may come 
harmony and concord, provided that there is something to join the elements 
together, not to assimilate them to each other: this is the role of the 
prudens”.199 The rector rei publicae ensures that many voices remain many and 
are never reduced to one; ‘heaven’ is res publica, when the many voices are 
singing in harmony, when they are in concord with each other. ‘The question is 
never whether an individual is good but whether his singing is good for the choir 
in which he is singing’ (p.165). 
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In Gadamer’s words, “developing this communal sense is of decisive importance 
for human life” (p.76); the rector is engaged in what Dallmayr called “an ethical 
quest for public virtue” (p.76). At a time when intemperate passions for power 
and glory amongst the leading men at Rome were bringing the res publica to its 
knees, Cicero wrote to Atticus, articulating his deep regret about the course of 
events and the abandoning of the quest, and recalling something he had written 
in Book V of the De Re Publica: 
“As a helmsman aims at a good voyage, a doctor at saving his patient, 
a general at victory, so this moderator rei publicae aims at the 
happiness of the life of the citizens, that they should be secure in 
means of defence, rich in property, splendid in reputation, 
untarnished in virtue. I want him to be the person to perfect this task, 
which is the greatest and best among mankind [operis maximi inter 
homines atque optimi].”200* 
As Arendt recognised, it is a very tall order indeed (even as she seemed to 
disdain the ‘enormous enrichment of the private sphere through modern 
individualism’ [p.189]), and Zetzel I think is correct that Cicero “places an 
astonishing burden of learning and virtue on his statesmen”; so astonishing that I 
think it right to call the rector rei publicae an ‘ideal-type’.   
4.4.2 Cicero Approaching Others 
We digress in this sub-section from Cicero’s theoretical writings on politics to 
consider some of his speeches and letters, specifically the Pro Lege Manilia, his 
speech to the Roman people delivered in 66 BCE in support of giving Pompey an 
extraordinary command against King Mithridates of Pontus; his letter to Pompey 
in 62 following conclusion of this command; and the Pro Marcello, his speech 
made in the senate in 46 regarding the pardon of the optimate senator Marcus 
Marcellus by Caesar (who by this point was dictator). The sub-section concludes 
with a consideration of Cicero’s advice to his son in the De Officiis regarding 
appropriate action in particular circumstances (ex tempore officium); a topic 
often studied by the philosophers at this time. Although some of the historical 
and political contexts will be provided to the letters and speeches, our concern 
in this sub-section is not to pass judgment on Cicero, Pompey, and Caesar as 
statespersons, nor is to analyse any of Cicero’s political or rhetorical skills in 
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approaching others, but to consider whether the statements he makes about the 
qualities of a good statesperson in his communications might add anything to our 
‘specialised conceptual filter’. 
In 66 BCE, around a decade before he had his character Antonius in the De 
Oratore distinguish between the art peculiar to generals and that peculiar to 
statespersons, Cicero delivered the Pro Lege Manilia, ‘On the Manilian Law’ 
(known alternatively as De Imperio Cn. Pompei, ‘On the Extraordinary Command 
of Pompey’), his first deliberative speech before the Roman people, in support 
of giving Pompey extraordinary powers in Rome’s ongoing war against 
Mithridates.201 Cicero lists in this speech four qualities he regards as being found 
in the perfect general—knowledge of military affairs (scientiam militaris), virtue 
(virtus), reputation (auctoritas) and luck (felicitas)—and argues that Pompey 
displays all of them. Our concern here is (mainly) with what he says about 
Pompey’s virtus:    
“Good heavens above! Is it really possible that the astonishing, super-
human virtue of a single mortal man has brought such a beacon of 
light to our res publica … ?”202 
With this question, as Gildenhard and Hodgson put it, Cicero “nudges Pompey 
skywards without explicitly claiming divinity for him”.203 Pompey is a mortal 
human being just like the rest of us, but as evidenced in his words and deeds 
over the years, outstandingly so. Cicero goes on at this point to set out some of 
the military virtues and speed with which Pompey concluded the extraordinary 
command he was granted the previous year in Rome’s battles against the 
pirates, before pointing out to his audience that they are not the only virtues 
one should seek in the ideal general:   
“In an ideal, perfect general [summo ac perfecto imperatore], we 
should not look only for martial excellence [bellandi virtus]: there are 
many other excellent qualities which support [administrae] and go 
with [comites] them. In the first place, what integrity [innocentia] 
 
201 For analyses of this speech, see for example: Ingo Gildenhard and Louise Hodgson, 2013. 
Cicero, On Pompey’s Command (De Imperio), 27–49: Latin Text, Study Aids with Vocabulary, 
Commentary, and Translation. Open Book Publishers; Catherine Steel, 2001. Cicero, Rhetoric 
and Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.114–135. 
202 Man. 33. 
203 Gildenhard and Hodgson, Cicero, On Pompey’s Command. p.144. 
374 
generals should have; then what moderation [temperantia] in 
everything they do, what good faith [fide], what approachability 
[facilitate], what natural ability [ingenio], what humanity 
[humanitas]! … He possesses them all, citizens, to the highest degree 
possible …”.*204 
Although Cicero provides numerous examples demonstrating these virtues in 
Pompey, our concern here is with the virtues themselves. Once again, we can 
see that Cicero is engaged in ‘humanising’ warriors (it seems to me with his eye 
not only on Rome but on international political society as well); military virtues 
are obviously necessary in a general, but we should be looking for non-military 
ones in he or she as well which bolster them. Innocentia, ‘innoxiousness’, has 
the sense here of ‘integrity of character’ or ‘moral uprightness’, “a quality of 
someone not liable to become corrupted by opportunities of wealth and power, 
and hence rather precious in public figures”; a refraining from damaging 
activities caused by moral weaknesses such as greed, avarice and so on.205 
Innocentia picks out things which persons do not do because of their integrity of 
character. Temperantia is an important part of the fourth primary virtue, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, not named but I think still seen in Laelius’s 
‘homespun’ definition of bonitas (p.303), and defined elsewhere by Cicero as “a 
firm and well-considered control exercised by the reason over desire 
[libidineme] and other improper impulses of the mind [animi]. Its parts are 
continentia [cf. pp.354–355], clementia [p.379] and modestia [pp.379–380].”206* 
Fides, as we have seen, “underwrites socio-economic exchanges [and] defines 
political interactions”.207 Facilitas refers to “ease in interpersonal relations”, 
“an indulgent disposition willing to overlook or forgive faults in others”.208 
Although not a virtue as such, ingenio seems to refer here to ‘natural ability’ or 
‘innate talent’, “inherent potential rather than inherent moral excellence”, and 
the meaning of humanitas in this context Gildenhard and Hodgson argue is more 
ethical, denoting something like “general human decency” (it being “the sign of 
a brave man to spare the vanquished and consider them as fellow human 
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beings”).209 In addition to these virtues, Cicero also praises Pompey’s consilium 
in providendo (‘strategic intelligence’ or ‘foresight in planning’) and 
auctoritas.210 
Cicero’s list here of qualities which go into making up the ideal general, 
although they may be broadly based on certain traditions of philosophy or 
rhetoric, are very much of his own choosing.211 Since the qualities of good 
generals and statespersons were often expected to be found in one and the same 
person at this time, and since he took care to divide the virtutes imperatoriae 
into ‘military’ and ‘non-military’ ones, might we be justified in carrying over any 
of the latter to the rector rei publicae? Taking the qualities in reverse order, we 
start with those not under Cicero’s heading of ‘virtues’ in this speech: auctoritas 
and consilium. We have already seen Antonius call the rector ‘consili publici 
auctorem’; both auctoritas and consilium are to be expected in such a person. It 
seems to me that we could also be justified in naming humanitas as one of the 
qualities of the rector, since he or she is the antithesis of a tyrant. Following his 
discussion of Tarquinius Superbus in the De Re Publica, Scipio says to his 
interlocutors: 
“Although [a tyrant] has the appearance of a human, through the 
viciousness of his character he outdoes the most destructive beasts. 
Who could rightly call ‘human’ someone who desires no bond of 
shared law, no link of human nature with his fellow citizens or indeed 
with the whole human race [Quis enim hunc hominem rite dixerit, qui 
sibi cum suis civibus, qui denique cum omni hominum genere nullam 
iuris communionem, nullam humanitatis societatem velit]?”212 
A tyrant is the epitome of monstrousness and brutality; attributes which place 
them outside of not only the res publica but also the societas generis humani, 
standing as they do against all endeavours of civilisation in its broadest sense. 
We saw in the previous chapter that the entire basis of civilisation in Cicero’s 
view is human beings helping one another and that humanitas is closely 
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associated with communitas and bonitas; a quality we see not in the tyrant and 
very much in the rector rei publicae. 
Ingenio, understood in terms of inherent talent and/or potential, I believe we 
may also consider as one of the qualities of the rector rei publicae. Although 
Scipio is not explicitly named as a rector in the De Re Publica, he is portrayed as 
one who very much approaches the ideal, and as we shall see in the next sub-
section, his ingenium is referred to a few times in the text. We have also seen 
Cicero in his own voice, in the Preface to Books III and IV, refer to bonis ingeniis 
who, with the help of the right institutions, may attain to “an unbelievable, 
superhuman virtue”. Although one might like to add facilitas to the rector’s 
qualities, I cannot find any support for this in the parts of the De Re Publica 
which have come down to us. One might wish to add innocentia, especially as 
the rector is an ‘ideal-type’, and even find support for doing so in Laelius’s 
inclusion of the virtue of integritas in describing a boni, but it seems to me that 
a rector is not the type of person citizens expect not to act on their behalf, and 
innocentia is an essentially ‘negative’ virtue only seen in not acting.213 But we 
may be on some firmer ground with temperantia and fides. Both these qualities 
seem to fit with Laelius’s Roman descriptions of bonitas and sapientia, which 
themselves are the first qualities of the rector that Scipio sets out. In his 
commentary on Scipio’s dream (discussed in the next sub-section), Macrobius 
mentions the four primary virtues as attributes of the rector.214 Powell, also, has 
provided a strong argument that Cicero’s account of the rector is structured 
around the four primary virtues, and considering that account in relation to the 
Pro Lege Manilia, I argue that, although the latter is of course steeped in its 
historical context far more than Cicero’s theoretical writings on politics, we 
might nevertheless be justified in adding the qualities of temperantia, fides, 
ingenium and humanitas to our ‘ideal-type’.215 
Pompey was granted an extraordinary command against Mithridates, which by 62 
had successfully been brought to completion. Back at Rome, however, domestic 
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troubles had been brewing, with the Catilinarian conspiracy unfolding in 63 and 
Cicero that year as consul exposing it, being hailed pater patriae, ‘father of the 
fatherland’, for having saved the res publica. Two of the tribunes in 62 
challenged Cicero’s actions in presiding over the execution of five of the 
conspirators without trial, and one of the tribunes, Metellus Nepos, proposed 
laws summoning Pompey back to Italy to deal with Catiline, which produced 
some political unrest, in turn resulting in his suspension from office and his 
leaving Rome to join Pompey’s armies. It seems Pompey was not best pleased 
with Nepos’s actions at Rome, and even though Rome’s success against Catiline’s 
army had removed the need for any of Pompey’s help, the latter made a point of 
sending a dispatch home reassuring everybody of his peaceful intentions upon his 
return, as well as a private letter to Cicero (not extant).216 Cicero wrote to him 
in response: 
“I hope all is well with you and the army, as it is with me. Like the 
rest of us I was immeasurably delighted with your dispatch, in which 
you have held out the bright prospect of a peaceful future; such a 
prospect as I have ever been promising to all and sundry in reliance on 
your single self … Your personal letter to me evinces but little of your 
friendly sentiments towards me, but you may be sure it gave me 
pleasure all the same. My chief joy is apt to lie in the consciousness of 
my service to others [meorum officiorum conscientia]. If these fail of 
a like response, I am perfectly content that the balance of good 
officia should rest on my side. I have no doubt that if my own hearty 
goodwill towards you does not suffice to win your attachment, the 
public interest will bring us together and join us together [res publica 
nos inter nos conciliatura coniuncturaque sit].  
Not to leave you in ignorance of the particular in which your letter has 
disappointed me, let me speak plainly, as becomes my character 
[natura] and our friendly relations. My achievements have been such 
that I expected to find a word of congratulation upon them in your 
letter, both for friendship’s sake and that of the res publica. I imagine 
you omitted anything of the sort for fear of giving offence in any 
quarter. But I must tell you that what I have done for the safety of the 
country stands approved in the judgment and testimony of the whole 
world [orbis terrae iudicio ac testimonio comprobari]. When you 
return you will find that I have acted with a measure of policy 
[consilium] and a lack of self-regard [magnitudo animi] which will 
make you well content to have me as your political ally [facile in re 
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publica] and private friend—a not much lesser Laelius to a far greater 
Scipio.”217* 
Is there anything in this passage that we might add to our ‘ideal-type’? I suggest 
that there is, and all of it centres around the virtue of magnitudo animi. The 
first paragraph here I think illustrates a shared belief between (at least) Cicero 
and Pompey that a good statesperson is forgetful of their own advantage and 
mindful only of that of the res publica; peace, of course, being a very important 
one to all concerned. A fragment from Book V of the De Re Publica suggests that 
magnitudo animi was discussed in relation to the rector: “This virtue is called 
courage [fortitudo], and it includes greatness of spirit [magnitudo animi] and 
great scorn for death and pain.”218 As Arendt also recognised, it is a virtue 
necessary in the statesperson, even as it is a risky one disconnected from other 
virtues. And we have already seen Cicero very concerned to connect it to them 
in the previous chapter. When it is joined with ‘great intellectual talent’ (ingenii 
magni) in a person, it relies on prudentia and consilium in holding fast to what is 
honestum. In that eloquent passage from the De Officiis, Cicero moves smoothly 
from speaking of one’s own prudentia and consilium acting as limits on one’s 
own magnitudo animi to speaking of the prudentia and consilium of others as 
doing the same (and he can move to speaking of others here because it is in res 
publica; it is fides which ensures that one can trust another’s counsel).219 As 
Kelsay pointed out in the first chapter through Aquinas, taking counsel from 
others is a key aspect of being a good statesperson, and here we see Cicero 
offering his services (ingenii magni) to Pompey, much like Laelius had done with 
Scipio; he seeks to ‘go with’ (comites) him, and go well, for the sake of res 
publica. 
Sixteen years later, however, Pompey was dead, and Caesar was dictator. On 
some accounts, Caesar had emerged victorious in the civil war because of the 
hubris of the much larger Pompeian side, but whatever the case, as one would 
expect, the war itself had wrought devastation.220 “Civil war”, as Steel says, 
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“emerged … as an unexpected and unwelcome prospect, onto a stage occupied 
by men busy pursuing their own interests” before they stopped their pursuit and 
started slaughtering one another.221 Cicero had eventually chosen the Pompeian 
side, without enthusiasm, and after the battle at Pharsalus in 48 (shortly after 
which Pompey had died in Egypt), refused (as the senior imperium-holder) to 
assume command of the Pompeian side of the war and returned to Rome with 
Caesar’s pardon in 47. While the Pompeian side began regrouping on the 
southern coast of the Mediterranean, Caesar himself returned to Rome in the 
summer of 46 for a few months, and to the great surprise of many, pardoned 
Marcus Marcellus (consul in 51), a Pompeian and one of his longstanding and 
outspoken enemies (and an ally of Cicero’s). Choosing the moment of Marcellus’s 
pardon to break his six-year silence in public affairs, Cicero, in the Pro Marcello, 
spoke in praise of Caesar as a statesperson: 
“…such exceptional kindness [mansuetudo], such unprecedented and 
unheard of clemency [clementia], such extraordinary moderation 
[modum] in someone who has attained absolute power over 
everything, and such astonishing and, one might almost say, 
superhuman sapientia—these are things I cannot possibly pass over in 
silence … Fortune does not offer herself as your partner in this glory … 
For accident is never an element in sapientia, nor is chance a 
component of consilium …”222 
Although as Berry says, it is exceptionally difficult to interpret any speech (or 
poem) given under autocratic conditions, we can be reasonably sure of Cicero’s 
sincerity at this point; he wrote in a letter to one of his friends that Marcellus’s 
pardon—which he says in the letter also showed Caesar’s magnitudo animi—
“seemed to me a beautiful day’s work; I thought I saw some appearance of a 
reviving res publica”.223 Although I find no support in the De Re Publica for 
adding mansuetudo to the qualities of the rector, and although we can note that 
Scipio says in Book II that Numa Pompilius had “restored two things that are 
most important to the long life of a res publica, religion [religio] and mildness of 
character [clementia]”, our concern here with the Pro Marcello is with what 
Cicero says about the virtue of sapientia.224 He associates it with Caesar’s pardon 
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of Marcellus no less than nine times in this speech, and from the above passage, 
we can see that one of its features—unlike in so many of Caesar’s other great 
achievements—is that it is absolutely free of fortune; it comes only from he 
himself, as homo sapiens. It seems to me Cicero is saying here that, after 
exercising his judgment as a fully autonomous moral agent (in a non-Kantian 
sense), Caesar employed it in the world (p.297); it could only have been the 
virtue of sapientia through his actions, and thus through his consilium. As Cicero 
goes on to say: 
“… whenever we hear or read of some act [factum] of clemency, 
kindness, justice, moderation, or sapientia—especially when it is 
performed at a moment of passion, which is the enemy of consilium, 
or in the hour of victory, which is by nature arrogant [insolens] and 
proud [superba]—how we are set ablaze with loving approval 
[diligamus], irrespective of whether the story is fact [gestis] or fiction 
[fictis]…”225 
Such acts are exemplary (and fixed in time through the literary arts), 
strengthening the mores of the res publica and thus the res publica itself. Cicero 
seems to be implying here that, in pardoning Marcellus, Caesar was delivering 
the honestas in the world in very unpropitious circumstances (the height of 
passion and the hour of victory), and in doing so achieving true glory. Excepting 
clemency and kindness (and probably taking Caesar’s courage as needless to 
say), Cicero lists here the cardinal virtues as set out by Plato, but although both 
he and Caesar were well-versed in Greek philosophy, and this fact undoubtedly 
had some influence on the form and content of Cicero’s speech, it seems to me 
that the meaning of sapientia in it, as in the De Re Publica, nevertheless shades 
into that kind which is seen in the actions of ‘men who lead great and powerful 
cities through their consilium and auctoritas’; that sapientia which creates and 
works through laws and institutions as distinguished from words and learning 
(and to repeat: it is not a competition). Caesar’s action was of ratio civilis, as 
befits a statesperson who is sapiens; it was entirely unexpected and not an 
action usually seen under the conditions of civil war in which citizens were living 
and dying. 
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But nor, it seems, was it an ‘action’ of, or usually seen in, a philosopher who is 
sapiens. Philosophers are generally aiming at contemplation of the truth or, in 
some of the Hellenistic schools, ataraxia, ‘peace of mind’, whereas Caesar’s 
pardon was an eminently political action, oriented to human affairs and (through 
the virtue of prudentia) very conscious of consequences in the world, one of 
which of course being that Cicero, a senior statesperson of great reputation, 
broke his long silence in public life, bolstering the res publica. Pro Marcello is a 
somewhat misleading title; it is not a forensic speech (a defence of Marcellus in 
a court of law), but a speech delivered in the senate under autocratic 
conditions. As such, it is unsurprising that it has a strong epideictic element 
(praise of Caesar), and notable that it has a deliberative element (a speech 
seeking to persuade others [who strictly speaking should be their peers] about 
what actions to take for the future). Cicero’s eloquence is on full display in 
injecting sapientia into the latter: 
“…I was disappointed when I heard you make that admirable remark, 
so full of sapientia, ‘I have lived long enough for nature, or for glory’. 
Long enough perhaps for nature, if you like; and, I will add, for glory, 
if that is what you want; but—and this is the crucial point—by no 
means long enough for your country. So please do not show the 
prudentia of philosophers in disdaining death; do not be sapiens at our 
peril! It is always being reported to me that you keep saying, much 
too often, that as far as you are concerned you have lived long 
enough. I do not doubt your sincerity, but I would approve the 
sentiment only if you were living for yourself alone, or had been born 
for yourself alone. But as it is your achievements [gestae] clasp 
[complexae] the safety of all the citizens and the entire res publica—
and you are so far from completing your greatest labours [operum] 
that you have not yet even laid the groundwork [fundamenta] of what 
you are contemplating [cogitas] … this act of the drama remains, this 
is what you must work at—to place the res publica on a sound footing 
[constituas], and, yourself above all others, to reap its benefits in 
peace and tranquillity. Then, and only then, when you have both 
discharged your obligations to your country and satisfied nature 
herself with your full fill of life, say, if you wish, that you have lived 
long enough … you [should] now proceed to extinguish the flames of 
civil war by the rescue of your country, and thereby prove the former 
to have been the result of fate, but the latter the result of 
consilium.”226* 
Although Cicero is relying here upon both his own and Caesar’s understanding of 
philosophical literature (all the schools in one way or another treat of death as 
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little or nothing to worry about), is deftly playing upon philosophical senses of 
sapientia and prudentia, and there seems to be a sub-text presenting a 
challenge to Caesar’s possible Epicurean leanings with an argument about our 
natural sociability, I think it is clear enough from this passage that the kind of 
sapientia towards which Cicero is guiding Caesar is the kind which is oriented 
fully to the res publica and is manifest through consilium; the kind from which 
he is guiding Caesar away is that which philosophers think may be reached 
through cogito ‘turning in on itself’ (pp.262–263). 
As matters turned out, Marcellus’s pardon did not amount to anything; on his 
way back to Rome, he was murdered by one of his friends (who then committed 
suicide), apparently over some financial disagreement.227 Foul play seems to 
have been unlikely, but Caesar’s own actions over the next couple of years did 
become increasingly despotic, resulting in his assassination by a group of 
senators on the Ides of March 44. In the end, he proved himself not a sapiens—as 
Cicero put it in a letter which he wrote to his friend Paetus, “we are slaves to 
him, and he to the times”—but the Pro Marcello itself, I argue, provides us with 
a richer understanding of the sapientia held by the type of person who is rector 
rei publicae.228 
And we might garner a yet richer understanding of this kind of sapientia from 
the De Officiis. Towards the end of Book I, which asks the question ‘what is 
honestum?’, Cicero makes the statement called right by Arendt that human 
beings are naturally sociable, and goes on to say that “every officium whose 
effect lies in preserving the bonding between men and their fellowship 
[coniunctionem hominum et ad societatem] must be preferred to the officium 
that is limited to learning and knowledge [cognitione et scientia]”.229 But then 
he goes on further to say that: 
“It should perhaps be asked whether this sociability, which conforms 
so greatly to nature, should always be given precedence even over 
moderation and modesty [moderatione modestiaque]. I do not think 
so: for some things are so disgraceful, or so outrageous, that a sapiens 
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would not do them even to protect his country. Posidonius has 
collected many such examples, but some are so repellent, so 
disgusting, that it seems dishonourable even to mention them. And so 
a sapiens will not undertake such things for the sake of the res 
publica, and indeed the res publica will not want him to undertake 
them for its sake. But in fact it turns out conveniently that a situation 
could not arise where it would benefit the res publica for such a man 
to perform any such deed.”230 
Exercising, it seems to me, what Arendt called the two highest virtues of the 
statesman, moderation and insight, Cicero here spares us the obscenities which 
Posidonius set out in his own theoretical writings (no longer extant) about ex 
tempore officia; obscenities that doubtless would make one’s blood boil and 
render one speechless, and thereby drastically reduce if not eliminate the 
possibility of calm and considered reflection in most people.231 Although he does 
not (and indeed cannot) tell us what the limit is, Cicero is emphatic in this 
passage that there is a limit to what a sapiens would do for the sake of the res 
publica, and it is placed by the virtues of moderatione modestiaque; there are 
some things which are beyond the pale. 
Not beyond the pale for Cicero, however, and indeed for the Graeco-Roman 
tradition more generally, is tyrannicide. Walzer wisely and rightly said that ‘hard 
cases make bad law’, and tyrannicide, ever a hard case, is one of Cicero’s 
examples of ex tempore officium, and his response will be thought 
unsatisfactory from, say, certain Christian or Kantian perspectives.232 Considering 
 
230 Off. 1.159. 
231 Cf. RJ. p.23 (emphasis added): “For my generation and people of my origin, the lesson began in 
1933 and it ended not when just German Jews but the whole world had been given notice of 
monstrosities no one believed possible at the beginning … At the time the horror itself, in its 
naked monstrosity, seemed not only to me but to many others to transcend all moral categories 
and to explode all standards of jurisdiction; it was something men could neither punish nor 
forgive. And in this speechless horror, I fear, we all tended to forget the strictly moral and 
manageable lessons we had been taught before, and would be taught again, in innumerable 
discussions, both inside and outside the courtroom.” Relatedly, at the same conference cited on 
p.99n176, Walzer responds to Yitzhak Benbaji’s paper on supreme emergency by commending 
Benbaji’s account of evil to the audience’s attention (once it becomes available to them) and 
saying that “I thought it was enough just to point to the experience of Nazism, but he actually 
tries to explain why this experience gives us a very acute insight into the justification for what 
Winston Churchill called supreme emergency (the term is [Churchill’s] and it was first used in 
response to the Nazi threat)” (emphasis added). Cicero’s statement at the end of this passage 
that, conveniently, the res publica would never ask us to commit such obscenities as he had 
read about in Posidonius’s work, is far from complacent. Just as Arendt called Germany under 
Hitler a “criminal regime”, so Cicero would have called it “no res publica at all”. 
232 Cf. Michael Walzer, 2007. ‘Killing Tyrants’. Dissent 54(2). pp.7–8. 
384 
the egregious case of Phalaris (tyrant of Akragas, Sicily, c.570–554 BCE), Cicero 
advises his son that: 
“…it is very easy to make a judgment in the case of Phalaris. For there 
can be no societas between us and tyrants—on the contrary there is 
complete estrangement [distractio]—and it is not contrary to nature 
to rob a man, if you are able, to whom it is honestum to slay. Indeed, 
the whole destructive and wicked type ought to be expelled from the 
community of mankind [hominum communitate]. For just as some 
limbs are amputated, if they begin to lose their blood and their life, 
as it were, and are harming the other parts of the body, similarly if 
the wildness and monstrousness of a beast [feritas et immanitas 
beluae] appears in human form, it must be removed from the common 
humanity [communi humanitatis], so to speak, of the body. Of this 
sort are all those questions in which the issue is appropriate action in 
particular circumstances [ex tempore officium].”*233 
The case of Phalaris shows, it seems to me, what Walzer calls ‘the utilitarianism 
of extremity’; a terrible case where a terrible decision must be made, where 
what he calls ‘rights normality’ (or in the context of the conduct of persons, 
Cicero’s formula [pp.264–265]), as well as communal utility, themselves need 
protected against somebody whose dispositions and/or deeds have placed them 
outside the societas generis humani.234 Cicero is well aware of the danger 
involved in such actions—the killer of a tyrant “must … do this in such a way that 
he does not, out of self-esteem or self-love, find a pretext for injustice”—and 
hence his ‘realism’, his recognition that ‘riskier, double-edged remedies’ may in 
certain rare and desperate situations be necessary for the sake of res publica, is 
embedded in a framework of virtue (and these should be rare situations because 
virtues are transmitted in instituta) that seeks to limit as far as possible, in the 
name of justice, such cases from even arising in the first place. Although the De 
Officiis is written as advice upon middle officia, i.e., it has ‘in view instruction 
for a life that is shared’ (p.221) and concerns the conduct of non-sages like you 
and me, it seems to me that Dyck is right when he says about the cases which 
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test the limits of Cicero’s formula at Off. 3.29–32 that “such a discrimination 
can surely be safely entrusted only to a sapiens”, to a rector rei publicae.235 
4.4.3 Approaching the Ideal? 
In her investigation into trans-political things, Arendt quotes several times a line 
of the elder Cato’s as it is articulated in Book I of the De Re Publica.236 As 
reported by Scipio, Cato had said to him that Scipio’s grandfather, Scipio 
Africanus (hereinafter Africanus, and who died when Scipio was two years old), 
used to say that “he never did more than when he did nothing, that he was 
never less alone than when he was alone.”237 Arendt used these words as a 
springboard for her investigation into thinking (“What are we ‘doing’ when we 
do nothing but think?”), and Cicero himself uses them again (slightly modified) in 
the De Officiis: 
“Africanus was accustomed to say that he was never less at leisure 
than when he was at leisure, nor less alone than when he was alone 
[numquam se minus otiosum esse, quam cum otiosus, nec minus 
solum, quam cum solum esset] … The words are magnificent, and 
worthy of a great and wise man [magno vira ac sapiente]; they testify 
that even in his leisure hours he reflected upon negotium, and that 
when he was by himself he used to talk with himself, so that he was 
never unoccupied, and sometimes did not even need another’s 
conversation. Thus the two things that induce indolence [languor] in 
others used to sharpen him [acuebant], that is to say otium and 
solitudo … there exist, entrusted to writing by him, no memorials of 
his ingenium, no achievement of his otium, no product of his solitudo. 
Consequently, we should understand that it was because his mind 
[mens] was active in investigating the objects of his reflection that he 
was never either at otium or alone.”238* 
Less important here for our purposes than what Africanus historically ‘did’ in his 
otium is what Cicero says he ‘did’; his thoughts, far from turning in on 
themselves or inducing languor as they do in others, honed him. In his otium, 
reflecting upon negotium, he was “eager … to learn, considering that the 
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discovery of obscure or wonderful things is necessary for a happy life [beate 
vivendum]”.239 Africanus in his otium talks with and by himself (to the extent 
that he only sometimes does not even need another’s conversation)—Arendt’s 
‘two-in-one’—when he is not occupied with the business of res publica, yet 
remaining occupied with matters of relevance.240 
We do not know what matters of relevance Africanus pondered in his otium, but 
in returning to Scipio’s use of Cato’s aphorism in Book I of the De Re Publica, it 
seems that at least some of the matters of relevance Scipio himself ponders are 
trans-political.241 We saw in the first section (p.307) that both Tubero and Philus 
at this point in the text argue the case for cosmology’s relevance to politics and 
Scipio rows back somewhat from his initial scepticism about this. In doing so, he 
recalls how Pericles had taught citizens not to fear “a sudden darkness” when 
“the sun disappeared” by drawing upon the achievements of sapientes such as 
Anaxagoras and Thales who had studied the heavens and demonstrated that 
eclipses necessarily must happen at specific times; there was nothing for citizens 
to be superstitiously fearful about.242 But after a gap in the text, Scipio appears 
to have moved on from such limited ways in which cosmology has relevance for 
politics by extolling how such loftier perspectives as taken by the likes of 
Anaxagoras and Thales can provide persons, including statespersons, with a more 
sobering view of ‘our empirical messiness’. For his part, Laelius seems to lose 
patience with all the Physics talk and reminds the interlocutors in their otium of 
the troubling times: 
“Why, I ask you, is [Tubero] … asking how two suns could have been 
seen and not asking why in one res publica there are two senates and 
almost two peoples? … [E]ven if we knew all about [such things as two 
suns appearing in the sky] such knowledge would make us neither 
better [meliores] nor happier [beatiores]. But it is possible for us to 
have one senate and one people, and if we don’t we are in very deep 
trouble; we know that things are not that way now, and we see that if 
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it can be brought about, then we will live both better and happier 
lives.”243 
It seems to me that the interlocutors (or at least some of them) see and 
understand Laelius’s Ethical argument; they are ‘men leading a city by their 
consilium and auctoritas’, albeit currently at leisure. Although Cicero in the 
Preface to Books III and IV praises Scipio, Laelius and Philus as statespersons who 
cultivated the principles of nature through two different kinds of sapientia, it is 
Scipio here in Book I who emerges from the conversation as the statesperson 
who has not ‘took a side’ between Physics and Ethics, and as Atkins says, this is 
appropriate, because it is Scipio who goes on to set out (almost) a political 
science in the rest of the Book, using some of the astronomical language Philus 
had used in explaining the appearance of two suns in the sky.244  
We saw in the previous section that Physics also makes an appearance in Book 
III, with Philus playing devil’s advocate in providing a ‘conventionalist’ account 
of law, and Laelius providing the Stoics’ natural law argument. As far as we can 
tell, Scipio was not part of this debate, but he seemed ‘positively ecstatic’ once 
it had been demonstrated that a res publica could not possibly function without 
justice. This dual commitment of Scipio’s to both Physics and Ethics (and indeed 
Philus’s and Laelius’s as well), and to the two different kinds of sapientia 
discussed by Cicero in the Preface to Books III and IV, I think is very intriguing. 
There is another fragment of this Preface, in which Cicero is discussing “the 
origins of human societies and the relationship between theoretical and 
practical knowledge in the creation and maintenance of those societies”.245 As 
ever, Zetzel provides us with excellent commentary: 
“Cicero … has a particular narrative [in this fragment]: the discovery 
of technology [e.g., the wheel] is followed by the discovery of speech, 
which brings people together into communities … the discovery of 
speech leads to the invention of writing, which gives the possibility of 
communication with people far away, expression of one’s wishes and 
memories of the past. And finally, the invention of number is not only 
important for daily life, it encourages people to look up to the sky and 
invent the reckoning of time … humans, through the divine gift of 
ingenium and mens, raised themselves from nature and used nature as 
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the basis on which to make something out of the wretched things that 
are humans … [I]t is language that creates human society … while 
mathematics, in addition to its utility in everyday life (for calendars 
and accounting), has the important effect of making us look up to the 
heavens. Language is of this world; mathematics leads out of it. And 
the contrast that develops [in two other fragments of the Preface, 
quoted on pp.295–297 above] is one that grows out of that, between 
the practical and the abstract, between the social and the 
philosophical. Both are varieties of wisdom, but they work in different 
ways.”246 
Although both Physics and Ethics, two parts of philosophy, would come under 
that kind of sapientia that Cicero says is cultivated through words and learning, 
there seems to me to be a certain similarity here between what Zetzel says 
about the two kinds of sapientia and what Schofield says about the Ethical and 
Physical approaches to justice in Stoic philosophy (pp.333–334): we learn 
different, and in different ways indispensable, things from both the Ethical and 
Physical approaches to justice in the Stoic system, much as we do so by 
cultivating the principles of nature through words and learning on the one hand 
and cultivating the principles of nature through laws and institutions on the 
other.247 And again, for Cicero, it is those persons excelling in both who are 
deserving of the greatest praise.  
Physics makes a significant return in Book VI of the De Re Publica. Scipio reports 
to his interlocutors a dream he had had twenty years earlier in 149 (a 
physiological occurrence), during the first year of the Third Punic War, in which 
Africanus appeared and foretold Scipio the events of his career up to the 
troubles Rome was facing at that point in 129, when “the whole civitas will turn 
to you alone and to your name … you will have to place the res publica on a 
sound footing as dictator—if you escape the undutiful hands of those close to 
you”.248* After his close friend Laelius shouted out at this point, and the rest let 
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out a large groan, Scipio, smiling gently and hushing them all, and bidding them 
to listen to the rest of the story, conveyed Africanus’s next words: 
“But so that you may be all the more eager, [Scipio], to protect the 
res publica, know this for certain [sic habeto]: for all those who have 
saved, helped, or augmented the country there is a specific place set 
aside in the sky where they may enjoy eternity in happiness [beati 
aevo sempiterno]. There is nothing that can happen on earth that is 
more pleasing to the leading god [princeps deus] who rules the whole 
world than those councils and assemblages of men associated through 
law [concilia coetusque hominum iure sociati] which are called 
civitates; the guides [rectores] and preservers [conservatores] of 
these have set out from here, and here they return.”249* 
At this point, Scipio’s father Paullus appears to him as well, and after their 
embrace, he tells Scipio that their time for being together is not yet; his only 
way of returning to the place in which he finds himself is to fulfil his worldly 
officia, suggesting a connection between protection of the earth and 
contemplation of the heavens which Scipio had already implicitly made in Book 
I.250 It seems to me that there is a significant connection here between what 
Paullus is saying to Scipio and what Cicero says in the fragments of the Preface 
to Books III and IV about the origins of civilisation and the two kinds of sapientia, 
but to return to Scipio’s dream, Paullus tells him that: 
“… you should be like your grandfather here and like me your father in 
cultivating justice and a sense of duty [iustitiam cole et pietatem]; it 
is important in relation to your parents and family, but most 
important in relation to your country.”251* 
This passage underscores much of what I have set out in this chapter as well as 
in the previous chapter, although the setting here is cosmic; Scipio finds himself 
in the starry heavens speaking to his father and grandfather. And in this cosmic 
setting, he is conversing with previous generations who had cultivated the 
principles of nature—whether through “ancestral traditions”, “scholarly 
learning”, or both (p.300)—and who are advising him to do the same. Paullus 
tells him that it is such a way of life, fulfilling one’s officia, which will lead him 
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back to where they are at this point. Scipio looks about him in the cosmos and 
everything seems to him “brilliant [praeclara] and marvellous [mirabilia]”; 
hitherto unseen stars easily surpassing the size of the earth, to which his eyes 
presently turn, and to Rome’s empire upon it, of which he now feels ashamed 
since it touches only a little speck on a planet which is itself only a little speck 
in the cosmos. 
For our purposes, we can pass over the cosmologies of Plato and the Stoics, of 
the poetic cosmographies of Alexander of Ephesus and Eratosthenes, and of the 
astronomies of figures such as Eudoxus and Archimedes, all of which and more 
influenced Cicero’s ‘old-and-new’ account of the cosmos in Scipio’s dream, and 
instead focus upon its Ethical lesson.252 As Scipio is gazing down ashamedly on 
the speck that is the Roman empire, Africanus bids him to soak in the pure 
rationality of the cosmos around him instead, in which everything is related and 
governed by the princeps deus. As Scipio looked up and was “staring 
dumbfounded” at it all, he heard the music of the spheres, the perfect harmony 
achieved in the cosmos which “corresponds to, and inspires, both literal and 
metaphorical harmony on earth”, to which his eyes are drawn back again.253 
Africanus notices, and speaks to him about the ephemeral things that happen 
under the Moon: 
“… even if you lose hope of returning to this place, where all things 
exist for great and outstanding men [magnis et praestantibus viri], 
still—what is that human glory [hominum gloria] really worth which 
can last scarcely a fraction of [nearly thirteen millennia]? Accordingly, 
look on high if you are minded [si voles]; behold this dwelling and 
eternal home; and do not abandon yourself to the discourse of the 
rabble, and do not place your hopes in human rewards: virtue itself by 
its own allurements should draw you towards true glory [verum 
decus].”254* 
Although what in remains of the text we find the virtue mentioned only twice, 
Sean McConnell it seems to me is right in identifying significant resonances of 
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magnitudo animi in the De Re Publica, and I think we can see it in this passage 
especially.255 We saw in the previous chapter that part of magnitudo animi 
involves a disdain for earthly things, a conviction that one should pursue only 
what is honestum, and that that pursuit is produced by strength of spirit (animi 
efficitur), and in this passage from Scipio’s dream it seems to me that amongst 
other things it is a strengthening of Scipio’s spirit which Africanus is providing.256 
McConnell argues that: 
“…the Dream’s grand cosmic imagery and the belittling of the 
ordinary are … attempts to expand our souls, or rather, to test the 
magnitudo animi that we might already possess: are we exalted or 
unmoved by such visions, are we gripped or dismissive?”257  
Africanus begins in the above passage by inviting even those who have lost hope 
to consider the fleeting nature of earthly rewards and the fact that, sooner or 
later, all is covered in oblivion, and in doing so, to look on high if they are so 
minded and to what he is saying. For his part, Scipio replies that, even if in 
following both his father’s and grandfather’s footsteps so far, he has not fallen 
short of their glory (decus), still with the prize he sees set before him he is going 
to strive even more energetically in guiding and protecting the res publica. This 
is strikingly different to the philosopher’s retreat from and return to the cave in 
Plato’s Republic; far from having no desire to engage in public life after ‘seeing 
the light’, Scipio’s trip to the stars has instilled in him a resolve all the stronger 
to fulfil his officia on earth.258 Africanus excites him once more to the task: 
“Keep at it [tu vero enitere]; and know this for certain [sic habeto]: it 
is not you that is mortal but your body. You are not what your physical 
shape reveals, but each person is his mind [mens], not the body that a 
finger can point at. Know then that you are a god [Deum te igitur 
scito esse], as surely as a god is someone who is alert [viget], who 
feels [sentit], who remembers [meminit], who looks ahead [providet], 
who controls and guides and moves the body of which he is in 
command just as that princeps deus does for the universe. And just as 
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the eternal god moves the universe, which is partly mortal, so too 
does the eternal soul move the fragile body.”259* 
He goes on to provide what is a close translation of Plato’s argument from the 
Phaedrus that the mens is immortal (as Zetzel points out, “this shows that the 
dream is a product more of reason than of revelation”), and his calling each 
person’s mens a god rather than divine recalls a line from Plato’s Laws, but what 
I wish to emphasise from this passage are not its Physical aspects, but its Ethical 
ones, specifically the qualities which Africanus lists.260 Rectores of res publicae 
are alert; they discern by sense; they remember the past; and they look to the 
future.261 In other words, they are not only sapientes, but also prudentes: those 
who comprehend a correct picture of the world which allows them to make the 
right choices; those able successfully to promote the citizens’ shared association 
in a happy and honestum way of life; and those who establish and work through 
laws and institutions for the well-being of cives, the safety of civitates, and the 
calm and happy life of humans.  
What are we to make of Scipio’s dream? Atkins argues that “it enables Cicero to 
introduce the divine, rational and eternal—in short the ideal—into a world that 
must otherwise yield before the forces of flux and degeneration”.262 Scipio learns 
in his dream that not everything under the Moon is ephemeral; the ingenium and 
mens of human beings are divine sparks which allow us to raise ourselves from 
nature and, on the basis of nature, institute civilisation in its broadest sense 
through both words and learning on the one hand and through laws and 
institutions on the other. But Atkins also says that “The Dream provides the 
vision of the good to which the wise statesman must look, even if he knows it 
will never be realised” on earth as perfectly as it is realised in the cosmos by the 
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princeps deus. Scipio’s ‘vision of the good’ is certainly not the kind that results 
in those ‘tyrannies of truth’ of liberal nightmares: 
“… ideals in Cicero’s dialogues aid the enquirer into politics much like 
mountaintops help hikers. The ability of a hiker occasionally to catch 
sight of a majestic but unclimbable peak in the distance reminds him 
of why he has decided to hike to a lower, more accessible destination, 
serves as a point of reference as he makes his way through the 
surrounding forest, and provides inspiration for the journey.”263 
 Although it is modelled in certain respects on many of Plato’s writings 
(especially the Myth of Er), as McConnell says, “the Dream itself is not presented 
as having any sort of divine providence nor any guarantee of its truth … [and] 
there is no real philosophical argument from first principles”.264 Scipio has a 
dream that is food for thought; it nourishes the life of the mind. There is a 
fragment preserved of the conversation that took place between the 
interlocutors before Scipio reported his dream, and although we do not know 
who spoke the words, it is perhaps worth quoting here: 
“…the things which are reported about the immortality of the soul and 
about heaven are neither the fictions of dreaming philosophers nor 
the incredible tales that the Epicureans laugh at, but are the 
reasonable inferences of men of judgment [prudentium 
coniecturas].”265* 
Thinking with and by themselves about “obscure or wonderful things” is not an 
activity restricted to philosophers; it is in rerum natura, including in 
statespersons. We all have “the other fellow” with whom we converse in our 
otium, with and by ourselves.266 Zetzel argues that “we are left knowing that the 
dream incorporates a great statesman’s deepest beliefs; whether its source was 
the princeps deus or his own mind makes little difference”; what matters, as 
Scipio had said in Book II, is that rectores look after the res publica, keep 
learning and keep observing themselves—looking to the past, present and future, 
all around them on the earth and occasionally, in their otium, on high—and in 
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doing so, offer themselves as a mirror to their fellow-citizens.267 Arendt viewed 
Scipio’s dream as “an example (and an eminent one, perhaps the first recorded 
in intellectual history) of how certain trains of thought actually aim at thinking 
oneself out of the world”.268 There is certainly much mathematics and 
abstraction involved in the account of the cosmos provided by Africanus which 
aims out of the world, and while Arendt may well be right that, on Cicero’s part, 
Scipio’s vision of a hereafter is not an article of faith but a moral hypothesis, she 
does not mention what I think might well be the most essential lesson of all in 
Book VI, an Ethical one, which Cicero conveys to his readers: Scipio wakes up. 
4.5 Conclusions 
4.5.1 Res Publica 
In the first sub-section of this chapter, we considered some of Cicero’s 
arguments in favour of the practical life of the citizen and were immediately 
presented with a conception of that life which comprehended not only rights but 
also officia, duties, as well as the kinds of actions carried out by ‘the best 
citizen’, the optimis civis, which he held in a higher regard than those of 
philosophers with no experience in public life. Cicero challenges the arguments 
of philosophers who ‘devalue civic responsibility’, arguing for the moral and 
practical necessity of engaging in public life to prevent subjection by wicked 
persons. But we also saw in this sub-section, as we saw in the previous two 
chapters, that Cicero is extremely far indeed from holding philosophy itself in 
contempt. He recognises the sapientia in those who have cultivated the 
principles of nature through words and learning just as he recognises it in those 
who have done so through laws and institutions, even as he reserves his highest 
praise for those accomplished in both approaches. Yet as one might expect, it is 
always sapientia as finds factum in the world upon which his focus is fixed, 
whether in the teachings of philosophers or through the consilium and auctoritas 
of statespersons.269 As already highlighted in the previous chapter, what is of 
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fundamental importance to Cicero in all of this is education— whether in 
statespersons, philosophers, or private citizens. 
The second sub-section provided in (very) broad outline how history and 
philosophy appear in the De Re Publica. I set out for the reader at this point the 
ancient tripartition of philosophy into Ethics, Physics and Logic, believing with 
Ierodiakonou that, even as the three parts do not exactly correspond to the 
different branches of modern philosophy and science, we may still have much to 
learn, many deep insights to gain, from it.270 In any event, it helped 
contextualise philosophy in the De Re Publica, which is an Ethical text, in the 
form of a dialogue (Logic), with some Physical arguments (at times) appearing, 
either as metaphysical or cosmological arguments, or metaphorically.271 The 
cosmological discussion of Book I provided a language employed by Scipio later 
in the text to describe the paths and turns that res publicae take, as well as a 
prefiguring of the grand cosmic account of Scipio’s dream in Book VI, but as 
suggested by Cicero’s Ethical orientation in his works more generally, these 
discussions were all geared, in this Ethical text, towards the res publica. We also 
saw in this sub-section that Cicero in the De Re Publica inter-weaves a historical 
account of Rome into its philosophical arguments, and/or vice versa, and I 
provided at this point one of the Elder Cato’s bon mots which I think is 
important enough to repeat: 
“… there never was a genius so great that he could miss nothing, nor 
could all the geniuses in the world brought together in one place at 
one time foresee all contingencies without the practical experience 
afforded by the passage of time.”272 
Contrary to the arguments between some disciplinarians, it seems to me that 
Cicero sees no competition between philosophy and history, recognising and 
appreciating the indispensability of both in human affairs. What philosophy 
provides us with is (amongst other things) a healing of the animus, and what 
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history provides us with is a fount of practical wisdom that no amount of 
philosophy could ever replace. As he articulated it in the Pro Archia, “All 
literature [libri], all spoken wisdom [sapientum voces], all history [exemplorum 
vetustas], abounds with incentives to noble action, incentives which would be 
buried in sheer darkness were the light of the written word [litterarum lumen] 
not beamed upon them”; philosophy and history are both parts of the humanities 
that we need, for the world’s sake.  
The third sub-section considered Scipio’s definition of res publica at Rep. 1.39. 
Heinz’s transliteration of the term, ‘including all interests of the community of 
the people’, gives an excellent account of its meaning, but there are several 
different parts of the definition, and it seems to me that IPT would benefit a 
great deal from closely considering them. A res publica is neither a city (urbs), a 
people (populus), nor even the organisation of a people (civitas, or constitutio 
populi), but the concern of a people (res populi), and a people is an assemblage 
of individuals associated (sociatus) with one another through agreement on ius 
(iuris consensus) and community of interest (utilitatis communio). I sought to 
show in this sub-section that built right into Scipio’s definition is the fact that a 
res publica is ongoing, it exists in time, it takes up (at least some of) the 
people’s time, and that it is plural by definition; it is a political society, a 
partnership in power which is held together not only by laws and institutions but 
also by the civic virtues of citizens. 
This section of the chapter concluded with a consideration of what Scipio says 
about the different kinds of organisation a populus might take to maintain res 
publica. We saw that each of the three basic kinds, monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy, is perfectly capable of maintaining res publica; what matters, 
according to Scipio, is that the directing consilium, whether it is from one 
person, a few persons, or many persons, is connected to the original and 
particular cause which first bound all of those persons together in the societas of 
res publica. But Scipio saw certain qualities and certain deficiencies in each of 
the three basic kinds; each too easily degenerates into its vicious counterpart, 
the king turning into a tyrant, the aristocrats into oligarchs, and the people into 
a mob. What may halt the uncertain (and unfixed) cycle of sempiternal change is 
a non-basic kind of organisation, a judicious mixing or blending of the qualities 
of each of the three basic kinds: potestas (monarchy), auctoritas (aristocracy), 
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and libertas (democracy). What is required here, Scipio argues, is an equitable 
balance of rights, duties, and responsibilities, so that there is enough of each of 
these three qualities in the constitution, fitting to the specific circumstances of 
the people.   
4.5.2 Laws and Institutions 
We began the second section of this chapter with a consideration of the debate 
between Philus and Laelius in Book III of the De Re Publica regarding justice, 
with Philus playing devil’s advocate arguing that the res publica cannot function 
without injustice, and Laelius arguing from the Stoic’s account of natural law 
“the profound truth of the idea that res publica cannot possibly function without 
justice”. Philus put forward the case that laws exist only by convention and that 
justice does not exist, or if it does, it is extremely stupid and self-harming, and 
that all the res publicae mentioned by Scipio earlier in their conversation are 
always vicious, comprising tyrants, factions, and/or licentious mobs, until 
through mutual fear and weakness the mixed form of organisation Scipio spoke 
of comes about as a kind of bargain. It is highly regrettable that most of 
Laelius’s argument has not come down to us, but we do have his account of 
natural law which puts forward the case that justice exists by nature and that in 
the future this law will be universally recognised on earth. After account has 
been given by Laelius that res publica cannot exist without justice, the previous 
day’s discussion is corrected, so that what Scipio had called flawed res publicae 
are understood to be no res publicae at all, since there is in none of them res 
populi. 
We moved away from the De Re Publica in the second sub-section to consider 
Cicero’s handling of the term ius gentium. I sought to show the reader here, 
through Nettleship’s study, that it developed as a popular and a legal, rather 
than a philosophical, phrase, that no essential change to its meaning was made 
by Cicero, and that certain points of agreement and points of difference can be 
identified between it and the Stoic’s account of natural law. Ius gentium refers 
to actual human conduct, observed everywhere on the planet by different 
peoples as right, whereas natural law is an ideal law, replete with metaphysical 
nuts and bolts, which may or may not pick out actual human conduct in the 
world but is in any case to be wished for. Cicero in the Partitiones Oratoriae 
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does in a sense bring the two strands of law close to each other when he says 
that it is prescribed by (unwritten) ius naturale such that (quodam modo) ‘our’ 
(written) laws and (unwritten) customs—the latter of which I take to include the 
ius gentium, the customs of history or mos maiorum—are preserved, indicating 
yet another inter-weaving of (Stoic) philosophy and history. I sought to articulate 
this within the Stoics’ framework by saying that these customs which have 
developed among different nations or peoples are based ultimately on right 
reason, with each nation’s or people’s internal development of this reason giving 
rise to virtue in their actions towards one another, whether in peacetime 
(commercial transactions) or wartime, but I also sought to show that the ius 
gentium itself is not dependent on the Stoic framework, since it is what natural 
reason has established in nature, across centuries, before and after the Stoics. 
In the third sub-section, we considered some of Marcus’s arguments about 
natural law and his law-code for Rome as both are set out in the De Legibus. In 
Book I, Marcus frames his account of lex Ethically, and Ethics in turn is framed 
by a Stoicising account of lex, the lex naturae. Through this account, he 
provides an argument that all human beings share in reason, and so in right 
reason, and so in lex and ius, even as our reason “differs in the particulars of 
knowledge [and is] the same in the capacity to learn”; no person of any nation 
or people cannot attain to virtue with the aid of a guide. I sought to show in this 
section that laws for Cicero guide us towards virtue, that laws in turn are the 
result of sapientes, those delivering honestas in the world in their actions, and 
that Marcus’s law-code, in Asmis’s words, “shares in the guiding power of 
natural law”, prescribing middle officia, even as Marcus expected, drawing on 
the sapientia of his forebears as well as that of the philosophers, that what he 
had codified would have permanent validity for Roman citizens. 
The fourth sub-section considered Cicero’s writings on instituta, on customary 
standards of social behaviour. Instituta differ from laws in always having a 
fundamentally customary aspect (even as custom is often a source of law), 
things which have been firmly established across generations and carry 
significant normative weight, whether written down or not; they often take the 
form of ‘unwritten rules.’ Regrettably, Book IV of the De Re Publica is very 
fragmentary, but we can see that the instituta discussed by Scipio and company 
included education, the regulation of adult male behaviour (especially of the 
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senatorial order), the theatre, and the office of the censor, all matters which 
directly bear upon the practices of human beings, practices which in turn affect 
the ongoingness of the res publica. Regulation of the senatorial order at Rome is 
an important institution because it is precisely those in charge who have the 
responsibilities for maintaining and developing the instituta and mores of the 
civitas, and I sought to show in this sub-section some of the difficulties, the 
paradoxical nature of these responsibilities, given that libertas itself is 
institutionalised. Innovation is frequent in a free society, and so whilst 
preserving the instituta and mores which keep that society free is essential, so is 
the cultivation and renewal of those instituta and mores to ensure that society 
keeps ‘going on’ in the world. But above all, I sought to show in this sub-section 
that it is those institutions which guarantee the possibility of deciding things 
through speech and persuasion rather than force and violence which should 
prevail, and that a key aspect of this involves institutionalising auctoritas and 
consilium which, as in Scipio’s account in the De Re Publica, are always 
connected to the original cause which brought all people together in the societas 
of res publica, and ensure the bonds of mutual trust and accountability are 
maintained in negotiations of power in political society.  
4.5.3 Rector Rei Publicae 
The final section of this chapter considered the ‘ideal’ qualities of the type of 
person who is entrusted by the people to bear and carry through the role of the 
civitas: what Cicero calls the rector rei publicae. In the first sub-section, we 
reviewed his explicit writings on this type of person, seen first of all in the voice 
of the character Antonius in the De Oratore, who was speaking about the sort of 
person who has brought his experience, knowledge, and energy to bear upon the 
guidance of res publica, and who defined this sort of person as one “who 
understands the means by which the well-being of res publica is achieved and 
increased, and can make use of those things”. Antonius also called such a person 
an “author of public policy”, showing that such a person holds and displays both 
auctoritas and consilium. Further qualities were seen in the De Re Publica, 
where Scipio said that this type of person is good (boni), wise (sapiens), and 
experienced about the interests and worth of the civitas, that they can be 
regarded as like a guardian (tutor) and manager (procurator) of the res publica, 
and should be called a guide (rector) and helmsman (gubernator) of the civitas. 
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This type of person is also a prudens, an understanding person able to guide 
citizens collectively through gentle instruction and touch, just like the mahout, 
and whose basic responsibility which encompasses virtually all his or her other 
responsibilities is that they never cease educating and observing themselves, 
offering themselves as a mirror to the citizens. The role of the prudens, as 
Ferrary argues, is to produce from the diversity and plurality of the citizens 
harmony and concord, “the best and tightest bond of safety in a res publica”, 
whilst of course retaining that diversity and plurality, since without it, there can 
be no harmony, only one note. 
We moved on in the second sub-section to consider some of Cicero’s letters and 
speeches, as well as the De Officiis, in which he also sets out some of the 
qualities of a good statesperson, and my aim in this sub-section was twofold: to 
enrich our understanding of the ways in which the rector is sapiens, and to show 
that we may be justified, through these other writings of Cicero’s, in adding 
some more qualities to the rector rei publicae, understood as an ‘ideal-type’. 
Through a consideration of the Pro Lege Manilia, I argued that we might add to 
the rector rei publicae the following qualities: temperance (temperantia), faith 
(fides), inherent talent (ingenium) and general human decency (humanitas). 
Through a consideration of Cicero’s letter to Pompey following conclusion of the 
latter’s command against Mithridates, I argued that magnitudo animi, a lack of 
self-regard, a forgetfulness of one’s own advantage, is also a quality of the 
rector rei publicae, and that connected to this greatness of spirit in the rector is 
not only their own prudentia and consilium, but also the prudentia and 
consilium of others who share the rector’s concern for the res publica. Through 
a consideration of both the Pro Marcello and a couple of passages from the De 
Officiis on appropriate action in particular circumstances (ex tempore officium), 
I sought to enrich our understanding of the sapientia that Scipio says is a key 
quality of the rector. We saw in the Pro Marcello that it is a virtue completely 
free of fortune and residing in a human being, and Cicero spoke of Caesar’s 
sapientia in pardoning Marcellus in terms very reminiscent of the more practical 
sort as he had set out in the Prefaces to the De Re Publica: it is manifest through 
a human being establishing and working through laws and institutions, through 
consilium, not “somewhat truncated and incomplete” (pp.243–244) like the 
sapientia of philosophers in their cogitations or contemplations, and it works at 
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all times towards setting res publica on a sound footing, in full recognition “that 
we are not born for ourselves alone” (pp.232 and 381). In the De Officiis, we 
saw Cicero advising his son that protecting and nurturing this natural sociability, 
whilst of the very greatest importance, is nevertheless limited by moderation 
and modesty; there are some things simply beyond the pale which even a 
sapiens would not do to protect res publica, and indeed the res publica would 
not even ask the sapiens to do them for its sake. Killing tyrants, however, is not 
one of these things. Just like a doctor is occasionally forced to amputate a 
gangrenous limb to save the life of a human being, so the rector as sapiens 
applies riskier, double-edged remedies to save the life of the res publica when it 
is confronted with the dispositions and deeds of a tyrant. Again, the rector is 
always working to put the res publica on a sound footing, even in those rare and 
desperate situations when its survival is threatened. These are situations “from 
which we must seek an escape” back to res publica, to political society, and 
sober, honest recognition both of their reality on those rare occasions when they 
come about, as well as their theoretical possibility, it seems to me, should lead 
not only rectores (after acting appropriately on those occasions), but all of us, 
to ask, “how can our institutions make it less likely that [such moral] conflicts 
will happen to people”?273  
The final sub-section of this chapter considered Scipio’s dream as he relayed it 
in Book VI of the De Re Publica, beginning with a consideration of the Elder 
Cato’s claim that Africanus used to say, ‘he was never less at leisure when he 
was at leisure, nor less alone than when he was alone’. We saw that Cicero took 
this to mean that, in his otium, Africanus’s thoughts were always occupied with 
negotium, with business, with matters of relevance, and we saw that Scipio in 
the De Re Publica took such loftier things in Physics as were investigated by the 
likes of Anaxagoras and Thales to be relevant for statespersons, providing a 
different, non-everyday view on public affairs—and this despite the impatience 
of Gaius Laelius Sapiens with such talk while the res publica was steeped in a 
crisis, there and then. Following a consideration of Zetzel’s commentary on a 
fascinating fragment from the Preface to Books III and IV of the De Re Publica 
 
273 Walzer, Arguing About War. p.48; Martha Nussbaum, 1988. The Fragility of Goodness. 
Interview with Bill Moyers. Available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tWfK1E4L--
c&t=913s Accessed 25th January 2021. 
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regarding the origins of civilisation, we turned to Scipio’s dream, in which 
Africanus foretold him his career, that he would need to become dictator to save 
the res publica in 129 if he could escape the undutiful hands of those close to 
him, showed him the pure rationality of the cosmos, strengthening his spirit for 
the great tasks that lay ahead of him, spoke of the place where they were as 
that to which rectores return after fulfilling their officia on earth, and provided 
a (Platonic) rational demonstration of the immortality of the mind. But quite 
apart from the Physics of Scipio’s dream, I sought to show in this sub-section the 
Ethical lessons it imparted: rectores are both sapientes and prudentes; they are 
alert, discern by sense, remember the past, are of and in the present, and have 
a care for the future; and whilst they make reasonable inferences about the 
obscure and wonderful things produced by academics, they are above all 
concerned with the res publica. 
4.5.4 Concluding Remarks 
What can Cicero’s theoretical writings on res publica contribute to arguments in 
IPT related to exercising judgments in the world? 
As in the previous chapter, I have sought to respond to this question by doing 
two things in the present one: developing some of the arguments made by 
scholars in the first two chapters at the same time as providing an account, 
necessarily incomplete, of Cicero’s understanding of res publica, to show that it 
is of continuing relevance in IPT more broadly. As to the first matter, I argue 
that Cicero’s theoretical writings on res publica contribute good reasons for and 
a deeper understanding of living the practical life of the citizen vis-à-vis the 
theoretical life of the philosopher, which we saw some scholars in the first 
chapter and Arendt in the second approaching and considering—and his account 
here is such that it contains no ‘hierarchical structure’ in terms of careers or 
ways of life and retains a deep appreciation of what philosophers contribute to 
humanity’s endeavours. He also contributes a rich and fascinating account of the 
human condition in his theoretical writings on res publica which inter-weaves 
philosophy and history without collapsing them into each other, lending strong 
support to Devetak’s and Arendt’s historical modes of critique at the same time 
as holding on to philosophy and indeed “bringing [this] subject out from the 
shaded retreats of scholars not only into the sunlight and the dust of the real 
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world but right into the front lines of battle”, something that cannot be done 
well without eloquence, and which in turn requires education in the literary 
arts, the studia humanitatis.274 His constant focus upon ‘particulars’ rather than 
‘universals’ whilst keeping ‘universals’ in mind, his rich account of auctoritas 
and instituta, his writings on both the natural law and ius gentium, and his 
account of the rector rei publicae, all, I argue, provide a necessary and 
important basis upon which not only to understand but also to develop the 
arguments about these same issues made by scholars highlighted in previous 
chapters such as Dallmayr, Walzer, Benhabib, Brown, Devetak and Arendt. 
Arendt provided a necessary ground-clearing function in the second chapter in 
terms of clarifying the meaning of ‘tradition’ and some of the problems with 
‘philosophy of history’. Her account of tradition as such has not been developed 
in chapters three and four because it is something Cicero took to be simply a 
matter of course; the testimonies of the ancestors—and especially the 
testimonies of sapientes of whatever kind—handed down from one generation to 
the next help us in exercising judgments in the world, and moreover, we need 
that help. Her account of philosophy of history has not been developed because 
it is something entirely absent from Cicero’s writings, and I argue that they are 
none the worse for it; his writings pave a way to a conception of politics as 
(partly) personal, without worrying about excavating ‘trends’ or ‘oppositions’ or 
‘ideologies’ which are operating according to Hegelian dialectics behind the 
backs of actual human beings and only accessible to critical philosophers—in this 
I agree wholeheartedly with both Devetak and Arendt. Although my argument 
has been in this project that IP theorists would do well in holding a conception 
of politics which is (partly) personal, I hope to have shown in this chapter that 
politics is not wholly personal and indeed runs into some deep trouble when it is 
taken to be; that IP theorists also do well in considering its institutional aspects, 
and that republican institutions, an outstanding account of which we find in 
Cicero’s theoretical writings on politics, are incredibly important in maintaining 
public freedom, the res publica, in existence, where citizens are exercising 
judgments in the world and retain their own discretion in doing so. But I also 
hope to have shown in this chapter and the previous one that politics is not 
wholly institutional either, it is (partly) personal, and considering both these 
 
274 Leg. 3.14. 
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chapters together, I cannot improve upon what Powell says as regards the rector 




275 Powell, ‘Cicero’s De Re Publica and the Virtues of the Statesman’. Nicgorski (ed.), Cicero’s 
Practical Philosophy. p.39. 
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Conclusions 
Cicero Today: A Consideration through Benjamin Constant’s The Liberty of 
the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns. 
It is customary in our time, when discussing the political thought of any figure 
from antiquity, to meet the challenge to its relevance posed by the oft-
mentioned ‘quarrel’ between ‘the ancients’ and ‘the moderns’ at some point in 
the argument. It seems fitting to meet this challenge by way of concluding the 
project and to do so through a famous paper by a distinguished author, originally 
given as a lecture in 1819 at the Royal Athenaeum of Paris, which contributes 
much towards constructing the quarrel in the minds of many of its readers: 
Benjamin Constant’s The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the 
Moderns.1 ‘The liberty of the ancients’ and ‘the liberty of the moderns’ is of 
course a very simple and striking dichotomy, and as we shall see, there are 
several of such dichotomies in Constant’s paper which it seems he intends to fall 
into place behind it.2 In relation to it, we may begin by noting the opinion of 
A.J. Carlyle in 1903 that Cicero’s work is “the dividing line between the ancient 
Greek political ideas of Plato and Aristotle and modern political thought”, as 
well as Charles H. McIlwain’s in 1932 that “we are plainly in the presence of the 
beginnings of ‘modern’ political thought” in Cicero’s treatises, with the 
influences of Stoic philosophy in them as well as the account of the res publica 
that he provides.3 One way of meeting the challenge, then, could be to argue 
that Cicero’s work is of enduring relevance in IPT simply because he is a 
‘modern’ political thinker (witness the presence he has in the work of so many 
 
1 Due to current restrictions, the two English translations of the paper that I have consulted are 
online: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/constant-the-liberty-of-ancients-compared-with-that-of-
moderns-1819 (translator unknown, hereafter cited as Libertyfund) and 
https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/constant1819.pdf (translator: Jonathan Bennett, 
2017, hereafter cited as Bennett). Accessed 24th June 2021. Differences in translation I regard 
as important enough to bring to the attention of the reader are either included in the main body 
of the text and separated by an oblique or mentioned in the footnotes (all in all, an awkward 
exercise which has stiffened my resolve to have better French). 
2 Wood, Cicero’s Social and Political Thought. p.10. Here I go against the grain of, but still agree 
with, arguments such as Cartledge and Edge’s that “Freedom is fundamentally a concept of 
degree, which is why [dichotomous] approaches such as Benjamin Constant’s should be 
avoided.” Paul Cartledge and Matt Edge, 2009. ‘‘Rights’, Individuals, and Communities in 
Ancient Greece’. Ryan K. Balot (ed.), 2009. A Companion to Greek and Roman Political 
Thought. Wiley-Blackwell. p.158. 
3 Wood, Cicero’s Social and Political Thought. p.10. 
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political and legal thinkers in modernity, such as Grotius, Locke, Hume, Kant, 
and Vattel). But Neal Wood might be closer to the mark than Carlyle or McIlwain 
in arguing that Cicero’s work “represents a new direction for social and political 
thought” when compared with that of his Greek predecessors, though it is 
perhaps better described as a “transition to” rather than ‘the beginnings of’ 
modern political thought as he is very much “ancient in values and viewpoint”.4 
If so, then we may still stand to benefit from considering how Cicero’s treatises 
on politics hold up against Constant’s arguments in The Liberty of the Ancients 
Compared with That of the Moderns. 
As is widely known, distance between ‘the ancients’ and ‘the moderns’ 
increased in the seventeenth century in the works of figures such as Bacon, 
Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke. Ryan K. Balot argues that such thinkers: 
“…aspired to create an utterly new, even utopian, vision of political 
order and human freedom. Their sanguine attitudes toward modern 
progress were based as much on faith in scientific and technological 
advancement as on the creation of new and supposedly more realistic 
political ideals. As noble as their ambitions may have been, however, 
the goal of ‘routing the ancients’, of eliminating classical political 
thought from the theoretical roadmap of modernity, is not a wise 
option. Whatever their shortcomings or mistakes, the ancient thinkers 
captured central truths about political psychology and about the 
social character of human beings.”5 
In this project, I have sought to show the reader the continuing relevance of 
Cicero’s treatises on politics to International Political theorists holding a concern 
with real-world politics in late modernity, and that especially relevant in this 
regard is his use of the term societas. I have also sought to place a question 
mark in the reader’s mind beside such notions as ‘utter newness’. But whatever 
the aspirations, goals, and ambitions of early modern thinkers may have been, it 
seems to me that the question of whether Constant himself sought to ‘rout the 
ancients’ is an open one, and this is something I seek to show here in the 
conclusion to my project as I engage with the arguments in his paper as they 
relate to Cicero’s treatises on politics. 
 
4 Wood, Cicero’s Social and Political Thought. p.10. 
5 Ryan K. Balot (ed.), 2009. A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought. Wiley-Blackwell. 
p.5. 
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Constant gets to ‘the liberty of the ancients’ by first giving account of how 
moderns such as the English, French and Americans understand the word. ‘The 
liberty of the moderns’, he argues, consists in five rights that persons hold 
concerning (i) the rule of law; freedoms of (ii) speech, (iii) movement, and (iv) 
association; and (v) the “right to have/exercise some influence on the 
administration of the government”, later asserting that “the ancients had no 
notion of individual rights.”6 Such an outlook of course continues to be popular, 
but recent scholarship has questioned this latter claim. Atkins has carried out 
some interesting work in this respect: 
“Why is it the case that, according to the prevailing accounts of the 
origin of the concept [of rights], when found in the writings of Hobbes 
or Ockham one can translate the word ‘ius’ as ‘a right’, whereas in 
Cicero or the Roman jurists such a rendering is forbidden? The key is 
the association of ius and potestas, of right and power, in the thought 
of the supposed innovators … To have a power in this sense is to have 
the capacity to take some action or enjoy some good, which in turn 
entails the possession of a legitimate claim to this good or action … 
Did the Romans possess the concept of rights outlined above? Despite 
the frequent assertions to the contrary, they did. In fact, there is an 
abundance of evidence to suggest that the concept of rights was an 
integral part of Roman law and politics.”7 
We have already seen that every aspect of potestas was part of Rome’s legal 
discourse, and a good translation of the term is ‘the right [ius] to give orders’ 
(p.171); what makes it ius for any given public officeholder is the consensus of 
citizens. Moving from rights as powers to rights as claims, Atkins touches here 
upon the issue of legitimacy, which can be understood broadly as the conditions 
a government meets in possessing the ius to govern. Schofield argues that 
Scipio’s definition of res publica as res populi operates as “a criterion of 
legitimacy” of forms of government and that this is “a distinctively Roman and 
Ciceronian input into the theory of [De Re Publica]”, that is, distinctively Roman 
and Ciceronian if one is reading the text only as a source for the lost theories of 
his ancient (Greek) predecessors in political philosophy (not to mention for the 
 
6 Bennett, 2017; Libertyfund. The assertion stands in some tension with another Constant makes 
later in the paper: “For ancient liberty, the danger was that men … might under-value individual 
rights and benefits” (Bennett, 2017); “The danger of ancient liberty was that men … might attach 
too little value to individual rights and enjoyments.” (Libertyfund) 
7 Atkins, Cicero on Politics. Ch.4; Atkins, Roman Political Thought. Ch.2; see also Straumann, 
Crisis and Constitutionalism. For an argument that traces human rights back to figures such as 
Cicero and Seneca, see Richard A. Bauman, 1999. Human Rights in Ancient Rome. London: 
Routledge. 
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extant theories of his ancient and modern beneficiaries).8 For Schofield, the very 
notion of legitimacy presupposes “the ideas of (1) popular sovereignty and (2) 
government as something not necessarily undertaken by the people themselves. 
Otherwise, there is no body with rights relative to which the ruling power has to 
justify its legitimacy”.9 I agree with Schofield that it is with Scipio’s definition of 
res publica as res populi, the ‘property of a people’, and the associated 
understanding that a populus has rights over the management and use of its res, 
that we first find together in the historical record these two ideas. Cicero 
provides in the De Re Publica: 
“…a lucid and original analysis of what makes government legitimate, 
and as simple and persuasive an explanation as one could hope to find 
of why an elected aristocracy of men of energy and judgment is the 
best way for a sovereign people to manage its affairs.”10 
Supported by the analyses of scholars such as Schofield and Atkins, it seems very 
clear to me that Cicero’s treatises are of continuing relevance to researchers in 
IPT who are engaging in “the liberal discourse of rights” (p.47) and discourses of 
legitimacy more generally, though I have also argued in this project that it is a 
fundamental feature of the civic republican tradition that the power of a people 
(which is also to say of the assemblage of individuals who comprise it) is not 
unlimited, it is not without constraints on the political liberty of citizens—
potestas in populo auctoritas in senatu sit—which ensure the ongoingness of its 
worldly condition. As Arendt recognised, this is an important issue—forms of 
government—to which modern liberals do not always pay sufficient attention. 
Constant speaks often in his paper as though authority in antiquity was always 
and everywhere held by an entire populace, and understood as such (“the 
authority of the group/community”; “the authority of the collective”; “the 
 
8 Malcolm Schofield, 1995. ‘Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica’. Powell (ed.), Cicero the 
Philosopher. p.64. Emphases in original. 
9 Malcolm Schofield, 1999. Saving the City: Philosopher-kings and Other Classical Paradigms. 
London: Routledge. p.193n5. 
10 Schofield, Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica. p.82. This of course speaks to Cicero’s political 
theory of the mixed constitution (and as is well known, sovereignty is a term more fully 
conceptualised at later points in time by others). Historically speaking, the senatorial elite in the 
Roman republic was not a hereditary aristocracy “in the sense of a closed and legally defined 
group privileged by right of birth and descent”, Cicero being an obvious case in point. Even as 
there were some noble families in its ‘inner circle’, the senatorial elite at Rome was, as 
Holkeskamp says, an “aristocracy of office”: roughly speaking, statespersons competing for 
honours or prizes (often offices) conferred upon them by the people or their peers for virtuous 
actions taken in protecting res publica. Karl J. Holkeskamp, 2010. Reconstructing the Roman 
Republic. p.76. 
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authority of the social body”; “…the theory/assumption that society had 
complete authority over its members…”), but as I have shown in this project, the 
Roman understanding of auctoritas (authority, standing, influence, reputation) is 
as an inalienable quality of a person, the exercising of which takes the form of 
advice or guidance and certainly does not involve, as Constant argues, 
individuals’ “complete subjection”.11 Auctoritas restricts or limits the political 
liberty (or as I have been calling it in this project, the public freedom) of 
citizens, if necessary, without ever removing or abolishing it. It is a quality 
which has a certain closeness to the virtue of prudentia (p.280n177), both 
involving a necessary connection in the present to the past with a care for the 
future, as well as consilium, ‘the necessary intelligence needed to guide a 
commonwealth’ (p.179n148), and I argued that it should be understood as a 
personal quality howsoever it is institutionalised in any polity. In a polity 
auctoritas slows or curbs, or better, checks, potestas, but equally, as Schofield 
points out, it is clear from the arguments in the De Re Publica that a people 
“should have some such power [potestas], and that consequently a degree of 
political liberty is essential to a true res publica”, it is a key aspect of its 
legitimacy.12  
 
These are points of some import in relation to Constant’s paper. After 
emphasising rights in his account of the liberty of the moderns, he makes no 
mention of them at all in his initial description of the ancient understanding of 
liberty, which he says “consisted in carrying out collectively but directly many 
parts of the overall functions of government” (compare this with the fifth right 
of the moderns he lists), although later in the paper he does describe such 
benefits or enjoyments (jouissances), both in antiquity and modernity, in terms 
of “political rights”.13 Direct government and representative government is one 
of the dichotomies which seem to fall into place behind Constant’s ‘the liberty 
of the ancients’ and ‘the liberty of the moderns’. He argues that representative 
government was “totally unknown to the free nations of antiquity” and those 
 
11 Bennett, 2017; Libertyfund. 
12 Schofield, Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica. p.76. Emphasis added. 
13 Bennett, 2017. Libertyfund translates the passage as “…exercising collectively, but directly, 
several parts of the complete sovereignty.” Atkins’ analysis of rights language in both ancient 
and early modern texts provides us with some clarity as to why Constant chooses often in his 
paper to speak not of the rights but of the jouissances of both the ancients and the moderns. 
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modern writers detecting traces of it amongst specific ancient peoples such as 
the Spartans or the Gauls are “wrong/mistaken.”14 But while he does go on to 
say that the role of the tribunes of the people in the Roman republic was 
representative “up to a point”, he claims that in general “ancient peoples 
couldn’t feel the need” for representative government, nor “appreciate its 
advantages.”15 With the historical inaccuracies of Constant’s generalisations 
about diverse and actual ancient peoples (unified as ‘the ancients’) we are not 
concerned here.16 Rather, the task at hand is to show through such 
generalisations the continuing relevance of Cicero’s treatises to IPT and to 
modern real-world politics. Regarding representative government, Constant 
argues that: 
 
“[It] is a modern discovery, and you will see that the condition of the 
human race in antiquity made it impossible then for such an 
institution to be introduced or established … [The representative 
system] is nothing but an organization by means of which a nation 
charges a few individuals to do what it can’t or doesn’t want to do 
itself. Poor men look after their own affairs; rich ones hire stewards. 
That is the story of ancient nations and modern nations. The 
representative system is a mandate/proxy given to a certain number 
of men by the mass of the people who want/wish their interests to be 
defended but don’t have the time to defend them constantly 
themselves. But, unless they are idiots, rich men who employ 
stewards keep a close and strict watch on whether they are doing 
their duty, making sure that they aren’t/lest they should prove 
negligent, corruptible, or incapable; and if they are prudent the 
landowners will judge how well their mandate/proxy is being carried 
out by staying well-informed about the affairs the stewards have been 
entrusted to carry out. In the same way, the people who resort to the 
representative system so as to enjoy the liberty that suits them, 
should/must exercise an active and constant surveillance over their 
representatives, and reserve for themselves the right—at times that 
aren’t too far apart—to discard them if they betray their trust, and to 
 
14 Bennett, 2017; Libertyfund. 
15 Bennett, 2017; Libertyfund. 
16 For more detailed (and at times contending) historical accounts of government in the Roman 
republic, see for example: Fergus Millar, 1984. ‘The Political Character of the Classical Roman 
Republic, 200–151 BC’. Journal of Roman Studies 74. pp.1–19; Fergus Millar, 1986. ‘Politics, 
persuasion and the people before the Social War (150–90 BC)’. Journal of Roman Studies 76. 
pp.1–11; Robert Morstein-Marx, 2004. Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman 
Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Karl J. Holkeskamp, 2010. Reconstructing 
the Roman Republic: An Ancient Political Culture and Modern Research. Princeton University 
Press; Valentina Arena, 2013. Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; van der Blom, Gray, and Steel (eds.), Institutions and 
Ideology in Republican Rome; Steel, The End of the Roman Republic: Conquest and Crisis. 
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revoke any powers they have abused/revoke the powers they might 
have abused.”17 
With “the enormous enrichment of the private sphere through modern 
individualism” (p.189), it is perhaps understandable why Constant chooses to 
imply in this passage and elsewhere in the paper that ‘the ancients’ were poor 
and simple, whereas ‘the moderns’ are complex and rich. Perhaps less 
understandable is the assumption he seems to make here that any living person 
in their capacity as an agent can claim to be incorruptible (p.161). But putting 
these matters aside, it seems to me that Constant’s assertion that 
representative government is a ‘modern discovery’ is questionable. As Quentin 
Skinner has shown, the notion of representation in politics is present not only in 
Hobbes, but can be traced through the Renaissance, the Middle Ages and early 
Christianity, back to Cicero.18 And key here is his use of the term persona. In 
addition to the four-personae theory in the De Officiis, Cicero elsewhere 
observes that in certain situations an individual may take on the part—‘play the 
role’ or ‘bear the person’—of another, speaking and acting in their name.19 And 
we saw that it is the officium of a magistrate to bear and carry through (gerere) 
the role of the civitas itself.20 All of which is to say that one can represent 
another person or entity, and that if Constant is correct that representative 
government is a ‘modern discovery’, then perhaps so is McIlwain (even if Wood’s 
articulation is better) about being in the presence of the beginnings of modern 
political thought in Cicero’s writings. 
In his account of representative government, consider the verbs Constant uses in 
relating “the nation” or “mass of people” on the one hand to “a few individuals” 
or “certain number of men” on the other: the former charges or entrusts the 
latter with government as a duty or responsibility that it cannot or does not 
want to do (or meet or discharge or carry out) itself; “the representative 
system” is a mandate which the nation or people gives (i.e. freely transfers) to a 
 
17 Bennett, 2017; Libertyfund. Emphases in original. 
18 Skinner, From Humanism to Hobbes. Ch.2. 
19 Leg. 2.48; De Or. 2.102. 
20 Schofield and Wood both translate the latter as the magistrate representing the civitas. Schofield, 
Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica. p.81; Wood, Cicero’s Social and Political Thought. p.135. 
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certain number of men in wanting their interests to be defended.21 Again, we 
can trace (nearly all of) this back to Cicero. Schofield comments on a relevant 
passage from the De Re Publica: 
“…the populus may decide either to assume itself the direct 
management of its own affairs or to choose (deligere) others whom it 
will expect to manage them on its behalf and in its interest. If it takes 
the second option, it does not thereby throw away its rights and its 
freedom, since it is not transferring powers (although in the surviving 
portions of the text Cicero nowhere makes this point) but only 
entrusting itself to others.”22 
We have already seen the fundamental importance of mutual trust, fides, in 
Cicero’s treatises; it is a characteristic feature of Roman moral and political 
thought in general.23 As E.M. Atkins says, it is the cement of the res publica, that 
which binds it together; “what matters is … the strength of the relationships 
that enable individuals to cooperate in a common life” (p.233), whether those 
individuals are to be found in the people or the elite. As Scipio puts it (playing 
the role of a defender of aristocracy as an unmixed form of government), “if a 
free people chooses [deliget] the men to whom to entrust itself (and it will 
choose the best people if it wants to be safe), then surely the safety of the 
citizens is found in the consilia of the best men [optimates].”24 Government 
Cicero says is like a guardianship and must be conducted in the interests not of 
those to whom management has been entrusted (commissa), but of those who 
have entrusted the management, and it is a special duty of magistrates to be 
“mindful of the things that have been entrusted to his good faith” (p.271). The 
legal connotations of fides, as Schofield argues, are absent in Cicero’s Greek 
predecessors in political philosophy.25 But more to the point, they represent a 
very important link in the tradition that leads through Constant’s paper to the 
present and make Cicero’s treatises on politics of continuing relevance to 
researchers in IPT who are concerned with what Brown has called “the 
 
21 Bennett, 2017. 
22 Schofield, Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica. p.79, emphases in original; Rep. 1.42. 
23 Schofield, Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica. p.81. 
24 Rep. 1.51.  
25 Schofield, Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica. p.81; cf. Straumann, Crisis and Constitutionalism. 
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juridification of world politics”, at whatever level of analysis, and on whichever 
side of the debates.26 
The final dichotomy of Constant’s we shall consider concerns political 
participation. On his account, the ancients were engaged in “constant active 
participation in collective power”, whereas the moderns enjoy it only 
“momentarily”.27 ‘The (poor and simple) ancients’ would have “languished under 
the weight of miserable/painful inaction if it hadn’t been for the constant 
exercise of political rights...”; exercise which would only bring about “trouble 
and fatigue” in the rich and complex moderns, not miserable inaction, their 
being “occupied” at all other moments with speculations, enterprises and other 
jouissances from which they desire to be “side-tracked/distracted” by politics 
“as seldom/little as possible”.28 Again, the actual levels of political 
participation—and, for that matter, the other, non-political, jouissances—of 
citizens in ancient polities is a complex and controversial question of history 
which is unduly covered up if one sticks to Constant’s dichotomous 
arrangements.29 And again, our concern is not with these activities in history but 
with how Cicero’s treatises on politics hold up against Constant’s claims. In the 
final chapter of this project, we considered Scipio’s definition of res publica as 
res populi and I construed it as a thing with which a given assemblage of 
individuals, all of whom comprise a people, are occupied; it takes up at least 
some of their time. How much time of course we are not told in the De Re 
Publica and I regard this as one of the great strengths of the treatise which 
makes it of enduring relevance; it is up to those associating, including those 
doing so within systems of representative government, to adjust the time they 
spend on political participation to “the liberty that suits” them.30 
 
In his paper, it seems that Constant sometimes understands “the liberty that 
suits the moderns” as being one which ‘sacralises’ individual independence; it is 
 
26 Chris Brown, 2019. Understanding International Relations. Fifth Edition. London: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
27 Bennett, 2017; Libertyfund. 
28 Bennett, 2017; Libertyfund. This stands in some tension with Constant’s argument that the 
moderns “must exercise an active and constant surveillance over their representatives.” 
29 For the Roman republic, see references in note 16. 
30 Bennett, 2017; Libertyfund. 
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something which he says ‘the ancients’ “sacrificed … in order to keep their 
political rights.”31 The moderns are “far more attached” to individual 
independence than the ancients, it is their “first need”, which entails that “they 
should never be asked to make sacrifices in order to establish political liberty”.32 
I believe the language of sacrifice, although certainly powerful, is unhelpfully 
distracting in this context. And quite apart from its religious connotations, it 
unduly buttresses Constant’s dichotomous approach to liberty. To sacrifice 
something is to give up (relinquish, abandon) something valued for the sake of 
other considerations, whereas it is far from clear that individual independence 
or individual liberty can be so finally divorced from political rights or political 
liberty that ‘sacrifice’ could be an appropriate term in describing it. These 
qualities are mutually and intimately involved, as Constant himself makes clear 
enough elsewhere in his paper. I hope to have shown the reader in the third 
chapter of this project, in discussing the virtue of decorum, that one of the 
reasons why Cicero is of continuing relevance to IPT is precisely that he accounts 
for this mutual involvement in the four-personae theory. What Constant calls 
here individual independence, Gill referred to as personal individuality or 
personality, a quality the development of which Cicero places real value upon in 
the De Officiis—it is not ‘sacrificed’ or ‘given up’—at the same time as holding 
that there is no purely private virtue; infinitely diverse individuals are members 
of societates and all virtue has a social orientation.  
 
Constant also argues that “none of the numerous and over-praised institutions 
which hindered individual liberty in the ancient republics is admissible in modern 
times.”33 The two institutions he discusses in the paper which he regards as over-
praised in his time are “Athenian ostracism” and “Roman censorship”, the latter 
 
31 Bennett, 2017. Libertyfund translates: “…sacrificed … to their political rights...”. Cf. Mill’s view 
that “In the ancient world … there might be, and often was, great individual or local 
independence…”. R.B. McCallum (ed.), 1948. On Liberty and Considerations on Representative 
Government, by J.S. Mill. Oxford: Blackwell. p.113. Constant’s exception to the rule of the 
ancients sacrificing their individual independence to their political rights is the ancient 
Athenians, of whom, however, “Finally, we shall be struck by their excessive love of individual 
independence.” Bennett, 2017; Libertyfund. Emphasis added. 
32 Bennett, 2017. Libertyfund translates: “…one must never require from them any sacrifices to 
establish political liberty”. 
33 Bennett, 2017. 
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of which is more relevant to the task at hand.34 Even whilst many of the 
arguments he was opposing at the time would have been reactionary and so his 
own argument would have been shaped accordingly, I think it is still important 
for us to note that in this argument he appears to squeeze ‘the (poor and 
simple) ancients’ and ‘the (rich and complex) moderns’ into the history of the 
Roman republic. He describes two Roman republics: (i) “a republic that had very 
simple moeurs because that’s all they could afford”, in which the censors had 
greater influence than they had later on (yet were themselves subjected to “a 
kind of moral surveillance exercised over them”, although Constant does not say 
by whom); and (ii) a republic increased in “size, the complexity of social 
relations, and the refinements of civilization”, including prosperity, in which the 
office itself had degenerated. Constant concludes from his account that 
“censorship hadn’t created the good moeurs; rather, the simplicity of the 
moeurs gave censorship its power and effectiveness.”35 Without getting into 
disputes about the history and the mores of the Roman republic—again, complex 
and controversial matters; the reader may wish to investigate them at their own 
leisure—I hope to have shown in the final chapter of this project through 
Cicero’s treatises on politics that instituta and mores are things established 
across generations. Regarding the office of censorship, in Zetzel’s words, it was 
“a public mechanism for the reinforcement of moral standards”, not their 
creation, and moreover, it was a mechanism which was inactive to the extent 
that citizens (and it is worth reminding the reader that it was mainly adult male 
citizens, especially those in the senatorial elite, who drew the “searching eye of 
the censors”) self-regulated through their verecundia.36  
 
Notwithstanding the shape of the arguments of his opponents which in turn 
shaped his own, it seems clear to me from Constant’s peroration in this paper 
that he is, in the final analysis, an advocate of political liberty, republican 
institutions, and the moral education of citizens:  
 
34 Bennett, 2017; Libertyfund. It is difficult to fault Constant’s reasoning as regards Athenian 
ostracism (roughly: it should happen in modern times only through the courts), except when he 
concludes that “the public good … resides only in respect for the laws, in the observance of 
forms, and in the maintenance of safeguards.” It is unclear to me what is meant by observance 
of ‘forms’, if not mores which, as I argued in the final chapter of this project, can but need not be 
idealised. 
35 Bennett, 2017. Libertyfund: “…kept by poverty to an extremely simple moral code…”.  
36 Bennett, 2017; Zetzel, Citizen and Commonwealth. p.90. Emphasis added. 
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“…far from renouncing either of the two sorts of freedom I have 
described, it is necessary (I repeat) for us to learn to combine the 
two. As the famous author of History of the Republics in the Middle 
Ages [Sismondi] says, institutions must accomplish the destiny of the 
human race; they can best achieve their aim if they raise the largest 
possible number of citizens to the highest moral position. The work of 
the legislator is not complete when he has simply brought peace to 
the people. Even when the populace is satisfied, there is much left to 
do. Institutions must carry out the moral education of citizens. By 
respecting their individual rights, securing their independence, 
refraining from troubling their work, institutions must nevertheless 
dedicate themselves to influencing public affairs, calling on the 
people to contribute to the exercise of power through their decisions 
and their votes, guaranteeing their right of control and supervision 
through the expression of their opinions, and by shaping them up 
through the exercise of these high functions, give them both the 
desire and the power to perform them.”37 
Constant recognises that it is a key aspect of the legitimacy of the res publica 
that citizens have a degree of political liberty, as it is political liberty which 
guarantees individual liberty—what I have been calling in this project ‘public 
freedom’ and ‘inner freedom’, respectively—and he says the moderns may be 
led (by their private jouissances?) to neglect these guarantees, “sometimes too 
much, and always wrongly.”38 He also understands that institutions, including 
those involved in the moral education of citizens, are fundamentally important 
in ensuring the successful performance of officia. As such, it seems to me that 
Constant himself, in no small part responsible for constructing the ‘quarrel’ 
between ‘the ancients’ and ‘the moderns’, provides strong evidence for the 
continuing relevance of Cicero’s treatises on politics to IPT and to modern real-
world politics. 
 
37 Bennett, 2017. Libertyfund: “…far from renouncing either of the two sorts of freedom which I 
have described to you, it is necessary, as I have shown, to learn to combine the two together. 
Institutions, says the famous author of the history of the republics in the Middle Ages, must 
accomplish the destiny of the human race; they can best achieve their aim if they elevate the 
largest possible number of citizens to the highest moral position. The work of the legislator is 
not complete when he has simply brought peace to the people. Even when the people are 
satisfied, there is much left to do. Institutions must achieve the moral education of the citizens. 
By respecting their individual rights, securing their independence, refraining from troubling their 
work, they must nevertheless consecrate their influence over public affairs, call them to 
contribute by their votes to the exercise of power, grant them a right of control and supervision 
by expressing their opinions; and, by forming them through practice for these elevated 
functions, give them both the desire and the right to discharge these.” 
38 Bennett, 2017.  
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What can Cicero’s theoretical writings on politics contribute to arguments in 
IPT related to exercising judgments in the world? 
The Conduct of Persons 
In conceiving of politics as (partly) personal in this project, I have provided an 
account of Cicero’s framework of civic virtues which I hope encourages in the 
studies and research of International Political theorists a consideration of the 
conduct of persons in political societies, and I argue that this framework is well-
suited to ‘communitarians’ and ‘cosmopolitans’, ‘republicans’ and ‘liberals’, 
alike, who hold such a conception of politics. Cicero has always been an 
important source for each of these strands of thought, whether they are 
construed as -isms or traditions; he provides an incredibly rich account of 
political life which is of great benefit to both ‘sides’ of the scholarly debates, at 
the same time as encouraging readers to keep thinking for themselves and keep 
exercising judgments in the world. 
I began the first chapter with a review of some of the work of cosmopolitan 
theorist Richard Beardsworth, highlighting his account of critical philosophy as 
ethical—it is concerned in one way or another to promote better human 
relations. In his critique of Arendt (through Owens) and defence of Habermas, 
Beardsworth evinces a strong engagement with “the liberal discourse of rights”, 
but in holding critical philosophy as “the force of thought pitched against other 
more determined forces”, his ethical approach it seems to me remains 
somewhat unclear (there being no sustained engagement with the civic virtues 
elsewhere in his work) (pp.46–47). Another cosmopolitan theorist, Seyla 
Benhabib, stands in a Kantian morally constructivist tradition in which the 
cosmopolitan norms and principles she puts forward “create a universe of 
meaning, values and social relations that had not existed before”, evincing in 
her approach a concern for ontological or ‘meta-normative’ foundations. 
Drawing upon Derrida’s work, Benhabib also provides a theory of democratic 
iterations which addresses how one might mediate between cosmopolitan norms 
and the will of democratic peoples or majorities through iterating and/or re-
iterating that democracy’s existing norms, but she acknowledges that such 
‘jurisgenerative processes’ may be ‘jurispathic’ and, following both Habermas 
and Derrida, seems to have an aversion to any ethical approach which considers 
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the content of the capacities—the virtues—of those iterating which would 
prevent jurispathic processes from occurring. 
Richard Devetak’s work suggests a trend in IPT towards historical rather than 
philosophical critique, holding a more contextualist outlook which is critical of 
universalist impositions made by critical philosophers. He recovers this mode of 
critique through some revisionist historiographies of the Enlightenment which 
emphasise a more civil and jurisprudential than ‘metaphysical’ movement in the 
eighteenth century, traceable to the development of the studia humanitatis and 
ars historica during the Renaissance which evinced “a practical engagement with 
public affairs guided by the ethical imperative of civility” (p.65). Devetak notes 
Cicero as the key figure in this revival, but as his focus is upon challenging the 
prevailing accounts of ‘theory’ and what counts as ‘critical’ in IPT, a close 
engagement with Cicero’s treatises in this regard remains missing in the field 
and I hope this project goes some way towards addressing the lacuna. 
Although still marginalised in favour of rules-based approaches, another trend in 
IPT identified in the first chapter is a move towards the person-centred 
approach often referred to as virtue ethics. Noting Kant’s concern with the 
virtues and Cicero’s influence upon his writings, I moved on to consider various 
accounts in IPT and neighbouring fields which are rooted in the philosophy of 
Aristotle who, whilst remaining a fundamental source for this ethical approach, 
did not have the benefit of reading the Hellenistic philosophers such as 
Antiochus or the Stoics, nor the practical experience of statesmanship, both of 
which Cicero had, and I argue that this makes the latter’s treatises an excellent, 
distinctive and very useful contribution to ethics and politics both practical and 
theoretical, consideration of which International Political theorists holding a 
conception of politics as (partly) personal will derive huge benefit. 
Pace Aristotle, and in line with the ‘Roman turn’ in political theory identified by 
Kapust and Remer (p.33), it is a Roman account of the virtues which I have set 
out in this project, providing inter alia a response to Norval’s question of 
Habermas’s account of civil society: “what are the virtues associated with these 
functions [of citizens]?” (p.74). Springing from Cicero’s account is a 
fundamentally sociable outlook. Human beings are driven by the power of reason 
to seek out fellow humans and form natural communities. This gives rise to 
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officia, actions appropriate to being naturally sociable, duties to others, and 
Cicero provides in the De Officiis excellent advice on these duties to others 
which nurture and cultivate this sociability. The supreme and the most 
widespread virtue in this respect is justice, to which he fixes fides—keeping faith 
with fellows—as a fundamentum (the legal connotations of which we have seen 
is a distinctively Roman contribution) and connects beneficentia as well as 
liberalitas, acts of kindness which promote fellowship, and the latter of which 
we saw Dallmayr in the first chapter connecting to the political liberal’s 
principle of justice: tolerance (p.93). According to Cicero, the first office of 
‘justice simply’ is that no person should harm another unless provoked by 
injustice, and the second that one should treat common goods as common and 
private ones as one’s own. Injustice is that which damages societas and works 
against our sociability; the positive type is inflicting injury without provocation 
and the negative type is failing to look out for those whom one ought to be 
protecting. Beneficia should accord with the two offices of justice, harming no 
one and treating common goods as common and private ones as one’s own. 
Diverse individuals with different talents and capacities mutually exchanging 
officia and contributing to communal utility—that which benefits all together— 
bind fast human society and connection. Cicero’s account of our natural 
sociability and the virtue of justice, I argue, answers Dallmayr’s concern about 
laissez-faire forms of liberalism, in which he acknowledged the wish of early 
liberals rebelling against absolutism and mercantilism to open a space for free 
initiative, “but surely not a space outside civil and legal bonds” (p.92).  
Justice is the supreme social virtue for Cicero, but it is wisdom, sapientia, which 
delivers the honestas in the world, either through words and learning, or 
institutions and laws, or both. Entirely free of fortuna, it is the virtue of 
sapientia involved in the perception of truth and which provides a correct 
understanding of the world, allowing prudentia to make the right practical 
choices about what to pursue and what to avoid, at the same time as providing 
knowledge of the sociability and fellowship of gods and human beings with each 
other such that the officia deriving from justice are seen also to be of the 
greatest importance (for the Stoics, God is synonymous with reason and the 
universe). Kelsay in the first chapter touched upon how prudence is connected 
to the other virtues, and it is when discussing wisdom and prudence in the De 
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Officiis that Cicero says they are all bound together and inter-woven. Indeed, 
the whole text provides a very rich account of this binding and inter-weaving 
which I commend highly to international political theorists. A broader sense than 
certain Greek philosophical accounts of sophia is to be found in the De Re 
Publica and elsewhere in Cicero’s writings of sapientia, such that he attributes it 
to both philosophers and non-philosophers. His account of this virtue, and of 
course prudentia as well, built into the very language with which he speaks, is 
always oriented to the world, bringing honestas into it and leery of those 
philosophers whose excessive devotion to contemplation leads to the negative 
type of injustice. Morgenthau called prudence “the supreme virtue in politics” 
(p.85) and Cicero’s writings on it, including those linking it to justice in the De 
Officiis, are above all those of a statesman, and as such, are an invaluable 
resource for international political theorists. And I hope also to have shown in 
the final chapter that his writings on sapientia are worth their close 
consideration as well.  
The third virtue, magnitudo animi, signifies greatness of spirit in a person; one 
who disdains external things and holds as true nothing except that which is 
honestas should be pursued. Such a person in taking charge of public affairs rises 
above partisan politics to take care of the whole res publica, is brave (fortis) in 
the face of adversity, undertakes with vigour perilous tasks which present 
themselves in public life and performs great deeds in the face of them, yielding 
neither to fortuna, any agitations of the spirit, nor indeed to any other human 
being. This latter suggests a certain risk inhering in magnitudo animi if it is 
disconnected from the other virtues; it could result in its holder slipping into a 
dangerous desire for pre-eminence and glory which is potentially ruinous of a 
civitas, so Cicero works in the De Officiis to connect it closely to virtues and 
qualities such as sapientia, prudentia and consilium, and emphasises the 
libertas to which end persons of magnitudo animi ought to be devoted. Kelsay 
does touch upon fortitude in relation to prudence, but I have seen no sustained 
discussion of the virtue of magnitudo animi in IPT more generally. It is a quality 
seen in citizens, soldiers, generals, and statespersons, and again, I argue that 
Cicero provides an excellent account of it in the De Officiis and elsewhere which 
deserves the attention of international political theorists. 
421 
A person of magnitudo animi does not yield to agitations of the spirit, and the 
virtue of decorum brings about their calming, with improper and unsociable 
impulses yielding to the power of reason which moderates them. Appearing 
under this virtue is also a socially sensitive kind of shame/respect or modesty, 
verecundia; a sense which looks both to the self and to the other, able to 
imagine how the other sees the self, managing impressions accordingly and 
thereby strengthening social cohesion. Decorum is associated with virtue in 
general (‘what is decorum is honestum, and what is honestum is decorum’), is 
one of the four parts of honestas itself, and it includes the qualities of 
moderation, temperance, modesty, due measure in all things, and (one of its 
aesthetic aspects) giving the appearance of a free person; a style of freedom 
which sustains freedom’s worldly condition, the building up of societas. 
Included in Cicero’s account of decorum is the four-personae theory, which 
identifies four roles that we unavoidably take on as ethical, social, and political 
beings. It has a simultaneous concern for the ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ aspects 
of being human, with the first persona being common to us all as sharers in 
reason and speech, and from which derives everything honestum and decorum 
and a way of figuring out our officia. We are also ‘dressed’ by nature with a 
second persona which is unique to us as individuals and the development and 
flourishing of which, whilst holding on to what is honestum and not what is 
vicious, Cicero positively encourages that we might more easily maintain 
decorum. The third persona is taken on by what fortuna, what changing 
circumstances bring, the virtuous person using such circumstances in which they 
find themselves in deciding how to act appropriately, and the fourth persona is 
that which is of our own design, the one arising from our own volition, our 
career, our way of life. 
Arendt spoke of this virtue simply as moderation, and in pairing it with insight 
(prudence), she said together they were “the two highest virtues of the 
statesman” (p.166). I linked the discussion of decorum in the third chapter back 
to Dallmayr’s comments about “the motivating force of human inclination”—it is 
the virtue which disciplines or controls the spirit (animus)—and again Kelsay 
referred to it as the virtue of temperance in his discussion of prudence. But with 
the honourable exception here and there in the field, the virtue of decorum I 
find is another one not discussed in IPT, and as above, I suggest here to the 
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reader that a change would be good.39 As Daniel Deudney says in concluding the 
edited collection of essays, Institutional Cosmopolitanism, “the early 
cosmopolitan Stoic emphasis on self-discipline … may be ripe for revival and 
relevance”, and what better place to start than with Cicero?40 
Res Publica 
As with the civic virtues, I have provided in this project an account of Cicero’s 
framework concerning res publica which is very well-suited to international 
political theorists holding a conception of politics which is (partly) personal, 
whatever side of current scholarly debates they are standing. We began the final 
chapter still discussing the practical life of the citizen, but in a less personal and 
more institutional context: res publica. In the Prefaces to De Re Publica, Cicero 
provides a very strong defence of living the practical life of the citizen against 
philosophers such as the Epicureans who argued that retreating from the world 
was the key to happiness. Without those who are leading res publicae through 
their consilium and auctoritas, establishing and strengthening ius and virtue 
through education, mores and laws, the philosophers would have no corners at 
all, the Epicureans no garden, in which to talk through and through the things 
that interested them (including the things those persons are achieving in deeds 
rather than words). Benjamin Constant makes a similar defence of the practical 
life of the citizen in saying that when ‘the moderns’ neglect the guarantees of 
their individual liberty, it is always wrongly that they do so. As I sought at the 
start of these conclusions to question Constant’s dichotomous approach to 
liberty, so I have sought in this project through a consideration of Cicero’s 
writings to question the dichotomous arrangement that pitches ‘civic 
republicans’ against ‘liberals’.  
In the first chapter, we saw Brown arguing that notions of civil society and 
republican virtue are opposed to one another in principle, and we also saw 
Norval’s work in seeking the development of civic virtues in civil society. In the 
 
39 Some discussion of the virtue can be found in Andrew Linklater, 2016. Violence, Civilization, and 
the Western States-System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
40 Daniel Deudney, 2018. ‘All Together Now: Geography, the Three Cosmopolitanisms, and 
Planetary Earth’. Luis Cabrera (ed.), 2018. Institutional Cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. p.276. 
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third chapter, I quoted a passage from the De Officiis where Cicero distinguishes 
clearly between the officia of magistrates and the officia of private citizens and 
noted the similarities between the latter and some contemporary accounts of 
civil society. I maintain that Norval is indeed working along the right lines in 
seeking the development of civic virtues in civil society and that most modern 
liberals are not anarchists and have therefore not abandoned the idea of 
managed consensus. We also saw in the first chapter that both Dallmayr and 
Walzer support a managed consensus; they acknowledge the benefits of 
constitutional constraints on democratic decision-making.  
In the final chapter, we considered the De Re Publica in this regard. Res publica 
res populi says Scipio, and a populus is an assemblage of individuals of some size 
associated with one another through iuris consensus and utilitatis communio. It 
is something different to a polis, which has senses of both urbs and civitas. 
Civitas Scipio described as constitutio populi, the organisation of the people, 
and we reviewed different forms of government in this regard as he set them 
out, unmixed and mixed. Again, none of these forms of government is res 
publica, which is res populi. Whilst Scipio and his interlocutors (and Cicero) 
seem not best disposed towards a purely democratic form of government, it is 
still very much included in the framework, and so radical democrats (such as 
Norval) I argue still have much to gain from a consideration of the text. As noted 
above, included in the definition is the term sociatus, ‘associated’, meaning that 
res publica is plural by definition; it is a partnership in power. I have provided in 
this project an account of the Latin term societas with the intention of 
questioning the modern tendency, evident in scholars’ arguments across the first 
two chapters, to conceive of society as ‘massifying’. With a deeper 
understanding of the term itself—in its broadest sense, it is simply an agreement 
between persons to contribute their resources towards a shared endeavour—we 
can see that a conception of self-reliance (something that Norval through 
Habermas sought to preserve in the concept of aversion to society) is wholly 
compatible with it. 
Cicero’s writings on the civil and legal bonds of which Dallmayr spoke I sought to 
show in the final chapter through a discussion of laws and institutions. It is a 
fundamentally practical project that is underway in the De Legibus, and Ethics is 
very much in the foreground; the whole point of the law-code is to preserve and 
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protect res publica, to ensure the safety of citizens and further virtuous 
conduct. We also saw in the first chapter Dallmayr’s history of the ius gentium 
and how in modernity it has been “increasingly strapped into the dilemmas of 
Cartesian and post-Cartesian thought” such that it is often reduced almost 
completely to natural law (p.99). Whilst scholars such as Atkins and Straumann 
appear to be quite close to regarding the ius gentium and natural law as 
equivalent, I argued in the final chapter that the natural law arguments upon 
which Marcus relied in writing his law-code are not identical to ius gentium; the 
former is an ideal law, it is right reason, whereas the latter is what natural 
reason has established across time, ‘the usage of the world, of all mankind’, a 
mixture of custom and a kind of common consent of human beings which is 
distinct from philosophical argument, even as both may sometimes overlap. But 
whatever the case, I hope to have made it clear across the third and fourth 
chapters of this project that Cicero’s writings on the ius gentium are of 
continuing relevance to researchers in IPT focusing upon the just war 
tradition/just war theory and international law. 
Instituta in Cicero’s writings are customary standards of social behaviour which 
strengthen mores, customary practices, which ought to be accomplished, in 
addition to laws, on the authority of res publica. Preserving, maintaining, and 
renewing instituta is a key and complex responsibility of statespersons, those 
persons in a duly constituted res publica vested with the potestas to be making 
high-level decisions on behalf of peoples. Given the complexities of 
statespersons’ responsibilities, I sought in the final section of the final chapter 
of this project to set out an account of Cicero’s writings on rector rei publicae, 
an ‘ideal-type’. The rector is antithesis of the tyrant: good, wise, prudent, 
experienced in the interests of res publica, and always aiming at the security 
and happiness of the lives of the citizens. Through Cicero’s communications with 
Caesar, Pompey, the Roman people, and his son Marcus, I also sought to add 
some qualities to the rector and provide a deeper understanding of the sapientia 
already listed by Scipio. I argued that we might be justified in adding the 
qualities of temperance (temperantia), keeping faith with fellows (fides), 
inherent talent (ingenium), general human decency (humanitas), greatness of 
spirit (magnitudo animi), authority (auctoritas), and deliberative responsibility 
(consilium). Through the Pro Marcello, I sought to show that the sapientia of the 
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rector is entirely free of fortuna, of the kind that establishes and works through 
instituta (without thereby devaluing the kind that works through words and 
learning), which is also to say of the kind that works always at placing the res 
publica on a sound footing. And through the De Officiis, I sought to show that 
while ex tempore officia may lead the rector to take drastic actions in 
desperate situations, there is nevertheless a limit placed on these actions by 
moderatio and modestia (a limit the rector knows as rector). Acknowledging the 
foregrounding of Physics again in Scipio’s dream at the end of the De Re Publica, 
I sought nevertheless to draw out for the reader the Ethical lessons contained in 
it: that the rector is a sapiens in the sense that they are of-and-in-the-world, 
and a prudens in the sense that they discern by sense, looking to the past, 
present and future in acting. Cicero’s account of the rector rei publicae and his 
writings on the role of the statesperson more generally, I argue, is an invaluable 
resource for scholars in IPT who focus upon this aspect of world politics. For 
example, it provides a more rounded account of the statesperson than those 
realists mentioned in the first chapter who focus only upon phronesis/prudentia, 
placing it in a larger framework of (Roman) civic virtue. 
The main theme of this project, exercising judgments in the world, I hope has 
held for the reader as they have passed through the different idioms used in the 
chapters. Bringing the language of virtue to a field in which it is currently 
marginalised is no easy task, and in addition to the arguments addressed in the 
chapters themselves, I hope the reader has also seen a transition to this 
different way of speaking about politics, a way which I maintain is still deeply 
meaningful, both in the academy and beyond. As one of his famous admirers put 
it: 
“Reading [Cicero’s] works elevates the heart no less than the mind … 
He deserves the title of philosopher no less than Roman orator … He is 
the first, among the Romans, who rescued philosophy from the hands 
of scholars, and freed it from the confusion of a foreign language. He 
made it common to all men, like reason, and, in the commendations 
that he received from them, men of letters found themselves in 
accord with the people … One notices, in his moral works, an air of 
gaiety and a certain contentment of mind that mediocre philosophers 
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do not know. He does not give precepts; but he makes them felt. He 
does not exhort to virtue; but he attracts to it.”41 
While I think Cicero certainly deserves the largest possible readership in this 
regard, my aim in this project has been somewhat closer than that. In summary, 
I argue that his theoretical writings on politics contribute to arguments in IPT 
related to exercising judgments in the world a sound and solid framework for 
scholars making these arguments holding a conception of politics as (partly) 
personal, a contribution which could even perhaps be articulated in a single 
word: mores. In venturing to respond to a question the editors of the Oxford 
Handbook asked of its contributors: 
“…how does IPT connect with real-world politics? In particular, how 
does it engage with real-world problems, and position itself in relation 
to the practices of real-world politics?”42 
I argue that international political theorists should connect, engage, and position 
themselves in relation to the practices of real-world politics through Cicero’s 
treatises, supported by the large body of secondary literature awaiting their 
attention and consideration. 
Epilogue  
In the first chapter, Brown (p.80) rightly warned against the ever-present danger 
of hubris, and I tempted fate by saying that this danger should not and anyway 
cannot prevent praxis altogether. An investigation into Cicero’s careful handling 
of tragedy (both Greek and Roman) would have been a different project 
altogether and beyond my own capabilities, but I think Zetzel is certainly right 
that “it may not be a coincidence that both Crassus in the De Oratore and Scipio 
in De Re Publica die before achieving their goals”.43 
We have good reason to hesitate, I think, over Devetak’s suggestion (p.62) that 
“mastery” of the studia humanitatis is a possibility, and good reason to be 
doubtful of Arendt’s (p.154) that one may “achieve” humanitas. It seems to me 
 
41 Montesquieu, 2002 (c.1717). ‘Discourse on Cicero’. Translated by David Fott. Political Theory 
30(5). pp.733–737. 
42 Brown and Eckersley, Oxford Handbook of IPT. p.4. 
43 Zetzel, Citizen and Commonwealth. p.97. 
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that avoiding hubris, insofar as it is possible, means always learning (so Arendt 
was much closer to the mark in saying that humanitas is something one 
acquires), and to this end, we could do a lot worse than take to heart the words 
of Prof. T.P. Wiseman:  
“We need to read Cicero’s lesson; Caesar’s is all too familiar.”44
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